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ABSTRACT 
Financing The Health Care Safety Net: How Federalism And Medicaid’s Funding Formula Shape State 
Budgets And American Welfare 
 
E. Grant Porter  
 
This dissertation explores the political development of Medicaid financing, specifically its federal-
state cost sharing formula. This dissertation traverses a half-century of congressional policymaking and an 
original 30-year dataset of state-level Medicaid expenditure and enrollment figures to provide a positivist 
account of how the federal and state governments’ shared financial responsibilities for Medicaid affect 
overall Medicaid expenditures and state budget priorities. This dissertation also considers the direct and 
indirect financial burden that Medicaid’s costs impose on taxpayers—both in their capacity as Americans 
and as residents of individual states.  
This dissertation argues that the growth in Medicaid costs is attributed to the resiliency of a funding 
formula that subsidizes the states’ policies and redistributes liability for Medicaid expenditures between the 
states and federal governments. By subsidizing the costs of a state’s Medicaid program, a state’s Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) reduces the effective fiscal burden of its Medicaid policies, thereby 
incentivizing policymakers to expand Medicaid beyond what is warranted by the policy preference of the 
state’s residents. As a result, state budgets are likely to reflect an intentionally inefficient, yet politically 
rational, allocation of public resources. Compounded over decades, and exasperated by more recent 
adjustments that reduce the states’ direct fiscal responsibilities for their Medicaid policies, the fiscal 
imperative imposed by Medicaid’s financing institution has compelled states to maintain a rate of growth in 
Medicaid expenditures that now threatens to overwhelm the states’ ability to adequately fund its other 
public commitments.
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 
 
Medicaid—Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965—is the nation’s federal-state program of 
non-contributory, means-tested health insurance for the poor and near poor. Despite being burdened by the 
stigma of public assistance and pejoratively described as “welfare medicine,” Medicaid has quietly become an 
essential and resilient component of both the United States’ health care delivery systems and its social 
welfare state.  While many public health scholars and welfare advocates still lament its purported second-
class quality, Medicaid is unusually generous for an American welfare program, both in terms of the 
expansiveness of its coverage and benefits—in 2011, the states and federal government combined to spend 
$425 billion on Medicaid/CHIP to provide health insurance to over 65 million individuals, about 1 in 5 
Americans. On average, Medicaid spending consumes about a quarter of all state budgets and nearly half of 
all federal grants provided to the states; it is the nation’s most expensive domestic program financed from 
general revenues, with the average state now spending more public monies on Medicaid than they do on K-
12 education (National Association of State Budget Officers, 2013). Medicaid’s expansion over the past 
half-century has been remarkable. The Affordable Care Act of 2010 hastens Medicaid’s expansionary 
tendency and will no doubt increase the program’s salience: an additional 15-25 million Americans are 
anticipated to eventually be enrolled in the states’ Medicaid programs at an added cost to the states and 
federal governments of at least $100 billion once fully implemented.  
With respect to either Medicaid’s societal impact or its public costs, it is no exaggeration to 
characterize the program as the most consequential of all intergovernmental programs, if not of all domestic 
programs in general.  To better understand the magnitude of the nation’s Medicaid commitments this 
dissertation emphasizes Medicaid’s public cost by exploring the political development of its financing 
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mechanism. Specifically, I explore how fiscal federalism—the federal and state governments’ shared 
financial responsibilities for Medicaid—impacts overall Medicaid costs and the fiscal burden that the 
program imposes on the states and taxpayers (both in their capacity as Americans and as residents of 
individual states). Using over half century of qualitative observations and quantitative data, I provide an 
original positivist account of the political development of Medicaid cost sharing and describe how this 
financial institution impacts state and federal budgets.  
In this dissertation I argue that the unbridled growth in Medicaid costs can be attributed to the 
resiliency of a funding formula that subsidizes the states’ policies and redistributes liability for Medicaid 
expenditures between the states and federal governments. By subsidizing Medicaid costs, the federal 
government’s matching rate—as determined by the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”)—
reduces the fiscal burden of a state’s own Medicaid policies, thereby incentivizing policymakers to expand 
Medicaid beyond what is warranted by the policy preference of the state’s residents. As a result, state 
budgets are likely to reflect an inefficient allocation of public resources. And yet, paradoxically, supporting 
this inefficient prioritization of Medicaid is rational from the perspective of the states. Compounded over 
decades, the fiscal imperative of Medicaid financing has compelled states to maintain a rate of growth in 
Medicaid expenditures that now threatens to overwhelm the states’ ability to adequately fund its other 
social obligations and maintain reasonable tax rates. Given the still ever-increasing proportion of state 
budgets that are being committed to Medicaid and with the Affordable Care Act of 2010 significantly 
extending Medicaid’s model of fiscal federalism—and doing so at an unprecedentedly generous level—it is 
essential that the public becomes better informed about how Medicaid’s funding formula can perniciously 
influence the priorities of state policymakers and thereby public budgets. This dissertation explores how the 
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comparatively low fiscal burden of the states’ Medicaid programs—relative at least to the full cost of 
Medicaid—shapes the American welfare state and the social priorities of the states.1 
This dissertation is intended to help researchers, policymakers, and the public better appreciate the 
anomalous nature of the nation’s fiscal commitment to Medicaid. In general, efforts to provide an 
explanation for the states’ Medicaid programs, either in relationship to either the American welfare state or 
within the context of the broader health care sector, including Medicare, have proved elusive. In 
approaching Medicaid from the perspective of welfare policy, Jonathan Engel, for example, begins his 
history of Medicaid with the typical observation that American’s “ambivalence toward charity medical care 
mirrors its historically ambivalent commitment to poor relief generally.” Describing Medicaid as a “tepid” 
policy that is exemplary of the meagerness of the nation’s other means-tested programs, Engel uses the 
states’ programs to argue, “America has proven itself consistent, if not compassionate” (2006: xi). Yet, 
Engel’s comparison of Medicaid and AFDC/TANF seems strained. The much-maligned cash assistance 
program provides support to fewer than 4.5 million Americans a month at total cost of about $33 billion in 
2011. Comparatively, whether measured in terms of costs or enrollment, Medicaid is more than ten times 
the size of AFDC/TANF. Engel’s characterization emphasizes the significance of perspective and exhibits a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I refer to both the “costs” and “fiscal burden” of Medicaid in reference to the national and state-level financial 
commitments to the program. The distinction is intentional and necessary. “Cost” alone is too generic a term for 
describing the budgetary implications of fiscal federalism and the political economics of Medicaid. Without imposing 
a normative standard for what constitutes a “burdensome” level of spending, I employ the notion of “fiscal burden” to 
differentiate between the full cost of a Medicaid policy and its cost to the states. Fiscal burden is therefore 
synonymous with the cost of the state share. For example, if a proposed reform is expected to cost $100 million, but 
the state benefits from a FMAP rate of, say 65%, the actual fiscal burden that the state incurs is just $35 million. The 
$65 million subsidy must still be financed. 
Related, in Chapter 6, I will refine the definition of fiscal burden to consider “taxpayer burden” and the actual 
liability it imposes on American taxpayers. Similar to how fiscal burden is a measure of only that share of Medicaid 
expenditures that a state must directly finance from its own revenue sources, taxpayer burden proxies the actual cost 
of Medicaid from the perspective of American households at different income levels. 
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common bias of health care scholars toward a preference for the more ambitious goal of universal access to 
public health care—a legitimate goal, but one that, for most, was never the intent of Medicaid.  
In contrast to Engel’s critical assessment of the health care safety net, Lawrence Brown and Michael 
Sparer (2003) characterize the evolution of Medicaid over the decades as a Cinderella transformation. 
Rather than perceiving the states’ Medicaid programs as callously insufficient welfare solutions that are 
emblematic of the nation’s failure to guarantee health insurance to all Americans, Brown and Sparer 
characterize Medicaid as an atypically resilient and successful means-tested program for the nation’s most 
vulnerable citizens. In their thoughtful comparison of Medicaid and Medicare, Brown and Sparer argue that 
“the conventional wisdom about the political inferiority of poor people’s programs…misses much” and 
conclude that the Medicaid is  “not so poor a program after all” (2003: 34, 43). I approach Medicaid from 
this perspective: rather than perceiving Medicaid to be another tepid welfare program and comparing it to 
the nation’s other redistributive welfare programs, I recognize Medicaid as being uncharacteristically 
generous in the context of American welfare programs—providing tens of millions of Americans with 
access to noncontributory and comprehensive health care. 
The peculiarity and salience of Medicaid justifies its centrality to this dissertation.2 While 
understanding the cause and effect of differences between different social programs is necessary and can 
improve our understanding of both programs, this is not the objective of this particular project. Despite the 
existence of many rich histories on Medicaid policymaking that comparativists can leverage, the literature 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For example, given that the primary objective of this dissertation is to understand the impact of fiscal federalism 
on the growth of Medicaid budgets, framing it as comparative study of Medicaid and Medicare would be of limited 
value. Despite their similar genesis, as mechanisms for the public financing of health care services, Medicare and 
Medicaid exhibit more differences than similarities. Unlike the joint federal-state administration of Medicaid, 
Medicare is an exclusively federal program. And whereas Medicare is an entitlement program available to all 
Americans, or their spouses, who have paid sufficient payroll taxes, Medicaid is a non-contributory, means-tested 
welfare program. 
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on Medicaid is not saturated. The primary objective of this dissertation is to understand the affect of fiscal 
federalism on the size and growth of Medicaid budgets. To that end, this dissertation includes original 
archival research and an analysis of an original dataset, efforts that can benefit future comparative work on 
other means-tested programs, health care payment models, or public financing, among other topics. 
Caveat Emperor 
Throughout this dissertation I emphasize the high level of spending that the nation commits to Medicaid. I do 
not propose a normative standard for what constitutes an ideal amount of state spending for the program, but I am 
critical of the manner in which Medicaid budgets are set. Without diminishing the real needs of the poor for the 
essential health care services that Medicaid offers, I argue that the magnitude of public spending committed to the 
Medicaid program reflect an inefficient allocation of public resources and does not respect the public’s true policy 
preferences for the welfare state. Given the base assumption that Americans taxpayers prefer a modest welfare state I 
uncritically conclude that the nation’s spending on Medicaid is ipso facto sub-optimal. This anomalous outcome is an 
intentional result of Medicaid’s funding formula as the federal-state cost sharing sustaining compels state policymakers 
to pursue expansionary reforms. Paradoxically, as I will demonstrate with using the game theoretic model known as 
the prisoner’s dilemma, such policies are simultaneously rational and inefficient from the perspective of the general 
public’s budgetary priorities.  
No doubt, many will counter that an expansive (and expensive) Medicaid program is more equitable than 
the alternative. That may be true. However, neither efficiency nor optimality is synonymous with equitability. 
“Political economy does not have to take morality into account,” warned Vilfredo Pareto himself (1906: 13). Taking 
this perspective, this dissertation is not a commentary on the effectiveness or equitability of Medicaid spending. I do 
not ruminate upon whether or not the end justifies the means. 
 
Overview of Dissertation 
The myopic attention of this dissertation toward Medicaid policymaking reflects the policy’s 
magnitude and its unique relationship to the American welfare state. With Medicaid likely to remain the 
fastest growing component of state budgets, particularly given the role that Medicaid has for the nation’s 
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health reform agenda, it is critical that the public, government officials, and academics, better understand 
its budgetary implications. As Frank Thompson and Thomas Gais (2000: 136) describe it, Medicaid is “the 
elephant in the living room that cannot be ignored by political officials and key interest groups”—nor 
academics. To understand Medicaid’s political development, I employ a mixed methods approach that takes 
seriously Paul Pierson’s counsel: “To be persuasive, accounts of welfare state change must combine 
macroscopic and microscopic analysis” (Pierson 1994: 13). By combining a historical narrative that surveys 
a half-century of policy debate with a statistical study that analyzes an original dataset of state-level Medicaid 
expenditure data, this dissertation offers a comprehensive examination of the institutional determinants for 
Medicaid’s exceptional costs. 
After presenting an outline of the subsequent sections, the remainder of this preliminary chapter 
will introduce the main bodies of literature that I reference, draw assumptions from, and for which I hope 
to make my own contributions. The associated research areas include: American political development; 
interest group politics; the welfare state; state politics and federalism. Borrowing from the analytical 
approaches, substantive insights and theoretical perspectives often developed independently by each of these 
bodies of literature, this dissertation looks to offer an explanation for the anomalous nature of Medicaid and 
challenge some of the discipline’s base assumptions about American politics—including the weak welfare 
state thesis and the supposed inherent weakness of poor people’s programs in the United States. I conclude 
this introductory chapter with a general overview of the federal cost sharing formula used to underwrite 
Medicaid—the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”)—and a discussion of the game theoretic 
model known as the prisoner’s dilemma. I use the model to support my theoretical argument that 
Medicaid’s funding formula compels states to expand Medicaid and implement sub-optimal policies. The 
abstracted formal model helps describe the reasons for why, within a context of federal cost sharing, it may 
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be rational for policymakers to support the continued growth of state Medicaid programs, even if the 
nation’s overall budgetary commitments to the program conflict with the public’s true preferences. 
Chapters 2 through 5 constitute Section II of this dissertation and reflect the core of my 
qualitative historical narrative. These chapters trace the institutional and political development of the 
federal government’s financial participation in, and the states’ commitments to, Medicaid, from the 
enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 1950 through to the Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). 
By leveraging congressional committee reports and floor debates, contemporaneous news accounts, and 
secondary literature, this original narrative emphasizes Medicaid’s fiscal underpinnings and the political 
development of the FMAP funding formula used to define the cost sharing arrangement between the federal 
and states’ governments. From its initial implementation the funding formula has remained remarkably 
stable. The history suggests the resiliency of the funding formula used for calculating the states’ FMAP can 
be attributed to the ambivalence by public officials toward the fiscal implications of Medicaid’s funding 
formula, as well as, the general recognition by state and federal lawmakers of the effectiveness of 
distributing fiscal burden across levels of government to encourage spending. While state and federal 
officials, alike, will voice their concerns about the sustainability of Medicaid’s fiscal burden and high costs, 
only modest adjustments to the financial arrangement have been made over its history, and each time the 
reforms have been in the direction of lessening the state’s fiscal burden. Specifically, incremental reforms 
beginning in the 1990s reflected a concession by Congress and acknowledgement that Medicaid spending 
was crowding out other public needs. Yet, the states continue to commit ever-greater proportions of their 
limited budgets to Medicaid. The full federal funding of the Medicaid expansion included in the ACA and 
beginning in 2014—to be reduced to 90 percent of costs by 2020—reflects the opinion held by federal 
lawmakers that Medicaid, as currently financed, is unsustainable for the states. 
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This general history of Medicaid financing emphasizes how the federal government’s mitigation of 
the states’ fiscal burdens has motivated every state to commit a large, and ever-increasing, proportion of 
their resources to their Medicaid commitments. However, it must be noted that the extent and nature of 
the states’ Medicaid expansions have not been consistent across the nation. In fact, from the perspective of 
certain indicators—including a state’s total Medicaid costs, spending per recipient, and eligibility criteria—
relative variation in the states’ Medicaid programs has increased over time. Remarkably, after nearly half-
century of Medicaid policymaking there has been no lessening of the degree of variability in the states’ fiscal 
commitments to their Medicaid programs.3 The subsequent section explores this persistent variation in the 
state-level implementation of Medicaid, with its two chapters exploring what Michael Sparer documented 
as the “inappropriate and inequitable variation” in Medicaid programs across the states (1995: 194). 
Section III is the quantitative component of this mixed methods dissertation. It employs an 
original dataset that I constructed from three decades of archival data on Medicaid expenditures and 
enrollments from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, as well as various other governmental 
resources, including the U.S. Census, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and non-profit entities, such as 
American Hospital Association and Kaiser Family Foundation. Such an expansive set of state-level data on 
Medicaid spending has never been created but is necessary for performing sufficiently robust time series 
models of the social-economic-political determinants of Medicaid policymaking.  
Chapter 6 represents a longitudinal macro analysis of state-level data from the fifty states over 
three decades, from 1980 through 2008. For the analyses I construct proxies for the three major 
components of Medicaid policymaking, which taken together epitomize Harold Laswell’s (1941) old 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For example, in 2008, the mean level of expenditures across the nation was approximately $1,150 per capita; 
but, 5 state and the District of Columbia spent more than $1,750 per capita on Medicaid/CHIP (inclusive of 
administrative and DSH payments), with New York and DC budgeting the most at around $2,500 per capita, while 
another 5 states spent less than $750 per capita, with Nevada budgeting the least at just over $500 per capita. 
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definition of politics as the determination of who gets what and for how. These proxies—that I refer to as 
coverage, benefits, and cost—reflect who will be eligible for Medicaid, what health services their Medicaid 
program will cover, and how much from the state’s revenues they will spend on Medicaid. While the poor 
may wish to maximize coverage, and providers are likely to lobby to maximize their benefit payments, the 
public, particularly the taxpaying public, is likely to be most concerned about the overall cost. The 
quantitative models test numerous predictors on these three components of the states’ Medicaid programs. 
However, despite significant variation in each of the dependent variables across the entire time period and 
contrary to expectations, no strong relationships can be discerned from the time series analysis suggesting 
that other dynamics may be unaccounted for in the study. Although the absence of any explanatory smoking 
gun that could explain the variation in Medicaid programs at the state level is admittedly unhelpful from the 
perspective of developing a succinct theory about America’s surprising welfare state, the results are 
consistent with the sentiment that Medicaid programs are esoteric. “If you understand one state’s Medicaid 
program, well, then, you understand one Medicaid program,” explained one Medicaid consultant who had 
experiences working on multiple state Medicaid programs.4 
Chapter 7 focuses exclusively Medicaid spending in fiscal year 2008 in order to understand how 
the progressivity of both the FMAP funding formula and the federal tax code impact Medicaid’s effective 
fiscal and taxpayer burdens. Using Medicaid expenditure and state- and federal-level tax data from the 
I.R.S. and Tax Foundation, I calculate variable metrics of what: (a) taxpayers, both as Americans and as 
residents of a particular state, contribute to Medicaid, and (b) states as sovereign entities pay to finance the 
Medicaid program relative to the value of the services the state actually receives. With a few adjustments to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  In 2012 and 2013 I served as Senior Policy Analyst and then Manager of Policy and Research for the 
Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange, a quasi-public agency responsible for implementing part of the Affordable 
Care Act in Connecticut. My job brought me into frequent engagement with not only Connecticut’s Department of 
Social Services (the state body responsible for administering Medicaid) but also consultants and officials responsible 
for health policy, including Medicaid reform, from several others states. 
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reflect the contribution of various funding sources, this chapter’s calculation of the direct and indirect costs 
of Medicaid suggest in most states, many residents get a high value of the services delivered for their 
investments in their state’s Medicaid program. 
A brief conclusion, Chapter 8, summarizes the preceding chapters and an epilogue considers the 
potential impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (“ACA”) on the future of 
Medicaid and Medicaid expenditures. With the massive Medicaid expansion included in health reform 
almost entirely funded with general revenues from federal government the law continues the trend of 
lowering the states’ fiscal burden for Medicaid. Reducing the states’ financial responsibility for Medicaid has 
the potential to diminish the states’ incentives to control their expenditures.  
 
Theoretical Foundation in the Literature 
 
This dissertation will appeal to a variety of subfields within political science and will draw broadly 
from departments of history, public policy, public health and social work, and economics. It has been 
enriched greatly by the breadth of substantive policy research on Medicaid that is already available: public 
health academics have provided at least partial descriptions of a number of state Medicaid programs; 
government institutions and research bodies have produced detailed reports on effectiveness of Medicaid on 
improving the health of the poor and dealing with the problems of the uninsured; economists have analyzed 
the differential costs of the various populations enrolled; journalists have objectively reported on the 
debates surrounding the growth of Medicaid expenditures and its reforms. Beyond the substantive appeal of 
these many resources, the following literatures provide important methodological and theoretical 
foundations for the research that follows. 
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State Politics and Federalism 
This persistent variation exhibited by the states’ Medicaid programs challenges political scientists’ 
classic theories of federalism and policy adoption—both the cynical race-to-the-bottom hypothesis often 
associated with redistributive policies and the more optimistic state-as-laboratories thesis of policy 
innovation and the spread of successful reforms. And given that Medicaid is the nation’s largest 
intergovernmental welfare program, its incongruence with the expectations of traditional theories of state 
politics should motivate scholars to reconsider the validity of those theories. The latter half of this 
dissertation offers original archival research and an original dataset that could service academics pursuing 
test cases for these two theories that dominate the federalism and state politics literature. 
The states-as-laboratories thesis justifies variation across the states as a reasonable and, even, 
desirable alternative to the inflexibility that would otherwise result from its administration being fully 
ensconced in Washington. Federalism, and the programmatic flexibility it grants to the states, allows states 
to experiment with their Medicaid policy design and implementation. As the promulgation of Medicaid 
managed care and various Medicaid waivers demonstrate, states have demonstrated their ability to learn 
from each other’s experiences with Medicaid to implement what is perceived to be a more efficient health 
care safety net for their poor residents. Yet, a reprise of recent studies on state politics and the idea of states 
as "laboratories of democracy" did not include any mention of research pertaining to Medicaid, specifically, 
nor health policy and politics, more generally (Moorehouse and Jewel 2004). This is a stark omission given 
the fiscal, political and bureaucratic pressures that Medicaid and CHIP impose upon state politics and the 
important supplementary, if not primary, responsibility that states have in the overall delivery of health care 
in the nation. 
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Of course, Medicaid has not been completely overlooked by political scientists studying state 
politics. For example, Craig Volden (2006) looks at the design of the states’ CHIP programs to test for the 
strategic interaction of states. Volden and others’ work on policy diffusion provide valuable theories on 
policy learning across states that are applicable to the political calculus of Medicaid reform (Volden et al. 
2008). In contrast to Volden’s optimism for policy learning driving innovation, Michael Sparer is dubious of 
the states-as-laboratories thesis as a justification for federalism, especially in relationship to the prolonged 
variation between state Medicaid programs. Failing to find a normative or ethical justification for interstate 
inequity present in Medicaid, Sparer argues instead that it demonstrates that states “are not especially good 
policy laboratories” (1996: 9; see also Sparer and Brown 1996; Oliver and Pal-Shaheen 1997; Peterson 
1997; Oliver 2001; Thompson and Burke 2007; Baughman and Milyo 2008; and, more generally: Walker 
1969; Gray 1973; Berry 1994; Volden et al. 2008). 
The flipside of the laboratories thesis is a more pessimistic artifact of American federalism: the race-
to-the-bottom (“RTB”) thesis. RTB presupposes that the interstate competition between states reduces the 
potential progressivity of state tax systems (Kincaid 1991; Duncan 1992), thereby limiting the fiscal 
capacity of state governments to implement robust social welfare programs. Among other consequences, 
Michael Bailey and Carl Rom (2004) hypothesize that threats of RTB will negatively impact the ability of 
the state to offer redistributive policies benefiting the poor. Given the high cost of Medicaid from the states 
perspective and the high benefit that a recipient could receive by migrating to a state for the purpose of 
becoming eligible for Medicaid, the policy should be an easy test for the validity of the RTB thesis. And yet, 
despite Medicaid’s status as a means-tested welfare program, the universal marginalization of Medicaid 
anticipated by the theory has not occurred. Not only do such traditionally accepted liberal states, such as 
California and Connecticut, retain significantly more generous eligibility standards than their neighbors, so 
do more conservative states like Arizona and Arkansas. 
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Overall, the Medicaid data supports neither a regression to the mean that could suggest potential 
policy learning, nor the precipitous downward trend toward the lowest common denominator as predicted 
by RTB. Rather, with state-level empirics that exhibit a degree of interstate variation that is comparable to 
international differences in healthcare policies, Medicaid offers strong evidence for Christopher Howard 
hypothesis “that there is no single American welfare state—that instead there are two or more American 
welfare states” (1999: 439).  
 
Interest Group Politics and Public Opinion 
Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza (2007) argue that the design of a nation’s welfare policies is generally 
influenced by the “embedded preferences” of its public. Although economic calculations may impact public 
opinion towards the size of the welfare state, Brooks and Manza argue that the public’s base policy 
preferences are “embedded” in a country’s—or in the instance of Medicaid, a state’s—social structure, 
major institutions, and collective memory. Of course, the idea that policies reflect, however imperfectly, 
public opinion grounds most theories of democratic representation. Yet, Brooks and Manza’s theory of 
embedded preferences gives greater agency to ideology and public opinion than do theories of path 
dependency and institutionalism, which privilege institutions and elites (Hacker 2002; Pierson 2003; see 
also, Baumgartner and Jones 1993, 2002). Given the commonality of Medicaid institutions across all the 
states, Brooks and Manza theoretical framing of the importance of public opinion offers a causal story and a 
potential explanation for both the observed variation across the fifty states and the year-to-year instability in 
the 50-state rankings of total Medicaid spending. Incidentally, as the largest means-tested program in a state 
budget, the states’ Medicaid commitments could be a good proxy of a state’s general level of support for 
the welfare state and, thus, offer useful evidence to substantiate Brooks and Manza’s research. 
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In contrast to the public’s likely knowledge for the overall size and cost of government (of which 
Medicaid is a major component), the public is less likely to be aware of the programmatic specifics of 
Medicaid, including its covered benefits and reimbursement rates. As such, marginal changes and variations 
in state benefits are likely to be better predicted by mechanisms other than public opinion, such as interest 
groups politics, legislative entrepreneurship, policy delegation and administrative discretion. There is 
extensive literature on the lobbying influence of interest groups on public policy (Baumgartner and Leech 
1998; Gray and Lowery 2001; Tichenor and Harris 2005; Moe 2005). With respect to health care, Mark 
Peterson (2001; also Hammer et al. 2003) persuasively argues that an asymmetry of information advantages 
providers. James Morone, in the introduction to a volume on the politics of health care policy, notes an 
uneven influence in the medical community that favors the organized: “The surgeon general, the Institute of 
Medicine, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention might issue warnings based on good science. 
However, any effort to act on those findings simply triggers the politics of self-interest,” observed 
Morone—with “self-interest”—be it economic or electoral—being “every bit as legitimate as medical 
science” (Morone 2005: 14).  
The fate of the United States Preventive Service Task Force’s (USPSTF) recommendation on breast 
screening exemplifies how the emotional appeal of health care can foment public opinion and triumph in 
politics. It is a perfect example to prove Monroe’s observation that “your science is only as strong as your 
political coalition” (2005: 15). In 2009 the USPSTF—a panel of medical experts appointed by the 
Department of Health and Human Services—recommended that women begin routine screenings at age 
50, as opposed to age 40.  This was a simple reform that could improve the nation's health while, 
incidentally, saving hundreds of millions from the nation's health expenditures. Congress' incredulous 
response to the recommendation was to not only ignore and mischaracterize the panel’s research, but to 
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create an expensive new federal entitlement that required all insurers to fully subsidize the very treatments 
the panel had cautioned against.5  
Policy Studies 
The policy studies literature is rich with work that considers Medicaid. David Smith and Judith 
Moore (2008) offer an excellent reference for those interested in the political history of Medicaid policy. It 
is an important complement to host of other work by political scientists and political historians, such as the 
more general work on Medicaid and charity care by Jonathan Engel (2006) or David G. Smith's (2002) 
work on the politics of Medicare and Medicaid following the Gingrich revolution (for more general political 
histories of American medicine see also, for example, Starr 1982; Hacker 2004; Weissert and Weissert 
2006; Patel and Rushefsky 2006, 2008). However, much of the existing Medicaid research, even that which 
discusses the politics of devolution, examine Medicaid and American health care almost exclusively from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Congress responded to the USPSTF recommendation by summoning, Ned Calogne and Diana Petitti, the chair 
and vice chair of the USPSTF, to a hearing before the House's Energy and Commerce Health Subcommittee. Politics 
dominated and it became clear that the Task Force’s recommendation was peripheral to the larger political debate 
over health reform. During hearing Rep. Michael Burgess (R-Tex.) referred to the health reform bill as “the 2,000-
page gorilla in the room” and Rep. John Shimkus (R-Ill.) assured that the breast cancer screening guidelines “will not 
be taken outside of the context of the H.R. 3962 [the Houses’ health reform bill]” (U.S. House Energy and 
Commerce Health Subcommittee, 2009). 
Although Dr. Calonge admitted it was poor timing to release the recommendation while Congress was engaged 
in a bitter debate over health insurance overhaul he assured the representatives that, “Politics play no part in our 
processes.” Yet despite such assurances, nearly everyone responded to the non-partisan medical report with 
unsubstantiated fears of rationing:  --“It's just kind of a peek under the curtain, if you will, of what we can anticipate 
with a government-run program,” observed Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska). --“This is when you start getting a 
bureaucrat between you and your physician. This is how rationing begins,” Rep Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) added. -
-Even the administration was quick to distance itself from the Task Force. The recommendation has “caused a great 
deal of worry and confusion among women,” Secretary Kathleen Sebelius said in a statement, adding that USPSTF 
“won't determine what services are covered by the federal government” (Olmos and Waters 2009). 
Subsequent to the hearing, the House voted 426-0 for a nonbinding resolution (named after Rep. Debbie 
Wasserman Schultz (D-Fla.), a breast cancer survivor) and the Senate passed under unanimous consent an 
amendment (proposed by Sen. David Vitter (R-La.) whose wife, at the young age of 6, had lost her own mother to 
breast cancer) that effectively required the federal government and all private insurers to ignore the Task Force's 
recommendations and promised expanded first dollar coverage for mammograms. 
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the federal level or generalizes to the states in a manner that presents a unitary impression of the 
implementation of Medicaid policies at the state-levels. Admittedly, my dissertation, too, emphasizes the 
role of the federal government, specifically, the relationship of the federal matching formula on Medicaid’s 
resiliency and growth. However, this dissertation is fundamentally about the impact of the evolving fiscal 
relationship between the federal government and the states, and how that relationship impacts the state-
level implementation of Medicaid. 
The narrowing of my substantive perspective to Medicaid’s financing arrangements is a response to 
Christopher Howard’s (1999) critique that the discipline of political science has a tendency for wheel 
spinning among tried and tested theories in explaining the politics of the nation’s welfare state. He contends 
these theories suffer from analytical exhaustion. In Howard’s review of the field, he observes that the 
“substantial gaps separating studies at the national level and studies at the state and local levels…produce 
dubious generalizations about the structure of the American welfare state and incomplete explanations for 
its development.” (1999: 421) In particular, Howard’s review uncovered that “developing mid-range 
generalizations limited to social policy has simply not been a priority at the state level” (Howard 1999: 
421). Such a tendency has led certain social programs, Medicaid included, that do not fit neatly into the 
archetypes of American politics and its welfare state policies—by which I mean the increasingly challenged 
abstraction of a two-tier national welfare system that differentiates between the deserving and undeserving 
poor6—to be overlooked or not sufficiently interrogated by the discipline. Referring explicitly to Medicaid, 
Howard aptly noted, “As a general rule, when the largest single element in a category does not fit, it is 
probably time to rethink the category.” (1999a: 428). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Christopher Howard’s own research on the “hidden” welfare state expanded the discipline’s understanding of 
welfare politics by looking into how tax expenditure policies are used to advance social welfare objectives  (see, 
Howard 1999b). Similarly, Jacob Hacker’s theorizing on the “divided” welfare state looks at the involvement of the 
private sector in the development of social welfare policies (see Hacker 2002). Both of these work focus exclusively 
on national level politics. 
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With an emphasis on Medicaid financing, this dissertation does not propose an alternative to the 
notion of a two-tiered welfare state. However, the historical narrative and state level empirics should 
appeal to academics, myself included, seeking to develop a better paradigm for understanding the charitable 
relationship of the public, their elected officials, and political institutions to the welfare state. For example, 
the growth of Medicaid fits into a general trend, highlighted by the parallel expansions of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit and Food Stamp programs, that suggests Americans have come to acknowledge the 
working poor as deserving of public assistance (inclusive of health care) as the elderly, children, and 
mothers.7 
I see four reasons why political scientists have not traditionally put policy under the microscope. 
First, policies are complex with any specific instance of a policy reflecting compromises and an ordering of 
individual preference that are inherently unstable. The social-choice paradox of Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem (1951) that, to paraphrase, asserts no rank ordering of preferences can be discerned given more 
than two choices (and a fair voting system), makes policy analysis unattractive for the discipline. This is 
particularly true for rational choice scholars searching for a deductive general equilibrium or statisticians 
hoping to identify predictable relationships. Policies and lawmaking exemplify why political science is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This study focuses almost exclusively on the financing of Medicaid. It does not explore an explanation, for 
example, the comparative fate of AFDC, or any other social welfare program. The differences in the growth and 
political resiliency of Medicaid and AFDC cannot be explained by their respective financing mechanisms, which up 
until 1996 were largely comparable (i.e. non-capitated federal match for the cost of state policy decisions). I suspect 
that the differences between AFDC and Medicaid may be best understood by first examining the differences between 
AFDC and the Earned Income Tax Credit program, another popular social welfare program, and then by looking at 
the similarities between Medicaid and EITC. AFDC never exhibited the symbiotic relationship with employers, the 
labor market or general economy that do EITC and Medicaid. 
AFDC (now TANF) is a cash assistance program limited to people who, for the most part, did not work. In 
contrast, EITC serves as a cash supplement to low-wage workers. As such, EITC socializes an employer’s direct cost 
of hiring low-wage labor, by effectively raising the nation’s minimum wage through a negative income tax subsidized 
by all higher income earner. Similarly, Medicaid socializes the cost of what had traditionally been seen as a maternal 
responsibility of employers and a component of their expected fringe benefit costs. These parallel expansions of the 
safety net have allowed employers to reduce their costs for certain workers with impunity. 
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known as the “the dismal science” (Riker 1980). Instead studying public policies, theorists study the 
institutional structures (e.g. a funding arrangement between states) in which political actors must define 
their policy preferences and through which some degree of stability is induced by the aggregation of 
individual preferences (Shepsle 1979; Riker 1980). Second, the balkanization of the discipline has 
encouraged political scientists to focus on either a specific type of institution or on specific types of political 
behavior outside those institutions. Well-behaving institutions and publics become the variables to be 
understood by the researcher. Policies themselves are discounted as ephemeral solutions to parochial 
debates: policies reflect, rather than modify, formal political processes; they adapt to, rather than shape, 
processes of historical change. Third, policies are very difficult to quantify. While programmatic 
expenditures are the most objective measure of a government’s relative fiscal commitments to individual 
policies, measuring the relative effectiveness of policy implementation is fraught with empirical uncertainty. 
Discovering good measurements for the many the different dimensions of specific policies is time 
consuming and requires significant trial and error.8 Finally, most political scientists are not policy analysts, 
and nearly as many would argue that they should not claim that role as academics. Academics are neither 
technocrats nor moralists and it is not the discipline’s responsibility to editorialize the effects of policy.  
Yet, as William Epstein correctly observes the influence of political power and impact of 
institutions and cannot be known, “except through their proximity to policy choice” (Epstein 1997: 29). 
Such recognition underlies his critique of the purported “objective truth,” “disciplinary formalism,” and 
“politically tempered solutions” of his professional colleagues (1997: 10). My own perspective is less 
cynical. The public can benefit from the academy’s purported objectivism in studying political institutions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  For example, in Chapter 6, I use spending per recipient as a proxy for the qualitative “generosity” of a state’s 
Medicaid’s benefits, but, as I will discuss in the chapter, the variations could be due to the expansiveness of benefits 
being offered, the level of reimbursements, utilization rates of the beneficiaries, or cost sharing required of 
recipients, among other potential causes.	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and their impact on public policy, even if the truth of it incorporates some subjective biases (e.g. if an 
academic ascribes to Marxist world view their take on reality will certainly be colored by what they 
perceive to be an equitable relationship between labor and capital). Motivating my own research is the 
belief that a better understanding of the development and impact of policy-specific political arrangements, 
in this instance the financing mechanisms for Medicaid, allows the discipline to contribute substantive 
insights to policy experts and policymakers. 
Research agendas put forward by Pierson (2004, 2005) and Hacker (2005) use path dependency 
theories to frame public policies as de facto institutions. For these scholars the political development of 
public policies is constrained by the policy itself. My theoretical lens differs from this exemplary work from 
the perspective of both our expectations and explanations for policy change and stability. Whereas these 
new institutionalists give a priori significance to the structural determinants and limitations of policy reform, 
I approach policies from a fundamentally functionalist perspective. I do not believe political institutions are 
exogenous to the political process. While I recognize potential for conflating political intentions with policy 
outcomes, I believe that even the unanticipated outcomes of a political institution must continue to 
effectively serve a coalition of interests. As such, political institutions will persist if and only if they continue 
to reflect the policy preferences of voters, elected officials and administrators. Medicaid cost sharing does 
not continue because the FMAP formula is now more than fifty years old, the FMAP formula remains 
because the status quo (and modest adjustments of it) continues to serve its purpose of incentivizing state 
participation in the Medicaid. 
 
The Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage (“FMAP”) 
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This section offers a general overview of Medicaid’s funding formula that I argue is foundational to 
the program’s resiliency and is the primary focus of the chapters to follow. A state’s Federal Medicaid 
Assistance Percentage, or “FMAP” rate or “match rate”, determines a state’s direct cost for its Medicaid 
commitments. The federal dollars redistributed to the states serve as a subsidy for the states’ Medicaid 
budgets and provide a strong financial incentive for states to expand coverage and/or benefits, especially 
during boom economics years. Reciprocally, the federal match discourages any reduction in Medicaid 
because a dollar’s worth of cuts to Medicaid coverage or benefits provides only 25 to 50 cents worth of 
state budgetary savings. 
The FMAP formula is a relatively simple, semi-automatic funding formula with no global cap that 
distributes federal matching payments to the states based on a simple income statistics.  It is based 
exclusively on a three year average of a state’s per capita income inversely related to the nation’s per capita 
income. The variable matching rates of the FMAP formula is predicated on the assumption that wealthy 
states are capable of supporting a greater fiscal burden compared to poorer states. As a state’s individual 
income level increases relative to the U.S. average, the state’s FMAP rate decreases, thereby reducing the 
amount of the state’s federal reimbursements as a share of its total spending on Medicaid (i.e. increasing the 
state’s fiscal burden). The quadratic nature of the formula enhances the formula’s progressivity and is 
premised on the principle that the marginal burden of an additional dollar of taxation is less significant for a 
state with higher level of taxable income relative to a state that has a low income and therefore a smaller tax 
base. The states’ FMAP rates are intended to smooth out the states’ total Medicaid expenditures (i.e. costs 
per capita) by providing larger federal matches to states with fewer resources to tax. Therefore, a wealthy 
state like Connecticut gets one dollar for every dollar of its own revenues it spends on Medicaid; whereas, a 
poorer state such as Mississippi receives over four dollars for each dollar it spends from its own sources. 
This variation is supposed to equalize the tax burden that a state’s Medicaid commitment will impose on 
	  
	   	  
22  
state residents. With any federal subsidies, Mississippi and Connecticut spent the same amount on Medicaid 
and received the same federal subsidy, Mississippi would need to impose much higher marginal tax rates on 
its residents compared to those required in Connecticut because Mississippi has significantly less economic 
activity and thus a smaller tax base across which it can spread its public expenditures. So as to encourage a 
poor state like Mississippi to support an adequately sized Medicaid programs the variable match more 
significantly reduces the taxpayer burden associated with Mississippi’s Medicaid commitment. 
Pursuant to Section 1905(b) of the Social Security Act, the formula for the state share is expressed 
(with a few exceptions) as follows: 
state share = 0.45  ×   
State per Capita Income!
U.S. per Capita Income!
 
Therefore, the share of total Medicaid spending by a state that is returned by the federal government to that 
state can be simply expressed as: 
𝐹𝑀𝐴𝑃!"#"$ = 1− state share 
By statute the FMAP can vary between a 50 percent and 83 percent, the former reflecting the 
federal commitment to share in at least half of the cost of each state’s Medicaid program.  In FY 2008, 
thirteen states were reimbursed at the minimum rate of 50 percent. (Without the minimum threshold on 
the states’ FMAP rates, the matching rates for these thirteen comparatively wealthy states would been, on 
average, 9 percentage points lower, with the FMAP for Connecticut dropping to a low of 16 percent.) The 
multiplier of 0.45 that is included in the formula assures that the federal reimbursement rate is 55 percent 
for a state with income equivalent to the national median; overall, the federal government has consistently 
financed about 57-60 percent of national Medicaid spending. Mississippi had the highest federal match for 
FY 2008 at 76.29 percent; Connecticut had the federal minimum with a federal match of 50 percent. 
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The intent of the FMAP rates is to more-or-less equalize the states’ per capita spending on 
Medicaid.9 Figure 1.1 presents a theoretical distribution of state and federal share of Medicaid spending per 
capita based on the national average of $1,157 in Medicaid spending per capita and the states’ actual FMAP 
rates for fiscal year 2008. The states are ordered by their per capita income along the horizontal axis with 
their hypothetical Medicaid cost per capita plotted against the vertical axis. The lighter region represents 
the state share and the darker region is the federal share. For example, if Medicaid costs totaled $1,157 per 
capita in both Connecticut and Mississippi, the state level charge would have been $579 in the former and 
$274 in the latter.  
Remarkably true to the intention of the FMAP formula the wealthiest state and poorest state in the 
United States have comparably sized Medicaid programs in 2008: Connecticut’s Medicaid program cost a 
total of $1,298 per capita with the state’s share at $649, compared to a total cost of $1,297 per capita and 
state share of $308 per capita in Mississippi. More frequently, however, the states differ dramatically from 
each other with respect to their overall commitments to Medicaid. For example, Utah, despite a FMAP rate 
of 71.63 percent, had the least expensive Medicaid program in 2008 at a cost of $554 per capita with a state 
fiscal burden of just $163 per capita; comparatively, New York, with a FMAP rate of 50.0 percent, had 
total expenditures of $2,443 per capita and a fiscal burden of $1,222 per capita. New York’s total costs 
were more than 4 times the level of expenditures in Utah and double the national average. In contrast to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 While the generosity of the federal matching rates has proven to be an effective means to induce every state in 
the Union to aggressively participate in Medicaid, the cost sharing formula has many noted shortcomings. Specifically, 
it is generally accepted that the key component of the FMAP equation—per capita personal income—does not 
accurately reflect the variation in the states’ true fiscal capacities to support welfare programs. The nonpartisan 
General Accounting Office argues that per capita income is “a poor measure of the size of states’ poverty populations” 
and so is a poor measure of state-level redistributive needs. Indeed, the formula gives no consideration to the state-
level poverty rate and demographics of the poor population, the health care needs of those poor or the variable state-
level cost of providing their health services. As Christie Peters summarizes, “the FMAP formula does not adequately 
reflect the differences among states’ fiscal capacities, concentrations of low-income citizens, or service delivery costs” 
(2010: 5). For various critiques of Medicaid’s regular FMAP formula see: Government Accountability Office, 2003; 
Miller and Schneider 2004; Granneman and Pauly 2010; Peters 2008; Helms 2007. 
	  
	   	  
24  
hypothetical distribution of liabilities presented in Figure 1.1, Figure 1.2 plots the actual state fiscal 
burden and total cost of each state for FY 2008, ordering the states along the horizontal by per capita 
income. The differences between the hypothetical distributions of total cost and state fiscal burden and the 
actual variability in the distributions thereof are significant. In general, it appears that the FMAP formula is 
inadequate to ameliorate the differences in the states’ commitments to Medicaid. Understanding the 
potential reasons for the variation in the states’ fiscal commitments to Medicaid is an emphasis of Chapter 
6 and Chapter 7.  
Figure 1.1. Hypothetical Distribution of the State and Federal Share of Medicaid Spending per Resident (based on FY 
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Figure 1.2. Actual Distribution of the State-Share and Total Medicaid Spending per Resident, FY 2008 
 
Theoretical Background: The Prisoner’s Dilemma 	  
 
 Before considering the variability in the states’ Medicaid programs, however, I explore the political 
development of the FMAP funding formula and the relationship of this financing mechanism to the nation’s 
overall spending on Medicaid. Throughout the next several chapters I ascribe the inflationary tendency of 
Medicaid budgets to the federal government’s persistent subsidization of the states’ Medicaid costs. I argue 
that federal cost sharing has effectively compelled state policymakers to expand Medicaid over the past 
many decades. As a prelude to the subsequent historical narrative I conclude this introductory chapter with 
a causal explanation for the extraordinary nature of the states’ Medicaid budgets—adapting the fundamental 
game theoretic model known as the prisoner’s dilemma to Medicaid’s financing mechanism. 
First, however, it will be useful to review a few concepts of game theory. Game theory is the 
application of mathematic models to a wide range of behavioral relations. It is used in the study of strategic 
decision-making. Specifically, in political science, game theoretic models have helped scholars to 
understand the median voter theorem (i.e. the idea that candidates in a general election will tend to 
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maintain moderate political platforms) and explain the notion of the democratic peace (i.e. the axiom that 
democratic nations do not wage war against one another), among many other applications (see McCarty and 
Meirowitz 2007 for overview of game theory for political scientists). 
The prisoner’s dilemma is a non-cooperative game used to model circumstances in which rationally 
behaving actors may nonetheless commit themselves to a suboptimal Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium 
is an outcome to a game in which no player would elect an alternative action given the choice of the other 
player; suboptimal implies that their exists at least one other outcome that makes all players at least as well 
off and at least one player strictly better off. The prisoner’s dilemma gets its name from the scenario is 
describes: two suspects of a crime are apprehended and placed in separate cells where they are interrogated 
and offered a plea bargain. Each suspect is offered the following deal: if he confesses the prosecutor 
promises immunity for any testimony that is needed to implicate his accomplice. Such testimony will 
guarantee that the prosecutor gets the maximum sentence of 10 years for the accomplice. If both suspects 
confess, however, the prosecutor will no longer need either suspect’s testimony against the other and both 
suspects will get 5-year sentences. If instead of confessing both suspects remain silent the best the 
prosecutor can do is charge them for a minor crime with a sentence that is less than a year. Figure 1.3 is a 
normal-form representation of a 2-player prisoner dilemma representing a matrix of the strategies and 
payoff for Suspect A and Suspect B. Along the horizontal axis are the choices available to Suspect A; 
the vertical presents the choices available to Suspect B. Each paired choices reflect the outcome of the 
indicated strategy. For example, from the diagram we can infer that if Suspect A confesses and Suspect B 
does not confess, the outcome will be that Suspect A will serve no years in jail and Suspect B will serve 
10 years. 
 
Figure 1.3. Normal-Form Representation of the Prisoner Dilemma 
  Suspect A 
  Don’t Confess Confess 
	  
	   	  
27  
Suspect B 
Don’t Confess A: 1 year 
B: 1 year 
A: none 
B: 10 years 
Confess A: 10 years B: none 
A: 5 years 
B: 5 years 
 
 The best joint outcome for the two suspects is for them both to remain silent and each serve the 
minimal 1-year sentence. This is a Pareto efficient outcome; no solution concept will improve the outcome 
for both suspects. However, the prisoner’s dilemma is modeled as a non-cooperative game. With no honor 
among thieves the strictly dominant strategy for each suspect is to confess. Consider the following strategic 
decision making from perspective of Suspect A:  
• If Suspect B does not confess, Suspect A should confess because he will then serve no time 
and this is preferable to a 1-year sentence.  
• If Suspect B confesses, then Suspect A should also confess because a 5-year sentence is 
preferable to a 10-year sentence. 
 Regardless of the action of Suspect B, Suspect A should confess. The same strategic options and 
therefore dominant strategy of confessing apply to Suspect B. Unfortunately for the suspects, both 
confessing is the game’s unique Nash equilibrium. The outcome is paradoxical because although it is 
suboptimal it remains the rational strategy of both suspects. 
 
From Bars to Budgets 
Now, the prisoner’s dilemma may seem like a peculiar analogy for Medicaid, but throughout the 
dissertation I will present data that suggests the prisoner’s dilemma example of a dominant strategy that 
compels a Pareto inefficient outcome is an ideal theoretical lens for interpreting Medicaid policymaking. 
Instead of confessing or not confessing, the choice for the states is whether or not to expand their Medicaid 
budget. The payoff is not measured in years, but in the net benefit of the investment for the state. And 
	  
	   	  
28  
instead of the promise of a lenient sentence to entice the suspects to confess, the introduction of a generous 
federal match rate incentivizes states to expand their programs. 
I will first model the state’s strategic decision of whether or not to participate in the Medicaid 
program and then consider the decision to expand the program in a subsequent year. To simplify things, I 
assume a federal system with just two states. Both states are the same size and the residents of each state 
have the similar preferences for the size of a state’s health program for the poor. Absent any federal 
intervention I assume that both states would commit $10 million of state revenues to their programs. 
Under this budget, the poorest residents get $10 million in medical care and the general public get a 
collective benefit, measured in utility, that they value at $10 million. This allocation of resources is 
considered to be Pareto efficient because both the general public perceives a benefit at least equal to the 
cost. Beyond $10 million in spending, however, the general public perceives a diminishing return on the 
utility of their investment. The general public values the subsequent $10-million investment at $9 million in 
utility. A further $10 million has a utility of just $8 million. And so on, according to the simple step 
function defined in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4. Hypothetical utility function for a state’s health care spending on the poor 
 
While the poor will fare better with each subsequent investment into their health care needs and a 
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efficient to invest anything beyond the initial $10 million allocation. The cost of any additional investment 
exceeds the benefits that the general public would receive from the expenditure on health care. For 
example, the additional $10 million in health care could necessitate a reduction in certain services that the 
general public preferred or an introduction of new taxes that exceeded the value of the health care benefit. 
Now assume the presence of a federal government. The federal government has different 
preferences with respect to health care spending and does not believe that a $10 million budget is sufficient. 
To incentivize states to spend more on health care the federal government decides to implement a program 
that matches what the state spends on health care, so long as the state agrees to maintain their earlier 
commitment of $10 million. Significantly, however, the residents of the individual states must still 
contribute toward the financing of the total federal share. Regardless of whether or not both states 
participate in the new federal program, the cost of the net federal share will be distributed uniformly across 
the two states. A state gets no utility from any health care spending in other states.  
How do the states respond to this new federal-state program? 
Figure 1.5 is a normal form representation of the strategic choices of State A and State B 
involving the decision of whether or not to participate in this new federal-state health care program. It 
resembles the prisoner’s dilemma from Figure 1.3. In addition to presenting the net pay-offs of the 
different strategies, each quadrant in the matrix also includes the utility of the specified amount of health 
care spending (i.e. the value of the benefit given the diminishing marginal utility of spending, as defined in 
Figure 1.5) and the cost of the strategy for each state (i.e. sum of the cost for the state’s own share and half 
of the net federal shares). The payoff for each state is the net utility of the health care benefit less the cost of 
the strategy. The following reflect the strategic decisions of State A: 
• If State B does not participate in the federal-state program, then State A should participate. 
State A gets an additional $10 million in health care that has a marginal value of $9 million to 
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the public, and because both states finance the net federal-share, the indirect marginal cost to 
State A is an additional $5 billion to the state. Overall, State A receives a positive payoff that 
the state values at $4 million. The alternative for State A would be to likewise not participate 
in the federal-state program, in which case State A would get an inferior outcome valued at 
$0. 
• If State B participates in the federal-state program, then State A should also participate. As 
above, State A gets an additional $10 million in health care that has a marginal value of $9 
million to the public; however, because both states are now participating total federal spending 
is $20 million. With each state financing half of that amount, State A has an indirect marginal 
cost of $10 million. The total investment by State A is now $20 million. Compared to the 
marginal benefit valued at $19, the state has a net pay-off of -$1 million. This is preferable to 
the alternative strategy of not participating, in which case State A would get a net payoff of -$5 
million. 
Figure 1.5. Normal form representation of strategic choices of states choosing whether or not to 
participate in federal-state program. (Nash Equilibrium highlighted in grey.) 
  State B 
  
Non-Participation 
$10 million state program 
Participation 
$10 million state share 
ð $20 million budget 
State A 
Non-Participation 
$10 million state program 
Utility of Health Care: (10, 10) 
Net Cost: (10, 10) 
Net Payoff: (0, 0) 
 
Utility: (10, 19) 
Cost: (15, 15) 
Payoff: (-5, +4) 
 
Participation 
$10 million state share 
ð $20 million budget 
Utility: (20, 11) 
Cost: (15, 15) 
Payoff: (+4, -5) 
 
Utility: (19, 19) 
Cost: (20, 20) 
Payoff: (-1, -1) 
 
 
Given identical preferences and costs, State B will make the same strategic decision as State A, 
leading to the Nash equilibrium of both states participating in the federal-state program. Each state gets 
utility valued at $19 from the $20 million of health care spending. But each state’s cost total $20 million, 
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for a negative net payoff. As was the case in the traditional example of the prisoners’ dilemma in which both 
prisoners confessed both states are made worst off. However, given the participation of the other state, not 
participating in the federal-state program would lead to an even worst outcome. 
 Having participated in the program what will the states do in the next budgetary period? For this 
second period, I will assume that the two states will again independently decide if they should maintain 
their participation in the program and how much should they spend if they do so.  
The states’ decisions to maintain their participation are the same as above and so it is not rational 
for the states to stop participating. The states’ policy choices thus become deciding upon how large of a 
budget to commit to the federal-state program. As provided for the previous example, Figure 1.7 is a 
normal form representation of the strategic choices of State A and State B involving the choice of how 
large a budget to support. Both states will settle on a total budget of $30 million. Regardless, of the choice 
of the other state, neither state improves its utility by increasing its total budget beyond $30 million. The 
cost of increasing the state’s budget from $30 million to $40 million would be another $7.5 million to the 
state (i.e. the sum of the state’s $5 million state-share and one-half of the corresponding $5 million federal 
share); but this amount exceeds the marginal utility, valued at $7 million, that the state gets from the 
additional $10 million in health care spending.  
Although the states’ budgets do not spiral upwards in this simple example it is worth noting that 
compared to the original situation in which the states exclusively financed their own program with a limited 
$10 million budget the state is worse off in this new equilibrium, with a budget of $30 million budget and a 
negative payoff of -$3 million. 
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Figure 1.6. Normal form representation of strategic choices of states for determining size of budget. (Nash 
Equilibrium highlighted in grey.) 
  State B 
  $10m state-share 
ð $20m budget 
$15m state-share 
ð $30m budget 
$20m state-share 
ð $40m budget 
State A 
$10m state-share 
ð $20m budget 
Utility: (19, 19) 
Cost: (20, 20) 
Payoff: (-1, -1) 
 
Utility: (19, 27) 
Cost: (22.5, 27.5) 
Payoff: (-3.5, -0.5) 
 
Utility: (19, 34) 
Cost: (25, 35) 
Payoff: (-6, -1) 
 
$15m state-share 
ð $30m budget 
Utility: (27, 19) 
Cost: (27.5, 22) 
Payoff: (-0.5, -3) 
 
Utility: (27, 27) 
Cost: (30, 30) 
Payoff: (-3, -3) 
 
Utility: (27, 34) 
Cost: (32.5, 37.5) 
Payoff: (-5.5, -3.5) 
 
$20m state-share 
ð $40m budget 
Utility: (34, 19) 
Cost: (35, 25) 
Payoff: (-1, -6) 
 
Utility: (34, 27) 
Cost: (37.5, 32.5) 
Payoff: (-3.5, -5.5) 
 
Utility: (34, 34) 
Cost: (40, 40) 
Payoff: (-6, -6) 
 
 
Of course, despite the inefficiency of the lower utilities the outcome is presumably assessed as 
preferable from the perspective of the federal government. As a result of the cost sharing mechanism the 
program now has a budget that is three times the size of what it would have been without the federal 
matching grants. Whether or not $30 million is sufficient to meet the needs of the poor is a political 
question, but the increased redistribution toward the poor is, presumably, more equitable and reflects a 
fairer allocation of resources than the original situation in which both states committed just $10 million. 
This equilibrium is not very robust, however. Minor changes to the assumptions of the models will 
lead to significantly different results and the models stable Nash equilibrium splintering. Among the many 
potential permutations of the model’s assumption, consider the potential impact of the three following 
changes on the states’ strategic policymaking: 
 
1. In the original examples the net federal cost was split evenly between the two states. If instead 
one state pays a greater proportion of the federal share, maybe because it is richer and its 
residents pay more federal income taxes, then the poor state will receive what amounts to a 
subsidy, paid for by the rich state. Assuming the states maintain the same preferences, then it is 
likely that the poor state will raise its own Medicaid budget while paying a lower share of the net 
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costs. The rich state in turn will pay a larger share of the costs and experience a lower pay off, 
holding all else constant. For example, if State A finances 75 percent of all federal spending then 
the poor state, State B, will raise its budget to $40 million and the rich state, State A, will reduce 
its budget to $20 million.10 
 
2. In the original scenario the two states had the same preference for health care spending on the 
poor. If instead one state receives a higher marginal utility from this spending, maybe because this 
state has a large number of health professionals among the public, then this state may favor more 
spending relative to the other state. The federal share associated with this state’s additional 
spending, however, will still be financed by both states and so the net payoff derived from this 
federal-state program will be affected—reducing the payoff for the state maintaining the lower 
marginal utility and increasing the payoff for the state with the higher marginal utility.11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Figure F.1.1 represents this first alternative scenario with the assumption that State A is a rich state that must 
finance 75 percent of the federal share. This change will affect the net cost of the strategic decisions that in turn 
affects net payoffs. Both states maintain the same utility function defined by Figure 1.4 and receive a 50 percent 
federal match. In this situation, the Nash Equilibrium sees State A supporting a budget of $20 million and State B 
supporting a budget of $40 million. Instead of the original payoffs of -$3 million each (given the states’ $30 million 
budgets), in this new scenario, the richer State A, is significantly worst off with a payoff of -$13.5 million, while the 
poorer State B now has a positive payoff at $6.5 million. 
Figure F.1.1 Normal form representation of strategic choices of states for determining size of budget given different state liabilities for federal share. Nash 
Equilibrium highlighted in grey. 
  State B 
(State B is liable for 25% of total federal spending) 
  $10m state-share 
ð $20m budget 
$15m state-share 
ð $30m budget 
$20m state-share 
ð $40m budget 
$25m state-share 
ð $50m budget 
State A 







ð $20m budget 
Utility: (19, 19) 
Cost: (25, 15) 

































11  Figure F.1.2 represents the second alternative scenario under the assumption that State A derives a utility 
valued at $10 million for the initial $10 million in spending, with each subsequent $10 million allocation valued at 
$500,000 less than the previous allocation (instead of $1 million less as in the original examples); State B has the 
same utility function as defined above in Figure 1.4. Both states maintain the same cost sharing functions. 
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3. In the original examples there were only two states. If instead of just two states the model 
incorporates fifty states and each is state responsible for 1/50th of the total cost of the federal 
shares, then every state will likely favor a significantly larger budget. Regardless of what the other 
49 states do so long as the marginal utility of the additional $10 million that a state puts towards 
its own health budget exceeds the marginal cost of the investment then the state will support the 
larger budget. Applying the original examples’ utility function (see Figure 1.4) all fifty will 
settle on a $50 million budget.12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Maintaining the original cost functions, the Nash Equilibrium now has State A supporting a budget of $60 million for 
a net payoff of $2.5 million and State B has a budget of $20 million for a negative payoff of -$2.5 million. 
Figure F.1.2 Normal form representation of strategic choices of states for determining size of budget given different utility functions for health care spending on 
the poor. Nash Equilibrium highlighted in grey 
  State B 
(State B has a lower marginal utility for health care spending) 
  $10m state-share 
ð $20m budget 
$20m state-share 
ð $40m budget 
$30m state-share 
ð $60m budget 
State A 
(State A has a 
higher marginal 
utility for health 
care spending) 
$10m state-share 
ð $20m budget 
Utility: (19.5, 19) 
Cost: (20, 20) 






















































12 With 50 players it is difficult to construct a normal form representation of the complete choice set of State A 
given all the possible permutations of choices by the 49 other states. Figure F.1.3 represents the strategic choices 
available to State A and the 49 other states, assuming the 49 other states all make the same decision and the same 
utility function defined in Figure 1.4. Instead of State A facing a marginal cost of $7.5 million for every $10 million 
increase in its state’s budget, the marginal cost is only $5.1 million (i.e. $5 million state share + 0.02 × $5 million 
federal share). Every state has the same marginal cost function and will make investments until the marginal cost 
exceeds the value of the benefit. For every state that point occurs at $50 million. With each state drawing down $25 
million in federal funding, the total federal share will equal $1.250 billion (i.e. $25 million x 50 states). Therefore 
total spending by each state will be $50 million (i.e. $25 million state share + 0.02 × $1.250 billion contribution to 
federal share) and the net payoff in this Nash equilibrium will be -$10 million for each state.  
Figure F.1.10 Normal form representation of strategic choices of states for determining size of budget given different state liabilities for federal share. Nash 
Equilibrium highlighted in grey. 
  49 “Other” States 
(Collective Utility/Cost/Payoff of 49 “Other” States, each responsible for 1/50 of total federal spending) 
	  
	   	  
35  
Researchers and policymakers can use such game theoretic abstractions to forecast the potential 
implications of the FMAP funding formula and the states’ preferences for health care spending on state and 
federal budgets—although formally modeling the impact of such refinements to the model is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. With respect to this dissertation’s current research agenda on the political 
development of the FMAP funding formula, it is sufficient to take from the above examples an appreciation 
for how federal cost sharing can incentivize state policymakers to support and sustain suboptimal outcomes. 
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The Social Security Act of 1935 established the national Old Age and Survivors Insurance, or 
“Social Security.” The Act also established three federal-state public assistance programs—Old Age 
Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to Dependent Children. Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled 
was added in 1958. Medicare and Medicaid, both, were built upon this shared foundation and further 
exemplify—like Social Security, on the one hand, and, Old Age Assistance, on the other—the 
complementarity of the nation’s universal federally-administered social insurance programs and disparate 
state-administered means-tested welfare programs. However, whereas Medicare, like Social Security, was 
and remains heralded by Americans, both elected or otherwise, Medicaid was largely ignored by the public 
in 1965 and has generally befuddled voters and state and federal officials alike in the proceeding decades. 
While this section accepts that a healthy ambivalence for how the nation insured its unhealthy poor 
was a necessary condition for the development of Medicaid, such benign neglect does not sufficiently 
explain Medicaid’s resilience. Relatedly, theories of path dependencies diminish the agency of those state 
and federal policymakers who over the past six decades have annually approved expanding medical 
assistance budgets. It is unsatisfactory historicism and reductivism to rationalize Medicaid’s current size and 
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scope as wholly the unintended consequence of what one could charitably characterize as a distracted 
policymaking process. 
This section takes the perspective that Medicaid was not a policy postscript to Medicare; that 
Medicaid’s policy salience should not be gauged solely by its political salience during the debates of 1965 
and thereafter. As David Smith and Judith Moore argue in Medicaid Politics and Policy, 1965-2007 (2008), a 
comprehensive history of the national politics of Medicaid policymaking, “Medicaid was anything but a 
casual afterthought; it was the culmination of a lengthy development and of the strategic and tactical 
calculations of Wilbur Cohen and Wilbur Mills” (Smith and Moore 2008: 81). Smith and Moore rightly 
reject the characterization that Medicaid was “a casual and belated inclusion” into the legislation for 
Medicare. Instead they portray Medicaid “as the culmination and ratification of a project begun almost 
twenty years earlier: to create a health benefit for the poor by incremental expansion, using the Social 
Security Act as a legislative vehicle” (Ibid. 21). Like Smith and Moore, Robert Stevens and Rosemary 
Stevens’ Welfare Medicine in America: A Case Study of Medicaid (2003 [1974]) and Laura Katz Olson’s The 
Politics of Medicaid (2010), too, offer comprehensive histories of Medicaid that elevate its salience relative to 
its undistinguished popular perceptions. 
The next four chapters explore Medicaid’s institutional heritage and its subsequent five decades of 
political development to better understand Medicaid’s fiscal and policy importance. Using the perspective 
of federal-state fiscal politics, this section outlines how a precedent for the public provision of welfare 
medicine was established early in the American welfare state and how that precedent was maintained (and 
expanded upon) even as the nation’s notion of the welfare state and health insurance was being challenged 
by both the Left and Right. 
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In order to establish a baseline of federal and state commitments to medical assistance for the poor, 
Figure II.1 charts public spending on medical vendor payments in the 15 years prior to enactment of 
Medicaid in 1965. This was a period of nascent reforms to how the nation financed means-tested medical 
vendor payments. While the total fiscal commitments made by Congress and the state capitals were 
modest, the institutional structures that were put in place during this time have remained largely 
unchanged.  
Figure II.1. Total Medical Vendor Payments, Nominal and Real (2008 dollars) Spending, FY1950-1969 
	  
Sources: FY1950-1960, 1965-66: Merriam, IC. 1967; FY1961-64: Merriam, IC. 1965. 
 
Figure II.2 pulls back and looks at historical spending between 1965 through 2010, overlaying the 
total inflation-adjusted annual spending on Medicaid (and CHIP; and the various means-tested medical 
assistance programs before 1965) with the average percent of a state’s overall budget that is being 
committed to the program. This dissertation considers the steep trajectory in costs that these two figures 
present. Does a financial arrangement used to distribute less than $20 billion in total spending in 1965 
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remain the appropriate mechanism for distributing over $350 billion in 2008 (in constant 2008-adjusted 
dollars)? 
Figure II.2 Total Medicaid/CHIP Payments (inc. Administration/DSH Payments), Nominal and Real (2008 dollars) 
Spending, FY 1966-2008.	  
 
Source: 1966-1979: Committee on Ways and Means, House. 1985. "Medicare, Health Care Expenditures, and the 
Elderly."(March 15) 99th Congress, 1st Session Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (Committee Report No. 
WMCP 99-6); 1980-2008 author generated from data requested from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. 
 
By approaching Medicaid’s early implementation and subsequent reforms from the perspective of 
its federal-state fiscal relationship, the history recounted over the following pages diverges from existing 
narratives of Medicaid that explore the policymaking process and national politics of health care more 
generally. Instead, this section takes as its premise that to understand Medicaid’s continued resiliency and 
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undergirds the fiscal relationship between the federal government, and states. James Blumstein and Frank 
Sloan credit Medicaid’s generous, open-ended cost sharing with having a “political lock-in” effect on policy 
because “the matching formula that makes program enhancements so appealing also makes cutbacks very 
unappealing” (2000: 133). 
From the viewpoint of both the legislative successes and failures, the development of the fiscal 
underpinnings of the nation and states’ medical vendor payments appears to exemplify the path dependent 
policy incrementalism articulated by Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson. However, in contrast to reductive 
institutionalism that minimizes political agency, an implicit premise underlying the following narrative is 
that the high level of spending on welfare medicine and tenacity of the Medicaid funding formula can be 
explained by the rational behavior of policymakers responding to external influences. The generous federal 
match provides states’ with a relatively inexpensive source of revenues to meet a social commitment to 
their poorest residents and placate the political demands of powerful interest groups and sympathetic 
constituencies, such as doctors, hospitals, the elderly and disabled. As such, the common parlance of path 
“dependency” unduly marginalizes political agency and the intentionality of the reforms legislated by 
Congress and implemented by the states. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are prequels to the quantitative study that follows in the next section. 
Chapter 2 traces Medicaid’s institutional heritage and the legislative antecedents to Medicaid’s matching 
formula back to the enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 1950. The foundational narrative 
continues with a review of the three subsequent pieces of legislation passed between 1955 and 1960 that 
amended the Social Security Act and impacted the provision of medical assistance to the poor. The 1960 
amendments introduced the Kerr-Mills program—the optional federal-state program of medical assistance 
for the elderly poor, that, itself, represented an incremental expansion of those federal policies introduced 
over the previous decade. Yet, even after fifteen years of steady annual expansions the total federal and state 
	  
	   	  
41  
commitment to means-tested medical assistance remained less than a paltry $1 billion by 1965 ($6.76 
billion in 2008-adjusted dollars), with the federal government’s commitment accounting for considerably 
less than a third of this commitment to the nation’s poor. At the state level, the desperate programs of 
medical assistance had required no more than a few percentage points of any state’s revenue.  
Chapter 3 opens with the passage of the Social Security Act of 1965 and the enactment of 
Medicaid under Title XIX of the Act. Medicaid significantly broadened eligibility requirements of Kerr-
Mills and mandated new standards of care for welfare medicine. In contrast to the contentious debate 
surrounding Medicare and its promise of universal coverage for the aged, there existed a general consensus 
in Washington that the medical safety net needed further expanding. Most policymakers perceived 
Medicaid’s funding and administrative framework as a reasonable and incremental reform of the status quo 
arrangement. In terms of its ultimate costs, however, Medicaid would quickly prove to be anything but 
incremental as Medicaid eclipsed all budgetary estimates. The inflationary growth can be attributed, in part, 
to a pervasive under-appreciation—albeit not an entirely justified ignorance— by policymakers of the 
poor’s previously unmet need for welfare medicine as well as to the state’s enthusiasm for leveraging 
federal dollars.  
The chapter therefore proceeds from the enactment of Medicaid to a consideration of the almost 
immediate attempts by Congress in 1967 and 1968 to retrench Medicaid and control its unanticipated costs. 
Subsequently examined is a report prepared by the McNerney Task Force of 1969 that President Richard 
Nixon commissioned to address Medicaid’s almost immediate fiscal crisis. Despite resolving Medicaid’s cost 
crisis being the impetus for the report, the Task Force reported on how Medicaid’s present financing 
arrangements was not adequate and concluded that without a considerable improvement in financing and 
delivery capabilities the promise of Medicaid to assure adequate healthcare to the nation’s poor and near 
poor would not be met. While further recognizing that in an economy of scarcity society needed to make 
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decisions on the proper allocation of resources for good, the Task Force tried to shame the government into 
action by characterizing the “sizable unmet need for health service as a disgrace”; one that “cannot be 
tolerated in an affluent society … because human compassion insists that essential individual health needs 
shall be met” (Report of the Task Force 1970). However, “the Task Force had neither the resources nor the 
time … to examine closely the full dimensions of the problem” (Social Security Bulletin 1970: 30). While 
such a thorough examination was needed, it would not come during the 1970s. 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 look at the continued growth in Medicaid budgets since 1980 and 
examine how the states’ increasing financial commitments ultimately compelled a reform of the traditional 
Medicaid funding formula. The 30-year period between 1981 and 2010 is also the time frame that will be 
given greater attention from a quantitative perspective in Section III. This extended time period saw 
several major efforts by the various Republican and Democrat administrations and Congresses to reform 
Medicaid, particularly its cost sharing formula. Chapter 4 will explore several of those attempts that 
failed. The chapter begins with a legislative history of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
involving President Reagan’s effort to convert the open-ended entitlement structure of Medicaid into a 
capitated block grant; followed by President Reagan’s unexpected response to his failure to do so by 
proposing a federal takeover of Medicaid in 1982. Stepping out of chronological order, the chapter provides 
a brief review of the rationale behind, and the ultimate failure of, the subsequent attempts by congressional 
Republicans and President George W. Bush to block grant Medicaid. The chapter then considers more 
modest amendments to Medicaid’s cost sharing arrangement, including proposals by Senator Patrick 
Moynihan’s (D-N.Y.) to reform the inequities of what he criticized as an arbitrary funding calculus and a 
report from the CBO released in 1982 that similarly suggested alternatives to the FMAP funding formula. 
None of these efforts at reform would succeed and costs would continue to escalate, particularly after 
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Congress enacted a series of federal mandates in the second-half of the 1980s that ignited an explosion in 
the number of Medicaid enrollees. 
Chapter 5 proceeds into the 1990s and the federal government’s hesitant acceptance of the fact 
that Medicaid’s original cost sharing model was insufficient to meet the states’ demand for Medicaid 
services and the subsequent costs thereof. Exasperated by the rising price of health care delivery and rising 
enrollments after a decade of stagnation, the status quo for Medicaid financing had, again, become 
unsustainable. Whereas past reform efforts emphasized the need to control federal spending, the reforms 
examined in this chapter have all helped relieve state governments of some of the fiscal stress imposed by 
Medicaid.  
By the mid-1990s, the proportion of state budgets appropriated to Medicaid often exceeded 25 
percent, up from just a few percentage points spent on medical vendor payments in 1965 and still more 
than double what the average had been the previous decade. Medicaid had eclipsed education as the costliest 
item in several states’ budget. Although the unsustainability of the increasing taxpayer burden of Medicaid 
had been a recurring theme throughout Medicaid’s history, the real inability of the states to continue to 
meet Medicaid’s increasing fiscal burden compelled reform.  
The states would respond first to the fiscal strain by learning to creatively leverage 
Disproportionate Share Hospital payments and, later, Upper Payment Limit appropriations to augment 
their budgets. By offsetting their DSH and UPL outlays with provider-specific taxes on hospitals or 
intragovernmental transfers on local governments (who often help finance hospitals) the states could 
collude with providers to recoup their own-source expenditures and thereby effectively raise the federal 
share going toward their Medicaid operations. While Congress would quickly respond by redressing what 
they perceived as an abuse of these so-called Medicaid maximization schemes, by limiting and not 
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eliminating these practices Congress effectively acknowledged the incapacity of the states to meet the 
increasing cost of their Medicaid commitments and providing coverage to the uninsured. 
Following the states’ own initiatives, the federal government’s own reforms would reflect a 
rebalancing of the shared responsibilities for financing Medicaid. This rebalancing was demonstrated by: the 
bipartisan enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) in 1997 (and its 
reauthorization in 2009), a supplemental block grant that incorporated a more generous federal matching 
rates; the temporary increases to the state’s federal shares in response to economic downturns in 2003 and 
2005, and; the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 and the Medicaid 
expansion included therein. These policies all represent an understanding by federal and state policymakers 
that Medicaid’s cost sharing arrangement had become inadequate to meet the broadening societal need for, 
and public cost of, welfare medicine. 
Taken together the distinct legislative moments described in these four chapters, whether 
successful or, more often than not, unsuccessful, are particularly significant in understanding the 
institutional and political development of the federal government’s financial participation in, and the states’ 
commitments to, Medicaid.  
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Chapter 2.  
Early Vendor Payments and Welfare Medicine, 1950-1960 
 
The provision of federal support for means-tested medical assistance for the poor dates back to at 
least the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Act of 1921 (P.L. 67-97)13 and Title V of the Social 
Security Act of 1935 (P.L. 74-271) that made available matching grants to the states for purposes of 
enhancing maternal and child health services.14 Before proceeding to those specific legislative moments in 
which the federal government expanded the health care safety net through its grants-in-aid programs to the 
states, it is worthwhile to establish a foundation with respect to the federal government’s more general 
fiscal support for the states’ welfare programs. 
Title V was of course part of a broader social program that set the institutional and financial 
framework for both Medicare and Medicaid. In general, the Social Security Act of 1935 exemplified the 
administration and Congress’ increasing New Deal activism and confidence of in the use of federal power to 
enact national social policies. Specifically, Titles I, IV and X of the Social Security Act of 1935, establishing 
Old Age Assistance (“OAA”), Aid to Dependent Children (“ADC”), and Aid to the Blind (“AB”), were three 
new means-tested federal-state programs that provided direct assistance to the poor. These programs are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The Shepperd-Towner program ceased in 1929 after Congress failed to renew its funding in 1927 and allowed 
the program sunset; although 19 states continued the program without federal funding (Lemons 1969) 
14 More generally, in 1798, President John Adams signed into law, “An Act for the Relief of Sick and Disabled 
Seaman,” mandated health care insurance for certain individuals. This extraordinarily progressive law levied a 
mandatory tax of 20 cents per month, equivalent to about 1 percent of wages, on all merchant seamen, that 
subsidized the cost of their publicly financed health services and creation of marine hospitals (5 Cong. Ch. 77, July 
16, 1798, 1 Stat. 605). Comparatively, the total employer- and employee-paid tax for Medicare was set at only 0.70 
percent of wages in 1966; it has been incrementally increased over the years, reaching its current level of 1.45 in 
1986. 
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the institutional precursors to Medicaid. In contrast to these welfare titles, Title II of the Act enacted Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance—what is colloquially known as Social Security—as a strictly federal social 
program that would become the vehicle for implementing Medicare. OAA, ADC and AB, like Medicaid, 
would be are paid out of general revenues; Social Security, like Medicare, would have its own dedicated 
revenue source that was, in part, financed by a contributive tax on all workers. Whereas Social Security’s 
funding mechanism lends the supports the perception that benefits are earned, the historical perception of 
welfare payments has been that they are unearned. 
For the aged indigent, OAA initially provided a federal match equal to one-half of a state’s cash 
payments up to a maximum of $30 per individual aged 65 or older, per month. For dependent children, 
ADC provided a federal match equal to one-third of a state’s cash payments made on behalf of children up 
to a specified maximum ($18 for the first child and $12 for each additional child, per month); under the 
1939 amendments, the federal match was raised to 50 percent (P.L. 76-379). Throughout the forties and 
fifties both the maximum amount eligible under the federal match and the percentage that was reimbursed 
by the federal government was increased several times for both programs. 
These federal-state welfare programs represented an early, if lenient, form of cooperative 
federalism that would become a hallmark of Medicaid. Nicole Huberfeld describes how the Social Security 
Act “adopted and codified states’ categories of deserving poor into federal law,” thereby federalizing a bias 
toward limiting public assistance to the elderly, children, blind, and those otherwise disabled (2011: 441). 
However, while the Social Security Act provided federal funding to support specific state-based welfare 
programs and established broad parameters for benefits and eligibility, the states were allowed significant 
discretion and were not asked to alter their public assistance mechanisms to receive that funding. “In other 
words,” Huberfeld explains. “The states were free to implement federal funding as they saw fit, which could 
be described loosely as a system of federal-state cooperation but was really a set of federal grants to the 
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states to continue providing assistance to the deserving poor with no conditions attached to the federal 
spending” (2011: 442). 
Noteworthy with respect to the historical development of Medicaid’s fiscal underpinning, in the 
1940s, the federal government moved away from a fixed federal matching rate to a variable rate that better 
tied the amount of federal assistance given to the states to the states’ ability to pay. With enactment of the 
Social Security Act Amendments of 1946 (P.L. 79-719), the federal government transitioned to a 
staggered-grants-in-aid, replacing the flat fifty-percent match (for assistance up to a specified maximum). 
The Federal government would now reimburse states for a percentage of payments up to a certain level and 
then at a lower percentage for payments that exceeded the initial threshold and fell below a second level. 
All payments above the second threshold would be paid entirely by the State. This staggered funding 
mechanism effectively boosted federal support for those states with lower welfare payments. It also meant 
that those states that had more generous welfare programs would be required to pay a greater proportion of 
their programs’ costs that exceeded a certain level directly from their own fiscal resources. 
However, the staggered grants-in-aid approach remained based on a state’s willingness to pay, not 
necessarily the state’s ability to pay. As one scholar rightly observed, “the focus of this change in 1946 is to 
further support States which offer lower benefit payments as opposed to offering additional assistance to 
States with lower fiscal capacities” (Thomas 1995). 
The chairman of the Social Security Board, Arthur Altmeyer, supported by some members of 
Congress, had proposed an alternative matching formula that compared to the staggered grants more 
explicitly provided additional assistance to those states with lower fiscal capacity. Introduced earlier, during 
the congressional debates over the 1939 amendments to the Social Security Act, the Senate Committee on 
Relief and Unemployment recommended that the federal contribution for the states’ welfare program 
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should be at a higher rate for poorer states that have less capacity to finance their program. The report of 
the Committee recommended, 
The contribution of the United States for public assistance for the aged, the blind, and 
dependent children be 50 percent of the amount paid, but that in those States where the 
average per capita income is less than the average per capita income of the United States, 
the Federal contribution be increased in proportion to such differences, and that a 
provision of the grant should be the guarantee of certain minimum payments (Peterson and 
Rom, 1990: 101; quoting Congressional Record, June 6, 1939, p. 6684) 
While not immediately implemented for ADC or OAA, this variable federal matching formula was 
also enacted in 1946, to subsidize the states’ school lunch programs (P.L. 79-396). The variable match was 
expanded to hospital construction in 1949, with implementation of the Hospital Survey and Construction 
Act of 1946 (P.L. 79-725).15 The subtle nuance between a states willingness and ability to pay is given 
greater attention later in this chapter when the Social Security Amendments of 1958 expanded the 
applicability of the variable matching rate to the above federal-state welfare programs.  
In reviewing the four major amendments to the Social Security Act that passed between 1950 and 
1960, inclusive, this chapter describes how the federal government’s approach toward medical assistance 
would closely follow the approach taken by Washington to subsidize and incentivize the states to commit 
their resources toward their cash assistance welfare programs. 
 
The Social Security Amendments of 1950 (P.L. 81-734) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 More commonly referred to as the Hill-Burton Act, this program offered grants to states to subsidize hospital 
construction or maintenance (expanded to include nursing homes in 1954), provided that the institution delivered a 
“reasonable volume of free and reduced cost care” to “individuals unable to pay” and to make their services “available 
to all” (P.L. 79-725 at § 622). 
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Before the enactment of the Social Security Amendments of 1950, federal regulations for the 
nation’s “categorically needy” assistance programs—OAA, Aid to the Blind (“AB”) and ADC—required all 
welfare payments to be made directly to recipient. Federal law restricted any federal match dollars from 
being used to subsidize third party payments to doctors or hospitals. If a state welfare agency wished to 
make such in-kind vendor payments to a doctor or hospital on behalf of the poor, the payments had to be 
paid for exclusively with state and local general assistance funds.  
This prohibition against federal funds being used for in-kind assistance was intended to empower 
welfare recipients and avoid the worst abuses of local poor houses; however, the policy had the unintended 
consequence of increasing a state’s relative costs for providing medical care to their poor residents. Given 
the cost sharing incentive of the federal match to provide cash payment and without any federal subsidies to 
support their medical charity, the states provided only meager levels of direct medical assistance, if they 
provided any at all. 
According to the report of the 1948 Advisory Commission, this prohibition against certain kinds of 
federal welfare assistance had the greatest impact on poor states with limited state tax revenues. To 
maximize the multiplicative effect of federal participation the states would direct their own limited 
resources to those services eligible for federal cost sharing. A state could augment its welfare budget more 
than once over if it distributed the funds as cash assistance to the recipients of one of the three federal-state 
categorically needy programs. The same was not true if those limited revenues were spent on health care. 
“Some states apply virtually all the State and local funds available for public assistance to the specific 
programs for which Federal reimbursement is available, leaving little or no money for so-called general 
assistance,” explained the Commission. “State funds are thus concentrated on programs which have Federal 
grants-in-aid” (Advisory Commission 1948: 100). 
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While, certainly, some states may have budgeted for medical care in the amount of cash allotments 
provided to the categorically needy, this marginal assistance was difficult to monitor and fell far short of 
adequately meeting the medical needs of the welfare population. Indeed, despite recognition by the Bureau 
of Public Assistance that sickness and disability were the “primary causes of the dependency of persons 
receiving public assistance” and that “at least a majority of the persons on general assistance rolls are 
suffering from acute or chronic illness or handicap,” federal administrators suspected that “when a 
recipient’s income is seriously inadequate, it is probable that medical needs, even though budgeted as 
requirements, often go unmet because of the more urgent need for food, housing, and clothing” (White 
1952).  
Similarly, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, in a later appraisal of the 
political legacy welfare medicine before Medicaid and Medicare, reasoned, “With full independence in use 
of their money payments, many recipients neglected medical care, often because States set the overall 
money payment level so low as to be insufficient for basic food and shelter” (Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations, 1968). Whether or not the cash assistance was adequate, a general implication 
of the reports was that the states needed a degree of paternalistic flexibility in defining their welfare policies 
if they wanted to ensure the poor received adequate medical care. 
Throughout the fifties, researchers in the Social Security Administration provided Congress with 
regular reports, either through testimony or through its in-house publication, the Social Security Bulletin, on 
the pressing health-related needs of the poor and current levels of expenditures on medical assistance at the 
state and federal level.i For example, in a report published in the June 1950 edition of the Bulletin, just 
months before Congress finished debating the Social Security Amendments of 1950, a government 
researcher prefaced his data on means-tested assistance for health care by noting that, “the Federal 
Government does not share in making payments to vendors.” He estimated that medical vendor payments 
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paid exclusively by state and local assistance agencies totaled as much as $85 million for calendar year 1949 
($769 million in 2008 dollars). While the estimations were imprecise due to absence of any reporting 
requirements, the researcher further calculated that total assistance for medical care, including money 
payments paid to welfare recipients and subsequently used for medical care, amounted to a total $125 
million ($1.1 billion in 2008 dollars; White 1950: 3). In all, two-thirds of all medical assistance provided by 
state and local welfare agencies was ineligible for any form of federal match due to the fact that 
reimbursements were paid directly to the provider.16 
Further, with total public assistance approximating $1.95 billion in 1949 ($17.6 billion in 2008 
dollars), medical payments, at $125 million or approximately 6 percent of the states’ total welfare budgets, 
were only a marginal priority for the states; although, with as many as thirteen states having little to no 
medical payments, the proportion of welfare budgets directed to the medical care of the poor was higher in 
some states. For example, the state of Washington, in spending about 11 percent of the total assistance 
dollars on medical care was the most profligate in 1949. Unique among the states, the local welfare agencies 
in Washington contributed $2.50 per month for each individual on their welfare rolls to county medical 
services bureaus that then used these collections to make prepayments on healthcare-related charges 
incurred by welfare recipients. Across the state, net expenditures averaged $7.33 per month for each 
recipient on old age assistance and nearly $15 per family with dependent children. Unlike the cash 
assistance provided to these same welfare recipients, none of these health-related expenditures were eligible 
for federal cost sharing (White 1950). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Another study by the same government researcher, this time of 20 states over a six-month period in 1946, 
corroborated his earlier article to argue that while many state and local governments had already institutionalized the 
provision of health services to the poor, federal participation was minimal. Importantly, this later study suggested that 
when states were not subject to federal restrictions on how assistance could be delivered to the poor (because no 
additional Federal participation could be obtained by including amounts in the money payments to welfare 
recipients), state and local governments favored making vendor payments directly to health care providers (White 
1952).  
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Regardless of the federal prohibition against third party welfare payments, the government 
researcher noted, “federal maximums [for public assistance] are so low that money for medical services can 
seldom be included within the maximums [eligible for federal participation]” (White 1950: 5). In 1949, the 
federal government limited federal participation to a maximum of $30 of the first $50 paid in assistance to 
any individual each month. Any additional dollars above $50 that was paid was to an individual would have 
needed to be financed entirely with state and local tax revenues, whether the assistance was classified as 
general assistance or associated with one of the special federal-state assistance categories. 
Again using the state of Washington as an example, the average money payment for an old age 
assistance recipient, at $68.26 per month in 1949, already far exceeded the maximum amount eligible for a 
federal match (Statistical Abstract 1950). Thus, the federal government would have reimbursed 
Washington the maximum $30, with Washington using its own state and/or local revenues to finance both 
the remaining $38.26 in cash assistance and the full amount of the $7.33 in vendor payments paid toward 
the medical care of OAA recipients. Given the strict capitation on the amount of federal assistance available 
to the states, it made little difference from a state’s budgetary perspective if medical charges were paid 
directly with vendor payments to doctors and hospitals or indirectly via money payments to unhealthy 
welfare recipients. In neither case would the federal government have subsidized the states’ budgetary 
commitments to the social welfare of their poorest residents. 
The Social Security Amendments of 1950 (P.L. 81-734) was the first of several laws that 
incrementally increased the federal government’s explicit role in financing (and administrating) medical 
care for the poor. Significantly, states could now use federal funds to directly reimburse medical vendors, 
albeit still within the strict fiscal limitations on the amount of federal revenues that would be distributed per 
welfare recipient. 
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The public assistance components of the 1950 law played “strictly a supplementary and secondary 
role” to the legislative change to the old age and survivors insurance (OASI) program that expanded 
eligibility to an additional 10 million workers and raised benefits by about 80 percent (Sidor 2010: 17). 
However, the new categorical grant-in-aid program for the disabled and the allowances for medical vendor 
payments were “necessary preludes”—to adopt Martha Derthick’s observation of the relationship between 
disability insurance and Medicare (1979: 319)—to the substantial health reforms that would follow over the 
decade, culminating with Medicaid’s passage in 1965.  
While the final law did not include the Truman administration’s preference for a comprehensive 
contributory disability insurance program modeled after OASI—the amendment having failed to be 
endorsed by the Senate Finance Committee and subsequently rejected by a voice vote on the Senate floor on 
fears that it was a harbinger of a more comprehensive health insurance agendas—the bill amended the 
welfare provisions of the Social Security Act to include a new state administered categorical grant-in-aid 
program of means-tested assistance to the “permanently and totally disabled.” Congress made federal 
participation available to approved plans on the same basis as old age assistance and aid to the blind.  
Given the expectation that the poor and disabled would have considerable unmet health care needs, 
the inclusion of this subpopulation precipitated a more general change to how the federal government 
approached the payment of medical care.  
To that end, the 1950 amendments permitted states to use federal matching funds to directly 
finance medical vendor payments made to doctors and hospitals on behalf of certain welfare recipient. The 
federal government would subsidize these vendor payments on the same basis as it did money payments 
paid directly to the welfare payments. State participation was optional and eligibility remained tied to the 
states‘ definitions of categorically needy as used for its categorical cash assistance programs (the federal 
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government would not subsidize the vendor payments for recipients who only received state or local 
general assistance).  
Federal participation with respect to vendor payments was limited, however, to the extent that the 
combined total of the cash payments and medical vendor payments to hospitals, doctors and other suppliers 
of medical services did not exceed the maximums on individual payments specified in the federal Act. In 
1950 that matching formula remained set at three-fourths of the first $20 of the state’s average monthly 
payment and one-half the remainder, up to an individual maximum of $50 per month (for a maximum 
federal contribution of $30 per month per individual); less for needy children. (The federal government 
separately compensated the states for one-half of its administrative costs for implementing and 
administering the system of vendor payment.) 
For states with cash assistance payments already at $50, the state and local government budgets 
would have little incentive to alter their payment schedule. As cited above, a hard ` remained: “federal 
maximums are so low that money for medical services can seldom be included within the maximums” 
(White 1950).  
Both chambers overwhelming passed the law—the conference report was passed 374 (140-R, 234-
D) to 1 (1-R) in the House and by voice vote in the Senate. The law authorized an appropriation of $50 
million ($413 million in constant 2008 dollars) for medical vendor payments during its first fiscal year of 
operation; the 1948 Advisory Council having earlier estimated that the annual cost of the reform to the 
federal government would range from $56 million to $89 million. President Truman signed H.R. 6000 on 
August 28, 1950. 
Although the disability compromise received some press attention, no major news outlet made any 
specific mention of the medical vendor payments initiated with the law. The latter was also absent—except 
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in the most cursory and indirect nod—from President Truman’s signing statement. Nonetheless, that the 
health-related provisions of the Social Security Amendments of 1950 were secondary does not diminish 
their incremental import to subsequent reforms. 
In fiscal year 1951, 38 states reported having made medical vendor payments from general 
assistance funds; but only 15 states availed themselves of the opportunity to obtain Federal funds through 
any of the now four federally subsidized programs, including the newly passed aid to permanently and 
totally disabled (Social Security Bulletin 1952: 13). Further, an analysis by the Bureau of Public Assistance 
of the early impact of the 1950 amendment emphasized the minimal financial assistance provided by the 
federal government’s new allowance for vendor payments. The Bureau estimated that less than a quarter of 
total vendor payments were even eligible for any federal cost sharing due to maximum on allowed federal 
participation. Of the total vendor payments paid by state and local governments, the federal government 
reimbursed just 13.2 percent (Norman 1952, based on June 1952 data). The Bureau approximated the cost 
of total federal participation at just $10 million for fiscal year 1952 ($80.2 million in 2008-adjusted dollars; 
Norman 1952: 9). Well below budgetary projections. 
Between 1952 and 1960 medical vendor payments increased dramatically. However, given the low 
base at which they started, total commitments remained, in absolute terms, overall insufficient (if not 
insignificant from the perspective of state and local outlays) to meet the need among the poor for medical 
attention. 
Table 2.1 presents data published annually in the Social Security Bulletin between 1953 and 1962 on 
the fiscal year expenditures on state-level medical vendor payments (inclusive of federal cost sharing) per 
resident for the four categorically needy programs as well as for state and local general assistance. A clear 
trend from the data is that an increasing share of any new state spending on medical care went to the 
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categorical assistance programs eligible for federal cost sharing and not state or local spending on general 
assistance that was not eligible for federal cost sharing.  
A similar pattern will be seen in most states with Medicaid and CHIP spending: at least through 
implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion in 2014, almost all means-tested medical 
assistance is directed exclusively to children, pregnant women, older parents, and, to a lesser extent, 
parents. Adults, however poor, are typically ineligible for assistance. 
Table 2.1. State Spending (including Federal Grants-in-Aid) on Medical Care Vendor Payments, Fiscal Years 1952-1962 
Source: "Assistance Expenditures per Inhabitant, 19xx-19xy" in Social Security Bulletin, various years (1953-63). 
 
	  
1952	   1953	   1954	   1955	   1956	   1957	   1958	   1959	   1960	   1961	   1962	  
	  
All	  State-­‐Level	  Assistance	  Programs	  (includes	  General	  Assistance	  and	  Categorical	  Assistance*	  Programs)	  
Total	  Spending,	  $millions	   123	   154	   174	   212	   253	   288	   320	   410	   490	   589	   812	  
Average	  Spending	  per	  Capita,	  $	   0.78	   0.97	   1.09	   1.30	   1.51	   1.69	   1.84	   2.32	   2.71	   3.20	   4.32	  
Total	  Spending,	  in	  Constant	  2008	  
Dollars,	  $millions	   999	   1,245	   1,393	   1,703	   2,003	   2,207	   2,384	   3,033	   3,564	   4,241	   5,792	  
#	  with	  No	  Vendor	  Payments	   -­‐	   12	   12	   13	   12	   12	   9	   7	   7	   4	   1	  
#	  with	  Vendor	  Payments	   -­‐	   41	   41	   40	   41	   41	   44	   46	   47	   50	   53	  
Vendor	  Payments	  per	  Inhabitant,	  #	  of	  states:	  
	  	  	  	  less	  than	  $0.50	   -­‐	   -­‐	   14	   13	   13	   12	   8	   9	   6	   6	   4	  
	  	  	  	  $0.50-­‐0.99	   -­‐	   -­‐	   5	   5	   4	   5	   7	   4	   8	   7	   4	  
	  	  	  	  $1.00-­‐1.49	   -­‐	   -­‐	   6	   6	   4	   1	   2	   5	   4	   3	   4	  
	  	  	  	  $1.50-­‐1.99	   -­‐	   -­‐	   7	   6	   8	   5	   4	   2	   1	   1	   6	  
	  	  	  	  $2.00	  or	  more	   -­‐	   -­‐	   9	   10	   12	   18	   23	   26	   28	   33	   34	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Categorical	  Assistance	  Programs	  with	  Federal	  Cost	  Sharing*	  
	  	  Per	  Capita	  Spending	   -­‐	   -­‐	   0.75	   0.90	   1.08	   1.27	   1.37	   1.78	   2.16	   2.59	   3.78	  
	  	  #	  with	  No	  Vendor	  Payments	   34	   29	   27	   29	   27	   23	   17	   12	   10	   7	   3	  
	  	  #	  with	  Vendor	  Payments	   19	   24	   26	   24	   26	   30	   36	   41	   44	   47	   51	  
*Includes:	  	  Old	  Age	  Assistance,	  Aid	  to	  Blind,	  Aid	  to	  Dependent	  Children,	  Aid	  to	  Totally	  and	  Permanently	  Disabled	  
General	  Assistance	  Programs	  
	  	  Per	  Capita	  Spending	   -­‐	   -­‐	   0.34	   0.40	   0.43	   0.43	   0.48	   0.54	   0.55	   0.61	   0.53	  
	  	  #	  with	  No	  Vendor	  Payments	   14	   13	   13	   14	   13	   14	   15	   16	   15	   14	   14	  
	  	  #	  with	  Vendor	  Payments	   39	   39	   40	   39	   40	   39	   38	   37	   39	   40	   40	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The Social Security Amendments of 1956 (P.L. 84-880)  
The next piece of legislation that was significant from the perspective of the federal financing of 
welfare medicine was the Social Security Amendments of 1956 (for summary see, Shottland 1967). This 
law differentiated federal grants-in-aid for medical care from cash assistance by enacting a separate matching 
rate for the former. 
Significantly, under the 1956 amendment, federal financial participation with respect to vendor 
payments was no longer related to expenditures associated with an individual, but was changed to an 
average expenditure basis calculated across all recipients for each welfare program. Formerly any amounts 
paid in excess of the specified individual maximums were excluded from federal subsidization. Now, 
however, with respect to vendor payments at least, Congress would no longer limit federal appropriations 
according to a maximum payment level per individual recipient. Rather the federal government would 
provide the states with a federal match equivalent to one-half the state’s costs, up to an average net 
expenditure of $6 a month per adult and $3 a month per child. (For cash assistance, the individual 
maximum was retained, but the amount eligible for federal cost sharing was raised to $60 for an adult, 
having been increased to $55 in 1952.)  
As with the original 1950 legislation, the states could choose whether or not to offer vendor 
payments for all, any, or none of the four categorically eligible groups. 
The provision represented the delayed enactment of a recommendation made eight years earlier by 
the 1948 Advisory Commission (albeit unadjusted for the intervening years of inflation). This earlier report 
had argued: 
It would be very difficult to meet medical needs with a ceiling imposed on individual 
payments. When medical bills are incurred, they are often large, particularly when the 
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recipient receives hospital or nursing-home care. We recommend, however, the control of 
federal expenditures by limiting Federal contributions for medical care to one-half the 
amounts which average not more than $6 per month per person receiving old-age 
assistance and aid to the blind, and not more than $3 per month per person receiving aid to 
dependent children. (1948: 114) 
Noting the unique nature of the health care spending as well as the limited fiscal capacities of poor 
states the Senate Committee on Finance, in their report on the proposed Social Security Amendments of 
1956 (H.R. 7725), repeated the Advisory Commission’s logic to explain the need for a separate matching 
formula and the elimination of the individual maximum: 
Since medical expenses for an individual may be high in one month (sometimes running to 
several hundred dollars) and small or nonexistent in other months, and since many of the 
individuals with the largest medical needs also have maintenance needs of $55 or more, 
there is frequently little or no Federal participation in payments made by States for medical 
care. This has limited the amounts of medical care that many States have been able to make 
available to recipients, and has certainly discouraged many States with less than average per 
capita income from assuming substantial responsibility for the costs of medical care for 
needy people. (84th Congress, 2nd Session, Report No. 2133, p. 29) 
The Commission and Committee’s summaries succinctly describe the basic economics of health 
care financing and insurance underwriting, in which the majority of costs are heavily skewed toward a 
minority of the population. The capitation of federal support at a low individual maximum—as opposed to 
an average capitation—made any sort of comprehensive program of medical assistance fiscally infeasible for 
many states. 
Under the 1956 amendment, large medical payments made on behalf of some recipients could be 
averaged with the many small or no expenditures for other recipients. This in essence would create a 
reserve fund for the medical care of the needy. It could have a maximum value of $6 times the total number 
of eligible recipient and the federal government would contribute half. Any expenditure over this amount 
would be fully financed by the states. Now, assuming an actuarially sound trust that averaged $6 per welfare 
	  
	   	  
59  
recipient, a $100 doctor’s bill could be paid entirely from the trust at a direct cost of $50 to the state, 
irrespective of the money payments allotted to the individual. Comparatively, prior to the enactment of the 
1956 reform and assuming the OAA recipient received a cash payment equivalent to the national average of 
$57.99 per month (for December 1956), the state’s cost for the same medical bill would have been the full 
$100 cost of the doctor’s bill, having already exceeded the individual maximum eligible for federal 
participation (Statistical Abstract of the United States 1957). 
After the bill’s sweeping bipartisan passage in the House and Senate (passing 374-2 in the House 
and by unanimous roll call vote in Senate, with House concurring by voice vote to Senate changes), 
President Eisenhower signed the Social Security Amendments of 1956 on August 28. 
 
The Social Security Amendments of 1958 (P.L. 85-850) 
In a January 1958 letter to the newly ensconced chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, Representative Wilbur D Mills (D, Ark.), the president of the American Hospital Association, 
Kenneth Williamson, acknowledged there existed a problem with respect to the access of the aged to health 
care services. While Dr. Williamson cautioned that any compulsory public hospital insurance program 
reliant upon Social Security payroll taxes “should not be accepted unless and until all other possible 
solutions of the problem have been fully explored and found wanting” it was significant that the he accepted 
that “the time is ripe for active Congressional consideration of the problem.”17 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The American Medical Association was less relenting to accept the need for government intervention, but 
would ultimately give its support to the Representative Mill’s 1960 proposal to extend the means-tested program for 
the poor. 
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While both the contemporaneous and historical attention to the biannual amendments to the social 
security act generally emphasized the social insurance provisions of the laws, the Social Security 
Amendments of 1958 (P.L. 85-850) is yet another example of the persistent incrementalism that expanded 
the federal grants-in-aid for the states’ means-tested health care programs. 
Similar to the delay between the 1948 report by the Social Security Administration recommending 
that maximum assistance for medical vendor payments be calculated on an average basis—as opposed to an 
individual—and the enactment of such reforms in 1956, the Social Security Amendments of 1958 
represented the delayed enactment of a pair of reforms introduced four years prior by President Dwight 
Eisenhower in a special message to Congress delivered in January 1954.  
Among the President’s proposals for reforming the federal social insurance programs for the 
nation’s elderly, President Eisenhower recommended, with respect to the federal grants-in-aid, that 
Congress adopt a new funding formula for all types of federal means-tested assistance that (a) calculated the 
maximum amount of federal cost sharing subsidies on an average rather than an individual basis and (b) took 
into better consideration “the financial capacity of the several States to support their public assistance 
programs by adopting, as a measure of that capacity, their per capita income” (Eisenhower 1954). 
Whether or not the length of the delay was intended, the four intervening years between 
Eisenhower’s special message and the enactment of its provisions with passage of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1958 would appear to fulfill the President’s caution that the “new public assistance formula 
should not become effective until the States have had an opportunity to plan for it” (Ibid.). 
With respect to Eisenhower’s first recommendation, the far-reaching Social Security Amendments 
of 1958 authorized the states to include both the regular monthly money payment to recipients and any 
vendor payments for medical care in a "general averaging formula" based on averaging the payments for all 
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recipients in an assistance category rather than setting a maximum for each individual's payment. The total 
sum of welfare payments that the federal government would subsidize was determined for each categorical 
program by multiplying the respective number of persons receiving OAA, AB, and AD by $65 and by 
multiplying the number receiving AFDC by $30. These aggregate amounts replaced the respective $60 and 
$34 individual maximums for cash assistance payments and the respective $6 and $3 average assistance 
amount for medical care provided to an eligible adult or child. 
Most important from the perspective of the development of Medicaid’s cost sharing formula (i.e. 
the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage, or “FMAP”) the 1958 amendments changed the calculus for how 
the federal government calculated its financial participation vis-à-vis the states by introducing the variable 
matching rate. The recommendation was for a broader application of the variable matching rate introduced 
on a more-or-less pilot program basis in 1946 for subsidizing the states’ school lunch programs and hospital 
construction. 
Prior to the 1958 the matching formula for medical vendor payments and cash assistance was 
constant across the nation.18 But, now, with the enactment of the 1958 amendments, the federal 
government had the subsidies it provided to the states’ welfare program better reflect the relative fiscal 
capacities of the states. This reform supported the view that a state’s collective wealth, or the lack thereof, 
should not be the limiting factor in determining how much charity a state could show to its needy residents.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The tiered subsidization schedule, however, had the affect that poor states that could not (or at least, choose 
not to) pay high assistance rates were liable for lower proportions of their total welfare expenditures. For example, in 
1957 the states paid four-fifths of the first $30 in assistance for aged, blind and disabled recipients and fourteen-
seventeenths of the first $17 for children, but they had to contribute a full half of the rest up to the defined 
maximum. States making high assistance payments could expect to receive as much as 65 percent of their assistance 
payments back in Federal grants-in-aid (less if they made payments greater than the maximum, any difference they 
would be wholly responsible for financing), whereas those with low individual payments would see upwards of 80 
percent of their categorically needy assistance subsidized by the federal government. 
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Americans had a national responsibility to guarantee a basic level of subsistence to all their neighbors, 
irrespective of the state of their residency. 
“[It] will be of particular assistance to States with limited fiscal resources and will enable these 
States to make more nearly adequate assistance payments,” reasoned the House Ways and Means 
Committee in its report supporting the equalization formation. “This will help to more nearly balance the 
level of assistance made available to needy people in various parts of the country” (House Ways and Means 
1958: 10). 
While the federal share continued to be a generous four-fifths of the first $30 for adults and 
fourteen-seventeenths of the first $17 for children, for payments in excess of these amounts the federal 
government would variably reimburse a state according to a ratio of the state’s income to the national 
income, bounded between a minimum of 50 percent and a maximum of 70 percent. The states would still 
be subject to the new average maximums for assistance set by the law. The federal matching percentage was 
to be recalculated every other year using a three-year average of per capita incomes according to this 
formula: 
Federal Share = 0.5  ×
state  per  capita  income
  national  per  capita  income
2
 
Remarkably, the calculus underlying the federal matching formula would remain largely unchanged 
for the next sixty-plus years. 
Despite the variability of the new formula bearing a resemblance to President Eisenhower’s 1954 
recommendation, his administration objected to the specific calculation of the federal share. The president 
opposed the calculation of the federal share because the formula, bounded as it was between 50 and 70 
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percent, had the affect of increasing overall federal participation relative to the states’ status quo 
proportional financing of vendor payments.  
During a hearing before the Democrat-controlled Senate Committee on Finance, the Secretary of 
Health, Education and Welfare, Arthur Flemming articulated the administration’s opposition to the 
proposed changes to the matching formula. While the administration accepted that the maximum ceiling on 
state expenditures should be a variable calculation and computed on the basis of per capita income, the 
administration remained “strongly opposed” to the “unsound proposal” to amend the federal matching 
formula in the manner presented (Ibid. 112, 113). 
The Secretary reminded the Committee that their proposal to reform the federal matching rate 
went counter to the President’s earlier budget message for “modernizing the formulas for public assistance 
with a view to gradually reducing Federal participation in its financing” (Ibid. 112).  
In preferring a reduction to the federal’s government’s commitment to welfare, the Secretary was 
referring to a proportional diminution of its fiscal responsibility, not an absolute reduction in federal 
outlays. The Secretary allowed for the likelihood that increased federal expenditures would be necessary; 
but he reiterated the perspective that if additional spending was needed to assist the poor residents of the 
states, the federal government should take a secondary, or tertiary (to local governments), role, not the 
primary role. 
During the Senate hearing on the bill, Senator Robert Kerr (D, Okla.) sparred with Secretary 
Flemming over the necessity of increasing federal participation. The senator contended that the already 
inadequate health benefits received by the needy would necessarily be reduced if the Federal government 
required states to pay a greater proportion of the costs. Secretary Flemming, however, challenged Kerr and 
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others that he “would not start from the assumption” that the states could not do more for the poor (Ibid. 
130).19  
It was the view of the Republican administration that the health care needs of the states’ poor were 
first and foremost the responsibility of the state and local governments. 
Again, Secretary Flemming stressed the administration’s primary objection was not over the 
absolute level of appropriation for welfare, but rather concerned notions of American federalism and the 
proper balance of administrative and financial responsibility for traditionally local welfare concerns. The 
Secretary rebutted the senators insistent on greater federal participation: “[T]his country has regarded these 
programs as State programs…. We are not objecting to an increase in the amount paid to the beneficiaries 
under this program. …[W]e do object to the increase in the percentage of Federal participation” (Ibid. 
141). 
It is worth quoting at length a statement by the Secretary that exemplified the nuanced position of 
the Republican administration’s philosophy toward the proper relationship between the federal and state 
governments and their respective fiscal and moral obligations to the poor. The national government, 
Secretary Flemming proposed, should set broad objectives and national standards, but the administration 
and financing of the public service should remain devolved to the states: 
…the Federal Government has got a real obligation to set what I might call a national goal 
in an area of this kind and indicate what it is society as a whole, governments at all levels, 
and private institutions should be doing in order to deal with this problem in an effective 
manner. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The relative merit of Secretary Flemming’s own assumption was reinforced by the committee chairman, Harry 
F. Byrd (D., Va.) who noted for the record the relative fiscal health of the states and compared the states’ finances to 
the recurring deficits of the federal government that was “not likely to have a balanced budget for many years” (Ibid. 
134). 
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On the other hand, I personally do not think that it is sound to see the States gradually 
move out of the picture from the standpoint of the assumption of fiscal responsibility or 
from the standpoint of making a contribution along fiscal lines to the achievement of these 
national goals.  
I think the Federal Government has made a real contribution to the achievement of these 
national goals. I think we should continue to do it. And I recognize the fact that even 
staying with the present percentage, or the present percentage relationship between the 
Federal Government and the State government, that the Federal Government may have to 
spend an increasing amount of money on it. 
But I think the time has come when we ought not to just let this curve of the percent of 
Federal participation keep moving up until it finally hits 80 or 90 percent because you and I 
know that if it does, this will no longer be an operation that will really be administered by 
the States and local communities. (Ibid. 143) 
Not persuaded by the Secretary’s testimony to limit federal participation, the Senate committee 
reported its bill with the enhanced federal match favorably to the floor. The Committee included a 
provision establishing an Advisory Council on Public Assistance that would review the status of public 
assistance in relation to old-age, survivors and disability insurance, the fiscal capacities of the states and of 
the federal government, and any other factors bearing on the amount and proportion of the state and federal 
shares of the public assistance programs.20 
On the Senate floor, the public assistance components of the bill faced competing demands (see 
Congressional Record Vol. 104 Part 14 [1958]: 17973-17979, 17992). On the one hand, with the price tag of 
the public assistance component of the Social Security Amendments of 1958 estimated to be $288 million 
annually there remained real and legitimate concern among a bipartisan majority in Congress that President 
Eisenhower might still veto the bill as recommended by the Senate committee.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 It is worthwhile to note that a national health insurance model based on a social insurance model, such as that 
then was being pushed by Representative Aime Forand (D, R.I.), was excluded from the Advisory Council’s mandate 
on means-tested programs. 
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A veto of the bill because of these specific welfare provisions threatened the enactment of the 
politically popular election-year increase in social security payments that was also included in the bill and 
for which the administration had given its consent. The consensus that seemed to emerge in parts of the 
Senate floor was that the only way to ameliorate the veto threat was to reduce the overall cost of the 
welfare components of the bill to less than a more palatable $200 million. 
On the other hand, Republicans and Democrats from California and Massachusetts and the other 
comparatively wealthy states with the most generous benefits for their needy residents wanted to adjust the 
matching formula by increasing the maximum capitation on federal participation. They objected to the 
premise that a presidential veto was a certainty. The fact that their proposal further increased the magnitude 
of the federal appropriations demanded of the bill did not deter these senators. 
As a member of this latter coalition, and splitting with the president, Californian Republican, 
Senator Thomas Kuchel, introduced an amendment to the Committee’s bill costing an additional $40 
million that would have raised the cap on federal participation to an average of $70 per recipient of OAA, 
AB and AD, and to $40 for each recipient of ADC—from $65 and $30 per month, respectively. Senator 
Kuchel’s amendment did not change the new variable matching formula, but raised the maximum amount 
on which the formula would operate. The additional federal spending proposed by Senator Kuchel would 
largely go to states that traditionally had generous payments, such as California, Massachusetts and 
Colorado. These states were not particularly advantaged by the Committee’s proposal to reform the 
federal-state partnership for means-tested assistance because the states already made welfare payments that 
exceeded the higher federal capitation levels. Such states would not see any fiscal improvement in changing 
from an individual- to average-based maximum. Further, the states that had more generous benefit 
schedules for their poor generally had higher per capita incomes relative to the national average and so they 
did not benefit from the introduction of the new variable matching grant, with its 50 percentage point 
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minimum rate, that replaced the constant 50-50 match. However, it was these very states that the president 
and his administration argued did not need any supplemental federal support given the states’ own robust 
revenue sources. 
Noting that his state’s traditional generosity to its poor burdened California residents with high 
state taxes, Senator Kuchel passionately argued that his own amendment offered charitable Californians a 
“modicum” of relief that would help to resolve “the gross, indefensible, inequitable, and miserable manner 
in which aged citizens in some States of the American Union are treated by the bill, in contrast to the 
manner in which similarly situated elderly Americans in other States are treated” (Ibid. 17973). 
Senator Robert Kerr (D, Okla.), who led the opposition to Kuchel’s amendment, retorted, “I 
know that California has a great burden. It also has great capacity” (Ibid. 17976). And Senator Kerr assured 
his colleague, “I would love to help California nearly as much as I would love to help Oklahoma.” Yet 
utilitarian concerns over a potential presidential veto forced him to be impartial, he explained. Despite the 
fact that “before too long Oklahoma would also become a beneficiary of [Kuchel’s amendment]” as 
Oklahoma increased payments to the poor, Senator Kerr warned the Senate that no state “can become the 
beneficiary of a vetoed bill” (Ibid. 17976). 
Not persuaded by such seemingly disingenuous charity when certain states, like Oklahoma, would 
receive an additional $10 or more per recipient from the Treasury, while others, like his home state of 
California, would get less than a dollar, Senator Kuchel reiterated that the “incredible inequity which exists 
in the committee bill is 100 percent indefensible.”  
Senator Kuchel added, “I do not see how Senators can approve such an elastic yardstick” and “abuse 
States in this Union which have tried to be, and have succeeded in being, a bit more fair and just with their 
fellow citizens in need” (Ibid. 17978). Fellow Californian and Senate Minority Leader William Knowland 
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(R) similarly argued that the committee’s proposed spending cap was “a gross discrepancy and inequity” 
(Ibid. 17975). 
In truth, however, California’s poor would continue to be better treated than most other poor 
across the nation because the state offered more generous welfare relief to its residents. The so-called 
“inequity” of the proposed reform fell upon the California taxpayers who necessarily paid high taxes to 
finance the state’s relatively rich welfare payments. Such Californians, and the residents of other 
comparatively generous states, would see little to no tax relief from the proposed reforms to the matching 
formula. 
Instead of reducing state taxpayer inequity, the Social Security Amendments of 1958 intentionally 
increased such taxpayer inequity by raising the tax burden of providing a certain level of welfare in a rich 
state, such as California, relative to a poor state, like Oklahoma.21  
In general, the additional federal appropriations included in the Social Security Amendments of 
1958 benefited states with average monthly payments at or below $65 and with per capita incomes below 
the national average. By associating a state’s matching rate with its per capita income, the matching formula 
was intended to help raise welfare payments in those poor states that historically paid out comparatively low 
benefits. Wealthy states, that typically paid more generous benefits, would not be eligible for the higher 
match. Thus, Congress intended the variable matching formula to reduce inequities among welfare 
recipients in different states by subsidizing a larger share of the welfare costs in poor states and thereby 
incentivizing such states to raise their welfare benefits to the national average.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Californian poor were not even the best off, if it is appropriate to refer positively to poverty in any situation: 
Connecticut was the most generous with payments to its elderly poor averaging $107.32 per month; California with 
OAA benefits averaging $84.02 was only the fifth most generous. The average monthly OAA payment across the 
nation was $66.55 in 1958. (Congressional Record 1958: 17978) 
	  
	   	  
69  
The absence of any real consideration to the formulation of the variable matching rate is striking. 
For the most part, the Senate accepted the simplistic ratio of per capita incomes—“the mumbo-jumbo of 
the involved so-called variable formula written into the bill “ as Senator Kuchel referenced it (Ibid. 
19793)—as a fait accompli. 
 “I do not think one can rewrite formulas on the floor of the Senate,” Senator Knowland acquiesced.  
However, in alluding to potentially competing factors that could also be considered and balanced in 
constructing an equitable matching formula, Senator Knowland added, 
I hope in the national interest something will be worked out to provide an equitable 
formula for the large and the small States, with respect to those which in some ways are 
economically better off, which perhaps have problems some other States do not have, and 
which have standards higher than some other States. (Ibid. 17975) 
But in offering no suggestion as to what an alternative formula should include, Senator Knowland 
punted, suggesting only that, “following Congresses must give that matter consideration.” (Ibid. 17975) 
The Californians could not have known that the simplistic ratio based strictly on per capita income would 
have managed to persist, largely unchanged, as the foundation for determining a state’s share of its Medicaid 
and CHIP expenditures for over six decades, through to the present day.  
In agreeing to put aside any further consideration of the appropriate calculus for the matching 
formula, the Senate debate focused on the level of the cap on federal appropriations and overall cost of the 
reform. The Senate defeated Kuchel’s amendment to raise the capitations on a division (or standing) vote. 
(Ibid. 17979) 
To further mollify the administration fiscal concerns over the total cost of the welfare component 
of the Social Security Amendments of 1958, Senator George Smathers (Fla., D) offered two “practical and 
sensible” amendments he saw as necessary compromises in order to “get something rather than nothing.” 
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His first amendment lowered the maximum match from 70 percent to 65 percent, thereby lowering the 
potential variable matching grant to be awarded to the poor states and reducing the overall estimated cost of 
the welfare provisions from $288 to $217 million.  
Senator Smathers’ second amendment to the Committee bill eliminated an upward revision in the 
federal match for payments to dependent children that would have increased the amount of federal 
payments from fourteen-seventeenths of first $17 spent to five-sixth of the first $18 paid to recipients. By 
retaining the status quo for the first $17 of assistance Smathers’ amendment cut the proposed increase in 
federal participation and further reduced the overall price tag of the welfare reforms to $197 million. Both 
amendments passed without any debate and on voice votes (Ibid. 17992). 
As an aside, and a preamble to the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960, it was telling that Senator Smathers’ 
amendment to maintain a lower cost sharing rate for the first $17 dollar of assistance applied only to 
payments for recipients of aid to dependent children, not payments to the recipients of old age assistance, 
or the blind or disabled. In the same vain, nearly all arguments pertaining to the need to increase the federal 
commitment to welfare were made in reference to old age assistance. Only Senator Kuchel referenced 
blind individuals, a small constituency that no doubt garnered public sympathy. The senators were 
uniformly silent in advocating for increased spending on behalf of children on welfare. When it came to 
welfare, and as shall be seen, medical care, the public and their elected representatives treated families and 
children differently that they did the aged, and to some extent, the disabled and blind. 
With the estimated cost of the public assistance components of the Social Security Amendments of 
1958 now falling below $200 million, thereby alleviating the senators concerns it would attract a 
presidential veto, the bill passed the Senate, 79-0. Having earlier passed in the House by a vote of 375 to 2, 
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albeit without the Smathers amendments, the House subsequently concurred with the Senate version by 
voice vote. President Dwight Eisenhower signed P.L. 85-840 on August 29.  
Consistent with his special message to Congress of 1954, President Eisenhower accepted “the 
desirable principle of varying Federal matching of costs in accordance with the relative fiscal capacity of each 
State.” However, as he calculated, “the effect of this change is very limited because the formula used results 
only in increases in the Federal share.” Reiterating Secretary Flemming’s concern that an over reliance by 
the states on the federal government’s fiscal capacity would negatively impact the states’ safety net, 
Eisenhower warned that the increases in the federal share, irrespective of the states’ fiscal resources, “can 
lead only to a weakening of the responsibility of the States and communities,” and their “financial 
responsibilities should be strengthened, not weakened” (quoted in Schottland 1958: 3). The preferences of 
the Republican administration for a realignment of the state and federal governments’ respective financial 
responsibilities for the poor’s safety net became clearer, if no more successful, during the subsequent 
hearings over the Kerr-Mills Act of 1960 reviewed next. 
 
Social Security Amendments of 1960 (P.L. 86-778) 
Changing the calculation of the federal government’s net share from an individual to an average 
basis and introducing the variable grant formula, significantly increased certain states’ ability to leverage 
federal resources. In 1955, vendor payments made by the 40 participating states and territories totaled 
$212 million ($1.7 billion in 2008-adjusted dollars; see Table 2.1 above). Washington financed just $23.3 
million, or 11 percent of the total charges. Thirty percent of all vendor payments were financed through 
state and local general assistance programs whose recipients were ineligible for any sort of federal cost 
sharing. Even after excluding these expenditures, federal grants-in-aid reimbursed just 15 percent of the 
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remaining vendor payments made on behalf of recipients in the four categorical assistance programs eligible 
for federal cost sharing. The proportionately low rate of federal participation was attributed, in part, to 
states having cash payments that on their own exceeded the maximum level of benefits eligible for federal 
cost sharing. 
A clear trend from the data is that an increasing share of any new state spending on medical care 
went to the categorical assistance programs eligible for federal cost sharing and not state or local spending 
on general assistance that was not eligible for federal cost sharing. A similar pattern will be seen in most 
states with Medicaid and CHIP spending: at least through implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s 
Medicaid expansion in 2014, almost all means-tested medical assistance is directed exclusively to children, 
pregnant women, older parents, and, to a lesser extent, parents. Adults, however poor, are typically 
ineligible for assistance. 
By 1960, total vendor payments had more than doubled with 47 states and territories reported 
paying approximately $490 million dollars on behalf of their poor residents ($3.6 billion in 2008-adjusted 
dollars), inclusive of vendor payments paid through the states’ general assistance not subject to any federal 
cost sharing. In total the federal government provided $200 million of that total in the form of grants-in-aid 
to the 40 participating state, with the federal share of the medical expenditures of the four categorically 
needy programs rising to just over half of the associated costs.  
As the opportunities for states to leverage federal dollars for specific constituencies, the distribution 
of state dollars changed. State (and local) spending on general assistance, which remained the only source of 
medical care for most poor adults who were generally ineligible for categorical assistance, decreased as a 
relative share compared to previous years; but remained relatively high, accounting for about $100 million 
of the total vendor payments in fiscal year 1960. 
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Notwithstanding this steady increase in spending on the poor over the later half of the decade 
(averaging an annual compounded growth rate of 18.2 between 1955 and 1960), medical vendor payments 
remained substantively insignificant and “pitifully insufficient,” according to a report released in January 
1960 by the Advisory Council on Public Assistance that had been established in 1958.22 Still, the Advisory 
Council was cognizant to the effect of medical inflation and recognized the increasing fiscal import that 
health care costs would have on the aggregate welfare expenditures of the states.  Their report included the 
assessment, “Future public welfare costs may increase largely because of increasing medical care needs and 
costs” (Advisory Council on Public Assistance 1960: 14).  
Consequently, among other recommendations, the Advisory Council suggested, “The Federal 
Government should exercise greater leadership in stimulating and encouraging States to expand the scope 
and content and improve the quality of medical care for which assistance payments are made to or on behalf 
of needy individuals” (Advisory Council on Public Assistance 1960: 14). 
Despite acknowledging “the concern of President Eisenhower and others over the continuous rise 
of the Federal proportion of public assistance funds over the years,” the Advisory Council nonetheless 
recommended that the federal matching rate should not be decreased because much of the unmet need was 
concentrated in “the very place where it is least likely to be met by the State or locality” (Ibid. 16). As the 
Council significantly observed, “For several low-income States, average personal income is actually less than 
some high-income States’ average public assistance payments per recipient” (Ibid. 18).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For the month of March 1959, the average expenditure for the permanently and totally disabled were $9.75 
per recipient, for old people $8.15, for the blind $4.96 and for dependent children $1.69. Comparable averages for 
general assistance recipients were not available.  To give these amounts, unadjusted for inflation, context the authors 
of the report note that these figures are “indication of unmet need” explaining that “in comparison with what anyone 
knows from personal experience about the cost of hospitalization, nursing home care, drugs and physicians’ services, 
the sums expended show up as pitifully insufficient” (Advisory Council on Public Assistance 1960: 14). 
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The Advisory Council’s report reflected a general consensus among politicos that government 
needed to do something about the health care access for the poor, particularly the elderly who tended to be 
poorer and sicker, on average. If not with respect to certain specifics, the Advisory Council’s 
recommendations can be traced throughout the congressional hearings of 1960 (and later, the hearings of 
1964-65 that preceded Medicare and Medicaid).23 
The Social Security Amendments of 1960 (P.L. 6-778) significantly, if again incrementally, 
augmented the federal government’s role in financing health care of the aged and poor by increasing the 
federal grants-in-aid for recipients of Old Age Assistance and creating a new opportunity for the states to 
direct health services to this constituency. With respect to the aged, the legislation reintroduced the 
separate match for vendor payments with the maximum amount of medical care spending eligible for 
federal cost sharing set at $12 per recipient, measured on an average basis. Evidence of the political 
preference of older Americans, the 1960 reforms left unaffected the vendor payments for the programs of 
aid to the blind, permanent and totally disabled and dependent children that continued to be averaged with 
cash payments. 
 
Enactment of Medical Assistance for the Aged: Kerr-Mills Program 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Others recommendations made by in the 1960 report by the Advisory Council on Public Assistance were 
included in Social Security Amendments of 1965. For example, noting the disparity in spending on different indigent 
categories—with old age people getting relatively more adequate care compared to dependent children—the 
Advisory Council recommended the “equitable treatment among categories” and application of the same assistance 
standards to all needy persons without partiality to one categorical group compared to another—a policy that would 
be eventually incorporated into Medicaid in 1965. 
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More significant to the institutional development of Medicaid, the legislation also created the new 
program of Medical Assistance for the Aged (MAA), more commonly referred to as the Kerr-Mills Act after 
its chief architects, Representative Wilbur Mills and Senator Robert Kerr.  
Ten years after the 1950 amendments had highlighted the related medical and financial problems of 
the elderly, this federal-state program greatly expanded the states’ potential to provide means-tested 
medical assistance to certain elderly Americans who were ineligible for cash assistance welfare but still had 
health needs beyond what their moderate incomes afforded. There was no limit set on the amount that the 
states could spend on these so-called “Medically Needy” and have partially subsidized by the federal 
government.  
For both OAA and the Kerr-Mills vendor payments, the Senate version of the bill that survived the 
conference committee maintained, for eligible payments, a 50 percent minimum for federal cost sharing 
and raised the maximum rate from 65 percent to 80 percent.  
The Committee on Finance originally estimated that the MAA and OAA provisions of the Act 
would affect upward of 12 million aged Americans: the 2.4 million currently receiving old-age assistance 
and another “10 million who may, at one time or another, be in need of assistance paying their medical 
expenses” (Senate Committee on Finance 1960b: 2). Though in any year after it is fully operationalized only 
“an estimated one-half to 1 million persons among these 10 million may become ill and require medical 
services that will result in payments under this title,” referring to Kerr-Mills programs (Senate Committee 
on Finance 1960a: 9).  
The original cost estimate of the legislation’s MAA and OAA provisions was $200 million in its first 
year after enactment (when relatively few states would have implemented the later program) and about 
$330 million when fully implemented (respectively, $1.4 billion and 2.4 billion in constant 2008 dollars). 
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Given the optimistic enrollment figures championed in Committee such estimates were unreasonably low; 
however, with actual enrollment being a small fraction of their expectations the estimate managed to be not 
far from the provisions ‘ actual costs. 
Reaction to Kerr-Mills was mixed. “One of the best things about this bill is that it is bipartisan in 
origin,” Senator Kerr said of his program of Medical Assistance for the Aged. “It is not the first choice of 
either the Democratic or Republican candidate for President but both the Republican and Democratic 
nominees have approved the provisions of the committee bill”  (Shannon 1960).  
Liberal Democrats in Congress who favored a national Social Security-based model for delivering 
health care to the old assailed the means-tested approach as a “pauper’s oath” and inadequate to meet the 
general public’s demand for comprehensive health insurance. Senator Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) characterized 
the limited policy as a “complete repudiation of the Democratic platform” (Haakinson 1960). Presidential 
nominee, Senator John Kennedy (D, Mass.) released a press statement voicing “keen disappointment” over 
the rejection of an amendment that he and Senator Clinton Anderson (D, N.M.) proposed and, similar to 
the Representative Aime Forand’s proposal in the House, added to the means-tested program a social 
insurance program of medical care for the aged that would be financed by an additional ¼ percentage point 
payroll tax (Albright 1960). 
Irrespective of the preferences of the Democratic platform and a plurality of the Democrats in 
Congress, the congressional liberals had to contend with an Eisenhower administration that steadfastly 
opposed to any system of national health insurance that piggybacked on Social Security. The Kerr-Mills Act 
was the only health reform that had a good chance of becoming law in 1960, particularly just months before 
a presidential election. 
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It is worth emphasizing, however, that even Senator Kennedy saw the means-tested program more 
charitably than might be presupposed by some of the more passionate rhetoric on the Left. While 
simultaneously pressuring for the more expansive social insurance proposal, Kennedy accepted the 
expansion of state aid as an essential supplement to his preferred policy. In a discussion of the proposed 
means-tested assistance, Kennedy articulated that a safety net of welfare medicine was integral to any policy 
of comprehensive health insurance. “The Finance Committee Bill is good as far as it goes. But it simply does 
not go far enough,” he wrote. “Extension of the Social Security mechanism to health benefits for the aged is 
not a substitute for the Committee action; it is an addition to it. Together, these actions would provide help 
to all our aged—those under Social Security and those who are not” (Associated Press 1960).  
Thus, in 1960, as it would be in 1965, means-tested medical assistance was seen as a critical, if less 
lauded, component to any social insurance model for health care. Even proponents of the later approach 
recognized that not everyone, aged or otherwise, who required medical care would be eligible and 
adequately served with social security alone. 
Secretary Flemming seemed to be comfortable with an incremental approach, citing as  “desirable” 
and “probably worth trying” the objectives of the means-tested approach embodied in Representative Mill’s 
amendment to H.R. 12580 and championed by Senator Kerr  (Committee on Finance 1960a). In contrast, 
during his 1960 testimony before the Ways and Means Committee, he relayed the president’s veto threat of 
the more comprehensive Forand bill, stating: “I want to make it clear that as an Administration, we will 
oppose any program of compulsory health insurance” (Social Security Online). He would reiterate this 
implicit veto threat before the Senate’s Finance Committee. 
Eisenhower’s Secretary was insistent throughout his multiple appearances before Congress that any 
national health insurance program needed to be financed with general tax revenues and jointly financed by 
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both the states and federal government, preferably with the richest of the former contributing a larger 
proportion. Of course, the much more limited means-tested program of Kerr-Mills shared these two 
institutional features—even if the administration would have preferred a different range establishing the 
federal match. 
Given these restrictions, Secretary Flemming consistently maintained that the total cost of any of 
the competing bills was not the primary issue. Indeed, the administration own ambitious proposal for 
providing comprehensive care for the aged was frequently described by the press as a “budget busting bill” 
that was even more costly than the Democrat’s social insurance model. Some senators on the Committee 
on Finance, however, doubted the sincerity of Secretary Flemming’s perfunctory testimony lauding the 
administration’s own belated substitute proposal.24 
Interestingly, in defending his preference for a national health insurance program financed by 
general revenues over a payroll taxes, the Republican Secretary offered an unabashedly liberal defense of 
the administration’s preferred financing structure. “Certainly as far as the Federal Government is concerned 
it means that they would be financed by relying to a very large degree on the progressive income tax,” 
explained Secretary Flemming. “We think that that is fairer thing to do than it is to throw half of the burden 
on earnings of $4,800 or less [referring to the increased payroll taxes that would be required of the social 
security proposal]” (Ibid. 93). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The administration’s proposal, subsequently introduced as bill S. 3784 by Senator Leverett Saltonstall (R, 
Mass.) and offered as an amendment by Senator Jacob Javits (R, N.Y.) to the bill released by Committee on Finance, 
would have underwritten only the cost of catastrophic illness for the aged and been financed by a federal and state 
match (see copy of administration’s bill inserted for record at Senate Finance Committee, 1960a: 62-70). Even more 
costly than Representative Forand’s bill, the administration estimated that its plan would potentially cost an additional 
$1.2 billion a year, with the federal government’s estimated share at $600 million. Representative Burr P. Harrison 
(D, Va.) referred to Secretary Flemming’s “budget busting” bill as a “Townsend Plan-Rude Goldberg scheme…more 
socialistic, more unsound and ultimately more expansive than the Forand bill” (Lyons 1960). Similarly, 
Representative Boggs (D, La.), lambasted the administration’s old age medical aid proposal as “even more radical than 
the Forand plan” (Chicago Daily Tribune 1960). 
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Given this rationale for the administration’s funding mechanism, Democrats on the committee 
were put in the atypical position of reminding the Republican secretary of the progressivity of the federal 
tax code that already imposed a marginal tax rate of 92 percentage points on incomes of $80,000 or more 
(equivalent to $580,000 in 2008-adjusted dollars) (Ibid. 105).25  
Despite this exceedingly high tax burden, the Secretary still accepted, “I think you and I would 
agree on this, I am sure, that our Nation is wealthy enough and has enough resources to assure adequate 
medical care for its aging” (Ibid. 94). Further, to counter the senators’ subsequent rebuttals that the 
administration’s logic for preferring general revenues was inconsistent with the regressive nature of the 
revenue raising mechanisms of many states that the administration’s preferred policy also relied upon,26 the 
Secretary offered his hope that the many states who currently “make very little use” of an income tax 
would, as far as additional revenues were needed to finance reforms, rely on a progressive state-level 
income tax as opposed to additional sales taxes (Ibid. 94). 
Secretary Flemming accepted, “any Governor would be reluctant to face the problems involved in 
taking on an additional fiscal responsibility” (Ibid. 80). Indeed, a telegram sent by the 52nd Annual 
Governors Conference to the Senate confirmed Flemming’s observation: the telegram cited the inadequacy 
of federal-state matching formula and urged the Finance Committee “not to increase the state’s role and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 It is worth noting that the marginal tax rate for those earning about $36,000 and $40,000 was 53%. 
Comparatively, in 2008 the tax bracket maximum marginal tax rate was 35% and individuals earning $250,000 had 
tax rate of 33%. 
26 Senator Paul Douglas (D, Ill.) highlighted the regressive nature of the states’ revenue mechanism that relied 
more heavily upon sales taxes: “So far as State revenues are concerned, that approximately 60 percent of State 
revenues are derived from the sales tax. These sales tax are arithmetically regressive, that is, those in the lower 
incomes pay a larger proportion of their income in sales taxes that those in the upper income brackets” (Senate 
Finance Committee 1960: 97). Earlier in the hearings, another senator quantified the percentage share of sales tax to 
total state revenues at 80 percent. 
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amend the House’s version of H.R. 12580 to provide health benefits under the social insurance system” 
(Ibid. 161).  
Of course, as Robert A Peters (2004: 457) noted, this was a predictable response. A rationale for 
the governor’s support for a fully federalized solution was provided by Senator Jacob Javits (R, N.Y.) 
elementary observation that “[t]he State Governors are not eager to raise money for the purpose of paying 
their share of these programs if they can get them without doing so. So who would expect any other 
reaction? We could hardly expect anything else but the Governors should say ‘Sure, let the Federal 
Government do it’” (Senate Committee on Finance 1960a: 161) 
Nonetheless, the Secretary relayed the administration’s “very deep-seated conviction that it should 
be a joint sharing of responsibility on the part of the Federal and State Governments just as we do it in the 
public assistance areas at the present time” (Ibid. 81). The administration’s own preferred allocation of fiscal 
responsibility, which the Secretary had championed during the 1958 hearings and again argued for with 
respect to both the administration’s own proposal and the Kerr-Mills program, put the federal share 
provided to the states between 33 and 66 percent, based upon the per capita income of the state relative to 
the national average. The Secretary pointed to the success of the funding arrangement of the Hospital 
Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (or the Hill-Burton Act) that was also based on a ratio of State per 
capita income to national per capita income and ranged from 33⅓ to 75 percentage points. 
Significantly, however, the Secretary demonstrated that neither he, nor, presumably, anyone in the 
administration, had put much consideration into the specific computation of either the equalization formula 
used in the administration’s own proposal or that recommended for the Medical Assistance for the Aged. 
During the Senate hearings, Senator Anderson argued that the status quo matching formula led to “quite a 
difference in the way States contribute[d]” to the medical needs of their poor residents. The senator then 
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asked Secretary Flemming if the reliance upon per capita income differentials among the states while, 
arguably, appropriate for cash assistance, should “apply in this field [of medical care payments]” (Ibid. 90)? 
The Secretary’s answer, which exhibited more than a little bit of naivety about the potential impact that the 
matching rate would have on future federal-state cost sharing, was indicative of the cursory attention that 
has historically been given to the construction of the fiscally critical FMAP formula: 
I appreciate that this question of an equalization formula is certainly a debatable one and 
one on which good arguments could be advanced on both sides.…Now personally I don’t 
have certainly dogmatic feeling relative to the exact nature of the formula and also relative to the 
various factors that should be taken into consideration. It has been suggested that that in 
developing an equalization formula in this area you might very well take into consideration 
the percentage of aged in a State in relation to the total population of the State (Ibid., 
emphasis added). 
The 1960 hearings never returned to the specifics of the funding formula. And instead of accepting 
the Secretary’s suggestion of reducing the federal reimbursements to the wealthiest states in the Union, the 
Senate’s Committee on Finance kept the 50 percent minimum and, further, amended the House bill with a 
more favorable matching rate for the nation’s poorest states, increasing the maximum rate from 65 to 80 
percentage points.27 
Nonetheless, the administration’s general preference for extending the shared financing 
arrangement triumphed over the social insurance approach after majorities in both chambers of the 
Democratic-controlled Congress were unwilling to endorse the later. The Democrat-controlled Ways and 
Mean Committee in the House rejected Representative Forand’s amendment by a vote of 17 to 8. Since the 
committee’s bill came to the House floor under a closed rule, representatives could neither offer an 
amendment nor vote specifically on the social insurance model in the Forand bill. Then despite the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Where the state aggregate average payments for Old Age Assistance recipients were less than $65, the federal 
share for the medical vendor payments would be further increased. Such states would see their existing federal cost 
sharing percentage rise by an additional 15 percentage points such that in these states with low overall payments the 
federal subsidization for medical service costs would range from 65-to-80 percent. 
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Democrats’ two-to-one majority in the Senate, the Anderson Amendment, having already been rejected by 
a vote of 5 to 12 in the Committee on Finance, lost by a vote of 51 to 44. (Incidentally, a vote on an 
amendment offered by Senator Javits that embodied much of the administration’s—including the then-Vice 
President and Republican nominee for president, Richard Nixon—preference for a voluntary federal-state-
aided system of health insurance also failed, with 67, including every Democrat, to 28, voting against the 
proposal.) 
Both Representative Mills, of Arkansas, Senator Kerr, of Oklahoma, were southerners and they 
both opposed the Forand and Anderson alternatives, respectively, to their bill. In fact, in the House, no 
representative from a southern district voiced support for the Forand proposition and in the Senate only 
Lyndon Johnson (D, Tex.) voted in favor of the Anderson amendment (Peters 2004: 448-449; 
voteview.org).  
While some of the opposition of the southerners was certainly ideological, Peters (2004) reasoned 
that the hesitancy of the South to embrace the expansion of Social Security in 1960 to include health 
insurance was fiscally pragmatic. He argued that southern senators understood that approval of the 
Anderson Amendment would jeopardize the entire bill and such an “outcome was inimical to the interests 
of the southern states because a veto would have cost them millions of dollars in new federal money that 
typically did not require matching funds from state coffers” (2004: 456). 
Further, the potential state-level savings associated with the Democrats’ health reform would be 
less immediate in the south. Until the 1950s most agricultural workers had been ineligible for OASDI and 
therefore the rural south generally had a lower proportion of its elderly collecting social security and a 
higher proportion on public assistance compared to other regions. This contributed to the geographic 
“divergence of state interests with regard to national health care policy” because fewer southerners would 
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be eligible for any social security-based health insurance (Peters 2004: 239). As Peters calculated, “States 
with the most rapid rates of caseload transfer [from OAA to OASDI] had a vested interest in pursuing the 
established of Social Security health insurance. Jurisdictions with the slowest rates of transfer, on the other 
hand, could maximize the flow of federal funds by advocating higher federal reimbursement for public 
assistance health care costs” (Peters 2004: 439).  
Also relevant to the long-term fiscal calculus of the southern legislators was the fact that unlike 
either the Forand or Anderson Amendments (as would also be true of the later Medicare legislation), the 
means-tested vendor payments could be used to reimburse a wider range of services, such as long-term care 
and prescription drugs. Prescient legislators could sensibly expect their state and local jurisdictions to need 
to continue to finance such health care expenditures even if a limited national health insurance eventually 
passed. It was in the fiscal interest of legislators from comparatively poor states to secure an increase in the 
federal match while it was being offered. The upward revision of the maximum federal matching rate 
included in the Senate’s bill favored the South because the region was generally poorer on average than the 
industrial north and had a greater proportion of elderly on public assistance. 28  
Table 2.2 summarizes the variation across southern and non-southern states with respect to their 
demographics and consequent impact of the Kerr-Mills Act on the state’s variable federal matching 
percentage (for OAA and MAA vendor payments). The table also shows the number of OAA and OASDI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Consider Louisiana and Mississippi. These southern states had two of the most liberal OAA programs in the 
United States with 57 percent and 49 percent of their respective elderly populations receiving means-tested benefits. 
Both states received the then statutory maximum federal matching rate of 65 percent for their vendor payments and 
could expect their respective matching rate increase 72 and 80 percent. (It is worth noting that Representative Mills’ 
own state saw its federal medical matching percentage increase to 80 percent; although Senator Kerr’s state of 
Oklahoma only saw a marginal increase in its federal share from 65 to 67.54 percent.) With no additional state-level 
spending the Department of HEW estimated that Louisiana would receive nearly $13.0 million in additional federal 
transfers for the medical costs of OAA recipients; and Mississippi, which previously did not have a vendor payment 
program, could expect $5.7 million in vendor payments at cost of just $1.1 million to the state and its local 
governments. 
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recipients (including disabled individuals under 65) as a share of the states’ population over 65, and the gain 
in federal transfers per resident that each state could expect if Congress adopted the Senate Committee on 
Finance’s bill (Senate Committee on Finance 1960b: Table B; Epstein 1962).  
Table 2.2. Summary of aged population, Old Age Assistance (“OAA”) and Old Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance (“OASDI”) recipients, then-existing and proposed Federal matching percentages, and estimated increase in 
federal grants-in-aid for states under Kerr-Mills proposal released by Senate Committee on Finance (for Fiscal Year 
1961) 
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Southern	  States	  	   8.7%	   24.8%	   77.5%	   64.4%	   73.1%	   77.9%	   $1.32	  
Non-­‐Southern	  
States	  with	  
Senators	  voting	  for	  
Anderson	  
Amendment	  






9.5	   10.2	   82.1	   56.7	   57.6	   62.2	   0.65	  
Notes:  
1. These matching rates would be applicable to the new Kerr-Mills program and to vendor medical costs under OAA when 
a state’s average total assistance payments (including cash payments) is over $65 per month. 
2. When average total assistance payment is $65 or less the Federal matching percentage shown in this column would be 
applicable. 
3. The Department of HEW also computed the additional state and local costs that would accrue from revised federal 
matching percentages. These were negligible with respect to additional vendor medical costs for OAA. As for MAA, any 
estimate of costs was assumed unreliable because it was “extremely difficult to estimate exactly which States will 
participate and to what extent, especially in the 1st year after enactment” (Senate Committee on Finance 1960b: 11)  
Source: Senate Committee on Finance 1960b: Table B; Epstein 1962 
 
Nearly a quarter of all older aged residents in southern states were recipients of OAA welfare; this 
was more than double the rate of take-up in the non-southern states. Further, the southern states had a 
slightly lower proportion of its aged collecting social security, on average (percentages used in Tables 
include survivors and dependents who are not necessarily over 65).  
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The biggest variation is seen, however, in the comparing the revised Federal matching rates. Prior 
to 1960, 12 out of the 14 southern states received the maximum federal matching rate of 65 percent, 
compared to just 6 of the 36 non-southern states; thus the South was set to benefit much more greatly by 
any upward revision of the maximum federal match under the equalization formula. The Committee on 
Finance’s bill boasted the average matching percentage for OAA vendor payments from 64.4 to 73.1 in the 
South. And any new Kerr-Mills expenditures would be reimbursed at the same rates. (Further, states with 
low cash assistance payments could get an additional increase in the federal share of medical payments made 
on behalf of recipients of OAA, bringing the average increase in the South to 77.9 percent federal match for 
that share of vendor payments when summed with cash payments totaled less than $65 per month, on 
average per recipient.)  
Enactment of the committee’s amendment meant that with very little, if any, additional state or 
local expenditures the South could expect to receive significantly more federal grants-in-aid for medical 
vendor payments. Thus, a veto threatened an infusion of federal revenues that averaged $1.32 per southern 
(and as much as nearly $4 per resident in Louisiana), compared to an increase in federal grant-in-aids that 
approximated half that amount in the rest of the country. 
Subsequent to the votes on the Anderson and Javits’ alternatives, and despite the contentious 
nature of those votes, the Kerr-Mills Act embodied in H.R. 12580 passed the Senate by an overwhelming 
vote of 91-2 on August 23. The bill had previously passed in the House under a closed rule limited debate 
with a sweeping bipartisan majority, by a vote of 381-23 on June 23. After an aborted filibuster by Senator 
Russell Long (D, La.) whose costly amendment to extend assistance for mental illness and tuberculosis was 
stricken during the inter-chamber negotiations, the House and Senate endorsed the actions taken by the 
conference committee. President Eisenhower signed the bill into law on September 13. 
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With the Senate debate on the Social Security Amendments of 1960 occurring subsequent to the 
party’s presidential conventions and with both nominees’ Kennedy and Nixon advocating for their 
preferred reforms, a need to confront the nation’s health care problems had become politically and publicly 
important. Given the close attention given to Kerr-Mills, both as a stand-alone bill and as a component of a 
more expansive health reform proposal, it is myopic historicism to diminish the salience of Medicaid’s 
political development to subsequent Medicare debates. Robert Peters aptly subtitled his study of the 
competing health reform policies advanced during the hearings and floor debates for the Social Security 
Amendments of 1960 as “completing the foundation for Medicare and Medicaid” (2004). 
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Chapter 3.  
Title XIX and Early Proposals to Amend Medicaid’s Cost Sharing, 1965-1969 
 
Even after the enactment and implementation of a generous Kerr-Mills program, it was clear by 
1965 that too many poor were getting too little health care. Despite optimistic projections, the problem 
was that the states provided care to just 264,687 aged people, less than 2 percent of the nation’s elderly 
population, in August 1965 under the provisions of the then five-year-old Kerr-Mills (Reed 1965: 48, Table 
15). Financially, total medical assistance—inclusive of moneys paid direct through both Medical Assistance 
for the Aged and indirect through Old Age Assistance—had increased to just $1.4 billion annually by fiscal 
year 1965 ($9.4 billion in 2008-dollars), averaging 2.8 percent of state-level general revenues. For its part, 
Washington reimbursed the states $760 million ($5.1 billion in 2008-dollars). 
While of critical importance to the many Americans the Kerr-Mills program served, this immediate 
precursor to Medicaid fell far short of the original estimate that the program would insure upwards of 10 
million elderly.  Even the more conservative, yet presumably more realistic, estimate that Kerr-Mills 
should have shortly expanded health insurance to an additional million individuals proved also to be overly 
optimistic. 
This chapter proceeds from Medicaid’s institutional heritage to its enactment and the immediate 
attempts by policymakers and policy experts to respond to the program’s unanticipated costs by 
fundamentally reforming how it is financed. The first section looks at passage of the Social Security Act of 
1965. With Kerr-Mills as its template, Medicaid was characterized as a modest reform that warranted little 
public or political scrutiny. Built on the social welfare programs that came before it, Medicaid was, in 
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Nicole Huberfield’s assessment “remarkably path dependent” (2011: 449); or, as Judith Moore and David 
Smith summarized, “Medicaid had deep and strong roots” (2005: 45; see also Moore and Smith 2008). 
However, immediately upon implementation, policymakers observed an unanticipated increase in public 
expenditures: whereas Kerr-Mills never achieved its enrollment expectations, Medicaid would succeed 
beyond even its proponents’ expectations. In fact, within months of the enactment of Medicaid, expansive 
participation in the program would cause its costs to eclipse its annual budget projections and federal and 
state policymakers would worry about its sustainability. 
Responding almost immediately to these fiscal concerns, Senator Russell Long, a Democrat from 
Louisiana, would make two attempts, in 1967 and 1968, to mitigate the inefficiencies of Medicaid’s open-
ended cost sharing formula by increasing the proportion of expenditures paid for by the states and limiting 
the federal government’s fiscal liability by mitigating the Treasury’s exposure to state largesse. Both of 
Senator Long’s attempts would narrowly fail. Instead, Congress imposed a capitation on Medicaid 
eligibility, leaving the program’s cost sharing formula unaffected.  
Following Senator Long’s failed appeal to fiscal conservatism and the greater devolution of fiscal 
responsibility for the provision of health care to the poor to the states, the Nixon administration appointed a 
task force in 1969 that counter-intuitively—given its Republican genesis—recommended that the federal 
government assume full responsibility for Medicaid financing. With the Congress’ attention still on how to 
better reduce the federal government’s exposure to high Medicaid costs, the task force’s recommendation 
was a non-starter. 
Medicaid’s status quo funding arrangement would remain unchallenged during the 1970s and so the 
chapter concludes with a brief overview of the decade. Figure 3.1 presents aggregate expenditure and 
enrollment data for the Medicaid’s first 15 years, 1966-1980, which are the focus of this chapter. While 
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enrollments plateaued by mid-1970, following the general saturation of the eligibility criteria, Medicaid 
costs continued to rise uninhibitedly at both the state- and federal-level. In particular, with an increasing 
proportion of state revenues being consumed by health care spending policy, a new chorus of policymakers’ 
would raise concerns over Medicaid’s fiscal sustainability. 
Figure 3.1. Federal and State Medicaid Payments and Medicaid Enrollments, FY1968-80 
	  
Note: Prior to 1969, medical vendor payments include some non-Medicaid vendor payments (i.e. for Kerr-Mills and 
other means-tested medical programs 
Sources: Table 3-4 and Table 3-7 from Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1992 Medicaid 
Intergovernmental Trends and Options Report A-119 
 
Social Security Amendments of 1965 (P.L. 89-97) 
Even if Medicare and the provision of a system of universal health care for the aged was the national 
priority of Democrats through the Sixties, all the preceding legislative successes that had impacted the 
public delivery of health care came from expanding the means-tested federal-state safety net. While the 
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the delivery of medical care to the indigent was a marginal priority for state and local welfare agencies and 
even less of a priority for the federal government—a precedent for the shared federal-state financing and 
provision of health care to the poor had clearly been established in the decade and half prior to the 
enactment of Medicare. 
During the debates on the Social Security Act of 1965, most of Congress and certainly most of the 
press and public perceived Title XIX to be simply another modest expansion of the American welfare state. 
With only flagging enrollments as the policymakers’ guide, Medicaid—contemporaneously thought as 
“Title XIX: Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs”— was understandably perceived, like its 
many predecessors, as just another incremental, even marginal, expansion to the nation’s system for 
providing welfare medicine. Medicaid was presumed to be fiscally and programmatically inconsequential 
relative to Medicare. Similar to the Kerr-Mills program and those programs before it, Medicaid’s 
institutional structure was consistent with certain well-established administrative and financial 
arrangements. Indeed, Title XIX exemplified a pragmatic reform agenda. While Medicaid removed certain 
fiscal barriers that had previously inhibited the federal and state governments from being more proactive, 
the program was not perceived as upending the status quo. 
In stark contrast to the cacophony over Medicare, Republicans and the American Medical 
Association pragmatically and uncharacteristically lauded the expanded social welfare program of Medicaid. 
By addressing the inherent inability of the nation’s employment-based health insurance market to cover the 
unemployed and retired, Medicaid was accepted as a necessary bulwark against greater government 
involvement. And for the doctors and hospitals who otherwise decried Medicare, Medicaid offered a source 
of public revenues to fund what otherwise was uncompensated charitable care that they were already 
providing. 
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The relative salience of Medicaid and Medicare, was exhibited in the fact that President Lyndon 
Johnson did not even feign to mention Title XIX in his signing statement, beyond a single opaque reference 
that explained how the Social Security Amendments of 1965 would, more generally, “improve a wide range 
of health and medical services for Americans of all ages” (Johnson 1965). This political obfuscation, 
unintended or otherwise, has been a common characteristic of public policy making around Medicaid. 
Yet, Medicaid’s lack of public or even political salience should not be mistaken for its limited policy 
salience. Adapted to the more urgent needs of the poor and rising costs of health care, Medicaid allowed 
career administrators and sympathetic congressmen in Washington, in partnership with the states, to 
expand the public’s safety net and achieve their ambitious social welfare objectives of expanding access to 
health care. As Margaret Greenfield contemporaneously noted in a 1968 monograph on the Social Security 
Amendments of 1965 and 1967, the potential import of Medicaid to the health care sector and poor people 
was not lost on everyone. Even with Medicaid still being a negligible public commitment relative to 
Medicare, Greenfield wrote: “Although Medicare received more attention from the public, the welfare 
experts regard Medicaid as a greater social gain in that it could facilitate the eventual provision of medical 
care for all needy persons” (Greenfield 1968: v). 
Similarly, the Ways and Means’ Committee’s described Title XIX determinedly, as “a greatly 
expanded medical care program for the needy and the medically needy” that was designed to correct the 
“failure of some States to provide coverage and services to the extent anticipated” for the Kerr-Mills 
program. The Committee Report lauded Title XIX for “undergirding the two new insurance program,” 
referring to Medicare’s Part A and Part B (House Ways and Means 1965: 23).  
“Acutely aware of the inadequacies of the State medical assistance plans in the 1960s,” former U.S. 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Wilbur Cohen explained that the eligibility criterion of 
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Medicaid was purposefully left ambiguous (Stevens and Stevens 2008: 50). In fact, certain language 
included in the Social Security Amendments of 1965 all but compelled the states to be ambitiously generous 
in how they interpreted the ambiguity.  
As enacted in 1965, Section 1903(e), “Payments to the States,” directed,  
The Secretary shall not make payments…unless the State makes a satisfactory showing that it is 
making efforts in the direction of broadening the scope of the care and services made 
available under the plan and in the direction of liberalizing the eligibility requirements for medical 
assistance, with a view toward furnishing by July 1, 1975, comprehensive care and services 
to substantially all individuals who meet the plan’s eligibility standards with respect to 
income and resources (Sec. 1903(e) of Social Security Act, as enacted in 1965, emphasis 
added). 
How far a state expanded its eligibility depended only upon state lawmakers’ interpretation of 
“liberalizing.” 
While the number of poor and near-poor recipients enrolled in the state programs was expected to 
reach “about 8 million,” at least some prescient policymakers recognized how the Act’s permissive language 
opened the potential that “states could, in the future, provide aid to as many as twice this number who need 
help with medical costs” (Senate Committee on Finance 1965: 3). In deferring the Medicaid’s eligibility 
determination to the states, it was state-level policy decisions that largely determined aggregate Medicaid 
spending in the program’s initial years. Within five years the enrollment projection of 16 million members 
was already. By fiscal 1973, over 20 million Americans were enrolled in Medicaid.  
Incentivizing the states to be liberal in establishing their enrollment criteria, the law guaranteed that 
the federal government would subsidize all vendor payments made on behalf of eligible Title XIX residents 
in any participating state. The mechanism by which federal funds was to be distributed to the states being an 
extension of the variable grants-in-aid that had been used for Kerr-Mills and certain other welfare 
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programs. Based on the Federal Matching Assistance Percentage (FMAP), the federal grants-in-aid would 
no longer be capped—neither on an individual nor on an average basis. This absence of any limit on the 
amount of federal funding available to the states exasperated the federal government’s potential fiscal 
liability. 
The only revision that was made to the matching formulary was a modest revision upward in the 
FMAP that reduced most states fiscal liability for its Medicaid program. The revision marginally increased 
the federal share so that states with an average per capita income received 55 percent (up from the existing 
50 percent rate) of their costs from the federal government and took the following form:  
Federal Share = 0.55  ×
state  per  capita  income
  national  per  capita  income
!
 
States with the lowest per capita income could receive up to 83 percent (rather than 80 percent 
maximum allowed prior to 1965 for the Kerr-Mills program). The wealthiest states in the nation would still 
receive the minimum 50 percent federal subsidy for any Title XIX spending by the state. 
The nature of this non-capitated federal match diminished the ability of Congress and the 
administration to maintain control over its Medicaid-related costs. Yet, still, and incongruent with even 
with the more modest enrollment expectations, the federal actuaries estimated that even “if all States took 
full advantage of provisions of the proposed Title XIX, the additional Federal participation would amount to 
$238 million” in 1967, its first full year of operation (House Ways and Means 1965: 85). Further, given 
reasonable delays in both implementing certain state plans and enrolling individual recipients the actuaries 
expected that the actual federal outlays would more likely increase by only $200 million over current law. 
Relatedly, the actuaries estimated that even with state governments financing an average of 47 percent of 
the aggregate Title XIX expenditures, state level spending should increase less than $200 million in first 
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fiscal year. This lower number was attributed to the expectation that some states would simply shift current 
budget items so that formerly unsubsidized state expenditures would now be partially reimbursed.  
It is worth noting that the government’s estimates for the additional outlays attributed to Title XIX, 
even when the amount is left unadjusted for the intervening seven years of medical care inflation, was less 
than the estimated cost of the modest technical reforms modifying the matching formula in 1958. 
Incredulously, the short-term budget estimate for Medicaid amounted to less than a 20 percent increase in 
federal outlays over the previous year for its predecessor programs, despite the introduction of a more 
generous matching formula and the estimate of an order-of-magnitude increase in the number of new 
beneficiaries. 
To put into perspective the optimistically low nature of the estimate for Medicaid’s total cost, it is 
worthwhile to compare the federal government’s budget projection for Medicaid to that of Medicare: with 
respect to the new Medicare program, approximately 19 million Americans were expected to qualify in 
fiscal year 1967, at an estimated net cost of about $3.4 billion: $2.2 billion for Part A, the mandatory 
hospital insurance program, and $1.2 billion for Part B, the optional supplementary medical insurance 
program (Cohen and Ball 1965). 
Given the nature of how the Medicare program was to be financed—in part, through the formation 
of a Medicare trust administered in the same manner as the social security trust fund—the actuaries’ budget 
estimates were intended to be sufficiently conservative so as to better guarantee the long term fiscal 
solvency of the new program. For example, a 1965 House Ways and Means Committee report on the 
actuarial basis for Medicare declared that “Congress has very carefully considered the cost aspects of the 
proposed hospital insurance system” and that “Congress very strongly believes that the financing basis of the 
new hospital insurance program should be developed on a conservative basis” (House Ways and Means 1965, 
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emphasis added). Nevertheless, despite such overtures of conservatism and an acknowledgment of the fact 
that hospital costs were rising faster than wages, the committee report dismissed the impact of such 
inflationary pressures on Medicare’s long term cost trajectory. With the hindsight of half a decade of 
medical inflation, the naivety of the following passage from the committee’s report is evident: 
It is inconceivable that hospital prices would rise indefinitely at a rate faster than earnings 
because eventually individuals–even currently employed workers, let alone older persons–
could not afford to go to a hospital under such cost circumstances….Quite obviously, it is 
an untenable assumption that there can be a sizable differential between the increase in 
hospitalization costs and the increase in earnings levels that will continue for a long period 
into the future. (House Ways and Means 1965) 
The House Ways and Means Committee concluded that it was a “reasonable” and “conservative” 
assumption that the difference between the rates of increase for wages and hospital costs would disappear by 
1975, after which wages and hospital costs would rise at the same rate.  
Although the committee’s report emphasized the actuarial assumptions behind Medicare’s trust 
fund, the underlying healthcare costs trend would also affect Medicaid spending and thereby its projections. 
While it an undocumented supposition, it is reasonable to presume that the federal government’s 
discounting of medical inflation was likely to have biased state policymakers to establish eligibility and 
benefit criteria that were more generous than would have been had state policymakers had a better 
appreciation of the future cost and therefore fiscal sustainability of their policy decisions. When defining its 
annual budget, a prudent state government prioritizes its fiscal commitments. Therefore, a state’s Medicaid 
budget and its Medicaid policies should, theoretically, be based around a defined and finite budgetary 
allowance and respond predictably to deviations away from the state’s predetermined prioritization within a 
broader global budget. However, the combination of a generous federal matching rate and the federal 
government’s optimistic actuary projections had significant, and persistent, ramification on Medicaid 
budgets, specifically, and state (and federal) budgets, more generally. 
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To appreciate the dynamic relationship between artificially low initial budgets and high health care 
inflation, on the one hand, and generous cost sharing, on the other hand, consider this hypothetical 
example: 
A state establishing its Title XIX program, sets its eligibility thresholds and provider 
reimbursements at levels so that its total estimated costs for the program is $10 million in 1966; given a 
50% federal match, the state reasonably expects its own costs to be about $5 million. After just a few years 
of operations, however, it is apparent that costs greatly exceed the state’s original estimates. In fact, actual 
spending on Medicaid totals twice the original budget at $20 million. The state’s own cost have doubled to 
$10 million. If the state wanted to return to its original budgetary projections the state would need to make 
some politically difficult decisions that would effectively dismantle its Title XIX program. Further, for 
every dollar in state-level savings, the state would have to cut total Title XIX spending by two dollars. This 
would only come about by either taking away benefits from residents now receiving them or substantially 
reducing reimbursement rates to doctors and hospitals. Alternatively, instead of cutting $10 million in 
health care spending, the state could preserve its Title XIX commitments and cut $5 million in direct, 
unmatched, state spending elsewhere in the budget (or the state could raise an additional $5 million in 
revenue). It is always easier for government to giveth than taketh away; but if the state must taketh away, is 
easier to take $1 instead of $2. 
In poorer states, that is, those states with a higher federal match, the state would have to cut total 
Title XIX spending by as much as 5 dollars for every dollar of state-level savings. For example, in our above 
example, a state with an 80 percent federal matching rate would have budgeted $2 million in state spending 
for its $10 million Title XIX program. If instead actual Title XIX spending were $20 million, the state’s 
costs would have been not $2 million, but rather $4 million. For the state to return to its initial budgeted 
allowance, the state would need to cut $10 million. Or it could cut $2 million from education, 
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transportation, etc., or raise $2 million in additional revenues in order to preserve the $10 million in Title 
XIX spending. 
The nature of Medicaid’s funding arrangement that doubled, trebled, or more, the cost of any 
state-level attempt to reign in state spending made any attempts at retrenchment inherently difficult. This 
dynamic of expanding welfare medicine presumably on the cheap, then later discovering the policy is more 
expensive than initially bargained, but being incapable of redressing this oversight, has plagued policymakers 
responsible for administering Medicaid. It is this dynamic that will become a major component of the future 
legislative debates discussed in this chapter and the next.29 
The absence of any substantial debate in 1964 and 1965 over Title XIX was not necessarily a 
legislative oversight. Reflecting on the 1965 congressional debates just a few years later, in 1968, Senator 
Carl Curtis (R, Neb.) portrayed the Medicaid debates as a myopic policy discussion. The senator described 
how “the entire [Medicaid] program was presented to the Committee on Finance with a minimum cost, at a 
time when the attention of the committee, was drawn to the two major parts of Medicare.” With the 
benefit of hindsight, Senator Curtis was sufficiently emboldened to charge the Johnson administration with 
selling Congress a bill of goods. “I cannot believe that [the Department of Health, Education and Welfare] 
was totally unaware of the type of program they were ushering in,” the senator critically argued, speaking 
on his chamber’s floor while discussing potential reforms intended to curb the seemingly uncontrollable 
Medicaid expenditures. “There was not the disclosure made to the committee that there should have been.” 
(Congressional Record 90-2 [1968]: 30089) 
Nevertheless, regardless of the validity of the senator’s conjecture, the relative silence around the 
program characterized the noncontroversial nature of Medicaid—a reform that was perceived to be just 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 A more thorough presentation of the economics of the federal match as well as the economics of health care 
financing more generally in the United States is presented in Chapter Two. 
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another limited expansion of an already existing means-tested program that was acknowledged as an 
essential, if insufficient by most, bipartisan public policy.30  
 
Senator Long Fails, Twice, to Revise Medicaid’s Matching Formula 
The Social Security Amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-248) 
By 1967, unexpected costs increases had compelled Congress to pass a supplemental appropriation 
for Title XIX of $470 million for fiscal 1967. Among the other causes that could have led to Congress and 
the state legislatures from underestimating their Title XIX expenditures, it is likely that in preparing their 
initial budgetary estimates for the program they had not anticipated the precipitous rise in medical costs—
this being a reasonable oversight given projections of the federal actuaries, cited in the previous section. 
Notably, in 1966 and 1967, medical costs rose 6.1 and 6.7 percent, respectively; compared to 3.3 and 3.1 
percent increases in the overall Consumer Price Index in the same two years (CQ Almanac 1969). In later 
years, the rate of inflation would frequently be in the double digits.  
Despite just 37 states having implemented a Medicaid program, the nearly half-a-billion dollars in 
additional appropriations was already more than twice again the original appropriation allocated to the 
increased federal costs associated with Medicaid. Further, a committee report on the legislation included 
the prescient warning that “even this sum may be less than is required.” Robert J. Myers, chief actuary for 
the Social Security Administration, cautioned that “without remedial steps” the federal cost alone for 
Medicaid would soon rise to $3 billion a year “or even more” (quoted in Smith and Moore 2008: 75, 76). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 As I will recount in the last chapter, a similar silence permeated, albeit less understandably given the accrued 
knowledge over its aggregate costs, Medicaid’s integral relationship to the health insurance reform debated in 2009 
and 2010.) 
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By the end of the fiscal 1967, the federal government’s total share of the costs had nearly doubled over the 
previous fiscal year to total $1.4 billion, eclipsing all estimates for federal spending on means-tested health 
care by a factor of three. Medicaid spending by the states and federal government totaled $2.5 billion. 
In those states that had already enacted Medicaid, vendor payments (including non-Title XIX 
programs) averaged 4.2 percent of the state’s total revenues, with the state-share of the net expenditures 
accounting for 2.3 percent of the states’ own-source revenues. In comparison, in states that had not yet 
implemented a Medicaid program, total spending on vendor payments equaled 2.3 percent of the respective 
states’ total revenues in 1967, inclusive of all federal reimbursements (Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations 1969: Table A-1 & A-2). The relatively low level of spending in the laggard states portended that 
the federal government would face escalating costs as these latter states implemented their own Medicaid 
programs before the 1969 deadline when the federal government would no longer reimburse non-Title XIX 
vendor payments. While state and federal administrators were already voicing fears of Medicaid’s 
unsustainability, in reality, the share of state and federal revenues committed to Medicaid remained low as a 
historical share of government revenues.  
Figure 3.2 charts the budgetary commitment of the states and federal government to Medicaid as a 
share of government revenues.  For the period between 1966 and 1980, Figure 3.2 shows the average 
percentage of a state’s total budget committed to Medicaid and the average percentage of the state’s own-
source resources (i.e. excluding federal transfers, but inclusive of local government payments) that go 
toward financing the state-share of Medicaid expenditures. The figure also presents the total federal-share 
of Medicaid distributed to the fifty states as a share of the federal budget.  
The share of the states’ own-source revenues devoted to the state-share of Medicaid costs would 
more than double from an average of less than 2 percent in 1966 to over five percent by 1980. (It is worth 
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noting that this amount, however, remains less than third of the proportion of a state’s own-source 
revenues consumed by the state-share of Medicaid today). More than the states’ concern for the rise in the 
absolute level of expenditures on Medicaid, which were significant, it was this increase in the proportionate 
share of total revenues being redirected to Medicaid that legitimated concerns over the program’s 
sustainability. Due to the common prohibition against deficit financing among the states and their need to 
mitigate the tax rate disparities between their neighbors, the states lacked the revenue raising abilities of the 
federal government and so there was an awareness that as long as Medicaid costs increased more rapidly 
than general revenues the program would necessitate a reprioritization of budgets. 
Figure 3.2. Medicaid Spending as Share of Government Revenues, variously measured, FY1966-1980 
	  
Sources: 1966-1979: Committee on Ways and Means, House. 1985. "Medicare, Health Care Expenditures, and the 
Elderly."(March 15) 99th Congress, 1st Session Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office (Committee 
Report No. WMCP 99-6); 1980-2008 author generated from data requested from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services. 
 
Whether or not fully justified, federal policymakers concluded that the primary cause for cost 
overruns was the unanticipated enrollment levels in some states, particularly New York and California. 
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family of four,31 thereby making eligible for Medicaid upwards of 8 million residents, or 45 percent of all 
New Yorkers. Whereas federal officials estimated that New York’s Medicaid program would cost the 
Treasury $46 million (about one-quarter of the $200 million that Congress had originally budgeted as new 
Title XIX spending), as a result of its generous eligibility standard Albany estimated its inaugural federal 
cost would be nearly five times the congressional estimate, at $217 million (Sparer 1996: 79).32 Like most 
healthcare-related budget estimates even this higher amount was overly optimistic of the state’s ability to 
restrain costs: with “just” 3.5 million New Yorkers enrolling statewide by the end of 1967 total costs 
reached $461 million, approximately half of which were financed federally. 
It was within this environment of perceived unsustainable cost and enrollment increases that 
Congress debated the Social Security Amendments of 1967 (H.R. 12080). The amendment of the original 
Title XIX legislation pitted two proposals for how to limit the potential growth of Medicaid costs by 
restricting, in two very different ways, the federal government’s original commitment to the health care 
needs of the poor and near poor. 
The proposal introduced in the House, and ultimately enacted by Congress and President Johnson, 
limited Medicaid eligibility to persons with household incomes no greater than 133⅓ percent of the state’s 
maximum eligibility threshold for Aid to Dependent Children. In tying Medicaid eligibility standards to 
those of the states’ means-tested cash assistance welfare program Congress rectified any potential ambiguity 
over the “liberalizing” mandate included in the original Section 1903(e) of Title XIX. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Comparatively, consider that in 2011, eight states—AK, AL, LA, MO, TX, VA, KA, and WV—still set their 
eligibility standards for adults below $6,000 in current dollars. And in all but seven states—AZ, CT, DE, HI, NY, VT, 
as well as the District of Columbia—childless adults were ineligible for their state’s Medicaid program irrespective of 
household income (statehealthfacts.org). 
32 The two estimates are not fully comparable as Congress’ estimate reflected only the additional cost associated 
with Title XIX. Previous expenditures for vendor payments that were rolled into Title XIX were not included in the 
$200 million estimate. In contrast, New York’s estimate reflected the full cost of the state’s Title XIX program that 
replaced some existing expenditures. 
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The Senate, however, originally passed an alternative proposal to restrain Medicaid. While it too 
capped enrollment (although not as severely as the House), more fundamentally, it affected federal cost 
sharing by adjusting the FMAP formula. Given the potential implications that this aborted reform could 
have had on amending the general fiscal relationship between the states and federal government, the 
Senate’s amendment is worth exploring in greater detail. 
Introduced by Senator Russell Long (D, La.), chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, the 
Senate’s Medicaid-related provision differed in three significant ways from the House version. First, while 
the Senate’s bill also reduced the states’ potential Medicaid enrollment, it set the maximum eligibility 
threshold significantly higher, at 150 percent of the state’s maximum old age assistance level (which was 
generally higher than a state’s ADC eligibility criteria). Second, the Senate reforms would have allowed the 
states to impose deductibles and coinsurance rates on the Medically Needy thereby compelling recipients to 
not only pay part of their own costs of care but also, according to some health economists, audit the 
necessity of that care. Third, and most significant from the ad-hoc perspective of long-term cost analysis, 
the Long Amendment proposed a downward revision of the federal matching rate for Medically Needy—
from the then-current 50-83 to 25-69 percentage points. The lower rate was calculated by squaring a state’s 
standard matching percentage. The proposal left unaffected the federal match for categorically eligible 
Medicaid recipients who also received cash assistance. 
Defending his committee’s proposals against criticism of the cuts, Senator Long explained, “In my 
judgment, we have a right to do that when we finance these benefits out of general revenues. The cost of 
what we have now is too great…” (Congressional Record 90-1 [1967]: p. 33170) 
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As evidence of the states’ largesse that needed to be reined in, Senator Long highlighted the 
following ad for Mount Sinai Hospital in New York City that the senator assumed any prudent member of 
Congress or taxpayer would agree was obnoxious in how it marketed its Medicaid health services: 
Attention: For most New Yorkers, the finest complete medical care 
is now FREE! 
Effective immediately, the Mount Sinai Hospital is offering 
the full benefits of the New York State Medical Assistance 
Program (Title 19). 
(Note: This is new and in addition to the Medicare Program of 
your Federal Government.) 
What this means to you: 
Unless your income is considerably above the national average, 
the total cost of almost all the same excellent medical care, 
services and supplies that Mount Sinai offers to any patient, 
will be fully paid by your State! (Ibid.) 
“Of course, they do not mention that the Federal government is paying for half of that,” exclaimed 
Senator Long, who defended his proposal to reduce the federal commitment by revising the matching rate 
as being “in the Federal interest and in the interest of the public in general” (Ibid). 
With respect to New York, Senator Long’s proposed reform would have transferred onto state 
governments and their taxpayers a greater proportion, but not all, of the fiscal burden of providing 
Medicaid to a sizeable subpopulation of New Yorkers who had household incomes above the state’s welfare 
level and “considerably above the national average.”  
With the cautionary example offered by Mount Sinai Hospital in Manhattan, Senator Long hoped to 
demonstrate how the federal government’s was incentivizing a pattern of sustained inflationary growth 
given the high degree of federal subsidization. Although New York had achieved only a fraction of its 
potential Medically Needy enrollment, its expenditure levels remained high. The state exemplified the 
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comparative savings that the Senate’s proposal to adjust the federal-state matching rates offered over the 
House’s marginally more restrictive eligibility standard. New York’s exceptionally high level of spending 
per beneficiary was attributed to the state’s comprehensive benefits package and its generous 
reimbursement rates that were made palatable to state budgets with federal assistance that lowered the 
state-taxpayer burden.  
By maintaining original cost sharing for those eligible for the state’s cash assistance programs, the 
proposal would not have affected federal fiscal commitments to those families that the states deemed truly 
destitute. But, the decrease in federal reimbursements and the potential increase in the state-share for a 
good proportion of Medicaid recipients would have necessitated that administrators, who set their state’s 
eligibility criteria, benefits, and payments rates, and state-taxpayers, who are liable for the state’s share of 
the costs, be more cognizant and discerning of overall spending levels. 
“What the committee was proposing to do here was to permit the States to be liberal, as to whom 
it could extend the Medicaid program with Federal matching. But it would encourage them to economize,” 
explained Senator Long. “If they wanted to be liberal with the program, that would be all right, but we 
would not put the higher amount of matching into that portion of the program (Ibid).” A state like New 
York could continue to offer a generous benefit package and maintain fairly liberal eligibility standards, but 
spending (on their optional Medically Needy recipients) would now cost them 50 percent more: every 
dollar spent on the Medically Needy would have had a direct cost of 75 cents to the state budget instead of 
the current 50 cents. In reality, by lowering the federal incentive per dollar of spending, the states would 
have been compelled to reduce their per capita expenditures. It is unlikely that most states would have 
increased their own spending to sufficiently compensate for the loss of federal support, thereby reducing 
overall spending and taxpayer burden for Medicaid. 
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In arguing for his proposal, Senator Long highlighted the real economic loss that many states 
experienced due to the interstate transfer of federal general revenues to a few states with overly generous 
Medicaid programs: “In this program, the poor States are contributing money to help support the liberal 
programs of the wealthy States (Ibid).” Sharing this divisive sentiment, Senator Carl Curtis (R, Neb.) 
critically added, “We must keep in mind that this Federal money is obtained by taxing all the people, 
including the States that cannot afford the program for those people already on welfare (Ibid, p. 33171).”  
Forty years later, scholars Thomas Grannemann and Mark Pauly (2010) would offer empirical 
support for these senators’ concern over Medicaid’s interstate fiscal inequities. Granneman and Pauly’s 
argument suggests that despite poor states getting a much higher federal matching rate and therefore paying 
a lower proportion of its aggregate Medicaid costs relative to the richer states, the residents of the poor 
states often still experience a net transfer of Medicaid-related federal tax dollars out of their states because 
of overly generous Medicaid programs in wealthy states.33 
It should not be surprising that the most ardent defenders of the status quo in 1967 (and again in 
1968), irrespective of party, were the senators from New York and California—the two largest states that 
with generous Medically Needy programs and a 50 percent match that would have been the most negatively 
affected by the proposed downward revision of the FMAP. In general, the nation’s wealthier states would 
have experienced a far greater downward affect on their states already low FMAP rates due to the squaring 
of the rate: for example, New York would see its federal minimum FMAP drop 50 percent from 0.50 to 
0.25, whereas, Mississippi, the poorest state in the nation, with an FMAP of 0.83 would experience a drop 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 In the previous chapter, I have examined the economics of the FMAP funding formula from the theoretical 
perspective of the preferences of the states’ and national median voter to argue that Medicaid’s cost sharing causes an 
inherently inefficient allocation of public resources—albeit an intentional inefficiency that is meant to compel an 
increase in redistributive spending. In chapter 7 I critique Granneman and Pauly’s conjecture with respect to the 
regressivity of the FMAP formula and argue that the while the transfer of funds may not be progressive in nature, it is 
not as regressive as the scholars conclude. 
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to 0.69, equivalent to just 17 percent of its original rate (of course, Mississippi had no Medically Needy 
program and so would not see any immediate drop in federal aid). 
Senators Thomas Kuchel (Cal.) and Jacob Javits (N.Y.), both Republicans, accepted the prudence 
of limiting Medically Needy eligibility, but countered Senator Long’s proposal as passed by the Senate’s 
Committee on Finance. The senators offered an amendment to the Long proposal that would have 
eliminated the downward revision of the federal matching rate while maintaining the diminution in 
eligibility.  
Senator Javits described the committee’s bill to lower the matching formula as a “manifest 
discrimination and injustice” (Ibid, p. 33169). Senator Kuchel indignantly characterized it as “an assault on 
the intention with which Congress approved Kerr-Mills and amended Kerr-Mills” and pleaded to his 
colleagues to not “break faith with the people” who he presumed tacitly supported the expansions of federal 
assistance to the near-poor (Ibid, p. 33167).  Similarly accusing his colleagues for “breaking our faith with” 
the American people, Senator Robert Kennedy (D, N.Y.) reminded the Senate that “when [Medicaid] was 
passed it was not aimed just at the poverty-stricken people of the United States,…it was also aimed at those 
in the lower income and lower middle income brackets” (Ibid, p. 33172). Despite the pleadings of these big 
state senators, their amendment to retain the existing matching formula was rejected in the Senate by a 
significant majority vote of 25 to 48.  
The revised matching formula reflecting a reduction in the federal government’s commitment to 
Medicaid was subsequently passed by the entire Senate as part of the chamber’s version of H.R. 12080, the 
Social Security Amendments of 1967, by a sweeping bipartisan majority of 78 to 6. 
However, upon further recommendation by Robert Myers, the federal actuary, conferees agreed to 
accept the House’s proposal that had a lower eligibility cap but left the matching rate unaffected. Congress 
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took this action given Myers’ calculation that implementing the House’s more restrictive eligibility was 
likely to save the Federal Government a greater amount of money. It was estimated that reducing eligibility 
for the medically needy program to 133 1/3 percent of a state’s maximum threshold for ADC eligibility 
threshold, would limit the Federal government’s spending to $1.7 billion in fiscal 1969 ($10.8 billion in 
2008-adjusted dollars; CQ Almanac 1967: 892). 
Although unrelated to the legislative debate over eligibility and the matching formula, it is worth 
mentioning that the Social Security Amendments of 1967 also enacted what would become three costly, if 
essential, new Medicaid requirements that would overwhelm any cost savings associated with the law’s new 
eligibility restrictions. The cumulative effect of these federal requirements and the introduction of mandates 
for other services over the decades guaranteed that per beneficiary costs would continue to increase in 
subsequent years.34 
 
Tax Bill of 1968 (H.R. 11394)  
Unfortunately, the need for consecutive supplemental budget requests within months of passage of 
the Social Security Amendments of 1967 frustrated Congress’ hopes for restraining federal Medicaid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The Social Security Amendments of 1967 introduced the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and 
Treatment (EPSDT) program that mandated an even more comprehensive benefits package for poor children eligible 
for Medicaid and would “become one of the most flexible and bounteous sources of funding of health care for 
children in poverty and almost, by itself, a separate entitlement” (Smith and Moore 2008: 78). The law also included 
the so-called “freedom-of-choice” requirement that allowed Medicaid recipients “to use providers of their choice, to 
enter the mainstream of American health care”. Given the unprecedented increase that Medicare and Medicare 
imposed on the demand side with their millions of new consumers with near-unlimited entitlements to health care, 
the states would have to increase its average reimbursement rates if it wished to assure adequate doctor participation 
and remain in compliance with this mandate. Further, and among other minor reforms related to Medicaid, the Social 
Security Amendments of 1967 also expanded the role that Medicaid would play with respect to the nursing home 
industry by recognizing and defining an “intermediate care facility” (ICF) and making these institutions eligible for 
Medicaid spending while setting up a legislative basis for regulating these facilities. 
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spending. First a bill for an additional $300 million and then another bill adding $400 million increased the 
net appropriation for Medicaid in fiscal 1969 to $2.4 billion  ($15.3 billion in 2008-adjusted dollars), over 
40 percent beyond projection. 
Reforming eligibility, alone, was clearly insufficient to control Medicaid costs. 
Instead of just arbitrarily limiting enrollments to enforce savings, Senator Long’s revision of the 
federal matching rate had been an attempt to fundamentally change the federal underwriting of Medicaid. 
Rightfully characterizing Medicaid as an “uncontrollable item” in the federal budget, Senator Long argued, 
“It stands to reason that it will get worse and worse…. And keep getting worse until somebody changes the 
law to put this thing back under control” (Congressional Record 90-2 [1968]: 27958). 
Some comparative savings undoubtedly resulted from the more draconian eligibility restriction 
included in the House proposal, but as a cost saving measure the House’s proposal was shortsighted. Given 
the magnitude of the accounting error, however, it is reasonable to criticize the policymakers for not having 
questioned the actuarial assessment reported in 1967. Even among those states that already had an 
expansive medically needy program the relative cost savings of the House’s proposal over the Senate’s 
proposal was dubious. For example, the Tax Foundation estimated that during fiscal 1968 approximately 
three quarters of New York’s total Medicaid expenditures went to its optional medically needy recipients 
and so by halving the federal appropriation for this subpopulation, the Treasury would have reduced its total 
appropriation to New York by nearly 40 percent, assuming the state did not reduce aggregate spending. 
Corroborating this estimation, Senator Javits, who opposed the Senator Long’s proposal to control 
Medicaid costs, quoted a state official that conservatively estimated that the version passed in the Senate 
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would have reduced federal reimbursements to New York by an additional $51.8 million compared to the 
House’s version of the bill (Congressional Record 90-1 [1967]: 33172).35 
“By yielding to the House language,” lamented a vindicated Senator Long. “The program is now 
$700 million more than [the Department of Health, Education and Welfare] said it would cost” 
(Congressional Record 90-2 [1968]: 27690).  
Although the federal government’s chief actuary, Robert Myers, would partially defend his office’s 
poor estimation of costs by pointing to the Medicaid’s unanticipated enrollment numbers, Myers candidly 
acknowledged the base error of his estimate. “I regret to tell you that we were wrong,” he admitted (quoted 
by Senator Long, Ibid. 27690). More critically, Senator Jack Miller (R, Iowa), characterized Mr. Myer’s 
analysis as a “horrible estimate” of Medicaid expenditures (CQ Almanac 1969). 
In support of Robert Myers and the nonpartisan Office of the Actuary, Senator Long accepted that a 
“good part” of Congress’ inability to control costs could be attributed to “the connivance and cooperation of 
the Department [of HEW]” that allowed states to evade the enrollment limits set by Congress and “make all 
kinds of people eligible [for Medicaid] that nobody in Congress ever intended to make eligible: and went on 
to question, “whether the people over there are the kind of people who should be administering the 
program” (Congressional Record 90-2 [1968]: 30089).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 New York reduced its annual income eligibility cap for a family of four to $5,300 in 1968, and further reduced 
its cap to $5,000 in 1969, leading to a million New Yorkers being removed from Medicaid’s roll and another 2 to 3.5 
million losing their opportunity to enroll. However, New York’s eligibility criteria remained nearly a thousand 
dollars higher than a 133⅓ percent of the state’s maximum AFDC eligibility threshold and so it is difficult to estimate 
what would have been the relative cost of defining Medicaid eligibility at 150 percent of the state’s maximum OAA 
payment. Thus, savings accruing from what amounted to an only marginally more restrictive eligibility threshold—
relative to Senator Long’s own proposed enrollment cap—should have been largely artificial. 
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Bolstering the senator’s accusation of complacency by federal administrators, the Tax Foundation, 
after examining the eligibility criteria of the 21 states with Medically Needy programs, concluded, “The 
great majority of the state programs which include some medically indigent persons have been more liberal 
in their interpretation of the numbers needing care than is allowed for in the 1967 revisions” (Tax 
Foundation 1968: 53). 
To emphasize his point, Senator Long used the example of Illinois’ welfare office to demonstrate 
how states were effectively flaunting the federal government’s intent to limit Medicaid eligibility to the very 
poor. Among some forty specific exclusions, Senator Long pointed out how households in Illinois could 
reduce their reported income for purposes of determining eligibility for ADC in special circumstances, and 
therefore for Medicaid generally, by the cost of restaurant meals, cod liver oil and vitamin D concentrate, 
housekeeping, storage of furniture, and life insurance premiums. Further reiterating his argument for the 
need to redress Medicaid eligibility, Senator Long presented data from those states offering a Medically 
Needy program under Title XIX. 
Of the 20 states that already had such a program established in 1967, eighteen had made changes to 
the ADC eligibility threshold that served as basis for eligibility for Medicaid by 1968, with such adjustments 
translating into an average increase of 28 percent in the eligibility threshold for Medicaid over that one year. 
Senator Long characterized the states that had implemented a medically needy program as generally being 
states with higher per capita incomes, explaining:	  
In other words, this tremendous expenditure is occurring in the states where there are 
relatively fewer needy people, compared with other States of the Union. That is perhaps 
the case because those States have relatively less needy people on the one hand and greater 
income on the other. With more matching money available to those State governments, 
those States are In a position to take a program of this sort—which, as welfare programs go 
would claim a lesser priority in a state with many needy people, relatively speaking—and 
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extend it to all sorts of people who were not expected by the Congress to be classified as 
medically indigent. (Ibid. 30088) 
With costs continuing to escalate, Senator Long again proposed a reform to the Medicaid program 
in 1968, but without the regular social security amendments passing through his Committee on Finance, the 
senator attached his Medicaid proposal as a rider to H.R. 2767, a minor tax bill.36 Undeterred by those 
senators who objected to the nature in which he introduced his proposal, Senator Long argued it was 
necessary get Medicaid’s expenditures “under control” to “put this genie back inside the bottle, where it 
belongs.” As Long explained, the money for Medicaid “has to come out of the hides of people for whom 
Congress voted money, in order to give it to somebody to whom Congress never intended to give the 
money” (Ibid. 27958). 
Senator Long reiterated many of his past arguments for why the proposed cuts were necessary. This 
time, however, he made a more explicit appeal to the implicit fiscal trade-offs, or opportunity cost, that the 
nation’s run-away Medicaid spending was imposing on the federal government due to the zero-sum nature 
of public finances.  
Senator Long’s proposal did two things. First, it tied Medicaid eligibility to the “average” or 
“ordinary” income threshold for ADC eligibility—as opposed to a state’s maximum income threshold. 
Second, it carried over the lower FMAP rate for medically needy populations that he had introduced and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 H.R. 2767 was initially a bill dealing exclusively with the deductibility of assessments made by drainage 
districts on their members for property subject to depreciation. This bill that was finally passed by the Senate 
contained 15 other tax, social security and expenditure control amendments, including Long’s amendments. 
However, there was not enough time for the House conferees to consider this many amendments; nonetheless, the 
House indicated its willingness to consider the drainage district provision itself as an amendment to another tax bill, 
Therefore, H.R. 2767 became public law under the heading of H.R. 11394. Actions like this lead to tangled 
legislative histories but sometimes are necessary if legislative action is to be completed on a bill as the Congress is 
drawing to a close. (Woodworth 1968: 79). 
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the Senate had approved in the previous session; Senator Long explained that this change would be 
responsible for the program’s “big savings.” 
The first provision was an attempt to put some teeth behind the existing law by reducing the 
opportunity for states to manipulate what had been the intent of Congress to limit Medicaid eligibility. “We 
do not object at all to providing Medicaid to people on welfare,” assured Senator Long. “This amendments 
affects the program where the State goes beyond the welfare rolls, to provide Medicaid to those who are 
not eligible for public welfare.”  
Compared to eligibility criteria, Robert Myers confirmed Senator Long’s proposition that the 
downward revision of the FMAP formula would be “less manipulable” (Ibid. 27958). Myers estimated that 
this provision had the potential to save the federal government $500 million in 1968. 
Defending the equity of tightening up the eligibility criteria and reducing the FMAP for the 
medically needy population, Senator Long explained, “In my judgment, there is plenty of money, under this 
amendment, to take care of those whom we intended to take care of, and, if the States want to be more 
liberal than we intended to be, let them put up a higher percentage of State money to be liberal with.”  
Not too surprising, the National Governor’s Association opposed the Long Amendment, 
collectively resolving that it “strongly supports the funding of current Title XIX programs as originally 
indicated” (quoted in Ibid. at 29928). 
Senator Long went on to describe how the current federal match encouraged the states to “take 
advantage of all this liberal Federal largesse, where the Federal Government pays up to 83 percent of the 
money, so that, by putting up as little as 17 percent State money, they get 83 percent Federal matching 
funds.” Absolving the states of blame the senator reasoned, “Under those circumstances, they could hardly 
	  
	   	  
113  
afford not to put the money out” (Ibid. 27958). Lowering the amount of federal underwriting of the state’ 
medically needy programs, “reduces the incentive for the State to try to keep boosting coverage up and up, 
because the Government will not be as generous as it has been before” (Ibid. 27959). 
Countering Senator Long’s amendment, Senator Clifford Case (R, N.J.), a moderate Republican 
from a large state with the national minimum FMAP rate, rejected the premise that the more liberal state 
programs, either in terms of their enrollments or services, went contrary to Medicaid’s original intent. “We 
should not treat it as welfare,” the Republican argued, referring to Medicaid. “[T]his program, which 
essentially is not a program for indigent people, is a program for extending to all people in the country the 
best kind of medical care this country can provide.”  
Sharing a similar perspective, Senator Javits (R, N.Y.) criticized the Long Amendment for going “a 
very long way toward completely nullifying the Medicaid program” (Ibid. 27960). Javits argued that 
Medicaid’s flexible expansiveness was part of its bipartisan appeal. “When we adopted the program [of 
Medicaid],” he explained. “An effort was being made to stop Medicare, as well as possibly a much more 
comprehensive program for health care in terms of people of the United States” (Ibid.29925). In order to do 
so, Medicaid had to offer sufficiently robust coverage to serve as a necessary bulwark against fully socialized 
medicine. 
Senator Long’s two proposals in the 90th Congress represented the first time that either chamber 
debated on its floor the implications of the FMAP formula and the federal matching rates. However, the 
debate took place only in the Senate and it only lasted an hour in 1967 and 30 minutes in 1968.  
Opposed as he was to the Long amendment, Senator Javits complained, “Certainly an effort to latch 
this in at the last minute of the last hour…seems to me to be rather ill advised.” Javits pleaded that the 
Senate give the matter further consideration, explaining that “matters of such vital nature to individual 
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States and to millions of Americans certainly ought to have enough consideration that they ought to await 
the next session of Congress” (Ibid. 27958). 
Just as Secretary Flemming acknowledged, in 1960, his own lack of “dogmatic feeling relative to 
the exact nature of the formula” in relationship to the Kerr-Mills program, it is worth noting how few in 
public office have ever seriously debated the profoundly significant implications of Medicaid’s funding 
formula. The rarity of any attempts in the subsequent congresses to reform the funding formula can be 
attributed, in part, to the inherent challenges of retrenchment politics. The difficulties associated with 
Medicaid retrenchment are exasperated by the high degree of cost sharing that diffuses at least half of the 
savings enacted by a state across the nation. Because federal spending is paid collectively but directed to an 
individual state, the voters are not guaranteed to see any proportionate return for their state’s reduction in 
its commitment to Medicaid. 
No doubt, Senator Long’s proposals to revise the FMAP formula would have effectively forced 
states to retrench their Medicaid programs. Had Senator Long’s proposal been passed then state residents 
would haven been immediately burdened with a larger share of their elected legislators’ Medicaid policy 
decisions. As such, if general economic theory and the median voter theorem are accepted as legitimate 
proxies for modeling rational political behavior, a potential result of increasing the states’ direct costs 
would have been discovering the optimal level of Medicaid expenditures preferred by a majority of state 
residents. (Chapter 2 explores this dynamic from a more general perspective.)  
The choices available to the states would then have been to increase taxes on its residents in order 
to raise additional revenues to maintain its current level of Medicaid spending, or to reduce services and/or 
reimbursements rates thereby lowering its aggregate Medicaid spending. The former would risk the ire of 
voters while the latter would challenge the political strengths of powerful interest groups (whether they be 
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doctors, hospitals, or the disabled or aged, by far the costliest beneficiaries of Medicaid). It is likely that a 
meaningful reform of the funding formula that would have led a combination of both increased taxes and 
reduction in services.  
In the end, neither one of the two attempts to revise the FMAP formula that had been introduced 
by Senator Long and passed by his colleagues were ultimately enacted by the full Congress. Both 
amendments were removed from their respective bills during conference and were not part of the final 
vote. 
 
Roll Call Analyses of Votes to amend FMAP in 90th Congress 
Although both attempts to revise the FMAP formula in the 90th congress ultimately failed, the 
Senate debates and the two roll calls related to the revision are worth examining because the instances of 
serious, even if limited, debate on the federal matching formula are few.  
Figure 3.3a and Figure 3.3b presents the individual voting data on the related roll calls in the first 
and second session of the 90th Congress. The “Yea” and “Nay” votes are presented for each senator according 
to their state and party. The horizontal axis plots the votes by the FMAP rate of the senator’s state (included 
in the figures are the announced and paired votes recorded in the Congressional Record). In Figure 3.3a, a 
“Yay” for Senator Kuchel’s amendment coincided with a rejection of Long’s proposal and retention the 
status quo matching formula; in Figure 3.3b, a “Nay” vote had the same effect. These two votes could be 
considered the more liberal option. 
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Figure 3.3a. 90th Congress, 1st Session - Roll Call No. 267 on KUCHEL AMENDMENT*, by party and state FMAP 
of voting senators (includes announced and paired votes) 
	  
Note: * To Amend H.R. 12080, by placing a ceiling on "medically needy" programs of the states, which would preserve the 
present law on federal participation, and by providing that "medically indigent" persons cannot have more income than 150 per 
cent of the highest type of welfare payment under the law of his state. (Nov 20, 1967, CR: 33174) 
Source: voteview.com, variable 267 (excl. 3 paired votes and 3 announced votes, roll call was 25 “yea” to 48 “nay”) 
Figure 3.3b. 90th Congress, 2nd Session - Roll Call No. 297 on LONG AMENDMENT^, by party and state FMAP of 
voting senators (includes announced and paired votes) 
	  
Note: ^To amend H.R. 2767, by providing a revised formula for payments to states toward Medicaid program, and barring 
payments for Medicaid to individuals whose income exceeds an amount to be determined in accordance with certain standards. 
(Sept 24, 1968, Congressional Record, p. 27961) 
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With defense for retaining the current level of federal participation in Medicaid being led by liberal 
Republicans from New York and California, partisanship was clearly not a strong determinative factor of 
the senators’ votes: for the vote in the 2nd session of the 90th Congress, a majority of both parties—60 
percent of Democrats and 68 percent of Republicans—supported lowering the federal matching 
percentage. 
A clear regional pattern is exhibited by the roll call, with the South voting almost uniformly—
excepting the liberal Texan, Senator Ralph Yarborough (D) who changed the direction of his vote in the 
second session—in favor of lowering the federal matching rate: 93 percent of the southern Democrats 
wanted to lower the federal matching rate, compared to 43 percent of non-southern Democrats; and 100 
percent of southerners Republicans wanted to lower the federal matching rate compared to 52 percent of 
non-southern Republicans. Comparatively, the Northeast and Midwest was more likely, though less 
uniformly than the South, to vote to reject any change in the cost sharing formulary. Compared to the near 
perfect cohesiveness of the southerners rejecting the status quo, only 37 percent of non-southern 
Democrats and a narrow majority of 52 percent of non-southern Republicans voted to retain the matching 
formula.  
Senator Case (R, N.J.) implied the conflict was regional in nature. Directly addressing Senator 
Long, Senator Case resented the implications of the reform, that in squaring a state’s regular FMAP rate 
more adversely affected those states that already had the lowest FMAP. “I am tired of having discrimination 
practiced against a State like New Jersey by measures which, too often, have borne the name of the Senator 
from Louisiana,” (Ibid. 27960).  
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However, the best causal predictor of a senator’s preference was his state’s FMAP rate (and by 
extension the state’s per capita income). Senator Case implied as much, adding to his critique of the Long 
Amendment that, “the formula operates inequitably.” To highlight his point, Senator Case requested that 
the adjusted FMAP rates be published in the Record in order to demonstrate how the formula adversely 
affects certain states, like New Jersey (Ibid). 
Irrespective of partisanship or region, states with a higher FMAP rate were more likely to vote for 
the downward revision of the FMAP rate than those states with a relatively higher FMAP rate: for the 2nd 
session vote, only 22 percent of states with a FMAP rate of 0.55 or below favored revising the matching 
rate formula, compared to 89 percent of states with an FMAP greater than 0.55.  
Further, three-quarters of the votes cast in support of revising the matching formula came that from 
senators representing states with an FMAP of 55 percent or below can be explained by the state’ absence of 
any Medically Needy program (in Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Nevada and Ohio). These states would not 
have been affected by the reduction in the federal match because the reform only impacted the Medically 
Needy populations. The small, comparatively wealthy sate of Delaware is an anomalous case, but as it had 
comparatively low level of per capita spending on Medicaid (particularly spending on what have been the 
affected medically needy population) any decrease in the state’s federal grants-in-aid would have 
represented an insignificant share of their state’s budget. 
An improved understanding by the senators of the relative fiscal implications of the amendment 
may account for the variation in certain senators’ votes for the two similar roll calls. Offering support for 
this perspective, Senator Charles Goodell (R, N.Y.) had criticized his colleagues for bringing up the vote 
“without warning.” “I am convinced that the full implications of this amendment were not understood by all 
Senators present when it was agreed to,” concluded the senator referring to the Senate’s vote in 1967. “And 
	  
	   	  
119  
I am certain that many who were unable to be present were unaware that the amendment was to be 
offered”(Congressional record 90-2 [1968]: 29927).  
Of the senators who expressed a preference in both sessions but changed their preference were two 
Democrats from Wisconsin and a Democrat from each Wyoming and Texas who moved in the “liberal” 
direction (defined as retaining the status quo), and the Utah and the Indiana Democrats who went in the 
“conservative” direction (defined as lowering the FMAP rates). Wisconsin and Wyoming had FMAP rates of 
0.57 and 0.59, respectively; comparatively, Utah had a relatively high FMAP rate of 0.65. Indiana, despite 
having a low FMAP rate of 0.53 did not have a medically needy program to consider. Texas, however, had 
a relatively high FMAP of 0.67 and no Medically Needy program as motivation of Senator Yarborough’s 
anomalous liberal vote. 
 
The McNerney Task Force Recommends 100 Percent Federal Financing of Medicaid 
During the 90th Congress, policymakers witnessed total Medicaid payments increase another three-
fold to $3.9 billion in fiscal 1968 and then, despite passage of the Social Security Amendments of 1967, to 
$4.4 billion in fiscal 1969 (respectively, $23.9 billion and $25.6 billion, in constant 2008 dollars). Even 
after adjusting for general inflation this later trend reflected a 12.8 percent increase in total expenditures, 
compared to a general inflation rate of 5.5 percent for 1969. This pattern of high medical inflation ensured 
that even as enrollment growth stagnated after the initial decade, Medicaid budgets continued to increase at 
	  
	   	  
120  
a level greatly exceeding normal inflation.37 Enrollment reforms alone did nothing to address the seemingly 
uncontrollable increases in per beneficiary expenditures. 
While limiting eligibility to 133⅓ percent of the states’ maximum ADC eligibility criteria had 
certainly restrained the potential maximum growth rate in enrollment, Medicaid expenditures continued to 
grow tremendously. Even though the Social Security Amendments of 1967 capitated eligibility, millions of 
poor Americans who were not yet enrolled in Medicaid still had incomes below the new eligibility 
threshold; and as more states implemented a medically needy program and eligible individuals enrolled and 
began to use those health care services now available to them, costs increased expectantly. Between 1967 
and 1969, the number of Medicaid enrollees jumped by more than a third from 6 to 8.6 million recipients 
(Senate Committee on Finance 1969). Medicaid enrollments more than doubled again to 17.6 million 
recipients by 1972. And by 1974 enrollment had surpassed 20 million, a level from which it would not vary 
by more than a few percentage points over the subsequent decade.  
Given such extreme escalation in Medicaid expenditures, Senator Russell Long had evidently been 
correct to argue that eligibility caps alone would be insufficient to control Medicaid’s inflationary spending. 
By retaining Medicaid’s generous cost sharing formula, the states had no short-term incentives to curb their 
immediate costs by either imposing service restrictions on beneficiaries or extracting any cost-saving 
concessions from providers. With the states being responsible for as little as a fifth, and in no instance 
paying any more than half of all expenditures, state public officials would have likely confronted a high 
political cost for any fractional budget savings that they may have considered advocating. Given the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Of course, the annual increases in per beneficiary expenditures reflected the fact that for much of the past 50 
years, medical care-specific inflation has generally exceeded regular inflation by at least 50 percent, and more often 
than not, significantly more. Medicaid expenditures were particularly prone to health care inflation because prior to 
1981 states were required to pay all Medicaid providers on the basis of uniform Medicare “reasonable charges,” which 
were determined by federal officials and largely set by the market (42 C.F.R. § 447.253(c)). 
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traditionally low public salience of Medicaid, members of congress had little electoral incentive to wage a 
campaign to reform the technical details of the FMAP formula. 
The inability of Congress and the former administration to curb Medicaid’s cost curve38 led the 
newly elected president, Richard Nixon and his Secretary of HEW, Robert Finch, to commission a Task 
Force on Medicaid and Related Programs in 1969. The task force was commonly referred to as the 
“McNerney Task Force” after its co-chairman, Walter McNerney, president of the of the Blue Cross 
Association. Secretary Finch charged the task force with making recommendations for administrative and 
legislative reforms that would “deal immediately with the crisis in Medicaid” (Smith and Moore, 2008: 96-
117). 
It remains beyond the scope of this chapter to fully explore the many policy recommendations 
included in the Task Force’s report to the administration and Congress, but it is worth taking up its 
commentary as it relates to the financing of Medicaid. In a remarkably progressive recommendation the 
Task Force largely ignored their mandate to look for cost savings and efficiencies for the federal-state 
program. Instead, the McNerney Task Force strongly argued for the “establishment of a national policy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 With costs still escalating through 1968 Senator Long had some limited success in 1969. In the 91st Congress 
Long added a rider to H.R. 5833, a bill that otherwise would have just suspended certain import duties. Offered at 
the behest of Sen. Clinton Anderson of New Mexico, a state which for a time in 1968 had suspended its purportedly 
bankrupted Medicaid program, the amendment, as originally designed, would have rescinded the non-discrimination 
requirement of Title XIX thereby permitting states to cut back some of its Medicaid services. It also would have 
suspended the requirement that states provide comprehensive care to all Medically Needy by July 1975. A 
compromise reached by Senator Long and eventually signed into law as P.L. 91-56 prohibited the states that adopted 
Medicaid programs from reducing cash payments to public assistance recipients (thereby lowering categorically needy 
eligibility) but permitted them to reduce certain optional medical services available to Medicaid recipients and 
suspended until July 1977 the comprehensiveness requirement. However, limiting the potential for any reduction in 
overall costs was the explicit condition that total non-federal spending for medical assistance programs could not be 
reduced and any plan to control utilization and costs would have to be approved by the Secretary of HEW. Thus, any 
potential incentives to constrain costs and increase efficiency were limited given it would be reasonable to suspect 
that providers, whom were a main advocate for Medicaid spending, would prefer to get paid more per patient than 
see more patients at a lower rate. 
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financing health care—a policy which treats each of our citizens with equity and justice without regard to 
the geographical area in which he may live or the ability of a State to participate in the financing of the 
health care he needs” (U.S. Task Force on Medicaid 1970: 14). 
Significantly, the Task Force completely rejected congressional and administrative directions to 
propose reductions in the Title XIX budget for fiscal year 1971. Its members acknowledged that they could 
offer no practical solution to the intractable problems of rising medical costs and persistent unmet need of 
the poor for increased health care services. In fact, just the opposite was their final recommendation.  
Despite the already high public costs of the nation’s then-current health care delivery system, the 
panel of experts reflected upon how “assuring access to such care for all who need it will call for fiscal 
commitments far beyond any that have as yet been made by State and Federal Government” (Ibid. 13).  The 
Task Force advised that the increasing fiscal responsibility would necessarily have to fall upon the federal 
government because the states, with their limited tax bases and inability to raise adequate revenues, “could 
not be counted on to make up the difference in Federal matching funds.” Therefore, as a consequence of the 
states’ more limited resources, “however ingeniously the money is spent, an equivalent savings could not be 
effected in the short-run.” (Ibid.13, f.n. 6) 
The Task Force did not so much as amend the FMAP but eliminated entirely the cost sharing 
mechanism fundamental to Medicaid (and the American welfare tradition more generally): their Report 
recommended, “Converting Medicaid to a program with a uniform minimum level of health benefits 
financed 100 percent by Federal funds, with a further Federal matching with States for certain types of 
supplementary benefits and for individuals not covered under the minimum plan” (Ibid. 14). 
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The report represented a more-or-less rejection of the cooperative federalism framework that had 
The task force prefaced their report with the apt observation: “one man’s pluralism is another man’s 
incoherence.” (1970: 3) 
Overall, the Task Force’s report was an astonishingly progressive document that in many ways 
resembled provisions included in the Democrat’s health reforms passed 40 years later as part of the Patient 
Protections and Affordable Car Act of 2010, including the notion of a federally-defined essential health 
benefits package and a uniform extension of Medicaid eligibility. With respect to Medicaid eligibility, the 
Task Force described the standards defined by the Social Security Act of 1967 as “arbitrary.” Relative to the 
Nixon administration’s concurrent Family Assistance Plan proposal that guaranteed an annual income of 
$1600 for a family of four, many states’ low Medicaid eligibility thresholds “created an illogical situation in 
which persons are assumed to need maintenance assistance but not medical assistance.” Instead, the Task 
Force recommended that Medicaid “extend coverage to additional groups until, as a minimum, all persons 
at or below the poverty level are eligible” (U.S. Task Force on Medicaid 1970: 15). Comparatively, the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 mandated Medicaid coverage for individuals with household income up to 133 
percent of the federal poverty line. Further, the 100 percent federal matching recommended by the Task 
Force was incorporated into the 2010 law; although in the case of the latter legislation the rate applied only 
to newly eligible beneficiaries and the federal matching would drop, marginally, to 90 percent by 2020. 
Concerned as Congress was about the federal Medicaid budget, Congress saw the Task Force’s 
recommendation as a non-starter and never took up debate on the proposal to shift a 100 percent of most 
Medicaid costs to the federal government. As Smith and Moore concluded their assessment of the 
recommendations of the McKerney Task Force, “It is an instructive paradox that one of the few valuable 
proposals for restructuring Medicaid came from a Republican administration that because of divided 
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government and the political temper of the times, the Democratic Congress was not interested” (Smith and 
Moore 2008: 99-100). 
 
Medicaid and Medical Inflation in the 1970s 
In 1971, the then-Governor of California, Ronald Reagan warned his fellow Californians that “the 
whole welfare system is about to collapse from the financial burden [Medi-Cal] is putting on the taxpayers” 
(Reagan 1971). With Medicaid spending outpacing budgetary projections across the nation, Governor 
Reagan’s critique was representative of more general anxieties over Medicaid’s sustainability. The growth 
rate of Medicaid budgets was giving state policymakers legitimate concerns that their commitments to the 
poor would require the state to raise marginal tax rates and/or reprioritize their public commitments. 
Yet, despite Governor Reagan’s concern over the tax burden that Medi-Cal was imposing on 
Californians or, for the matter, the McKerney Task Force’s more general fear that the states were incapable 
of continuing to finance the increasing costs demanded by Medicaid, for the duration of the Seventies 
neither Congress nor the administration was much interested in offering a solution to Medicaid’s cost crisis. 
Between 1971 and 1980, Medicaid’s total costs rose from $3.9 billion to $26.4 billion, adjusted for 
2008-dollars, 570 percent increase in expenditures. During that same period the number enrollees 
increased from 18 million to 21.6 million, just a 20 percent increase in the number of enrollees over that 
same period. Even after enrollments first stagnated during the mid 1970s and then declined during the later 
part of the decade, by an average of 0.7 percent annually between 1977 and 1981, costs continued to 
increase precipitously. Figure 3.4 looks at the increase in average per beneficiary expenditures over 
Medicaid’s history; the solid bars indicate the annual real growth rate of total Medicaid expenditures 
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adjusted for regular inflation illustrate (the percentages in the figure reflect the increase over and above 
growth in the Consumer Price Index). Even during the late 1970s when sharp increases in inflation 
impacted the national economy and contributed to even higher increases in medical costs, Medicaid 
expenditures increased at yet an even greater pace, exceeding general inflation by 5 percentage points 
during the later part of the decade. 
Figure 3.4. Average Medicaid Spending per Beneficiary (based on Annual Unduplicated Enrollment), FY1972-2008 
 
The 1970s, in particular the later half of the decade when state revenues declined relative to federal 
revenues, witnessed a considerable broadening in the gap between what the federal and state governments’ 
committed as a share of their revenues to Medicaid. Over the decade, average total spending on Medicaid as 
a share of the state’s total general revenues (i.e. including federal transfers payments) more than doubled 
from 5.2 percent in 1971 to 10.7 percent in 1980. The state-share of Medicaid measured as a share the 
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to 6.5 percent. Comparatively, while federal Medicaid costs also increased, the federal government’s 
revenues also rose. As a result, the federal share went from 2.1 percent to 2.8 percent of federal general 
revenues over that decade; and for the last six years of the decade—despite it being a period of extremely 
high inflation—the share of federal transfers for Medicaid remained steady at about 2.8 percent. 
Figure 3.5 charts the national average budgetary commitment to Medicaid in the fifty states 
between 1966 and 1980. The figure shows the average percentage of general revenues consumed by total 
Medicaid spending and, separately, the average percentage of the state’s own source resources (i.e. 
exclusive of federal transfer payments, but inclusive of local government transfers) and the average 
percentage of combined state and local general own resources that are used to finance the state’s share of 
Medicaid/CHIP spending. Over the subsequent three decades, concerns over the sustainability of Medicaid 
would only worsen, particularly as the fiscal burden imposed by Medicaid’s ever-increasing costs 
disproportionately affected the individual states that had more limited revenue sources and therefore lacked 
the revenue raising abilities of the federal government. 
More than concern over the rise in the absolute expenditures on Medicaid, it was this increase in 
the states’ proportionate share of total revenues that legitimated many policymakers’ concerns over 
Medicaid’s fiscal sustainability. As such, it is difficult to give an overall assessment of Medicaid’s first decade 
and a half. From an enrollment perspective, it was a significant success: whereas all efforts prior to 1965 to 
enroll needy Americans in health insurance failed to achieve the enrollment objectives set for those 
programs, Medicaid was a resounding success in enrolling millions of Americans and getting these 
individuals the care many of them so desperately needed. However, from a budgetary perspective, the very 
success of Medicaid in enrolling the poor, coupled with the high cost of providing comprehensive coverage 
to each enrollee, meant expenditures that consistently exceeded projections were becoming untenable for 
states with limited resources. Still as unanticipated and seemingly unsustainable as Medicaid’s high costs 
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may have appeared after its first decade and a half, these costs would come to appear moderate in hindsight 
of Medicaid’s subsequent development. 
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Chapter 4 
The Rising Taxpayer Burden of Medicaid 
 
This chapter and the following chapter consider the three decades of policy development between 
1980 and 2010. Section III of this Dissertation examines this 30-year period from a quantitative perspective. 
Chapter 4 begins with a look at the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, introduced by the Reagan 
administration, that included a proposal to block grant Medicaid and limit the federal government’s fiscal 
liability for the program in return for giving the states greater latitude in defining eligibility and benefits. 
While his “Medigrant” proposal could not achieve majority support, congressional Republicans managed to 
overcome opposition to enact a temporary reduction to Medicaid’s federal matching rate. The experiment 
in reducing the federal government proportional contribution to Medicaid highlighted the sensitivity of the 
state’s Medicaid programs to the federal government’s contribution: during the three years in which the 
OBRA reduced the states’ federal share by a few percentage points, the nation’s Medicaid spending patterns 
changed abruptly with overall expenditures stagnating for the first time and following a prolonged period of 
double digit inflation.  
However, the 1981-84 period would prove to be an aberration. Following the sunset of the OBRA 
‘81 reductions to Medicaid’s federal match, Medicaid experienced renewed inflation. Figure 4.1 charts the 
significant increase in total Medicaid spending, nominal and real (adjusted for 2008 dollars), between 1980 
and 2008.  
The desire by Congress and, for the most part, the willingness of the states to expand access to 
adequate health care for their poor population increasingly collided with the need of states to balance their 
	  
	   	  
 129 
budgets. As Medicaid eligibility and benefit costs continued to increase faster than the ability of the states to 
raise revenues, the share of state budgets committed to the health care needs of poor residents rose and 
imposed increasingly burdensome fiscal pressure on public officials. Figure 4.2 presents the individual 
state-level data on Medicaid spending as share of state revenues between 1980 and 2009. In both Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.2, the periods, 1990-91 and 2000-01, are clear inflection points in the fiscal history of 
Medicaid. 
Figure 4.1. Total Medicaid Spending, Nominal and Real, FY1980-2010 
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Sources: 1980-2006, data request from CMS; 2008 and 2009 from statehealthfacts.org 
The imbalance between revenues and expenditures led to efforts by policymakers and 
administrators to recast the calculus of Medicaid’s cost sharing formula. The chapter explores proposals 
introduced by Senator Patrick Moynihan to adjust the formula to better reflect the states’ variable ability to 
pay for Medicaid services relative to the variable need for such services, as well as recommendations offered 
by the Government Accounting Office to employ better data in establishing what was a proper distribution 
of fiscal responsibilities for the states’ own Medicaid commitments. 
The final section of the chapter considers the eligibility initiatives enacted by Congress to 
incrementally expand access for the nonelderly poor—particularly pregnant women, infants and uninsured 
children. Without the implementation of any credible solution for adequately controlling the public’s fiscal 
burden and reigning in the state’s exposure to Medicaid-related inflation these eligibility reforms 
exasperated the rise in Medicaid expenditures beginning in the second half of the 1980s. 
 
President Reagan Attempts to Reform Medicaid 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981: Reagan Proposes to Block Grant Medicaid 
As governor, Ronald Reagan had considerable success in controlling the California’s exposure to 
the rising costs of Medi-Cal in the first half of the Seventies. By reducing reimbursement rates and imposing 
a greater responsibility on local governments for the health care needs of their residents the state was able 
to slow the growth in its Medicaid program relative to other states (Sparer 1998). As a result, California’s 
share of its Medicaid program required only 3.9 percent of the state’s own-source revenues in 1980—less 
than half of the national average. Significantly, California was able to keep its per capita costs low despite 
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maintaining expansive coverage equivalent to 133% of those living below the federal poverty line, the 
second highest rate among in the nation.39 
No doubt motivated by the example he set during his governorship; upon assuming the presidency 
in 1981 Ronald Reagan included reforming Medicaid as part of his ambitious domestic agenda. Specifically, 
he sought to contain federal expenditures by granting the states greater flexibility in administering their 
Medicaid program. President Reagan believed if it were required of them governors and state legislators 
would be more capable of controlling costs than the Washington bureaucracy—as his tenure in California 
had demonstrated was possible. 
To that end, an early component to President Reagan’s New Federalism agenda was a proposal to 
cap the federal government’s Medicaid expenditures and to more fully devolve the responsibility of 
providing means-tested medical assistance to the states. The federal government would establish a 
maximum federal outlay for the states, in return grant the states discretion to amend or curtail Medicaid 
eligibility and services with a minimal federal oversight in order to maintain a budget. The administration 
anticipated that by limiting Federal spending, States would have additional incentives to provide cost-
effective services and to reduce fraud, abuse, and waste.  
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35) the president and his 
administration advocated for capping federal Medicaid payments. As part of a larger deficit reduction 
package, these so-called block grants would have reduced the federal government’s current fiscal year’s cost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Critics, however, argue some of the savings may have been more illusionary than real because the state figures 
do not capture the additional health care-related burden imposed on the county governments who are mandated by 
state law to be the providers of last resort for low-income uninsured people ineligible for coverage through other 
public programs. Los Angeles County, for example, experienced an eightfold increase in its health care costs over the 
decade following the Governor Reagan’s reforms eliminated local medical-cost pass-through and capped state 
responsibility (Lee and Ensminger 1981; Sparer 1998). 
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sharing by $100 million and, thereafter, impose a limit, or cap, its appropriations. For fiscal 1982, the 
federal cap would be equal to 105 percent of the federal outlays of the previous fiscal year. The cap for each 
following year would increase according to the prior year’s inflation, as measured by the GDP deflator.   
A report prepared by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that if 
Congress adopted President Reagan’s proposal to cap federal program expenditures the federal government 
could expect savings of $1 billion in fiscal 1982 and up to $5 billion a year by 1986 compared to the status 
quo law. This reflected nearly a 20 percent savings over the CBO’s baseline estimate that federal costs 
would reach $24 billion by 1986 if Congress did nothing to reform Medicaid (CBO 1981)  
Although cautious to not directly discredit the status quo, the CBO prefaced its report with the 
observation that “the magnitude of Medicaid expenditures has reached what many legislators consider to be 
critical levels” (CBO 1981: ix). Yet despite the apparent urgency to contain Medicaid costs, neither the 
administration’s preferred policy of imposing a federal cap on Medicaid appropriations nor the Democrats’ 
own competing proposal to temporarily reduce federal outlays between 1982 and 1984 could get enough 
votes in the Democrat-controlled House’s Energy and Commerce Committee and so the solution was left, 
rather uncharacteristically, to be decided by the full chamber. 
Representative Henry Waxman (D, Cal.), who as chairman of the Health and Environment 
Subcommittee would become one of the most influential policymakers with respect to Medicaid for the 
next three decades, criticized President Reagan’s proposal for being needlessly ideological and inherently 
irresponsible. “A cap on Federal Medicaid contribution does nothing to address the underlying problems of 
health care cost inflation or inappropriate utilization,” argued Representative Waxman. “It does not stop 
hospital costs form rising. It does not cap the aging process. It does not change people’s basic need for 
medical care. All a cap will do is shift the cost from the Federal Government to the States.” 
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With Medicaid expenditures having increased at an average rate of more than 15 percent per year 
over the previous 5 years, more than twice the rate of general inflation, the states’ governments had 
legitimate reason to be concerned that their Medicaid expenditures would increase at a much greater pace 
than would the Medicaid budgets appropriated to them by Congress. Specifically, with Medicaid costs 
estimated to rise about 18 percent over fiscal 1981, governors were cautious to accept only a 5 percent 
increase and assumption of any fiscal liability above the federal capitation. In an op-ed published in The 
Washington Post, Governor Bruce Babbitt (D, Ga.), the influential chairman of the National Governors 
Association, labeled the block grant as “unacceptable” and characterized it as “a tactical weapon to cut 
federal budgets while deputizing the governors to hand out the bad news.” The proposal was a maneuver to 
“repeal the Great Society and remake the federal system” (Babbitt 1981).  
Despite an intensive lobbying effort by President Reagan, the administration was never able to win 
over the governors’ support. The Washington Post reported that Republican and Democratic sources said that 
with respect to the reconciliation process the “hottest lobbying came on Medicaid, on which a number of 
governors as well as hospital groups exerted pressure on delegations” (Rich and Omang 1981). The support 
of governors was particularly critical because they were “the only people in town who support the block 
grants” in principle. According to an official at the National Governors Association, “If [the governors] don't 
go along with Reagan's proposals, Reagan will have a harder time convincing Congress to support them” 
(Weisman 1981: B8).  
A compromise amendment introduced by Representative James Broyhill’s (R, N.C.) raised the 
proposed annual increase of the federal cap 50 percent, from 5 to a 7.5 percentage points. However, while 
a majority in the Democrat-controlled House tentatively accepted this compromise, the administration saw 
a vote on the amendment as “too risky” and worried that such a vote would endanger the entire budget bill. 
In the end, the administration failed to convince critical policymakers of the efficacy of its block grant 
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proposal. As a rebuttal to the administration a loose coalition of Republican House members from the 
Midwest and Northeast sent a letter to the president’s budget director, David Stockman, indicating they 
“found a cap on Federal Medicaid expenditures to be unacceptable” and opposed “the use of the 
reconciliation process to enact block grants” (Rich and Omang 1981). Reporting on the “pandemonium” on 
the House floor, the Washington Post described how just minutes before the final vote and to the 
“astonishment” of many, Representative Broyhill rescinded his amendment, effectively concluding any 
further consideration of the block grant proposal (Ibid). 
While it was not voted upon, Representative Clarence Brown, a Republican from Ohio, introduced 
his own bill (H.R 3756) as an alternative to the administration’s proposal that is worth consideration (see 
Congressional Record 127 [1981]: 11233-34). Representative Brown supported the idea of capping Medicaid 
payments to the states, accepting that the fiscal discipline imposed by the federal cap was “both necessary 
and practical”; however, in recognizing the countercyclical nature of Medicaid expenditures, he proposed a 
variable Adjusted Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage (“AFMAP”) to help hard-hit states. The AFMAP 
formula took into consideration a state’s unemployment rate and cost of living, relative to the national 
averages, when appropriating the states’ federal share.  
Mr. Brown explained, “Using per capita income alone to allocate federal Medicaid funds to the 
states misrepresents the fiscal capacities of states in the Northeast, Midwest, and other regions which have 
been adversely affected by downturns in the economy, while it understates the fiscal capacity of several oil 
and mineral-rich states” (Blade Washington Bureau, 1981). 
To achieve a more equitable allocation of federal resources, Brown’s formula involved a three-step 
process for determining each state’s adjusted block grant.  
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First, a state’s FMAP is adjusted upward if the state has a high cost of living or high unemployment 
rate. If either or both of these state-level economic indicators are higher than the national value then the 
ratio of the state’s cost-of-living or unemployment rate to the respective national economic indicator is 
multiplied by five percentage points with the result then added to the state’s base FMAP. There would be 
no downward revision of a state’s FMAP for states having a lower cost of living or unemployment rate. 
Second, the adjusted FMAP is multiplied by the state’s total Medicaid spending for fiscal 1981 
(inclusive of the federal and state shares) to get the amount of federal monies that the state would have 
received in 1981 given this adjusted FMAP. Summing every state’s adjusted federal share provides a new 
hypothetical amount for the federal government’s total Medicaid budget for 1981. A state’s adjusted federal 
share would then be divided by the total adjusted federal share to get that state’s adjusted percentage share 
of the federal Medicaid appropriation. 
Third, to get the actual appropriation level available to each state, a state’s adjusted percentage 
share is multiplied by the total federal Medicaid appropriation authorized by federal statute. 
Representative Brown acknowledged that in contrast to the administration’s proposal his adjusted 
redistribution of funds benefited slightly less than half of the states—meaning more than half would see 
their federal share drop modestly relative to the administration’s proposal. However, the states benefitting 
would change with the relative economic conditions of the states. Regardless, the Brown formula would 
have only redistributed just 2.1 percent of the aggregate federal amount proposed by the Reagan 
administration in 1982: approximately $360 million of the $17 billion federal cap. While he acknowledged 
that his state of Ohio, with above average unemployment in 1981, would be a bit better off with the 
adjusted formula (on the other hand, Ohio’s cost of living was below the national cost of living and so the 
state saw no adjustment for that component). But, as local economies waxed and waned across the nation it 
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could be expected that Ohio would not always benefit from such an adjustment. Given the variability of the 
identified economic indicators and the real impact that they have on Medicaid expenditures, Representative 
Brown believed such redistribution was justified, summarizing, “it is only fair that the formula by which 
these [finite] funds are distributed be adjusted to reflect changes in State fiscal capacities.” 
While Representative Brown’s bill to amend Title XIX was not taken up after being referred to the 
House’s Committee on Energy and Commerce it was taken up in hearing. The formula that he advocated 
represented a novel approach to reforming Medicaid financing. Alternatives to the FMAP would proliferate 
over the following decades and some of these would incorporate additional economic indicators while 
others would revive efforts for a hard federal capitation, but few would combine the fiscal discipline of a 
fixed global budget with the variability of local payments in the robust manner advocated by Representative 
Brown in 1981. 
Instead of ending the open-ended entitlement as the president had originally proposed, the House 
accepted the Democrats’ alternative plan introduced by Representative John Dingell (D, Mich.). The 
Dingell amendment was a temporary, across-the-board reduction in the federal share appropriated to the 
states that allowed the federal government to still meets its short-term deficit reduction goals. The proposal 
reduced transfer payments by 3 percent in 1982, 4 percent in 1983 and 4.5 percent in 1984. These annual 
reductions, however, could be curtailed by 1 percentage point for each of the following reasons: instituting 
a qualified hospital cost review program; if the state had a high unemployment rate (defined as 150 percent 
of national average) for the quarter; if third party and fraud abuse recoveries for the previous quarter are 
equivalent to 1 percent of federal payments to the state. In 1985 the open entitlement would revert to its 
normal funding. Of course, the temporary cuts did nothing to fundamentally affect the FMAP formula, as 
had been the administrations intent. 
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With Democrats controlling the House 242 to 190, President’s Reagan’s Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981 was just narrowly passed 216 to 212. The Act embodied nearly the 
administration’s entire package of preferred cuts, excepting the federal cap to Medicaid. A colleague 
described the substitute amendment as a “well thought out approach to cutting expenditures in the 
Medicaid program” (Congressional Record 127 [1981]: 14642). 
In the Republican-controlled Senate, the administration would have greater success, at least 
initially. In the Senate, the federal cap would become part of the Senate’s version of the budget bill, albeit 
with the annual increase in the federal cap raised from 5 percent to 9 percent. The Senate’s bill also reduced 
the minimum federal share from 50 percent to 40 percent.  
This latter reform would have had significant implications for the nation’s comparatively wealthy 
states. For example, California, Illinois, and Michigan, three states that alone account for a quarter of all 
federal Medicaid grants, would have seen their federal matching rate drop by an average of about 15 
percent, from 50 percent to 41.79, 42.59 and 47.69, respectively (CBO 1981: 55). The reduction would 
have affected 13 states’ FMAP rate for fiscal years 1982-83. Further, an additional 10 states skirted within 5 
percentage points of the 50 percent floor and so would have reason to fear that they could be potentially 
affected in the near future. 
The relative success of the administration in the Senate could be in part attributed to the legislative 
rules of the reconciliation process that expedites legislation under a more limited set of procedural rules. In 
contrast to how minorities of senators threatened a filibuster to thwart Senator Long’s attempts in 1968 and 
1969 to lower the FMAP formula, the reconciliation processes inhibits such brinksmanship. Whereas in the 
House a majority of representatives were elected in states with lower FMAPs and so could persuasively 
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threaten to derail legislation, in the anti-majoritarian Senate such senators did not represent a majority of 
the states and so had less ability to influence policy.  
Nonetheless, a late floor discussion led by the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator 
Bob Dole (R, Kan.), was intended to mollify the concerns of many of his colleagues who sat across the aisle 
and were critical of the bill (for example, see floor statements by Max Baucus and Daniel P. Moynihan who 
characterized the proposals as a shortsighted prioritization of crude cost savings over genuine programmatic 
reform; at Congressional Record 127: S6121, S6122). Before the Senate vote on the bill, Senator Dole 
pledged that he would not advocate for the retention of the federal cap or FMAP-related provisions during 
the conference committee negotiations that would be necessary to resolve differences between the two 
chambers’ competing reconciliation bills.40 He explained that the short-term retention of the provisions in 
the Senate bill was simply an expedient decision to avoid an extra vote in the chamber. He assured his 
colleagues, Republicans and Democrats, alike, that he would “remove most of the concerns in conference” 
(Congressional Record 127(9-11): 13914). Senator Bill Bradley (D, N.J.) who voted for the Senate’s bill only 
“after Senator Bob Dole gave me his word to help” to preserve the House’s language explained that as a 
consequence of Senator Dole’s willingness to accept the House’s more limited cuts, “New Jersey, instead of 
losing $80 million, suffers only a $10 million loss, and insures that poor people still have access to health 
care” (Congressional Record 127: 19097). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 The Conference Committee included an unprecedented 259 congresspersons from the Republican-controlled 
Senate bill and the Democratic-controlled House who met in July to resolve differences between their respective 
versions of OBRA 1981. The administration’s budget director David A. Stockman lobbied the Senate to bypass the 
Conference altogether and just accept the House version of the bill without any changes. While only $800 million 
separating the two bills—with the Senate’s total budget savings of $38.1 billion slightly larger than the House’s $37.3 
billion—one of the major sticking points was over cutbacks in Medicaid and various health program that the House 
had capped. (Houston 1981) 
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In addition to accepting the House’s more modest cuts, Senator Dole proposed the creation of a 
presidential commission mandated to confront Medicaid’s fiscal crisis.  The commission would evaluate 
various cost savings proposals, including the administration’s block grant proposal, and submit policy 
recommendations to Congress and the administration for later consideration. Such a mandate would be 
meaningless if the hastily debated reforms were enacted before the commission could have its inaugural 
meeting and offer its own recommendations. It is likely that Senator Dole believed the commission would 
legitimate the Republicans’ sweeping reform to Medicaid and give conservative leaders the necessary 
leverage to overcome the entrenched opposition on the Left and among governors and providers groups. 
“We believe that we could satisfy the concerns of some of the Governors in about 30 states, and 
probably all the states, with the establishment of this Federal commission,” said Senator Dole, presumably a 
reference to the National Governors Association recently voiced opposition to any federal capitation of 
Medicaid transfers (Congressional Record 127(9-11): 13913).  
The proposed commission seemed to also satisfy some Democrats: Senator Nunn (D, Ga.) told his 
fellow Democrats that the commission would allow the governors to “be able to monitor these large 
cutbacks that are going to take place in the Medicaid program”; and, Senator John C. Stennis (D, Miss), 
who added himself as a cosponsor, saw the commission as necessary because he was convinced that 
Medicaid “is not going to be on a sound basis until something in depth is learned about all the facts and a 
new start taken” (Ibid). 
Senator Dole’s assurances to his colleagues were met when the conference committee retained the 
Houses’ provisions as they related to Medicaid, including its temporary reduction in federal outlays in lieu 
of either the federal capitation or any lowering of the minimum FMAP rate. Representative Dingell called 
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the preservation of Medicaid entitlement as “perhaps, the greatest achievement of the conference 
[committee]” (Congressional Record Vol. 127: 18957). 
The Conference Report kept the House’s instruction for the nonpartisan Government Accounting 
Office to “study the Medicaid formula and provide information that would contribute to a more equitable 
distribution of Federal Medicaid funds to States,” instead of a more expansive (and more partisan) 
presidential commission, as proposed by Senator Dole. The GAO’s instructions, limited as they were to 
studying the FMAP, removed any assessment of a potential Medicaid block grant from their prospectus 
(Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2165, Stat. 357, 806; Congressional Record 127: 18548). 
In cutting federal outlays by $130 billion over three years (equivalent to about $280 billion in cuts 
in 2008),  1981 represented the then largest historical cut in peacetime federal domestic spending and was a 
significant early achievement for President Reagan’s agenda. The conversion of Medicaid from an open-
ended entitlement into a block grant was one victory Congress denied the president, however.41 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Given its importance to Medicaid’s overall expenditures it also worth mentioning the inclusion of an extension 
of the so-called Boren Amendment in OBRA ‘81. Having first been enacted in 1980 with respect to nursing homes, 
this reform repealed the Medicaid law requiring that states pay for inpatient hospital services at the Medicare’s 
“reasonable charges” rate. Instead, the Boren Amendment instructed the states to use a rate that was merely 
“reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities 
in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable state and federal laws, regulations and quality and 
safety standards” (Section 1902(a)(13) of the Social Security Act). Expecting that this statutory allowance for 
increased state discretion would result in lower Medicaid payments for many hospitals, especially those serving a 
large number of Medicaid and uninsured patients, Congress included a provision specifying that a state’s 
reimbursement rates had to take into account whether hospitals serve a “disproportionate share” of low-income 
people. Any facility designated as a disproportionate share hospitals (DSH) were to be provided with supplementary 
payments that would be matched according to the state’s regular FMAP rate.  
While it would be at least a decade before states learned how to leverage DSH payments to augment their 
Medicaid budgets, this provision would eventually have significant ramifications for the Treasury. As more states got 
involved and federal funding for DSH significantly increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s Congress began passing 
legislation to limit DSH funding increases. Significant changes to DSH were passed in 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 
2003. (Several of the more recent acts restored some of the cuts in DSH payments to states.) 
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The Medicaid-AFDC/Food Stamp Swap: President Reagan Proposes Fully Federalizing Medicaid 
Having failed to cap the federal government’s contribution to the states for Medicaid in 1981 and 
with no potential of an mandated commission’s report to trumpet the benefits of a Medicaid block grant, 
President Reagan tried a different approach to reforming Medicaid and upending what was still perceived by 
most to be the unsustainable status quo. In his State of the Union of 1982, the president proposed to 
Congress that the federal government should fully finance Medicaid itself. In exchange for the federal 
government assuming full fiscal responsibility for the nation’s Medicaid liabilities the states would be 
responsible for financing the two major income support programs, AFDC and food stamp. The “swap” as 
this exchange was referred would commence in fiscal year 1984.  
Lynn Etheredge, a veteran of the OMB’s health policy branch, explained how the Reagan 
administration “confounded nearly everyone by reversing course on Medicaid.” She added, “The flip-flop 
was all the more puzzling since both the Nixon and Ford administrations aimed to avoid a federal Medicaid 
takeover at all costs in the belief that a federal Medicare program and a federal Medicaid program would 
inevitably lead to a nationalized health system” (Etheredge 1983: 19). 
At the time, without knowing the full details of the administration’s proposal, the CBO crudely 
estimated that the federal government would see a net savings of $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1984 and almost 
$5 billion over its first 4 year. However, another report concurrently released by the GAO, highlighted 
how the different growth rates for the three programs made forecasting unreliable and long-term estimates 
of relative savings difficult. In contrast to the CBO’s projection for cost savings, the GAO warned that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Additionally, the Boren Amendment led to a spate of lawsuits alleging payments were neither reasonable nor 
adequate. Consequently, many states did not lower payments schedules, possibly to avoid legal challenges from 
medical societies and nursing home groups. Congress repealed the Boren amendment in 1997. 
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swap could be potentially ruinous for the federal treasury, noting that while the respective per recipient 
costs for AFDC and food stamps had increased by an annual average of 5.1 percent and 5.9 percent over the 
past 5 previously years (1977-81), for Medicaid that rate was 12.1 percent over the same period (CBO 
1982, GAO 1982). The GAO was rightfully concerned that if Medicaid’s rate of inflation continued, 
Medicaid would soon eclipse, and significantly so, the combined cost of the other two welfare programs.  
Experience proved the GAO’s concerns to be prudent: total spending on Medicaid/CHIP currently 
stands at approximately ten times the aggregate amount spent by the states and federal government on 
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (the former food stamps programs) and Temporary 
Assistance For Needy Families (formerly, AFDC).  Of course, the hypothetical counterfactual is that had 
the federal government been successful in assuming full responsibility for Medicaid’s financing it would 
have also acquired the ability to effectuate additional reforms that could have better controlled aggregate 
Medicaid spending.42 
Although the governors were likely to later rue not fully supporting the opportunity to rid 
themselves of Medicaid’s fiscal burden, the states and members of Congress were hesitant to back the 
“swap” for such uncertain gain. No one but Reagan and his staffers seemed very enthusiastic about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 For example, it is likely that there would have been less abuse of DSH payments in the early Nineties had the 
payments been subject to greater federal scrutiny. Conversely, however, without state balance budget laws imposing 
a modicum of restraint on Medicaid budgets, federal expenditures could have actually increased relative to the status 
quo. For example, section 1902(a)(13) of the Affordable Care Act requires states to increase their Medicaid 
reimbursement rates for certain primary care physicians to Medicare levels, with the federal government providing a 
100 federal match for the cost differential between the two payment rates. This provision alone is expected to cost 
the federal Treasury $5.74 billion in 2013 and $5.96 in 2014 (Federal Register Vol. 77, No 92: pp. 27671-27691, 
(Friday, May 11, 2012)). 
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reform, and so within weeks of the introduction of Reagan's dramatic proposal, the swap silently died 
without ever being taken up in Congress.43 
 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1995 and the Republican’s Medigrant Proposals 
In 1995, the Republicans under the leadership of House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R, Ga.) gained 
control of both chambers for the first time since 1952 and interpreted the midterm as a mandate to 
implement their Contract with America and reform government. Having defeated the attempted health 
reform legislation pursued by President Bill Clinton and First Lady Hilary Clinton during the previous 
Congress, the Republicans’ agenda included their own proposal to reform the federal government’s 
relationship to health care. To that end, the Republicans included in their Omnibus Balanced Budget Act of 
1995 (H.R. 2491) the Medicaid Transformation Act. Similar to Reagan’s proposal 25 years earlier, this bill 
repealed Medicaid’s entitlement status and converted the open-ended federal match for state Medicaid 
expenditures into a block grant program called “Medigrant.” The reform was expected to slow the annual 
growth in federal spending on health care, thereby saving the federal government $163 billion over the next 
seven years (CBO 1996).  
The Medigrant plan was similar to President Reagan’s earlier block grant proposal that had passed 
the Senate in 1981; however, it differed from Reagan’s plan in two significant ways. First, instead of 
uniformly increasing in the federal cap for Medicaid expenditures, the Medigrant legislation borrowed some 
ideas from the alternative Brown formula introduced in 1981 as an amendment to OBRA ’81 (see above). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 The only Medicaid-related legislation to pass in Congress that year was included in the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-248) that revised Medicaid cost sharing policies between the states and recipients 
by allowing for the expansion of state options for imposing nominal cost sharing on certain Medicaid beneficiaries and 
services. 
	  
	   	  
 144 
Under the Republican’s Medigrant proposal, a state’s appropriation would be determined by a state’s 
historical Medicaid spending (for 1994) adjusted for certain “needs-based” factors: including national health 
spending per poor person, adjusted for local costs, the demographics of the state’s Medicaid population, 
and the number of residents in poverty, (Lambrew 2005: 6). Despite the well-defined nature of the 
formula, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna E. Shalala, criticized the aggregate cap on 
state allotments as an essentially as arbitrary limit driven by federal budgetary concerns. Despite the 
supposed attention to needs-based factors, she explained the simple fact was, “the states’ allotments are 
determined through the use of ‘floors’ and ‘ceilings’, rather than by the results of the need-based formula” 
(Committee on Finance 1996: 132).44 
Second, the Medigrants were accompanied by an upward revision of the FMAP formula. As passed 
by Congress, the legislation allowed states the choice between three alternative FMAPS: (1) their current 
rate; (2) the lesser of a new formula based on state’s Aggregate Expenditure Need (a function of the 
number of residents in poverty, a case mix index, national average spending per poor adjusted for local 
health care costs) and Total Taxable Resources or the current law plus 10 percentage points; or, (3) a 
federal share of 60 percent. Every state would see an increase in its federal matching rate, with the 
wealthiest states seeing the largest increase of 25 percent, from the current minimum of 50 percent to 60 
percent (most administrative expenditures would remain reimbursed at 50 percent across the nation). The 
maximum rate would remain 83 percent (Section 2122 of H.R. 2491). 
Up to a state’s maximum allotment, health costs would be shared between the states and federal 
government according to each state’s revised FMAP; however, beyond each state’s allotted federal share, 
the state’s federal match would drop to zero and the state would be fully liable for any additional spending. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 This assessment was made in relationship to the Republican’s subsequent 1996 proposal, S. 1795, a bill that 
made only marginal changes to the Medigrant proposal vetoed by President Clinton in 1995. 
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The upward revision of the states’ federal matching rates meant that the states could maximize their federal 
share with fewer state resources than they would have to if the Medigrants was implemented without any 
concurrent change to the FMAP—as much as 20 percent less in certain states. Quickening the attainment of 
the federal cap and zeroing the federal match once attained, however, would lessen the states incentives to 
maintain their current fiscal commitments because their marginal cost for a portion of previously subsidized 
state spending will have significantly increased. 
The Republicans in Congress believed they were justified to encourage an overall decline in both 
state and federal spending on Medicaid. At the federal level, Speaker Gingrich saw controlling Medicaid 
spending as a perquisite to achieving and sustaining a balanced budget. And with respect to the states, 
federal Republicans defended capitation as being necessary to suspend the crowding out effect that Medicaid 
had on state budgets. “As state Medicaid spending has experienced uncontrollable rates of growth, other 
critical State funding initiatives have suffered commensurately,” critiqued the Conference Report, citing 
data from the National Association of State Budget Officers. For example, between 1987 and 1994, as a 
share of total state expenditures, elementary and secondary education spending dropped 11 percent, state 
higher education spending fell 8 percent, other welfare-related spending decreased 13 percent, and public 
transportation investment declined 16 percent. Meanwhile, Medicaid spending increased over 90 percent 
(House of Representatives 1995: 1054).	  	  
Although Congress passed the Medigrant legislation as part of its Balanced Budget Act of 1995, 
President Clinton vetoed the bill, thereby precipitating a shutdown of the federal government. In his veto 
message, the president explained that the conversion of “Medicaid into a block grant with drastically less 
spending” was, among dozens of others, one of the objectionable provisions that justified his veto of the 
budget bill. The president maintained that it was essential to protect Medicaid as an open-ended 
entitlement, adding,	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Title VII [of the BBA of 1995] would have cut Federal Medicaid payments to States by $163 billion 
over 7 years and converted the program into a block grant, eliminating guaranteed coverage to millions of 
Americans and putting States at risk during economic downturns. States would face untenable choices: 
cutting benefits, dropping coverage for millions of beneficiaries, or reducing provider payments to a level 
that would undermine quality service to children, people with disabilities, the elderly, pregnant women, 
and others who depend on Medicaid. I am also concerned that the bill has inadequate quality and income 
protections for nursing home residents, the developmentally disabled, and their families; and that it would 
eliminate a program that guarantees immunizations to many children. (H.Doc. 104-141) 
In January 1996, President Clinton issued a second veto related to the Republican’s proposed 
welfare reform legislation (this time a stand-alone piece of legislation, H.R. 4). President Clinton expressed 
his concern over the consequences that repealing the individual entitlement to cash assistance would have 
upon Medicaid eligibility. "Welfare reform must be considered in the context of other critical and related 
issues such as Medicaid and the earned-income tax credit," explained the president (H.Doc. 104-164). 
Estimating the counterfactual impact that enactment of the federal capitation and increases in 
FMAPs would have on Medicaid spending is difficult. The ceiling on the federal appropriations would have 
had a definite impact on reducing and controlling the rate of growth in the federal government’s Medicaid 
liability, but it is less certain what the changes to federal incentives would mean for the states’ own 
spending commitments.  
Assuming that the states would have drawn down their full federal allotments, Jeanne Lambrew 
(2005: 12) calculated the seven-year federal savings at approximately $18.5 billion, just two percent, 
compared to actual federal spending. (All of the savings were accounted for in the last two years of the 7-
year authorizing legislation, however, and so any hypothetical federal savings over the baseline would have 
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increased significantly over the long-term as the disparity between the federal cap and actual spending 
increased.) She was silent, however, on the impact that reforms would have on state-, and therefore, net 
spending on Medicaid.  
How the Medigrant Legislation Alters a State’s Incentives to Finance Medicaid 
To explore the potential implications that raising the FMAP might have for state spending, lets consider 
how the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 might have affected New York’s Medicaid spending: 
In fiscal year 1995, New York’s Medicaid program totaled $23.5 billion: the federal-share was $12.0 
billion and the state-share was $11.5 billion. The Medigrant proposal allotted New York $12.9 billion for fiscal 
year 1996, an increase of 7.5 percent over the previous year’s federal-share.  
If New York’s FMAP remained at 50 percent, the state would have to spend $12.9 billion from its own 
resources to get its full federal allotment—for total spending of $25.8 billion. The growth in overall Medicaid 
spending would have been high, but within historical averages.  
The Medigrant proposal revised the FMAP formulary, however. The reform would have increased New 
York’s matching rate from 50 percent to 60 percent. As a result, instead of having to meet half of all Medicaid 
costs, New York could contribute only 40 percent. Without any explicit maintenance-of-effort requirement, 
New York could spend $8.6 billion and draw down its entire Medigrant allotment. With this level of fiscal 
commitment by the state, total spending would be $21.5 billion, an overall reduction of 8.5 percent compared 
to the previous year. Further, the state-share would have declined an unprecedented 25 percent to $8.6 billion, 
freeing $2.9 billion in state revenues. 
However, regardless of whether New York’s total Medicaid spending totaled $25.8 billion or $21.5 
billion, or something in between, the federal government would have subsidized the same amount: $12.9 
billion. If total spending fell below $21.5 billion, the Treasury would compensate New York at 60 cents on the 
dollar. While at $25.8 billion in total spending, the effective share paid by the federal government was 50 
percent, in reality the last $3.9 billion would have been fully paid by New York taxpayers. In economic terms, 
the marginal cost for every dollar beyond $21.5 billion increased from 40 cents to a full dollar—not 50 cents. 
To justify spending anything beyond the Medigrant threshold, the taxpayers would have to feel they received a 
dollar-worth of value for each additional dollar of taxes committed to Medicaid. 
Whereas in the past, New York taxpayers would have compared a dollar of additional Medicaid 
spending to just 50 cents of unsubsidized spending on, say, education, now all these competing budget items 
could be assessed on an equivalent basis. What seemed like a worthwhile trade-off in the past may no longer 
appear as attractive. How Albany would have responded to the combination of a maximum federal transfer and a 
tiered federal match would have depended on the preference order that New York taxpayers used to judge 
Medicaid expenditures relative to other uses of state revenues (as well as the political strength of providers and 
recipients to protect their appropriations). 	  
 
	  
	   	  
 148 
Senator Moynihan’s More Equitable Funding Formula 
Though ultimately unsuccessful in 1981, President Reagan and his Senate Republicans had nearly 
succeeded in fundamentally reforming Medicaid by capping the federal government’s commitment to the 
states. At the same time that his colleagues were debating how large of a reduction to Medicaid should be 
included in the fiscal year 1982 budget (see S.Con.Res. 9), Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D, N.Y.) the 
freshman Democrat from New York had the audacity to introduce two alternative proposals, S. 853 and S. 
855, that would have significantly increased the federal government’s fiscal commitment to Medicaid (and 
welfare generally).  
“Let every senator understand two things: First, we are not talking about a program that has 
covered all those in need; and, second, the changes to come will occur because of fiscal pressure from this 
administration, not because the need suddenly vanished,” explained Senator Moynihan referencing Medicaid 
and rebutting President Reagan’s effort to block grant Medicaid and limit the size of the welfare state (Ibid, 
6122). 
Having introduced similar bills in the 96th Congress (1979-80; see S. 2073 and S. 2574), Senator 
Moynihan explained how his two bills “illustrate alternative approaches to the solution of a large and 
pressing problem: the crushing and inequitable fiscal burden created by the current system of apportioning 
responsibility for AFDC and Medicaid among the three levels of Government in our federal system” 
(Congressional Record 127(4-5): 6106).  
Senator Moynihan, who served in the Senate from 1977 through 2000, was well qualified to offer 
criticism of the FMAP formula’s calculation of the states’ relative need for federal assistance. Over his 
thirty-plus years in Congress, Senator Moynihan maintained the view that the status quo with respect to 
FMAP formula was inequitable to New York and certain other states because it failed to accurately reflect 
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the true variation in the states’ welfare needs and the states’ real ability to pay for the welfare needs of its 
residents.  
Beginning his inaugural year in Congress and continuing until his retirement in 2000, the senator 
commissioned an annual report, “The Federal Budget and the States”, that quantified New York’s (along 
with the other 49 states) balance of payments with the federal government His reports consistently showed 
that the residents of New York sent significantly more federal income taxes to Washington than the state 
received in federal appropriations. The senator did not argue for an absolute equalization of per capita 
federal revenues from the states nor did he demand uniformity in per capita federal outlays to the states; 
Senator Moynihan accepted that certain states with their comparatively higher per capita incomes would, on 
average, necessarily pay more federal taxes to the IRS then they received. Raising New York’s FMAP would 
not eliminate the state’s net intergovernmental imbalance of payments. However, Senator Moynihan, and 
several state officials since him, noted, that if Washington sufficiently reformed the FMAP formula so that 
Albany received what these politicos perceived as New York’s equitable share of federal Medicaid dollars 
the state could greatly reduce, if not eliminate altogether, its annual budget deficits. 
More so than the negative balance of payments that may result from a state receiving comparatively 
fewer federal appropriations for, say, defense contracts or national park maintenance within its borders, any 
inequities in the level of federal transfers associated with Medicaid (or AFDC, for example) will have direct 
fiscal implications for state and local governments. Whereas the absence or shortfall in most federal 
appropriations does not necessarily need to be made up at a lower level of government, Medicaid as a 
jointly funded federal-state entitlement program that requires complementary commitments by the states 
and federal government for certain mandated services. Thus, any misallocation of federal Medicaid 
payments to a state would mean that the state would have contributed a greater (or lesser) amount of its 
own-source revenues to the program than the state should have if the federal funds were properly allocated. 
	  
	   	  
 150 
For Medicaid, those federal allocations to the states are, theoretically, based on the states’ respective 
abilities to pay for their residents’ redistributive welfare needs. 
Senator Moynihan’s argument is that despite New York’s aggregate wealth, its relative need for 
federal assistance is greater than is indicated by the FMAP formula. Based solely as it is on the states’ 
relative per capita personal incomes, the funding formula fails to take into consideration New York’s 
relatively high poverty rate and high cost of providing health care to the poor. The poor, by definition, have 
few taxable resources and so with a relatively large population living in poverty, the proportion of its 
residents that New York can effectively tax is smaller than other states with a lower poverty rate. Thus, the 
taxpayer burden imposed by Medicaid on actual taxpaying New Yorkers will be much higher than for the 
residents in states with similar, or even lower, per capita incomes but a more normal distribution of 
personal incomes. It simply is not feasible, argued Senator Moynihan, for New York to raise the revenues 
needed to meet a full half of the costs of its Medicaid-related expenditures.  
Both of the proposals that Senator Moynihan introduced in 1981 went a long way to correct what 
he perceived as a great inequity for New York in large part by simply increasing the national federal share 
and therefore narrowing the range of matching rates across all the states. His first bill, S. 853, ostensibly 
federalized payment of Medicaid and AFDC by increasing every states’ Federal medical assistance 
percentage to 90 percent by 1985. As preliminary a draft as the proposal may have been, the senator 
claimed the support of former President Jimmy Carter (D) and suggested his reform was in accordance with 
both the Democratic Party’s 1980 platform that had characterized the nation’s welfare system as 
“inequitable and archaic” as well as the (Democratic-controlled) National Governors’ Association platform 
that had long maintained, “the Federal Government…should move toward primary responsibility for 
welfare and Medicaid” (Ibid. 6101). At least with the latter, Senator Moynihan could add President Reagan 
as a supporter, if his 1982 proposed swap (introduced in the previous section) was any indication. 
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Significantly, the proposal seemed to allow the states to retain administrative responsibility for 
establishing the specifics of their Medicaid program. Although Senator Moynihan claimed that the 10 
percent state share was sufficient to ensure state efficiencies, the moral hazard that this cost sharing 
arrangement created for the Treasury would have worsened the very inflationary tendency of Medicaid that 
Congress and the president were concurrently seeking to resolve. 
The senator’s second bill, S. 855, the Medicaid Formula Modernization Act, was less drastic in 
comparison to the former, but still amounted to a fundamental reform of the FMAP formula and, therefore, 
Medicaid. It would become a regular proposal from the senator from New York, and although the 
Government Accountability Office included a variant of it in its OBRA ’81-mandated study of the potential 
impact of various Medicaid reforms on state and federal budgets, Congress would never take it up for 
debate, either on the floor or in committee (for reasons that will soon become apparent). Nonetheless, 
Senator Moynihan would relentlessly argue that it was necessary to reform the “perverse and inequitable” 
federal-state matching rates (Ibid. 6101). 
Senator Moynihan’s revised formulary amended the current FMAP calculation that he characterized 
as “entirely arbitrary” in three important ways that he argued would better reflect the states’ real ability to 
pay for Medicaid: 
First, it reformed the proxy used in the FMAP calculation to measure the states’ tax capacity. It 
adjusted per capita income to reflect the cost-of-living differences among states and it eliminated a state’s 
need-based public transfers. Including in-cash payments such as SSI or AFDC to welfare recipients as 
personal income double counted a certain proportion of the states’ net income: counting it first as income 
earned and then taxed by state and local governments and counting it, a second time, as income 
subsequently redistributed to the state’s welfare recipients. Senator Moynihan complained that any state 
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with liberal—but not egregious, (never!)—welfare policies would be unfairly penalized because its per 
capita incomes would be the most overstated and its corresponding federal match most negatively affected.  
Second, Moynihan’s reform eliminated the squaring of the per capita income, thereby reducing the 
impact that a low per capita income would have in increasing a state’s federal share relative to a wealthier 
state. According to Senator, there has never been any evidence to suggest that a State's need for Federal 
matching funds is geometrically related to the ratio of is income to national income levels and so the 
squaring mechanism only aggravates problems resulting from reliance on per capita income (Ibid: 6105-06). 
The senator would later recount a 1977 commencement address he gave, in which he suggested, “only half 
jokingly,” that the squared function should be replaced with the square root. He reasoned, “If you are going 
to have algebra in Federal statutes, why not turn it our way?” (Congressional Record [1997]: S8725) 
Third, Moynihan’s proposed formula decreased from 0.45 to 0.35 the FMAP multiplier that 
determines the state share, thereby increasing the federal share that is reimbursed to the states and lessening 
“what must be acknowledged as an unimaginable burden on the States, and, often on local governments” 
(Congressional Record 127(4-5) [1997]: 6106). 
Coupled with the Senator Moynihan proposal made receipt of the more generous federal match 
dependent upon states adhering to a higher national standard for state AFDC payments and food stamp 
benefits, of at least 75 percent of the official poverty line (significantly higher than what many states 
currently pay). 
Although the proposals neither attracted a co-sponsor nor were they given a hearing in committee, 
all of the criticisms and recommendations voiced by Senator Moynihan (at least with respect to the 
Medicaid Formula Modernization Act) would be thoroughly reviewed by the GAO as mandated by OBRA 
‘81. 
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Moynihan’s Equitable FMAP Redux 
Senator Moynihan would make repeated attempts to amend the equalization formula over the next 
two decades. For example, in 1999 he introduced a bill to amend Medicaid “to provide for an equitable 
determination of the Federal medical assistance percentage.” Moynihan described the FMAP as “a somewhat 
exotic creature” that could be described as “the South’s revenge for the Civil War” (Congressional Record—
Senate 1999: S634; see S. 203) 
While Senator Moynihan accepted that “perhaps in the 1950s and 1960s, per capita income was the 
best available indicator of a state’s wealth”; however, new measurements of state need were readily 
available from the Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics that made such rudimentary estimations 
obsolete. (Ibid) 
Worst than the arbitrariness of the FMAP function, “squaring the ratio of state per capita income to 
national per capita income exaggerates the differences between States with regard to this inadequate proxy 
for both wealth and of population in need of assistance” (Ibid. S634). Earlier Moynihan had “only half 
jokingly” suggested “why not square root [the per capita income values]?” He reasoned, “if you are going to 
have algebra in Federal statutes, why not turn it our way?” (Congressional Record—Senate 1997: S8725).  
Senator Moynihan referred his colleagues to one of many GAO reports that studied the FMAP 
formula and Medicaid inequity across the nation.45 GAO work has consistently raised concerns about the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Congress has repeatedly asked GAO to examine ways to improve the allocation of Medicaid funding. A non-
exhaustive list of GAO Reports that explore alternatives to the Medicaid funding formula include: 
1983. “Changing Medicaid Formula Can Improve Distribution of Funds to States.” GAO/GGD-83-27. 
1995. “Medicaid: Matching Formula’s Performance and Potential Modifications.” GAO/T-HEHS-95-226. 
1999. “Medicaid Formula: Effects of Proposed Formula on Federal Shares of State Spending.” GAO/HEHS-99-29R. 
2003. “Medicaid Formula: Differences in Funding Ability among States Often Are Widened.” GAO-03-620. 
2013. “Medicaid: Alternative Measures Could Be Used to Allocate Funding More Equitably.” GAO-13-434. 
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FMAP, noting that per capita income does not accurately represent states’ populations in need of Medicaid 
services or states’ ability to finance services, and does not account for geographic cost differences among 
states. Consistent with its past findings the 1995 Report damningly concluded, “the current formula has not 
moderated disparities across the states with respect to the population and benefits Medicaid covers.” The 
report suggested, “the use of per capita income to reflect a state’s wealth sometimes overstates or 
understates the size of a state’s poverty population and its financial resources” (quoted at Congressional 
Record—Senate 1999: S634). 
A GAO Report on Senator Moynihan’s proposed equitable FMAP found that 38 states would see its 
federal rate drop whereas 7 would see an increase and 8 states would see no change due to legislative 
constraints on the minimum allowed EFMAP. 46 Not surprising given who was the bill’s sponsor, New York 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Maintaining the current allowed range for the federal share of 0.50 to 0.83, the EFMAP equation is as follows: 
"Equitable" FMAP   =   1.00   −   0.45  
state share of RESOURCES
state share of NEED
 
where,  
state share of RESOURCES = 
cost-adjusted Total Taxable Resources in state
cost-adjusted Total Taxable Resources in all states
 
and, 
state share of NEED = 
3.6 × # of elderly poor + 1.0 × # of adult poor + 0.5 × # of children
weighted # of people in need in all states
 
A state’s share of resources is a proxy for the value of the fiscal resources available to a state to fund 
Medicaid. This proxy depends on the relative value of a state’s total taxable resources (“TTR”), a statistic reported 
annually by the Secretary of the Treasury that begins with state’s gross state product (“GSP”) and adds any personal 
income of residents not included in the GSP. This number is then adjusted to reflect the local cost of providing health 
care services, using the method employed to determine the federal grant allocations to states under the Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health block grant. 
The state’s share of need is also based on measurements already being collected by the government. A proxy 
for a state’s level of need for Medicaid services is calculated by making two adjustments to the official poverty count 
reported by the Census. First, the official poverty income threshold is adjusted in each state to reflect variation in cost 
of living using as a proxy the cost of rental housing in the states. These revised income thresholds are then used to 
tabulate the number of poor in the state. Second, because of the very different costs in providing care to an elderly 
population than with adults or children, the EFMAP assigns age group weights to the poverty counts for elderly, 
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would see the greatest benefit, with its federal share increasing from 50 to 69 percent of its Medicaid 
spending; had these revised federal matching percentages been applied to FY 1997 spending, New York 
would have received about $17.1 billion in federal assistance instead of the $12.4 billion it actually 
received, an increase of 39 percent. California would gain $3.3 billion and another five states would get a 
total of $750 million. In contrast the 38 states would lose an average of $180 million each in federal 
funding. 
With such lopsided benefits and all governors objecting to the crippling costs of Medicaid it is not 
surprising that the formula was a non-starter. Although Senator Moynihan’s bill offered a serious policy 
rationale for amending the funding formula it was a profoundly unserious political document. 
 
GAO Agrees, “Changing Medicaid Formula Can Improve Distribution Of Funds To States” 
In March 1983 the Government Accountability Office released its report that had been mandated 
by OBRA ‘81 (GAO 1983). The report, entitled, “Changing Medicaid Formula Can Improve Distribution 
Of Funds To States,” is notable as the first significant study by the government to specifically critique the 
FMAP formula. More than two decades and $150 billion in federal appropriation after Secretary Flemming 
admitted during the 1960 hearings over Kerr-Mills Act that the “question of an equalization formula is 
certainly a debatable one” the FMAP formula was given a thorough examination.  
The GAO’s blunt conclusion was, “The formula used to establish Federal reimbursement rates for 
State Medicaid spending is not as equitable to States as it could be” (GAO 1983: i). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
adults 21-64 and children under 21. Based on a average cost and participation rate among Medicaid recipients the 
weights are: 3.6 for elderly, 1.0 for adults and 0.5 for children. 
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In making their policy recommendations for its improvements, the analysts weighed what they 
perceived as three interrelated objectives of the funding formula as implied by legislative history of 
Medicaid: (1) narrowing the interstate variation in Medicaid benefits; (2) reducing the disparity in 
distribution of state tax burden associated with Medicaid, and; (3) controlling the rate of increase in Federal 
Medicaid funding. The analysis presented several alternatives to the current cost sharing arrangement that 
reduced “the inequities inherent in the formula.”  
The GAO cautioned their principals in Congress and Executive, “no single formula change will 
equally address the three objectives” (Ibid). 
The GAO was thorough. It seriously explored the implications of amending the federal-state cost 
sharing arrangement and took into consideration a wide variety of potential factors, including state-level 
poverty rates and unemployment rates, the number of Medicaid recipients, and cost-of-living differentials. 
The GAO examined the potential impact of reducing the federal minimum and lowering the overall federal 
share (currently 55 percent for a state with a per capita income equivalent to the national median) and 
including general incentives for either increasing or decreasing state-level spending. Some potential reforms 
they dismissed for practical reasons and others for conceptual reasons after weighing the availability of 
reliable data and the implications of the variable to the formula.  
All the funding formula options they considered resembled the following equation: 
State Share = 𝐾  ×   
State tax capacity
per person in poverty
U.S. tax capacity per
per person in poverty
×
State Mediciad spending
per person in poverty
U.S. Medicaid spending
per person in poverty
!!∝
 
Where the federal share is 100 percent minus the State share with a specified minimum and 
maximum. K is the formula’s constant—a smaller constant produces overall lower state shares. (Currently 
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K = 0.45; Senator’s Moynihan recommendation was to lower K to 0.35, whereas the GAO considered 
raising K.) The exponent, 1 − α, is an incentive factor that would adjust the federal share based on the 
states’ relative spending on Medicaid—a state that spent more than the norm would have to pay a greater 
share; conversely, a state spending less would have a more generous federal share (reducing 1 − α to zero 
would eliminate the incentive term from the formula altogether) (Ibid: 97-98). 
Although the GAO explained the strengths and weaknesses of the incentive term, the nonpartisan 
researchers concluded that its inclusion was ultimately a political calculus to be decided by elected officials. 
In contrast, the GAO was insistent that Congress moves away from per capita income as a proxy 
for the states’ relative tax capacity and tax burden. “The use of per capita income to reflect a state’s wealth 
sometimes overstates or understates the size of a state’s poverty population and its financial resources,” 
explained the GAO. 
Noting that state income taxes accounted for only about a fifth of state revenues the GAO 
recommended the greatest improvements to the funding formula could be achieved by substituting personal 
income with a broader measure of a state’s true tax capacity that included other potential sources of tax 
revenue, such as natural resources, property and corporate sales—the GAO recommended the 
Representative Tax System (RTS) pioneered by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs. 
The GAO also argued that controlling for the number of residents below the poverty line would be a 
marked improvement in the funding formula (and preferable to an estimate of actual Medicaid recipients). 
These substitutions contributed to a better accounting of a state’s fiscal capacity and the potential tax 
burden of its needy. 
Even if the RTS was substituted for personal income in determining the relative fiscal capacities of 
the states, significant inequities would remain: for example, the GAO identified that the 50 percent federal 
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share minimum prevented the FMAP formula from offsetting the comparative disadvantage of poorer 
states. However, the GAO conceded that even if they could design a funding arrangement that perfectly 
equalized the states’ tax burdens and fiscal capacities, the formula would not fully resolve program 
disparities because “many social, economic and political circumstances influence a State’s selection of 
Medicaid benefits to be provided” (Ibid, 10). For whatever reason, the median New Yorker is simply 
willing to pay more toward the health care costs of their poor neighbors than the typical Texan. 
The GAO’s recommendations offered significant credibility to Senator Moynihan and even 
Representative Brown’s arguably self-serving (to their home states, at least) critiques of the existing 
Medicaid formula.  
Despite New York having the nation’s costliest Medicaid program, accounting for 18 percent of 
federal outlays for the program in 1981, its modest tax capacity and large poverty population meant the 
state’s tax burden was (and remains) relatively high compared to most other states. Although the GAO did 
not specifically score the New York senators’ proposed formula and rejected some of his specific grievances 
with respect to the current FMAPs, each of the GAO’s potential reforms “significantly raise the Federal 
share for New York because of its relatively large poverty population and low tax capacity.” For example, 
by factoring in the number of residents in poverty and replacing squared per capita income with what it 
perceived to be a better measure of the states’ true tax capacity, the GAO calculated that New York’s 
federal share for fiscal 1981 would have increased over 25 percent, from 50.88 to 64.21 percent.  
The government researchers were not so naïve as to not recognize that their recommendations 
“could be considered unfair to the other States if they must suffer reductions in their programs to make up 
for New York’s increase, because such reductions would have to be made in many cases in programs already 
less generous than New York’s” (Ibid: iv). Specifically, in contrast to New York’s fate, the funding formula 
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proposed by the GAO that they assessed as most significantly reducing interstate variation would have 
resulted in 39 states with smaller Federal rates and in 30 of theses states the reduction would be greater 
than 5 percent (Ibid: 36). Reducing the minimum federal share to an arguably more equiTable 30 percent 
share (as was recommended by Senate Republicans in 1981) would have impacted thirteen states alone. 
Despite the GAO’s comprehensive study and its specific policy recommendations for reforming the 
funding formula, the recommendations had no political potential. In fulfilling the objectives set by OBRA 
’81 the GAO’s recommendation created a net number of losers. Given the need for any policy change to be 
passed by at least a majority in the House and a supermajority in the Senate, reform was unlikely. Officials 
in the administration who commented on the GAO’s recommendation captured the futile reality thusly, 
“The introduction of the RTS, although theoretically appealing, represented a major change in the present 
formula and that it might be desirable to present options which represent lesser changes to the formula” 
(Ibid: 58).  
 
Medicaid Expansion During the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush Era 
While President Reagan continued to target Medicaid with deep cuts in each of his budgets, a 
diminution in Medicaid inflation and stability in enrollment lessened the impetus for any attempts to 
fundamentally reform the program for the remainder of Reagan’s first administration—compared to the 
average annual expenditure growth of 15 percent between 1976 and 1981, the rate of growth dropped to 
an average of less than 8 percent between 1981 and 1984.  
Following the failed reform initiatives in 1981 and 1982 the Reagan administration ostensibly ceded 
leadership over Medicaid policy to Congress—a Congress that, as Larry Brown observed, was 
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“unexpectedly adept at generating health policy leadership” (Brown 1990: 294). For example, the 
Democrat-controlled Congress refused to extend the temporary reduction to the federal share included in 
OBRA 1981 after the cuts expired in fiscal 1984 and had no problem protecting Medicaid from any further 
cutbacks or changes to its basic funding structure (Rowland, Lyons and Edwards 1988: 236). As 
Representative Henry Waxman explained, “the irony of [OBRA ‘81] was that it developed an enormous 
amount of support for the Medicaid program which helped us throughout the '80s in expanding Medicaid” 
(Smith and Moore 2003-06: 745).  
Rather then fending off additional cuts, Congress would successfully pass a series of incremental 
reforms throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations that cumulatively resulted in a massive increase in 
the number Americans eligible for Medicaid. Motivating the Democrats’ liberal reform agenda was the 
observation that stagnation in Medicaid enrollments over the past decade had contributed to a significant 
widening of the gap between the number of Americans in poverty and the number of Americans enrolled in 
Medicaid. With Medicaid eligibility still restricted to those with household incomes less than 133 percent of 
a state’s AFDC limit and states failing to consistently raise their cash assistance welfare limits to keep up 
with inflation, the result was retrenchment and even a decreasing rate of Medicaid participation among the 
poor in many states. Further exasperating this trend, certain federal regulations included in OBRA ‘81 
restricted the amount of income and resources that AFDC recipients could exclude in determining 
Medicaid eligibility. Measured as a percentage of the federal poverty level, the states’ Medicaid eligibility 
criteria dropped from an average of 55 percent in 1980 to 47 percent in 1984; in five states the penetration 
was less than 25 percent (Rowland et al. 1988: 432-33, Table 1).  
The inability of many poor Americans to pay the high costs required of the nation’s health care 
system led state officials and public health advocates to beseech Congress to expand Medicaid’s eligibility 
criteria. In 1983, Representative Waxman culled from former President Jimmy Carter’s health reform 
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platform a proposal for a Child Health Assurance Plan that would have provided full federal funding for 
expanded Medicaid coverage for first-time pregnant women and for poor women and children in families in 
which main wage-earner is unemployed. Republicans in the Senate, however, countered with a more 
modest proposal that would have required states to cover only first-time pregnant women who had 
qualified for AFDC at existing matching rates. To protect his own plan, Representative Waxman attempted 
to attach his proposal to the Ways and Means reconciliation bill that would be taken up together as part of a 
large tax bill and subject to more restrictive congressional rules. The legislative maneuver was rebuked. 
Through experience, however, Representative Waxman would learn how to expertly use the 
reconciliation process—the same legislative vehicle used by Republicans to enact the reduction in Medicaid 
expenditures in 1981. As chair of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee responsible for Medicaid 
policy, Representative Waxman would repeatedly coopt the reconciliation process to pass incremental, yet 
cumulatively significant, expansions to Medicaid. Taking a lesson from his failed reform attempt in 1983, 
Representative Waxman learned to concede certain “pragmatic accommodations” out of political necessity 
in order to extend Medicaid services and eligibility (Brown 1990: 294). As Federal Assistant Secretary for 
Planning and Evaluation (within the Department of HHS) Robert Helms, described, Representative 
Waxman was “a very clever guy who was always able to get in a little expansion of a program here and 
there over the years” (Smith and Moore 2003-06: 236). 
By arguing that it was both efficient and morally right to more adequately provide for the health 
care needs of pregnant women and their children, Representative Waxman garnered endorsements from 
the Children’s Defense Fund, the American Academy of Pediatrics and the US Catholic Conference. 
Representative Waxman successfully courted social conservatives in Congress, such as Representatives 
Henry Hyde (R, Ill.) and Thomas Biley (R, Va.), who saw health care as essential to minimizing pregnancy 
terminations and to ensure the health of newborns (Ibid: 298). Motivated by what many perceived as an 
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unacceptably high mortality rate of infants and the poor health of children in the United States, Democrats 
and Republicans, alike, accepted the direction of Medicaid’s focused expansions.47 
Despite dropping the provision that an expansion should be fully federally funded from the 
Treasury, Representative Waxman managed to retain, at least initially, the support of the states and their 
governors. Sarah Shuptrine, who during the Eighties served as senior staff to the Southern and National 
Governors’ Associations, identified “a number of very progressive Governors” and public health advocate in 
the South whose “leadership” was essential for ultimate passage of the Medicaid-related amendments in the 
mid-Eighties. Although she credited Representative Waxman as “very supportive” and someone who 
“provided strong leadership on the House side” and identified the bipartisan support of Ted Kennedy (D, 
Mass.) and Strom Thurmond (R, S.C.) as being critical to passage in the Senate, her account depicted a 
policymaking process motivated by state-level public officials, particularly those from southern states, who 
were empathetic to the plight of their poorest residents (Smith and Moore 2003-06: 590). 
With the willingness of some Republicans to tacitly oppose their president’s budget priorities, the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA) (P.L. 98-369) included a compromise mandate requiring states to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Researchers estimate that Medicaid paid for 10 percent of all births between 1979 and 1982 (Kenney et al. 
1986), 15 percent of births in 1985 and then more than doubling as a result of the reforms of the later part of the 
Eighties to 32 percent of births in 1991 (Singh, Gold, and Frost, 1994). In 2010, Medicaid covered approximately 41 
percent of all births, with Medicaid in poorer states such as Mississippi and Louisiana paying for approximately three-
fifths of all births (statehealthfacts.org; for review of research on Medicaid family planning services see, Howell 
2001).  
Such a trend was the direct consequence of  in proposing the George H.W. Bush administration’s “new focus 
on the nation’s problem of infant mortality and morbidity”, Louis Hays, then-Director for Health Care Financing 
Administration (HFCA), explained: 
As a major source for financing the health care of low-income pregnant women, who are most at risk, 
Medicaid already offers services that make a difference in pregnancy outcomes. But more help is needed….With this 
in mind, the bill submitted to Congress by the Administration…calls for Medicaid coverage of pregnant women and 
infants up to 130 percent of the federal poverty level. (Hays 1990, 496) 
	  
	   	  
 163 
expand Medicaid coverage to poor women pregnant for the first time who would be eligible for Medicaid 
once the child is born as well as pregnant women in two-parent families in which the principal wage earner 
is unemployed, and to poor children up to the age of five in two-parent families that met their state’s AFDC 
eligibility standards. 
Thereafter followed a series of reforms progressively expanding Medicaid eligibility that were 
included as amendments to half-a-dozen reconciliation laws: the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
of 1985 (COBRA) (P.L. 99-272), OBRA 86 (P.L. 99-509), OBRA 87 (P.L. 100-203), OBRA 89 (P.L. 
101-239), and OBRA 90 (P.L. 101-508).  
Each subsequent expansion built upon the previous one to greatly diminish the relationship 
between Medicaid and AFDC. Sandra Tanenbaum described how before the eligibility expansions of the 
mid- to late- 1980s, reflected a “utilitarian” incrementalism that so weakened the relationship between 
Medicaid and a notion of welfare deservingness that tied to “blameless economic insufficiency” that one can 
“justifiably speak of pre- and post-OBRA eras of the program”  (Tanenbaum 1995: 936, 937). 
Cumulatively over a ten-year period, Congress had quietly mandated the states to cover pregnant 
women and children under 6 with incomes at or below 133% of the FPL, cover children ages 6 through 18 
in families with incomes at or below 100 percent of the poverty line (by 2002), pay the premiums and cost 
sharing liabilities of Medicare beneficiaries at or below 100 percent of poverty (by 1992) and the premiums 
of Medicare beneficiaries between 100 and 120 percent of poverty (by 1995). The result was and significant 
increase in the number of insured through Medicaid after an extended period of stagnation and 
retrenchment. Figure 4.3 charts the annual enrollment counts between 1980 and 2012.  
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Figure 4.3. Annual Cumulative Count of Unduplicated Enrollees in Medicaid (or CHIP), FY1968-2010 
	  
Notes: Enrollment Data reflect cumulative count of unduplicated individuals enrolled in Medicaid (or CHIP) at any point during 
the year. For example, in 2007 there were 7.1 million children enrolled in SCHIP for part or all of the year; comparatively, there 
were 4,4 million enrolled in June 2007. The solid Medicaid enrollment figure includes M-SCHIP enrollees in states that do not 
have a separate SCHIP program. 
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States (census.gov), Center for Medicare and Medicaid (cms.gov) 
 
Contemporaneous accounts of the Eighties’ reforms did not miss the significance of the incremental 
expansions to Medicaid. Taking stock of the recent legislative achievements of Medicaid, the New York Times 
led with the headline, “Expanded Right to Medicaid Shatters the Link to Welfare” in March 1988 and 
chronicled the “small” “piecemeal,” but “revolutionary steps” that Congress had taken over the past three 
years to distinguish Medicaid eligibility from welfare eligibility (Pear 1988: A1). The editorial staff at the 
Washington Post similarly described the Medicaid expansions as “a series of soft steps that taken together 
would have created enormous controversy, has begun to loosen the connection” between welfare and health 
care entitlements (1987: A22).  
Yet, even if the incremental reforms during the Eighties sustained a quantitative change in Medicaid 
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general demographics of those enrolled. Medicaid eligibility remained strictly tied to the notions of 
maternalistic deservingness, with most of the expansions were directed toward pregnant women, infants 
and, later, poor children who were traditionally characterized as excluded from the wage economy and 
deserving of the charity of a sympathetic state.  
Whereas the National Governors’ Association had endorsed and even petitioned Congress in 
support of Waxman’s mandate to raise the federal floor on Medicaid eligibility in 1985, by the end of the 
decade the same state officials were actively petitioning Congress to halt the imposition of more federal 
mandates. By end of President George H.W. Bush’s term in office nearly 36 million Americans were 
enrolled in Medicaid and total spending for fiscal year 1992 was $120 billion. Compared to the stagnate 
enrollments and an annual growth rate in costs that averaged 8 percent during President Reagan’s first 
term, enrollment and costs averaged an annual growth rate of nearly 5 percent and 13 percent during 
Reagan’s second term and President Bush’s presidency. With the states still phasing in the mandated 
expansions and medical inflation contributing to an unprecedented increase in per-beneficiary costs, states 
officials expressed legitimate concern that Medicaid was crowding out competing public expenditures. For 
many states, Medicaid had become the second costliest line item in their budget, just behind education 
and/or local transfers.  
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Chapter 5. 
Sustaining Medicaid by Responding to Medicaid’s Taxpayer Burden 
 
In 1993, Boston Globe columnist hypothesized, “Decades from now, historians will place the big 
transition at fiscal 1993, when, for the first time, states spent more on Medicaid than on higher education.” 
Aptly describing Medicaid as the PAC-Man of state budgets, Evan Bayh (D., Idaho) gave the columnist his 
blunt assessment of fiscal situation facing states, “Health care is destroying state government” (Shribman 
1993). 
Of course, state governance has not ceased even though Medicaid remains and its expenditures have 
not abated. In fact, today many states spend more on Medicaid than they do on K-12 education, not just 
higher education. This chapter explores how the federal government and states adapted to the rising costs of 
Medicaid by revising the traditional cost sharing arrangement to meet the increasing fiscal burden imposed 
on the states. 
The states would respond first by learning to creatively leverage Disproportionate Share Hospital 
payments and, later, Upper Payment Limit appropriations to augment their budgets. By offsetting their 
DSH or UPL outlays with provider-specific taxes on hospitals the states managed to recoup their own-
source expenditures and thereby effectively raise the federal share going toward their Medicaid operations. 
While Congress would quickly respond by redressing what they perceived as an abuse of these so-called 
Medicaid maximization schemes, by limiting and not eliminating these practices Congress effectively 
acknowledged the incapacity of the states to meet the cost of their Medicaid commitments.  
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Further, following the states’ own initiatives, the federal government’s subsequent reforms to 
Medicaid would acknowledge the need to rebalance the shared responsibilities for financing Medicaid. The 
legislative results consistently increased the federal’s government proportional responsibility, as 
demonstrated by: the bipartisan enactment of the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (“CHIP”) in 
1997 (and its reauthorization in 2009), a supplemental block grant that incorporated a more generous 
federal matching rates; the temporary increases to the state’s federal shares in response to economic 
downturns in 2003 and 2005, and; the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 
2010 and the Medicaid expansion included therein. These policies all represent an understanding by federal 
and state policymakers that Medicaid’s cost sharing arrangement had become inadequate to meet the 
broadening societal need for, and public cost of, welfare medicine. 
 
 “Medicaid Maximization”: The States Leverage DSH and UPL to Meet the Costs of Medicaid 
Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) Payments 
Included as part of the Boren Amendment to OBRA ’80 and OBRA ‘81, Disproportionate Share 
Hospital (DSH) payments are intended to be supplemental Medicaid reimbursements provided to certain 
hospitals “which serve a disproportionate number of low income patients” (see Section 1902(a)(13) and 
Section 1923 of Social Security Act). These special payments are made at the discretion of the state and are 
eligible for the same federal financial participation as determined by the state’s FMAP.  
The rationale by these payments is that they are necessary to supplement and make financially 
whole those hospitals that render high volumes of care to low-income Americans and therefore often lose 
money as a result of either the low Medicaid reimbursement rates (that the hospitals argue fail to meet even 
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the actual cost of care) or the high levels of uncompensated care provided to Medicaid-ineligible indigents. 
DSH payments help relieve the financial burden put upon providers who are ostensibly underwriting the 
state’s charitable care. Ironically, given how DSH payments would contribute to Medicaid inflation, 
another argument for DSH payments was that these supplemental payments could slow the rate of growth 
in Medicaid spending because they could be targeted and therefore reduce the need for across-the-board 
reimbursement rate revisions.  
With their already fiscally burdensome commitment to Medicaid, however, most states did not 
elect to immediately appropriate any additional revenues to healthcare providers. The DSH payments might 
relieve the financial burden of charitable care imposed on providers, but they would do nothing, on their 
own, to relieve the increasing state-level taxpayer burden of Medicaid. Any DSH payment would only 
increase the state’s net health spending; as such, there was little incentive for the states to make such 
optional payments to providers. 
DSH payments remained marginal throughout the 1980s, up until state governments discovered 
provider taxes and donation programs. After states understood how the dynamics of this shell game of 
monetary transactions could allow them to leverage additional federal revenues without any associated state 
contribution, the states awarded DSH payments liberally. Many states quickly came to realize they could 
use supplemental DSH payments to augment their own budgets, not the operating budgets of certain 
hospitals. The concurrent use of DSH payments with provider taxes or donations has the affect of lowering 
the relative cost of the state share.  
Figure 5.1 depicts the mechanics for how a state government in partnership with a hospital can use 
a combination of provider taxes to leverage federal dollars: (1) The state appropriates a $1 million DSH 
payment to a hospital; (2) the state submits a claim for the DSH payment to the federal government; (3.a) 
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the government reimburses the state for a proportion of the DSH according to the state’s FMAP, say 50 
percent, so $500,000. (3.b) The state then uses its taxing authority to impose an arbitrary tax on the 
hospital for, at least, $500,000 to cover its own share of the DSH-payment—the hospital and state could 
share the residual $500,000 in any manner they see fit. For the example let’s assume the hospital retains 5 
percent of the DSH payment. Whatever additional proportion the state collects from the provider will be 
general revenue gained ostensibly at no cost to the state taxpayers and can be used for however the 
government.  
 




Whether a coercive tax or voluntary donation the two mechanisms served the same purpose: the 
state could collect money from a hospital and then use that revenue to finance a DSH payment to the very 
same hospital. Meanwhile each of those dollars repaid to the providers would generate one to four dollars in 
federal transfers, depending upon the state’s FMAP, that the state leveraged at zero cost. 
-­‐$500,000	  (Federal-­‐Share,	  
FMAP=50%)	  
Net	  Expense:	  $500,000	  
FEDERAL	  
GOVERNMENT	  
+$1,000,000	  (DSH	  Payment)	  
-­‐$950,000	  (Provider	  Tax)	  
Net	  Gain:	  $50,000	  
LOCAL	  HOSPITAL	  
	  
-­‐$1,000,000	  (DSH	  Payment)	  
+$500,000	  (Federal	  Reimbursement)	  
+$950,000	  (Provider	  Tax)	  
Net	  Gain:	  $450,000	  
STATE	  GOVERNMENT	  
(1)	  DSH	  Payment:	  $1	  million	  (2)	  DSH	  Claim:	  $1	  million	  
(3.b)	  Provider	  Tax/Donation:	  $950,000	  
(3.a)	  Medicaid	  Reimbursement:	  $500,000	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In 1984, Florida became the first state to establish a provider tax program. West Virginia was the 
first state to use a donation program, in 1985, after the Health Care Financing Administration (now the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid) issued a rule clarifying how states could receive donations from private 
medical care providers. Still, the states were slow to appreciate the fiscal utility of these payments as a 
source of federal revenues. By 1985, only about a third of the states had specific DSH payment regulations 
in place and the net amount of supplement federal revenues being drawn down was marginal. 
Subsequent provisions in each of the reconciliation bills of 1986 through 1990 greatly encouraged 
the general practice of states drawing upon federal DSH payments.48 With state spending on Medicaid 
steadily rising as a consequence of the recent federal mandates and medical inflation, the states learned—by 
necessity, they would argue—to use donations and providers taxes as a way to finance the state's portion of 
the of Medicaid. Whether or not it was the intention of the original law, Congress and the executive gave 
its tacit support to the practice.  
Legislation in the later part of the Eighties supports the characterization that the federal 
government was complicit in their growth. “Numerous members of both parties in Congress, both liberal 
and conservative, sought to find ways to assist their home states,” observed Jean Donovan Gilman. Offering 
Senator Warren Rudman (R, N.H.), who co-authored both the fiscally-conservative Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) and the Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-119), as an example of a senator who despite his opposition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 OBRA ’86 (P.L. 99-509) rescinded a HCFA regulation limiting a state’s aggregate Medicaid payments for 
inpatient hospital services to no more than the amount that would have been paid under Medicare payment principles 
and gave states express permission to make Medicaid DSH payments without limit; the next year, OBRA ’87 (P.L. 
100-203) required states to submit state plan authorizing Medicaid DSH payments, established DSH eligibility criteria 
and required minimum payments to reflect Medicaid utilization rate; OBRA ’90 (P.L. 101-508) allowed DSH 
payment to reflect a hospital’s low-income (not just Medicaid) utilization rate, separated DSH payments according to 
type of hospital;, and prohibited executive from changing treatment of provider taxes/donations. 
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excessive federal spending assisted his state in exploiting the Medicaid program for federal transfers, Gilman 
added, “Even conservative members of Congress have a difficult time putting their money where their 
mouths are when the possibility exist to distribute concentrated benefits (especially to powerful interests) in 
their home states.” (Gilman 1998: 194)  
In June 1989, the HCFA regulation that states could not require or solicit contributions from 
providers for the purpose of obtaining federal matching funds (a response to the West Virginia program) 
was overturned in the courts. This provided a mechanism for states to generate additional federal matching 
funds without any net increases in their own budgets. The combination of the provider tax or donation 
programs and a relaxation in allowable DSH payments created the potential of enormous financial 
advantages for states. Then OBRA ‘90 extended a moratorium (initially enacted under the Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-647)) on any federal regulatory changes to the treatment of 
voluntary contributions and provider-specific taxes. 
Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, as the number of states with a tax or donation program 
increased from 6 to 39, the total DSH payments soared from under $1 billion to $17.4 billion, accounting 
for 14.7 percent of total of Medicaid spending in 1992. DSH payments have been identified a major causal 
factor for the rapid growth in Medicaid spending in the early Nineties, contributing to nearly half of the 
growth in medical expenditures between 1991 and 1992 (Holahan et al., 1993; Hearne, 2005). 
Ultimately the uninhibited growth in DSH payments and rising concerns over the federal deficit led 
to reforms. With DSH payments exceeding 15 percent of the total Medicaid budget in about a third of the 
states in 1991, neither Congress nor the executive could ignore the alleged abuses of DSH financing. Too 
many states were not actually contributing to the state-share of their DSH payments and a large proportion 
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of DSH spending was not actually going to safety-net hospitals to cover their uncompensated care as 
Congress intended, but relieving state budget deficits. 
The first attempt to reign in the growth (and perceived abuses) of provider/tax programs was the 
Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991 (P.L. 102-234). 
(Incidentally, this legislation represented the first stand-alone piece of Medicaid legislation passed by 
Congress in its first three decades.) This law capped DSH payments, setting a maximum DSH allotment for 
each state based upon its historical DSH spending for 1992, with the DSH program (including state share) 
not to exceed 12 percent of a state’s total Medicaid expenditures (Herz 2009).  
The 1991 law also addressed certain practices that were used by the states to circumvent their 
shared responsibility for funding the Medicaid program. The law banned provider donations and required 
that provider taxes be “broad-based” and uniformly applied within specified classes of providers, thereby 
preventing the taxation of only Medicaid providers. (Other providers could not be repaid by simply raising 
Medicaid rates, and therefore some providers would likely oppose the imposition of such taxes.) The law 
prohibited states from making any direct or indirect guarantee to providers that they would be held-
harmless for any taxes or donations by reimbursing them with either DSH payments or inflated Medicaid 
payment rates.  
While the 1991 law halted growth in DSH spending, the DSH program continued to be a 
contentious issue between the states and the federal government. As Mark Reynolds, who served in 
Massachusetts and Tennessee’s Medicaid offices, reflected, “[Y]ou will notice that when Congress had the 
chance to roll those things back it never did. It might have capped them but it never repealed benefits.” As 
he explained, “DSH became a very big funding tool for safety net institutions at federal expense…. Once 
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[the Congress and executive] see what the cost of rolling them back is in terms of the impact, that's a very 
difficult situation” (Smith and Moore 2003-06: 510).49 
To better assure that the states used the DSH payments as intended, Congress enacted additional 
legislation in 1993 and 1997 that lessened state flexibility and curbed the worst abuses of DSH financing 
schemes by the states (Coughlin and Liska 1997).50 
Figure 5.2 presents aggregate federal share of DSH payments for fiscal years 1993 through 2010. 
The figure represents the federal allotment and not necessarily the actual DSH payments made. The federal 
allotment represents the maximum amount of DSH a state can distribute and have subsidized according to 
the state’s matching rate. The amount can vary from actual payments because states may either choose to 
not spend the full amount of concurrent state resources required or the state may exceed the federal 
amount in a particular fiscal year depending when the payments were made within the state’s fiscal year. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Of course, there are legitimate reasons why a state would expect “donations” or impose taxes on hospitals in 
the state. For example, if there are certain community hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of the state’s 
Medicaid patients and provide a lot of charitable care, it might be reasonable to expect that the state’s more affluent 
hospitals, whose patients are more likely to be fully insured, should bear some of the cost of financing the delivery of 
care to the poor. (Whereas taxing the recipient of DSH payments defeats the intention of the subsidy.) 
50 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (P.L. 103-66) made an effort to better assure that DSH 
programs were being used for their intended purpose by allowing states to provide DSH supplemental payments to 
only those hospitals that had Medicaid utilization rate of at least 1 percent of patients. It also imposed the restriction 
that total DSH payments provided to a single hospital could not exceed the unreimbursed cost of providing inpatient 
care to Medicaid or uninsured patients. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) phased down DSH 
allotments by 1 percentage point for each year between 1998 and 2002 and, for 2003 and beyond, instituted a CPI-
adjusted growth on the states’ maximum DSH allotments. The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA) of 2003 (P.L. 108-173) designated the 16 states with DSH expenditures between 0 and 3 
percent of total (state and federal) Medicaid spending in FY 2000 as “low DSH” states and increased their DSH 
allotment by 16 percent each year from FY 2004 through FY 2008, and by the CPI thereafter. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) provided for additional DSH payments by increasing all state 
Medicaid DSH Payment Program allotments by 2.5 percent in 2009 and an additional 2.5 percent in 2010. After 
2010, the states’ annual DSH allotments returned to the baseline as determined under current law. 
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Comparing actual DSH payments reported to the HCFA/CMS, federal allotments were drawn at an 
average rate of about 85-90 percent of maximum allotment throughout the period. 
Figure 5.2. Federal Share of DSH Allotment, Nominal and Real Dollars, and Federal DSH Allotments as Percent of 
Total Federal Share of Medicaid Payments, FY1989-2011 
	  
Source.	  Federal	  Register	  
 
There are several ways to measure the equity of the DSH payments to the states. Figure 5.3 and 
Figure 5.4 respectively chart the federal share of DSH allocations per capita and total DSH payments per 
poor person for such payments across the states between 1993 and 2009, including the state average and 
20th/80th percentiles (Hawaii, Tennessee and Arizona are excluded for those years when they had no DSH 
allocations due to waivers). By considering federal DSH payments on a per capita level, adjusted for regular 
inflation, the cynical analyst can look to Figure 5.3 to better understand state-level variation in DSH 
payments from the perspective of general interstate revenue sharing—i.e. this is how much a state can draw 
down from the Treasury without any real state expenditure if it were able to use provider taxes and 
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sharing (a 1993 survey by Ku and Coughlin (1995) found that about one-third of federal payments were 
being retained by the states for non-DSH related expenditures), the best way to minimize inequities would 
be to make sure that each state receives the same federal share per capita.  
In contrast, if the DSH reforms passed by Congress in 1991, 1993 and 1997 are accepted as having 
successfully curtailed the worst abuses of DSH funding mechanisms so that the payments are used, as 
intended, to subsidize hospitals for their uncompensated care, it might be preferable to compare changes to 
the states’ total DSH payments per person in poverty. To this end, Figure 5.4 charts the variation in DSH 
payments per person in poverty,51 adjusted for impact of medical inflation to reflect the real value of 
payments over time. In 2008, the average federal DSH payment per poor person was $475; however, the 
range went from $10 per poor resident in Wyoming to $3,000 per poor resident in New Hampshire. 
Figure 5.3. Federal DSH Allotment per Capita, Real 2008 Dollars, by State, FY1993-2009 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 I also looked at the DSH payments per the number of uninsured and Medicaid beneficiaries in a state, the two 
targeted groups of DSH payments (given that DSH payments are intended to subsidized Medicaid shortfalls associated 
with low reimbursement rates and uncompensated care for the uninsured); however, the aggregation of uninsured 
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Regardless of the measure, it is clear that the variation in DSH payments is quite severe. The 
federal ceilings imposed on DSH payments may have been needed to maintain Medicaid’s financial 
partnership between the states and federal government, the individual ceilings had the affect of locking into 
place the historical variation in state-level DSH spending patterns. Unfortunately, this variation is often 
times unrelated to actual need. For example, the correlation between the federal share of DSH payments 
per capita and the state’s FMAP is approximately zero and the correlation between total DSH payments per 
poor and the state’s FMAP is negative (falling from a -0.35 in 1993 to -0.22 in 2009).  
The designation of Low-DSH and High-DSH states (with that later being granted greater allowance 
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Vetoing New York, Spurning Hawaii and Privileging Alaska  
Included the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 was a significant reduction to Disproportionate Share 
Hospital payments (estimated at $10.4 billion in federal savings over 5 years). However, DSH-related 
earmark granted New York a reprieve for certain provider taxes the state had previously collected and the 
federal government argued violated the provider tax criteria established by OBRA ’91 (Coughlin and Liska 
1998). 
Objecting to the recusal of New York’s federal liability that the CBO estimated to be $1.5 billion in 
disputed DSH payments, President Bill Clinton exercised, for the first time, his recently acquired line item 
veto authority to rescind the reprieve. President Clinton argued the special treatment awarded to New 
York went against recently implemented legislative and regulatory guidelines that were intended to curb 
DSH expenditures. “This preferential treatment [recusing New York of its DSH liability] would have … 
treated New York differently from all other States,” explained President Clinton in his veto message (cited 
in Clinton v. City of New York 524 US 417).52 
Senator Moynihan subsequently went to the floor to defend New York’s accounting and to offer a 
bill (S. 1144) denouncing his president’s unilateral action. The senator argued that the high level of DSH 
payments would have been unnecessary if New York received an equitable allotment of federal Medicaid 
dollars, implying that the supplemental federal revenues generated by the DSH payment program served to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The line-item veto has since been ruled unconstitutional. Presciently, an unforgiving Senator Moynihan—who 
wondered why it was that at “no point in the course of those deliberations [with the administration or House over the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997] did the subject of the Medicaid waiver come up” —warned the President that he chose 
poorly for the test case of his new executive authority (Congressional Record—Senate 1997: S8725). Moynihan 
explained that because the president’s chose to exercise his new executive privilege “on a measure designed to help 
New York surely there will now be a lawsuit that will persuade the Supreme Court to strike down the measure as 
unconstitutional” (Ibid: S8726). Within a year the Supreme Court ruled in Clinton v. City of New York (1998) that the 
line item was veto unconstitutional. 
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effectively raise the state’s federal share, thereby making the state’s commitment to Medicaid sustainable 
(Congressional Record—Senate 1997: S8725). No doubt singling out Arkansas’ generous FMAP rate 
because President Clinton previously served as the state’s governor, Senator Moynihan slyly added how 
New York’s dependency on the DSH payments would be lessened, “if, for example, the Federal 
Government paid 73 percent [of New York’s Medicaid costs] as it does in Arkansas” (Ibid). 
As a rebuttal to the President’s rationale for his veto that the recusal amounted to preferential 
treatment of New York, Senator Moynihan cited a 1994 address given by President Clinton to a New York 
audience in which the president himself acknowledged, “There’s no question that the formula should be 
changed, and that states like New York with high per capita incomes but huge numbers of poor people are 
not treated fairly under a formula that only deals with per capita income” (Ibid: S8726). The senator argued 
that until such time as a full reform of the funding formula could be undertaken, there was a need for 
exceptional ad hoc solutions, like DSH payments, to adjudicate certain states’ unique fiscal situations.  
Ironically, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 included other examples of “preferential treatment” 
not vetoed by the president. The District of Columbia, for example, had its federal match permanently 
increased to 70 percent. Significantly, Alaska too had its FMAP amended, with its congressional 
representatives successfully arguing that its federal matching rate should reflect the reality that the state’s 
cost of living was well above the national average. As a result, the Balanced Budget Act included an increase 
to Alaska’s federal match from the bottom rate of 50 percent to the national average of 59.8 percent for the 
next three fiscal years. Alaska succeeded in having its own preferential FMAP rate extended for another five 
years in 2000.53 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Whereas the 1997 legislation had awarded Alaska with a fixed FMAP rate of 59.8, the Benefits Improvement 
and Protection Act of 2000 adjusted the FMAP formula to reflect Alaska’s high cost of living by dividing the state’s 
per capita income by 1.05, effectively raising its income relative to the otherwise unadjusted national income. With 
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The Hawaiian delegation also asked the House to include an increase in its FMAP to reflect its 
similarly high cost of living, but by then the bill had been closed for new amendments (Congressional 
Record—Senate 1997: S8726). Then despite the precedent set by Alaska and an explicit recognition in the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 that both Alaska and Hawaii’s poverty guidelines (as they related to the new 
TANF program) should be calculated differently than in the continental states, the Hawaiian delegation was 
unable to secure an adjustment to Hawaii’s FMAP to “reflect more fairly the state’s ability to bear its share 
of Medicaid payments.”54 
No floor statement, no committee report, no media report could be found to rationalize what 
amounted to a legislative earmark granting special treatment to Alaska. Meanwhile, Hawaii’s FMAP 
remained at 50 percent. In not reintroducing their appeal for a higher FMAP rate beyond the 106th 
Congress, it appeared that even the Hawaiian delegation had no illusions that their colleagues would be 
sympathetic to their state’s specific fiscal imbalance. 
Nonetheless, the different treatment of Hawaii and Alaska is astounding for two reasons. First, if 
the cost-of-living argument legitimating Alaska’s special federal match is considered, the different fate of 
Hawaii is inexplicable because the nominal income data used in the current funding formula disadvantaged 
Hawaii more so than Alaska. For example, measured in real terms Hawaii was ranked as 48th poorest state 
in 1999 with an adjusted per capita income of $22,870. Comparatively, Alaska was ranked 33rd with a real 
per capita income of $25,606. The national average was $28,518. Adjusting Hawaii’s FMAP to reflect the 
real value of the state’s per capita income would have raised Hawaii’s federal share about 20 points, from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Alaska’s special FMAP rate increasing to 60.1 percent in fiscal year 2001, compared to the 56.0 percent it would 
have fallen to with no adjustment, the CBO anticipated the added cost of the provision to be $200 million over the 5 
years (CBO 2001). 
54 Senator Akaka introduced S. 1376 and S. 264 in the 105th and 106th Congresses, respectively, to increase the 
FMAP for Hawaii to the national average of 59.8 percent. His state’s House delegation introduced similar bills in 
their chamber (respectively, H.R. 3118 and H.R. 402). 
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the national minimum of 50 percent to approximately 70 percent. A confounded Senator Daniel Akaka (D, 
Hawaii) summarized the situation for colleagues. “The same factors justifying an increase for Alaska apply to 
Hawaii,” he said (Congressional Record—Senate 1999 Vol. 145(9): S792).  
Second, as Senator Moynihan was always want to remind his colleagues with respect to New York, 
this modest correction to Alaska and Hawaii’s comparative income data ignores the fact that latter had a 
comparatively higher poverty rate than former—Hawaii had a 17 percent poverty rate in 1998 compared to 
Alaska’s 12 percent poverty rate and a national average of 14 percent (Leonard and Walder 2000). It could 
be reasonably expected that Hawaiians would have a higher tax burden with respect to the welfare needs of 
its residents compared to Alaskans. 
 
Upper Payment Limits (UPL) 
Just as Congress and the executive were getting a handle on DSH abuses in the second half of the 
nineties, the states discovered that the Upper Payment Limit (UPL) (42 C.F.R. § 447.272 and § 447.321) 
could similarly be used to leverage federal financial participation far above the states’ nominal, statutory 
federal match. The fiscal mechanism for UPL payments is essentially a variant of DSH payments, though for 
the most part intergovernmental transfers between local governments and the state are used in lieu of 
provider taxes and donations. Unlike DSH payment programs, states are not specifically required by federal 
law to implement a UPL program. 
Whereas DSH payments are intended to subsidize the uncompensated care provided by hospitals to 
Medicaid and uninsured patients, UPL payments are meant to supplement the potential inadequacy of 
Medicaid’s reimbursement rates in one of three types of facilities: hospitals, nursing homes or mental health 
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facilities. Medicaid DSH payments are excluded from the UPL calculation (though UPL payments made to a 
hospital count toward the hospital’s DSH cap, reducing the total amount of DSH payments the hospital may 
receive). Figure 5.5 is a visual representation differentiating the two types of supplementary payments. 
Figure 5.5. Differentiating Medicaid's Supplemental Payments: UPL & DSH 
	  
Source:	  National	  Association	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  Public	  Hospitals	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  Health	  Systems	  
 
Although federal Medicaid law gives the states broad discretion in setting provider payment 
levels—so long as total payments are consistent with “efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are 
sufficient to enlist enough providers” (Section 1902(a)(30) of Social Security Act)—it does set an upper 
payment limit on reimbursements, which stipulates that Medicaid payments for fee-for-service care cannot 
exceed what would have been paid under Medicare’s payment principles. In 1987, the Secretary of HHS 
issued regulations that interpreted this to allow states to supplement their normal vendor payment that fell 
below this UPL with lump sum payments equivalent to the difference between what the state paid in 
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significant “room” under the UPL capitation for the state to make supplemental payments. UPLs are eligible 
for the same federal financial participation as normal Medicaid vendor payments and the resulting federal 
transfers come with no stipulations regarding their use. 
Similar to the Medicaid maximization schemes involving DSH payments of a decade earlier, 
Timothy Westmoreland, a director of Medicaid in the HCFA, reported in 2000 that “the practical outcome” 
of the UPLs “is that the States using this financing mechanism actually gain Federal matching payments 
without any new State financial contribution” and with “many States allowing their county-owned providers 
to keep less than five percent of the Federal funds that are used to provide these excessive payments” 
(Westmoreland 2000, emphasis added). He informed Congress upon how states were using UPL 
arrangements for non-health purposes, such as financing budget deficits or tax cuts, reducing state debt, and 
paying for education programs. “These practices, which are effectively general revenue sharing, are 
inconsistent with the Medicaid statute, Congressional intent, and Administration policy,” summarized 
Westmoreland (Ibid).  
For example, imagine a state’s Medicaid typical reimbursement rate per hospital discharge was 
$1,000 less than what the state estimated would have been paid according to the customary Medicare 
payment schedule. If the state discharged 100,000 Medicaid recipients from hospitals in the fiscal year, the 
total UPL allowance for hospitals would be $100 million. The state could distribute the entire $100 million 
to local government-owned public hospitals (regardless of what proportion of Medicaid patients had their 
care provided by these specific hospitals). As usual, the federal government would reimburse the state a 
share of the UPL payment according to the state’s FMAP rate; if the state had a FMAP of 50 percent, the 
state would receive $50 million from the federal government. Then the local governments would transfer 
some proportion of the supplementary payments originally paid by the state to the hospital back to the 
state. If the local government retained just 5 percent, or $5 million, thereby returning $95 million of the 
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original $100 million UPL payment back to the state, the state would net $45 million in additional revenues 
from the completed transaction. 
Despite the obvious incentives of this funding arrangement and the fiscal convenience provided by 
intergovernmental transfers as their primary financing mechanism, UPL payments totaled just $313 million 
in fiscal year 1995. States only began to broadly implement UPL programs beginning in the late-nineties, 
after the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) repealed the Boren Amendments (Section 
1902(a)(13)(A) of the Social Security Act) that required Medicaid payment rates be sufficient to cover the 
cost of “efficiently and economically operated facilities.” By granting the states far greater freedom in setting 
payment rates, the states lowered their reimbursements, thereby worsening the disparity between the 
states’ Medicaid payments and Medicare’s payment schedule.  
The resulting increase in the state’s potential UPL allowance, as well as the concurrence of 
renewed Medicaid inflation and decreased real value of DSH payments, provided both the means and 
motive for the subsequent explosion in UPL payments. Between 1998 and 2000, UPL payments increased 
from $1.4 billion to $10.3 billion with the number of states having a UPL program increasing from only 12 
states to 28 states. The growth in UPL payments accounted for nearly 30 percent of the growth in total 
federal Medicaid spending over 2000 (Schneider and Rousseau 2002). 
As a result of the proven allegations of general revenue sharing and the appearance of fiscal 
impunities, the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA) 
(H.R. 5661; as incorporated into The Consolidated Appropriations Act, P.L. 106-554) included proposals 
by the Clinton administration to curtail UPL abuses. Before these regulatory reforms were implemented 
the states were able to generate very high federal payments in part because they could combine, or 
aggregate, UPLs across private and public facilities into the calculation of the state’s net UPL and then 
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direct the entire allocation to just the public facilities (who could be counted upon to reliably transfer the 
money back to the state). A government audit that examined how 6 states used intergovernmental transfers 
to finance UPL payments in 2000 was damning of the state’s Medicaid maximization practices: the 
supplemental payments were not based on cost of provided care to Medicaid beneficiaries, the states used 
intergovernmental transfers to attain federal matching funds without contributing the required non-federal 
share, and the windfall federal revenues were used as general revenues that were as likely to be spent on 
education or infrastructure as healthcare (U.S. Dept. of HHS, OIG 2001). The Inspector General suggested 
that any portion of the federal share retained by the state government constituted, at the very minimum, 
“refunds required to be reported as other collections and, consequently, offset against expenditures 
reported to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services” (Ibid: ii). 
New regulation, promulgated just before President George W. Bush took office in 2001, broke up 
each group of providers based on the facility’s ownership (state, local public, and private) so that any 
potential revenue shortfalls in Medicaid payment to private facilities could no longer be factored into 
determining the UPL paid to public facilities (66 Federal Register 3148 (2001)). The CBO anticipated the 
new regulation would “reduce states’ ability to generate additional federal funds through UPL mechanisms 
by 95 percent for nursing homes and about 33 percent for hospitals” (CBO 2001: 17). 
Significantly, however, the regulatory reform allowed the state to pay non-state, but still publicly 
owned, facilities up to 150% of the Medicare payment rate. This higher payment standard effectively 
nullified the intended affect that separating the facilities by ownership was to have on reducing the aggregate 
UPLs available for public facilities. President George W. Bush’s first director of CMS, Tom Scully, 
characterized the separate 150 percent UPL as “the single biggest outrage I have ever seen in the history of 
government finance” (Riccardi 2001). The director swiftly eliminated the higher payment rate as “part of 
[the Bush] Administration’s efforts to restore fiscal integrity to the Medicaid program and reduce the 
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opportunity for abusive funding practices based on payments unrelated to actual covered Medicaid services” 
(7 Federal Register 2602 (2002)). 
In 2007, the Bush administration published additional regulation further affecting UPL payments. A 
new “Medicaid Cost Rule” again lowered the state’s potential UPL payment, this time by instructing states 
that the determination of the upper payment limit that governmentally-operated health care providers could 
be reimbursed was not to exceed the cost of providing Medicaid covered services to Medicaid recipients (as 
opposed to the more generous payment determination used for Medicare). The regulatory changes also 
restricted certain intergovernmental transfers, and reaffirmed that all health care providers received and 
retained the total computable amount of their Medicaid payments (UPL, DSH or otherwise).  
A 2008 federal court, however, vacated the regulatory change, after it was proven that the 
executive action violated a Congressional moratorium (one signed into law by President Bush) on the 
finalization of the regulation that would have implemented the Medicaid Cost Rule. Subsequent 
congressional laws extended the delay, and then rejected, the proposed regulatory change to UPL 
determination.55 
Unfortunately, providing an accurate historical accounting of the total spending on these 
supplemental programs is difficult (the data for 1998 and 2000, above, was from survey of states, not 
HCFA/CMS reports) because the states do not separately report their non-DSH payments. Since 2001, 
CMS has required states to report certain supplemental payments on a separate informational section of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See Alameda County Medical Center, et al. v. Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, et al., 559 F. Supp. 2d (2008)). The District Court referenced The Troop Readiness, Veteran's Care, Katrina 
Recovery and Iraq Accountability Appropriation Act of 2007 (P.L 110-28) as preventing the rule Subsequent to the 
court decision, Congress extended the moratorium on finalizing the “Cost Rule” to April 1, 2009 in Section 7001 of 
the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2008 (P.L 110-252) and then expressed the sense that the Cost rule should 
not be adopted as a final rule in Section 5003(d) of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-
5). 
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their expenditure reports (CMS 64.9I form), but states do not receive federal reimbursement based on this 
section of the expenditure reports and so the data is incomplete. The GAO, to the best of their abilities—
that they admit, “likely understates” the true amount by several billion dollars—estimated that DSH and 
UPL supplemental payments totaled at least $23.4 billion in fiscal year 2006 (about $25 billion in 2008 
adjusted-dollars)—$17.1 billion in DSH payments and $6.3 billion in UPL payments (GAO 2009: 21-22). 
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is critical of potential Medicaid maximization 
mechanisms, such as UPL and DSH payments. These supplemental payment programs have been 
historically susceptible to abuse and the fungible nature of state budgets makes them difficult to monitor 
once the payments are transferred to state accounts. This allows states to inappropriately leverage federal 
Medicaid matching dollars without necessarily making a corresponding contribution from their own 
revenue sources. If, as in the two hypothetical examples above, the DSH and UPL payments were 
essentially offsetting ledger entries in the state and local governments’ bank accounts (and, therefore, did 
not actually go to reimbursing hospitals for either uncompensated care or Medicaid deficits), the 
supplemental payment arrangements threaten to violate the integrity of the federal/state partnership under 
Medicaid. 
A few studies have examined how the state funding of these supplemental payments have affected 
the statutorily defined financial partnership between the federal government and the states and increased 
many states’ effective federal matching rate (Coughlin and Zuckerman, 2003; Coughlin et al., 2007). For 
example, the average Medicaid federal matching rate among 20 survey states was approximately 57 percent 
in 2005; however, when the authors excluded provider taxes and all intergovernmental transfers from 
county funds, then the federal share of the real spending on supplemental payments rose 20 percentage 
points to nearly 87 percent. Further, seven of the twenty states were dependent on sources other than state 
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general funds for at least 95 percent of the state share of the supplemental payments (Coughlin et al. 2007: 
1476-78).56 
Dennis Smith, a CMS director, who, in testimony before the House, defended the Bush 
administration’s regulatory changes to the UPL payments in 2007, argued that regulating supplemental 
payment programs was necessary because, absent corrective measures, Medicaid had the potential to be “a 
limitless account for State and local programs and agencies to draw Federal funds for non-Medicaid 
purposes” (Smith 2007). Numerous reports by the non-partisan GAO have concluded similarly, (see GAO 
2000, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009).  Although the worst purported “Medicaid scams” by 
the states have been mitigated and it can be safely assumed that most of the tens of billions of dollars that go 
to these enhanced payments every year are in fact critical to the nation’s safety net institution, a GAO 
report, published in 2009 maintained, “ongoing federal oversight of payments to offset uncompensated 
hospital care costs is warranted” (GAO 2009). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It should be footnoted, at the very least, that Coughlin et al. do not level the explicit charge that the states are 
shirking their financial obligations. This is important to clarify. In many states, the county and local governments have 
traditionally contributed to Medicaid’s costs. Since its inception, Medicaid has always permitted states to rely on local 
governments as a source of financing for the program. Indeed, the statute refers only to the federal share and the 
“non- federal share” of Medicaid expenditures (nowhere does the term “state share” appear) and the statute explicitly 
permits states to derive up to 60 percent of the non-federal share of Medicaid from “local sources” other than state 
general revenues. According to the National Association of Counties, 27 states required some form of local financial 
matching requirements for Medicaid in 2010. The funding mechanisms are varied. The counties’ fiscal liabilities may 
be collected as a fixed amount or as a proportional share of certain Medicaid expenditures—ranging from a maximum 
of 10 percent of the non-federal share of the administrative costs in Ohio, to, $6.7 billion, more than one-third of the 
entire non-federal share, in New York (National Association of Counties, 2010).  
 With respect to the enhanced payments associated with UPL and DSH, the local facilities, whether public or 
private, are the entities that have the incentive to provide the necessary intergovernmental transfers or donations 
required to fully fund the supplemental payment programs. It is as much a means for the community hospitals to 
derive additional revenues to finance their operating budget at no net cost than it is for the state to increase its general 
revenues. 
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Block Granting a Medicaid Expansion: The State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Although Republicans had introduced a revised Medigrant proposal again in 1996 (see Chapter 4 
above), Secretary Shalala reasserted President Clinton’s concern with the proposal (Shalala 1996) and the 
Republicans ultimately abandoned their efforts to reform Medicaid. With the public and politicos’ attention 
largely diverted to welfare reform (and the upcoming general election) neither the Republican’s Medigrant 
plan nor the National Governors’ Association’s alternative block grant proposal,57 gained traction in 
Washington. Medicaid reform had temporarily moved to the periphery as Congress focused its attention to 
major welfare reform.58 “For Medicaid, the year 1996 was almost a non-event,” summarized David Smith 
and Judith Moore (2008: 243). 
In 1997, however, Congress passed the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). It 
represented the first major expansion of public health insurance for the poor since the last of the Medicaid-
related mandates passed in 1990. Included as an amendment to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-
33) and enacted as Title XXI of the Social Security Act, CHIP was a block grant that offered generous 
matching grants to the states to provide health-care insurance to children in families with incomes earning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The National Governors’ Association unanimously endorsed a repeal of the individual entitlement to Medicaid 
and its replacement with a combination of a block grant and, significantly, supplemental payments (not subject to 
congressional authorizations) for unexpected increases in enrollment. Ironically, the conservative Heritage 
Foundation was reticent to endorse the governor’s block grant plan, being suspicious of the included supplemental 
“umbrella insurance” (Liu 1996); while, the liberal Center on Budget and Policy Priorities supported the NGA’s plan, 
despite its strong opposition to the Republican’s own Medigrant proposal (Lambrew 2005). Although Secretary 
Shalala testified “the Governors' financing mechanism had the potential to be creative and a workable formula that 
constrains growth without providing incentives to drop coverage,” neither the Democrats nor Republicans were 
choose to take up the proposal in Congress (Shalala 1996). 
58 The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) (P.L. 104-193), 
was the landmark, bipartisan legislation that repealed the six-decade old AFDC program and replaced it with 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Although Medicaid financing was not directly affected by the 
fundamental restructuring of the nations’ welfare system, TANF did create some confusion over the enrollment 
status of Medicaid’s “categorically” eligible AFDC recipients. Any decline in Medicaid enrollments, particularly 
among mothers and children, however, was unintended and temporarily.  
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between 150% and 200% of the federal poverty line, well above the existing maximum Medicaid 
thresholds. States could implement CHIP by expanding their Medicaid program, creating a separate CHIP 
program, or proposing a combination of the two approaches. 
Unlike Medicaid, CHIP does not guarantee an individual entitlement and so children have no 
legally enforceable rights to benefits if a state runs out of money. Instead, CHIP funds would be available 
through a federal-state matching arrangement with the federal government’s financial commitment 
purposefully capped. The original legislation authorized $40 billion in federal matching funds over 10 years, 
to be ostensibly financed by an increase in the federal tax on tobacco products. (Although CHIP attracted 
bipartisan support from some of the very legislators who had signed the Contract with America, it is 
unlikely that this significant increase in net federal spending was what Speaker Gingrich had intended when 
he proposed his block grant as a way to shrink the net size of the federal government.) 
Despite not having the same open-ended entitlement status of Medicaid, CHIP was generously 
funded, with each state’s funding allocation to be based on the number of low-income children and low-
income uninsured children in the state, adjusted for the local cost of providing health care services. Any 
unspent funds under an individual state’s original allotment could be carried over for two years (this was 
later adjusted to three years), after which time the remaining revenues, if any, would be redistributed to 
states who had overspent their allotments.  
Similar to the proposed increase to the FMAP included in the Republican’s Medigrant proposal, the 
federal government would distribute CHIP funding, up to the maximum allocation, as a matching payment 
according to an “enhanced” FMAP (E-FMAP). The E-FMAP (not to be confused with Senator Moynihan’s 
proposed “Equitable FMAP” formulary, discussed below) provides greater federal assistance compared to 
the standard FMAP. It is calculated by reducing the state’s Medicaid share by 30%. For example, for states 
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with the minimum standard FMAP of 50%, their state share decreases from 50 percent to 35 percent (50 - 
50 × 0.30) and their enhanced FMAP rate is increased to 65 percent. The relative change is less for a 
poorer states with a high FMAP and a correspondingly lower state share to begin with: for example, 
Mississippi with a FMAP rate of 76.8 percent in 1999 would benefit from an E-FMAP rate of 83.8 percent, 
equivalent to a 9 percent increase over its baseline rate.  
As it had done on multiple occasions in the past, Congress could have simply passed a reform that 
gave the states the option (or imposed upon them a mandate) of raising their eligibility criteria for children. 
Instead, by pairing the expansion with a significantly increased financial incentive Congress was effectively 
acknowledging the inadequacy of Medicaid’s status quo funding arrangement. CHIP’s enhanced FMAP 
established the precedent that any further expansion of Medicaid would require a reduction in the states’ 
comparative fiscal burdens. 
Although CHIP funding is ostensibly capped, the supplementary matching rate authorized for CHIP 
has the potential to be a major inflationary stimulus for public health spending and enrollments. Critical of 
this CHIP expenditure creep, the conservative Cato Institute lamented, “[T]hat cap is not as binding as it 
may appear” (Cato 2009: 138). 
Certainly, the state and federal financial data backs this specific criticism: with the allocated 
appropriations running short of several states’ full fiscal needs Congress appropriated an additional $283 
million in FY 2006 and another $650 million in FY 2007 to be split among the several states that expected 
to run out of CHIP money before the end of the fiscal years.59 It is not incidental that many of the states that 
required additional appropriations had taken the enhanced FMAP rate to expand eligibility well beyond the 
original intention of the 1997 law. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Appropriations included as amendments to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-362) and U.S. Troop 
Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007” (P.L. 110-28) 
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With CHIP set to expire in 2008, the 110th Congress took up its extension in 2007. By then CHIP 
had insured 7.1 million children (with an average point in time coverage rate approximating 4 million 
children). The proportion of children aged 18 and under who were uninsured dropped by about half 
between 1998 and 2007, from 28 percent to 15 percent (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the 
Uninsured 2009). The proposed reauthorization would have increased CHIP’s then-current spending level 
of $5 billion per year by an additional $35 billion over the 5 years (to be paid for with a further increase in 
the federal tobacco tax), with the additional revenues permitting states to expand coverage to children in 
families earning up to 300 percent of the federal poverty line. 
President George W. Bush twice vetoed the proposed expansion of CHIP in 2007. In his veto 
message the president reiterated his support for CHIP’s reauthorization, but not its significant expansion as 
proposed by Congress. He argued that Congress’ proposal would needlessly lead to government coverage 
displacing private health insurance for many children. “If this bill were enacted, one out of every three 
children moving onto government coverage would be moving from private coverage,” rationalized 
President Bush in his first veto message (Bush 2007).  
President Bush added that although CHIP was intended to target poor children, many states used 
the enhanced funding to expand insurance to children in families who earned more than twice the poverty 
line. Indeed, by 2007, 20 states had acquired Section 1115 waivers (albeit, with the tacit approval of 
President Bush’s own Secretary of Health and Human Services) to extend CHIP coverage to children in 
families earning over 250 percent of the federal poverty line and in a few cases the parents of those children 
(Baumrucker 2008). Nina Owcharenko at the Heritage Institute sympathized with President Bush. “The 
debate is not about reauthorization. It is about expanding the government program,” she explained 
(Owcharenko 2008). Given the magnitude of the proposed expansion to CHIP, the Heritage scholar’s 
critique of the congressional debates over CHIP proved not unwarranted. 
	  
	   	  
 192 
In January 2009, President Obama signed into law the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) (P.L. 111-3). Although the contentiousness of CHIP’s 
reauthorization moderates the perspective that CHIP was a bipartisan triumphant, its reauthorization still 
passed with an uncharacteristic level of bipartisan support: in the House 289 to 139, with 40 Republican 
offering their support, and in the Senate 66 to 32, with 8 Republicans joining the Democrats.  (Colleen 
Grogan and Elizabeth Rigby (2009) offer an excellent account of the shifting partisan politics of CHIP over 
its first decade.)  
The law increased annual CHIP allotments to the states by almost a factor of two, authorizing $79 
billion in CHIP funds to be distributed to the states over the next five years. This included $25 billion in 
existing ‘baseline’ funding and $44 billion in new funding—nearly $10 billion more than the bills passed by 
Congress in 2007. Tellingly, the “State” was dropped from the bill’s title and the colloquial S-CHIP 
acronym. 
The law retained the Enhanced FMAP, but the allotment formulary for CHIP was adjusted to 
better take into consideration demographic trends and health care inflation. In fiscal year 2009 all states 
experienced an increase in their allotment, determined by the higher of either the previous year’s federal 
allotment to a state, or the state’s actual spending on SCHIP-eligible recipients, adjusted by for health care 
inflation and demographics. 
 
Mitigating Medicaid’s Burden by “Temporarily” Increasing the Federal Participation 
Although a source of constant intergovernmental tension, Medicaid financing has always been 
predicated on a general belief that the states and federal governments should share in the financial 
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responsibility of providing health services to the poor. Based on the squared ratio of a state’s per capita 
income to the national per capita income the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage defines the specific 
fiscal relationships between any particular state and the federal government with a state’s FMAP being 
determined by the relative variability of the states’ incomes. The mean FMAP rate has consistently hovered 
around 60 percent over the decades, but each states’ specific FMAP rate will fluctuate as the relative 
incomes of the states changes. Figure 5.6 presents the mean and max percentage point change in the FMAP 
rates from year-to-year. During normal economics periods a state could see its FMAP rate change by as 
much as ±3 percentage points. Wealthier states that are protected by the minimum rate of 50 percent are 
the least likely to be affected one way or another so long as their income remains well above the national 
mean. 
Figure 5.6. Percentage Point Change (Mean, Max/Min) in FMAP Rates, FY1980-2011 
 
Note: Max change excludes statutory revision to the District of Columbia's FMAP in 1997 (from 50 percent the year 
before to 70 percent) and Alaska's FMAP in 1998 (from 50 to 59.8) 








4.3	   4.2	   3.8	   3.9	  
5.2	  























-­‐3.8	  -­‐4.2	  -­‐3.4	  




































































































































Maximum	  Percentage	  Point	  	  
INCREASE	  Over	  Previous	  Year	  
Maximum	  Percentage	  Point	  	  
DECREASE	  Over	  Previous	  Year	  
	  
	   	  
 194 
However, due to its construction, the FMAP is largely unresponsive to both national economic 
trends and abrupt changes in a state’s fiscal conditions. Two aspects of the FMAP formula diminish its 
effectiveness at responding to countercyclical fiscal strains. First, the FMAP is based on an average of the 
previous three years’ income data available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. However, due to delays 
in economic reporting and the requirement that rates be published the prior fiscal year, the data used to 
calculate the FMAPs is already dated by the time the FMAP rates take effect—for example, the rates for 
FY2010 (that goes from October 2009 through September 2010) were published in November 2008, based 
on data from 2005-07. In 1986, the publication of FMAPs was accelerated from a biennial to an annual 
basis, with the FMAP being published sometime in October or November for the subsequent fiscal year.  
Further, because the FMAP formula is based on a ratio of state incomes to the national average, if 
all, or nearly all, states experience lower economic activity, the ratio between these to numbers may 
remain essentially unaffected or bare little relationship to national economic trends. Irrespective of any 
nominal decline to state-level personal incomes, a state with a per capita income equivalent to the national 
median will still be reimbursed 55 percent of their Medicaid costs. Only the comparatively worse off states 
would see any potential increase in their federal share, but only then after several intervening years given.  
 The significant lag in the income data used, the averaging of this data, and the endogeneity 
captured in the income ratio guarantees that the FMAP formula is incapable of adjusting to abrupt changes 
in economic conditions and will be largely unresponsive to national economic downturns.60 With state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For example, the baseline matching rates for FY 2009, having already been published in November 2007, are 
based on income data for 2004, 2005 and 2006. Significantly, the mid-decade was a period of relative economic 
prosperity in the United States: state-level per capita incomes increased an average of 4.9 percent annually and state 
revenues increased an average of nearly 10 percent annually. In contrast, in 2009, personal income declined 1.7 
percent and state tax collections fell 8.5 percent in 2009, compared to the already depressed figures of the previous 
year (data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Census Bureau, National Conference of State Legislatures). The 
impact of the economic downturn of 2009 will not begin to be even partially reflected in the FMAPs until FY 2012.  
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budgets increasingly dependent on the amount of their federal share to offset their aggregate Medicaid 
spending, these conditions could cause temporary, yet potentially severe, state fiscal crises.  
Despite the inherent problems associated with the FMAP, Congress had not traditionally excused 
the states of their shared fiscal responsibility to provide Medicaid during recessions. With the possible 
exception of the apparent abuse by the states of DSH payments that raised state’s effective FMAP rates 
(after discounting state spending by provider donations) and the subsequent abuse of such DSH payments 
during the early 1990s recession, the states’ responsibility for the social welfare of their residents has held 
during economic recessions when the countercyclical nature of welfare spending exasperated the fiscal 
burden imposed on state taxpayers. Congress has not historically appropriated supplemental Medicaid 
payments to the states simply because of economic slowdowns: for example, neither during the 1973-75 
recession when GDP fell 3.2% over 16 months and unemployment peaked at 9.0% nor during the 
recession of the early 1980s when GDP dropped 2.7% and unemployment reached 10.8% did Congress 
offer the states an increase in federal Medicaid assistance.  
Yet, whereas Medicaid insured 18 million Americans and accounted for 8 percent of state revenues 
in 1973 and insured 22 million and accounted for 11 percent in the early 1980s, by 2001 the numbers were 
approaching 50 million and over 22 percent. Even during the extended period of economic prosperity that 
preceded the new millennia’s recessions, state spending on Medicaid (and CHIP) was steadily crowding out 
other public commitments. Any precipitous drop in revenues would have a significant impact on a program 
such as Medicaid with countercyclical expenditures. Such was the case in 2009. For example, during the 
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first quarter of the year tax collections experienced the most significant drop then on record61 at the same 
time that Medicaid experienced its largest one-year increase in enrollments. 
 
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (P.L 108-27) 
In 2003 with the economy rapidly deteriorating after the longest period of economic growth in US 
history, Congress felt compelled to react to the states’ Medicaid-related fiscal crises. With GDP contracting 
by 0.3% over the latter half of 2001 and unemployment continuing to rise well after the overall economy 
improved, reaching 6.3% in June 2003, Congress and President Bush accepted that the states required 
federal assistance to meet Medicaid’s unsustainable countercyclical demands. 
To relieve some of the states’ fiscal burden associated with Medicaid, the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (P.L 108-27) included $10 billion worth of temporary Medicaid 
assistance (along with another $10 billion in direct assistance apportioned to the states). The Medicaid 
provisions (1) held states harmless for any potential annual decline to their FMAP rate for the last two 
quarters of fiscal year 2003 and the first three quarters of fiscal year 2004 and (2) uniform increased every 
state’s federal share by 2.95 percentage points for those 15-months. Receipt of the extra federal funding 
was dependent upon the states not restricting their eligibility criteria—none did. 
In 1986 Congress had also included a hold-harmless provision when it accelerated the publication of 
the states’ FMAPs,62 but the intervening 15 years made its impact much more significant to the affected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Boyd, Donald and Lucy Dadayan. 2009. “State Revenue Report: State Tax Decline in Early 2009 Was the 
Sharpest on Record.” The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government (July 2009). Internet:  
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/government_finance/state_revenue_report/2009-07-17-SRR_76.pdf 
62 The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-272) accelerated the publication of FMAPs 
from a biennial to an annual basis with the funding rates being published sometime in October or November for the 
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states. Given Medicaid’s high total costs, as little as a one-half to one percentage point drop in a state’s 
FMAP (with larger changes to the state’s matching percentages not being unusual) could have a significantly 
substantive impact on a state’s overall budget. For example, between FY 2002 and FY2003 California’s 
statutory FMAP rate dropped from 51.40 percent to 50.00 percent. Policy analysts’ Vic Miller and Andy 
Schneider (2004: 2) estimated that this marginal 1.40 percentage point drop in the state’s federal matching 
rate could have cost the state nearly half a billion in federal Medicaid payments. However, as a result of the 
combined effects of the hold harmless provision and the uniform increase to every state’s FMAP, California 
saw its federal match temporarily increased to 54.35 for the second half of FY 2003 (instead of dropping to 
50.00).  
In addition to raising the FMAP rate, the law temporarily increased the state’s DSH payment 
allotments for FY 2004, increasing them to 116% of the FY 2003 allotments and eliminating the cap that 
DSH payments could not exceed 12 percent of medical assistance payments (DSH payments, however, 
were not subject to the enhanced FMAP rate). 
 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) 
Again in 2009, with the nation in the worst recession since the Great Depression and state tax 
collections declining by 8.6 percent, Congress included an $86.6 billion authorization for increased 
Medicaid spending in its $787 billion stimulus bill—the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(P.L. 111-5). As was the case in 2003, to qualify for stimulus funds the states could not lower their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subsequent fiscal year. Though this reform did not change anything in the fiscal arrangement between the states and 
the federal government, it is significant for highlighting one of the potential faults of the FMAP calculation. Before the 
change in computing the FMAP was set to become effective beginning in fiscal year 1987, the Omnibus 
Reconciliation Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-509) held twelve states fiscally harmless against a reduction of their matching 
rate that the new annual calculation affected for 1987.  
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eligibility criteria. (States, however, still retained the ability to cut optional Medicaid services—such as 
dental or home health care—or reduce provider payment rates to help offset the added cost of new 
enrollees, but few states did so and some states actually raised benefits.) 
The legislation impacted the states’ FMAP rates in three major ways. First, the law held states 
harmless for any decrease in their FMAP rates that resulted from economic gains in the year prior to the 
national recession. For example, if a state’s FMAP rate in FY 2008 was 73% and scheduled to drop to 70% 
for FY 2009, then the state would retain its higher FMAP rate of 73% for the duration of FY 2009 and FY 
2010, and for first quarter of FY 2011 (extended through FY 2011 through additional legislation). Second, 
the stimulus bill provided an across-the-board increase—6.2 percentage point rise for every state’s base 
federal-share. Finally, the law raised the states’ federal match by including a variable unemployment-related 
adjustment that reduced the state’s adjusted state-share by up to 11.5 percent, depending upon the state’s 
most recent quarterly unemployment rate in relationship to the national average. The supplemental federal 
match was to last 27-months, from July 2008 (retroactively paying the states for past reimbursements) 
through December 2010 (Families USA 2009).63 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 An FAQ prepared by Families USA (2009), describes how the enhanced FMAP rate is calculated: 
To determine the amount of additional assistance, you first have to determine how much the unemployment 
rate has risen. If a state’s unemployment rate in any quarter between October 1, 2008, and December 31, 
2010, exceeds the average unemployment rate in its base quarter by:  
-­‐ 1.5 – 2.5 percentage points, the state’s share of Medicaid will be reduced by 5.5 percent (Tier 1) 
-­‐ 2.5 – 3.5 percentage points, the state’s share of Medicaid will be lowered by 8.5 percent (Tier 2).  
-­‐ 3.5 or more percentage points, the state’s share of Medicaid will be reduced by 11.5 percent (Tier 
3).  
Once the tier of additional assistance has been determined, it is applied as follows:  
1. apply the “hold harmless” provision to the state’s FMAP 
2. add 3.1 percentage points (representing one-half of the 6.2 point across-the-board FMAP increase) 
3. figure out the corresponding state percentage (100 minus the sum in 2, above) 
4. multiply the state percentage calculated in 3, above by the percent reduction shown in the 
appropriate tier of assistance, above. This is the amount of additional assistance the state will 
receive due to high unemployment. 
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Figure 5.7 presents the mean FMAP since 2001 to show how the temporary increases to the 
baseline FMAP rates passed by Congress in 2003, 2009 and 2010 affected the FMAP.  
Figure 5.7. Impact of Congressional Legislation to Temporarily Increase Federal Share on Average FMAP rate 
	  
Sources: Congress passed following laws to temporarily raise FMAP rates thereby increasing proportion of Medicaid spending paid 
by federal government:  
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-27) 
- Medicaid FMAPs for the last two quarters of FY2003 and first three quarters of FY2004 were held harmless from 
annual declines and were uniformly increased by an additional 2.95 percentage points 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-5) 
- For a 9-quarter “recession adjustment period” that begins with the first quarter of FY2009 and runs through first 
quarter of FY2011, the ARRA holds all states harmless from any decline in their regular FMAPs, provides all states 
with a uniform increase of 6.2 percentage poitns, and provides an unemployment-related increase to qualifying states. 
Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-226) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For example: 
A state with an FMAP rate of 55 percent would normally pay 45 percent of its Medicaid costs. Once 3.1 
percentage points are added (55 + 3.1 = 58.1), the state percentage would be 41.9 percent (100 – 
58.1 = 41.9). If the state qualifies for the first tier of additional assistance, the 5.5 percent reduction of 
the 41.9 percent state share would amount to 2.3 percentage points (41.9 x 0.055 = 2.3). Finally, 
these 2.3 percentage points would be added to the federal share of Medicaid after the hold-harmless and 
6.2 percentage-point increase have been applied: 
55.0  Current FMAP 
+    6.2  Across-the-board increase 
61.2  Subtotal 
+    2.3  Additional assistance for high unemployment 
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- Provides an additional six-month increase to FMAPS for second and third quarter of FY2011 (through until June 30, 
2011-the end of most state fiscal years). Maintains hold-harmless provision and unemployment-related bonus, but 
reduces across-the-board increase from 6.2 percentage points to 3.6 in second quarter of FY2011 and 1.8 percentage 
points in third quarter of FY2012. 
 
The need for these complicated adjustment to the states’ federal share helps to highlight how the 
FMAP formula fails to accurately reflect the changing capacities of the states to finance their Medicaid 
commitments. For example, without the temporary enhancement to the FMAP, the matching rates for FY 
2009—having already been published in the Federal Register in November 2007—would have been based on 
the income estimates for 2004, 2005 and 2006. The FMAP formula would not have incorporated the 
impact of the national recession until FY 2012. Significantly, these three years was a period of relative 
economic prosperity across the United States: annually, state-level per capita incomes increased an average 
of 4.9 percent and state revenues increased an average of nearly 10 percent. In contrast, in 2009, state 
personal income declined 1.7 percent and state tax collections fell 8.5 percent, on average, compared to 
the previous year (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Various Years; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). Were it not 
for the hold-harmless provision for the states’ FMAP rates included in the 2009 stimulus bill, 17 states 
would have seen their FMAP rate decline for fiscal year 2009 compared to the previous year (Baumracker 
2010).  
Table 5.1 compares the original FMAP rates for FY 2009, published in the Federal Register in 2007, 
to a hypothetical FMAP calculation based exclusively on the states’ actual 2009 per capita income. Despite 
the considerable worsening of the fiscal situation facing the fifty states in 2004-06 compared to 2009, the 
differences the actual and hypothetical calculations are minimal. Again, this is the result of the FMAP 
formula reflecting variation among the states’ per capita income relative to the national average. If nearly all 
states experienced lower economic activities the ratio between the individual states’ per capita income and 
the national average may remain essentially unaffected. Irrespective of the nominal decline in its economic 
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activity, a state with a per capita income equivalent to the national median will still be reimbursed 55 
percent of their Medicaid costs.  
Table 5.1. Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP), Actual FY 2009 versus Hypothetical FY 2009 (excluding 













FY2009	   Difference	  
Alabama	  	   67.98	   67.82	   -­‐0.16	   Montana	  	   68.04	   66.03	   -­‐2.01	  
Alaska	  	   50.53	   50	   -­‐0.53	   Nebraska	  	   59.54	   57.4	   -­‐2.14	  
Arizona	  	   65.77	   68.13	   2.36	   Nevada	  	   50	   56.28	   6.28	  
Arkansas	  	   72.81	   70.02	   -­‐2.79	   New	  Hampshire	  	   50	   50	   0	  
California	  	   50	   50	   0	   New	  Jersey	  	   50	   50	   0	  
Colorado	  	   50	   50	   0	   New	  Mexico	  	   70.88	   68.02	   -­‐2.86	  
Connecticut	  	   50	   50	   0	   New	  York	  	   50	   50	   0	  
Delaware	  	   50	   53.43	   3.43	   North	  Carolina	  	   64.6	   65.13	   0.53	  
Florida	  	   55.4	   58.07	   2.67	   North	  Dakota	  	   63.15	   54.09	   -­‐9.06	  
Georgia	  	   64.49	   66.47	   1.98	   Ohio	  	   62.14	   63.22	   1.08	  
Hawaii	  	   55.11	   50	   -­‐5.11	   Oklahoma	  	   65.9	   63.46	   -­‐2.44	  
Idaho	  	   69.77	   70.61	   0.84	   Oregon	  	   62.45	   62.63	   0.18	  
Illinois	  	   50.32	   50	   -­‐0.32	   Pennsylvania	  	   54.52	   53.98	   -­‐0.54	  
Indiana	  	   64.26	   66.59	   2.33	   Rhode	  Island	  	   52.59	   50.61	   -­‐1.98	  
Iowa	  	   62.62	   60.32	   -­‐2.3	   South	  Carolina	  	   70.07	   70.29	   0.22	  
Kansas	  	   60.08	   57.77	   -­‐2.31	   South	  Dakota	  	   62.55	   59.92	   -­‐2.63	  
Kentucky	  	   70.13	   70.14	   0.01	   Tennessee	  	   64.28	   65.86	   1.58	  
Louisiana	  	   71.31	   62.96	   -­‐8.35	   Texas	  	   59.44	   60.9	   1.46	  
Maine	  	   64.41	   60.33	   -­‐4.08	   Utah	  	   70.71	   72	   1.29	  
Maryland	  	   50	   50	   0	   Vermont	  	   59.45	   56.45	   -­‐3	  
Massachusetts	  	   50	   50	   0	   Virginia	  	   50	   50	   0	  
Michigan	  	   60.27	   65.99	   5.72	   Washington	  	   50.94	   50	   -­‐0.94	  
Minnesota	  	   50	   50	   0	   West	  Virginia	  	   73.73	   69.50	   -­‐4.23	  
Mississippi	  	   75.84	   73.38	   -­‐2.46	   Wisconsin	  	   59.38	   60.17	   0.79	  
Missouri	  	   63.19	   62.61	   -­‐0.58	   Wyoming	  	   50	   50	   0	  
	  




	   	  
 202 
Consequently, even if the FY 2009 FMAP rates had been based exclusively upon the states’ 
depressed income data from 2009, most states would have seen little or no respite in the share of total 
Medicaid spending that they remained responsible for financing. States such as Louisiana and Maine that 
despite having their own state revenues decline by 9.2 percent and 8.2 percent, respectively, would have 
actually seen their federal shares decrease. Overall, 22 states would have seen their FMAP rate fall, by an 
average of 2.75 percentage points (a number that does not include the 11 states that would have been 
protected from any decline in their FMAP due their to being subject protected by minimum rate of 50 
percent). Alternatively, only 17 states would have benefited from using the more recent economic data, 
gaining an average of slightly less than 2 percentage points. 
 
Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act of 2010 
When Congress passed ARRA in January 2009, unemployment stood at 7.6 percent. A report by 
the administration warned that without the government’s stimulus the unemployment rate would peak at 9 
percent in 2010; but with stimulus funding, unemployment should remain just below 8 percent (Romer, 
2009). Unfortunately, the administration forecasts were overly optimistic. Even before the start of 2010 it 
was clear that with the continued deterioration of the national economy was affecting state revenues as well 
as Medicaid demand and therefore state expenditures. With the national unemployment rate now 
approaching 10 percent the rationale for the FMAP enhancements persisted and throughout 2010. 
Governors and state officials warned that without a continuation of the supplemental federal funding states 
would need to enact severe rescissions to Medicaid beginning in January 2011. 
In February 2010 forty-two state governors signed a letter for the Congressional leaders requesting 
the “timely passage of an extension of ARRA’s enhanced FMAP” and arguing that such legislation was 
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prudent and “would greatly assist [the states] in maintaining services and further stabilizing the economy” 
(nga.org 2/22/2010). While both the House and Senate had managed to separately pass a six-month 
extension of the full FMAP enhancement, the supplemental Medicaid funding was attached to 
Congressional bills that died or were stripped of the Medicaid-related provisions for one reason or 
another.64 During the summer of 2010 the National Governors Association again lobbied Congress to argue,  
“passing a two-quarter extension of FMAP as soon as possible is the best way to help states bridge the gap 
between their worst fiscal year and the beginning of recovery.” Given the countercyclical nature of 
Medicaid spending the governors’ forewarned of “the role states play in either speeding recovery or 
prolonging the effects of a recession.” 
Not persuaded by the governors’ pleas, Republican Senate Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ken.) 
rhetorically asked, “When does this dependency [of the states on the federal government] come to an end?” 
Referring to original FMAP stimulus included in ARRA answered: “I thought last year was suppose to be 
timely, temporary, and targeted” (Congressional Record—Senate 111(2): S6680). In the House, Rep. Steve 
Buyer (R-Ind.) was similarly unsympathetic to the “great spin”—as he called it—of the governors and their 
states. “This is about protecting the ignominious conduct and behavior of legislators that didn’t do their job 
and they’re too frightened right now, 84 days before an election,” Buyer exclaimed. “They don’t want to 
increase taxes, they don’t want to cut spending, and they don’t want to monetize the debt…. This is a 
bailout. This is another bailout,” he shouted (Congressional Record—House 111(2): H6614). 
Despite such strident opposition, Congress managed to narrowly pass the Education Jobs and 
Medicaid Assistance Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-226) in August: the bill passed the Senate by a vote of 61-38 
after the Democrats courted Republicans Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins to break a filibuster; and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 A 6-month extension of the full 6.2 percentage point increase and unemployment adjustment was included in 
President Obama’s FY 2011 budget. It had previously passed as an amendment to larger bills in the House on 
December 9, 2009, by a narrow vote of 217-212 and the Senate on March 10, 2010, by a vote of 62-36. 
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subsequently passed the House on a party line vote of 247-161. The final bill provided $26.1 billion in 
supplemental state aid—$16.1 billion for Medicaid as well as $10 billion in direct assistance to local school 
boards. The temporary extension of the Medicaid assistance was a compromise measure that reduced and 
then phased out the enhanced FMAP over six months, through June 2011—the end of most states’ fiscal 
year 2011. Further, instead of a 6.2 percentage point increase, as was included in the original stimulus, the 
law increased the states’ baseline matching rates by 3.2 percentage points for the first three months and 1.2 
percentage points for the second three months (it however retained the variable unemployment-related 
adjustment to the state share). 
As contentious as the political battle over the passage of this second state “stimulus” package was it 
was striking that the $16.1 billion FMAP extension was largely absent from public debate. The Democratic 
Caucus and the White House succeeded in what can only be perceived as a deliberate strategy of 
emphasizing the  $10 billion education component and ignoring the Medicaid assistance.  
Standing with teachers at the White House prior to the House’s final vote on the bill, President 
Obama stressed the immediacy of the state’s fiscal potential problem in terms of the upcoming school year. 
"We can't stand by and do nothing while pink slips are given to the men and women who educate our 
children or keep our communities safe," he said. To quantify the bill’s urgency, the White House posted on 
its homepage an interactive map that detailed how many teacher jobs would be saved by state as a result of 
the legislation that the president championed as “an investment in our economic prosperity and in our 
children’s future” (whitehouse.gov; Barnes, 2010). No comparable map showing the impact of extending 
the supplemental Medicaid assistance was produced. 
In Congress, Senator Dick Durbin (D, Ill.) emphasized the necessity of the temporary measure to 
stave off state austerity and save teacher jobs and did not specifically mention Medicaid in his remarks that 
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kicked off the final hour of debate after the Democrats successfully invoked cloture on bill. Defending the 
budget neutrality of the legislation, Senator Durbin explained that the increased spending was a “conscious 
decision to move resources from other parts of the budget, where they are not as high a priority, into the 
priority of keeping teachers in the classroom” (S6678) Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D, Cal.), too, was similarly 
silent on the Medicaid provision in a press release her office released preceding the final vote on the bill, 
choosing instead to criticize Republican members of Congress for their “jaw-dropping indifference to 
America's teachers and police officers” (Pelosi, 8/9/2010)—a sentiment she would reiterate on the House 
floor. Curiously the congressional Republicans respected the Democrats’ script. So too did the nation’s 
media.65 
Senator Lamar Alexander (R, Tenn.) was one of the few congresspersons that expressed concern 
specific to the extension of the FMAP extension. The senator had served two-terms as Tennessee’s 
governor in the Eighties and so had direct experience with state-level Medicaid budgeting and has 
frequently been critical of the federal requirements on state Medicaid programs. He pointedly criticized the 
bill for mandating a continued maintenance-of-effort requirement that, as he put it, “says to the governors, 
‘Don't you change Medicaid. You're not even allowed, if you take this money, to make changes that would 
save money in Medicaid.’” The senator warned that the constraint against the states adjusting their eligibility 
criteria downward “ties the Governors’ hands” and would only “extend the so-called fiscal cliffs in the 
states” (Congressional Record 111(2): S6565). But, Senator Lamar represented a small minority of concerns. 
For the most part, the opponents of the bill continued to repeat their now well-rehearsed election 
year criticism of the Democrat’s tax-and-spend policies and generally characterized the Education Jobs and 
Medicaid Assistance Act as a bailout to fiscally irresponsible states and an election-year pay-off to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 That Representative Charlie Rangel (D-N.Y.) gave an emotional 30-minute floor speech against charges of 
ethic violations on the same date that the House returned from their August recess specifically to pass the Education 
Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act, no doubt, deflected some of the public and media’s attention from the bill. 
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Democrat’s special interests—teacher unions. Senator Judd Gregg (R., N.H.) was direct in his criticism, 
describing that at its “essence” the bill was a “pay off education unions,” emphasizing how “26 percent of the 
delegates at the Democratic National Convention were teachers, members of teachers unions” (Congressional 
Record—Senate 111(2): S6680). Medicaid funding was largely peripheral to a political narrative that pitted 
unionized public employees against federal bailouts for the states.66 
In contrast to the teachers’ unions lobbying efforts, the medical community was not attacked for its 
support of the bill; nor were congresspersons criticized for listening. "Our organizations stand ready to 
assist Congress in support of legislation to stabilize Medicaid at this critical time," announced the American 
Academy of Family Physicians, the American College of Physicians, the American Osteopathic Association 
and the American Academy of Pediatrics in a letter sent to every senator urging for their support of the 
extension of the enhanced FMAP provisions (aafp.org, letter of July 13, 2010). Separately, the American 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The New York Times, for example, reported, “The legislation would provide $10 billion to retain teachers who 
might otherwise lose jobs to cutbacks, and an additional $16 billion to help states struggling to close budget deficits.” 
Adding, “The $16.1 billion in aid to states would increase the federal contribution toward Medicaid costs, allowing 
states to shift money elsewhere” (Herszenhorn, 2010).  
Even conservative editorials that were generally critical of the supplemental state assistance directed their ire 
toward the bill’s education component and not the more costly Medicaid assistance to the poor.  The Washington Post 
criticized the $10 billion for education jobs as “deeply discouraging” and “more of an election-year favor for teachers 
unions than an optimal use of public resources.” The paper acknowledged that “the same bill also includes $16 billion 
for Medicaid relief” that “defensibly helps states cope with what is, for many, a crushing federal mandate”, but this 
was peripheral to the Post’s editors criticism of the education funding and the $11.9 billion reduction in nutritional 
assistance to the poor (Washington Post, 8/6/2010).  
The conservative National Review also narrowly described the bill as a “$10 billion public-education bailout” to 
“the largest political contributor [the nation’s teacher unions] to Congress” (Burke, 8/4/2010). 
And the Wall Street Journal characterized the state aid as a “teacher bailout” that “comes with strings that will 
multiply the benefits for this core Obama constituency” (Wall Street Journal, 8/10/2010). In another editorial the 
Journal again myopically characterized the bill as a union bailout that “hands $10 billion to mainly unionized public 
employees, paid for by cutting benefits for the poor.” The editors quoted the stalwart liberal, Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D, 
Conn.), who described the bill as a “bitter pill to swallow” and who compared her vote to “Sophie’s Choice”—a 
hyperbolic reference a William Styron book about the decision forced on a mother by the Nazis as to which of her 
two children will live. “Rosa's choice was to help the unions first,” assessed the Journal (8/12/2010). 
	  
	   	  
 207 
Hospital Association directly lobbied for the extension. After the vote the Association released a statement 
to “applaud Congress and the Administration's action to help protect the health care safety net” (aha.org). 
 
Federalizing of Medicaid 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
On March 23, 2010 President Barak Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (“PPACA”, P.L. 111-148).67 The significance of the near trillion-dollar68 reform package (as 
budgeted for 2010-2019) cannot be understated. PPACA signified the first time since the enactment of 
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 that Washington had successfully demonstrated its resolve to fundamentally 
reform the American health care system. At the bill-signing ceremony, a triumphant President Obama 
claimed health reform marked “a new season in America,” adding: “We have now just enshrined, as soon as 
I sign this bill, the core principle that everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their 
health care” (The White House 2010). 
Integral to the nation’s new promise of enhanced health care security would be Medicaid. More 
than any other reform affecting Medicaid since its inception, PPACA greatly expands the poor’s entitlement 
to health care. Accounting for over half of the 32 million Americans who will eventually become newly 
insured because of PPACA, the Medicaid provisions, including the state option to raise eligibility criteria to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 As amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-152) 
68 During the bipartisan “Blair House” health reform meeting in 2010 in February, Rep. Paul Ryan (R-Wisc.) 
challenged the administration’s cost estimate and argued that that a more accurate accounting of the cost of the 
reforms, estimated for its second decade of implementation, would be significantly higher, at $2.3 trillion (although 
Rep. Ryan is more forthcoming about measuring certain costs, he ignores increased revenue streams and cost savings 
that will offset the growth in spending) (Wall Street Journal 2010). 
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133 percent of poverty for all Americans and the enhancement of reimbursement rates for certain primary 
care physicians, are the most expensive and the most expansive components of health reform.69 
Yet, despite its importance to health reform, Medicaid was—as was the case in 1964 and 1965—
the neglected partner during much of the contentious 2009-2010 health reform debates, its significance 
largely underestimated or ignored. Except for emphasizing some of egregious political compromises that 
were tied to federal Medicaid payments—such as, and among other backdoor deals, the aptly named 
“Cornhusker kickback” and “Louisiana Purchase” that the recalcitrant senators Ben Nelson (D-Neb.) and 
Mary Landrieu (D-La.) shrewdly lobbied to have included in the Senate’s version of the bill, but were 
ultimately reconsidered in the subsequent reconciliation act—there was shockingly little media attention or 
even political scrutiny by elected officials of the impact that healthcare reform would have on the states’ 
Medicaid programs. 
While typical of the general silence permeating the fifty year history recounted above, the modern 
silence is notable because the Medicaid reforms were responsible for over half of the individuals who will 
gain health insurance coverage through PPACA and the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimated 
that the Medicaid components would add $434 billion in outlays to the federal budget over the legislation’s 
first decade—costing $97 billion in 2019, the last year of the CBO’s prospective estimate. (Comparatively, 
the price tag of the premium and cost sharing subsidies for private insurance purchased through the new 
Health Insurance Exchanges was approximated to be $358 billion over the same decade—costing $88 
billion in 2019) (Elmendorf 2010: Table 2). Whereas the costly implementation of Title XIX of the Social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Certainly, the extensive new regulations on the private insurance market that are included in the health reform law 
will have some major and many subtle effects on the health care insurance purchased by almost all Americans and 
such consequential reforms warranted extensive scrutiny. These reforms may decrease profits and/or raise 
premiums, but by themselves they do not do anything to change the institutional arrangements of the private 
insurance private insurance market. 
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Security Amendments of 1965 caught most observers by surprise, the 111th Congress and its media 
watchdogs could not claim such rational ignorance of the cost of the Medicaid components of PPACA. 
Beyond its absolute costs, PPACA transforms Medicaid policy in several ways. First, the liberalizing 
of eligibility rules will fundamentally change the demographics of Medicaid. Ever since its enactment 
Medicaid has served, almost exclusively, poor children, pregnant women and single mothers, as well as the 
indigent disabled and elderly; all of whom Americans have long accepted as sympathetically deserving of 
public charity given their general exclusion from the labor market. Medicaid has remained until now a 
program not for the poor generally, but for a specific “deserving” subset of the poor. Non-disabled adults, 
for the most part, have always remained excluded from accessing public health insurance. Only individuals 
who are excluded from employment for reasons beyond their own control—age, disability or childbearing 
responsibilities—have ever been deemed deserving of the public’s charity. The recent health reforms 
significantly, if subtly, remove those maternalistic restrictions and reject the notion that employment is 
sufficient prerequisite having access to affordable health care. The Medicaid expansion will do more to 
diminish the prototypical maternalistic notion of welfare deservingness than any reform to the social welfare 
state since the 1960s. If the 1996 welfare reforms ended welfare-as-we-knew-it, then health reform will 
end Medicaid-as-we-know-it.  
Second, the Medicaid reforms included in PPACA offer a potential backdoor for states and or 
regional partners to implement a public option by leveraging Medicaid’s administrative structure. While the 
public, punditry, and politicians’ were fixated on the paralyzing controversy surrounding a national public 
option, or lack thereof, PPACA included a significant Medicaid-related provision known as the Basic Health 
Plan that can be fairly accurately described as a quasi- or state-based public option.  Offered by Senator 
Maria Cantwell (D, Wash.), the Basic Health Plan allows individual states, or compacts of states, to 
negotiate directly with private health insurers on behalf of its uninsured residents between 133 and 200 
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percent of poverty in order to establish plans that would be an alternative to the private health insurance 
exchanges.70 A Basic Health Plan will not be dissimilar to the Medicaid managed care plans already offered 
in many states. States qualifying for a Basic Health Plan wavier will receive a direct federal transfer valued at 
95 percent of the affordability tax credits and cost sharing reductions71 that would have otherwise been 
provided to individual residents of the state who enrolled in the health plans offered on the national 
exchanges. The state would then negotiate rates with insurers and managed care organizations, paying for 
the services using a combination of the federal transfer payments, premium collections and deductibles. 
Third, the Medicaid reforms continue the trend toward federalizing Medicaid financing. Barring 
any precipitous increase in the number of residents falling below the poverty line, the number of individuals 
enrolled in regular Medicaid—i.e. individuals eligible under the states’ pre-2010 eligibility criteria—should 
remain relatively stable, as most new enrollees will gain Medicaid eligibility under the enhanced either 
through the provisions PPACA or the higher eligibility criteria of CHIP. The 100 percent federal match for 
newly eligible enrollees included in PPACA as well as the significant increases to FMAP that accompanied 
CHIP in 1997 and its expansion in 2008-09, means that most of the expenditures related to new enrollees 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 In states that choose to institute a Basic Health Plan, all residents with household earnings between 133 and 200 
percent of poverty line will be ineligible for the tax credits that would have otherwise been available to them to 
purchase private insurance. Beginning in 2017, states will be able to apply for a “Section 1332 Waiver for State 
Innovation” to expand their state’s Basic Health Plans beyond 200 percent of poverty line. Although the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services cannot waive “any Federal law or requirement that is not within the authority of the 
Secretary” (p. 218), which is likely to include ERISA protections of employer-sponsored plans (thereby limiting the 
potential expansiveness of reforms), the potential expansiveness of this should not be underestimated. Further, any 
state operating under a waiver will receive fully 100 percent of the value of the federal affordability tax credits that 
would have otherwise gone to the state’s residents. 
71 The federal transfer was initially set at 85 percent of the value of the tax credits that would have otherwise 
gone to the individuals purchasing health insurance through the exchanges. However, discretely incorporated into 
Senate Amendment 3276 (to amend the Senate’s version of H.R. 3590) was a costly increase in the subsidy’s to 95 
percent of the value of the federal tax credit; this amendment also allows legal immigrants earning less than 133% 
FPL but not eligible for their state’s Medicaid program to enroll into the Basic Health Plan (Congressional Record, 19 
December 2009, p. S13495). 
	  
	   	  
 211 
will be subsidized by the federal government. As such, the proportional share of total Medicaid 
expenditures financed by the states will continue to decline relative to the federal-share. How this dynamic 
will impact the incentives of states to control overall costs will remain to be seen. 
 
Conclusion 
While the Congressional Budget Office, think tanks and policy scholars would on occasions make a 
study of the formula for calculating the states’ respective federal medical assistance percentages, the 
historical narrative told over the past four chapters sections suggests the futility of such exercises. Few in 
public office have seriously debated Medicaid’s funding arrangement and the impact of the equalization 
formula on lessening state inequities. Despite a myriad of potential factors that could be considered in 
appropriating the hundreds of billions of federal dollars to the states and territories it would be safe to 
assume that most members of Congress and the administrations would admit, like Secretary Arthur 
Flemming did back in 1960, to a complete lack of any “dogmatic feeling relative to the exact nature of the 
formula.” 
Aside from a technical change in 1986 that accelerated the publication of the matching rates from a 
biennial to an annual basis and the temporary increases in the federal match as a consequence of general 
shortfalls in state and local revenues in 2003 and 2009-10, the FMAP has remained unaltered since 1958, 
with the fiscal relationships between the states and federal government still resembling what it was in 1965 
when Medicaid was casually enacted as part of the Social Security Amendments of 1965. Instead of real 
reform to the FMAP or general funding arrangement for Medicaid, Congress has only been capable of 
stopgap responses to a pressing fiscal problem. In 1981, it was the nation’s increasing federal deficit that 
pushed Congress to impose an ad hoc reduction in the federal share. In 2003 and 2009, it was the depressed 
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economy and the fiscal strain that compelled Congress to pass ad hoc increases in the federal share—like 
DSH payments in the early nineties and UPL payments later in that decade, this supplemental federal 
assistance has never been the result of any systematic reform of the FMAP formula.  
By the mid-Nineties, Congress had finally accepted that the states’ Medicaid commitments had 
finally become fiscally unsustainable. After decades of enrollment growth and increasing Medicaid costs the 
states’ commitment to Medicaid as a share of their finite budgets has reached its natural limit. Each reform 
affecting Medicaid since the Republican’s attempt to block grant Medicaid in 1995 has involved a reduction 
in the states’ proportional share of Medicaid costs. Despite its near-success, the Republican’s Medigrant 
reform attempt likely represented the last serious attempt to devolve to the states the inherent fiscal risks 
posed by Medicaid and attempt to cap federal contributions to the states. 
The reform of Alaska’s FMAP to reflect its higher cost of living and the recusal of New York’s DSH 
payment-related liabilities in 1997 were admissions by Congress, however marginal, that the FMAP 
formula’s reliance on per capita income inadequately reflected certain states’ actual financial need. More 
significantly, and unlike the fiscal support provided for the Medicaid mandates passed during the 1980s, the 
more generous financing of the Children’s Health Insurance Program was a bipartisan acknowledgment that 
states could no longer bare the full cost of any further expansion of Medicaid. And whereas in the past the 
states have always been expected to adjust their own budget priorities during recessions to meet the 
unanticipated costs of Medicaid, twice this decade—in 2003 and 2009—Congress passed emergency 
supplemental appropriations that recused the states of the countercyclical costs associated with Medicaid. 
The states’ need for supplemental payments to meet the increased demands for Medicaid services, and the 
federal government’s acquiescence to this need was evidence of the unsustainability of Medicaid’s status quo 
funding arrangement. 
	  
	   	  
 213 
Such increases to federal match reflected awareness by Congress that the states with their limited 
financial resources and revenue raising capabilities cannot sufficiently meet the increasing fiscal demands of 
Medicaid. That the massive expansion of Medicaid included in the health reform legislation of 2010 is to be 
financed almost entirely from the federal treasury demonstrates the futility of imposing a greater fiscal 
demand upon the states to meet the public objective of expanding access to health care. 
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Section III. A Quantitative Study of Medicaid Spending, 1980-2008 
 
Introduction 
The primary emphasis thus far has been an exploration of the historical development of Medicaid’s 
cost sharing formula and its impact on Medicaid costs—in particular the cost of Medicaid to the federal 
government, and to a lesser extent the cost to the states. In Chapter 1, I provided a theoretical 
understanding of Medicaid’s cost sharing structure. I argued that inefficiencies of the federal-state cost 
sharing arrangement obfuscate Medicaid’s true costs and thereby contribute to a general tendency by the 
states to incessantly raise Medicaid expenditures. In Chapters 2 through 5, I offered a legislative history of 
Medicaid’s financing policies and the primary political debates over the political development, or lack 
thereof, of Medicaid’s intergovernmental cost sharing arrangement. This history demonstrates how federal 
efforts to fundamentally reform Medicaid’s cost sharing arrangement and reign in federal expenditures have 
repeatedly failed. While there have been many obstructionists to reform, a persistent force of opposition 
have been the states that have been generally hesitant to accept any greater fiscal burden for their Medicaid 
commitments. Contrary to the consistent efforts of some members of Congress and Republican 
administrations to rebalance the shared responsibility between the states and federal governments for 
underwriting Medicaid, the federal government has seen both its absolute and proportional shares of 
Medicaid’s fiscal liabilities steadily increase over the past. Further, to incentivize the continued and 
expanded participation of the states, the federal government has more recently responded to the states’ 
heightened fiscal strains by increasing the federal matching rate, thereby exasperating the disincentives that 
states have to control their Medicaid budgets. 
With only few exceptions, the empirics and narrative of the previous section emphasized the 
general inflation in Medicaid expenditures in the aggregate and the associated fiscal burden that these costs 
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have imposed on the federal government. The national narrative has not, yet, addressed the significant 
variation in Medicaid programs that persists across the states even despite the program’s absolute growth at 
both the national and state levels. It is somewhat surprising given the great extent of state and federal 
commitments to this welfare program that there has been neither a race to the bottom in terms of the 
program’s eligibility and benefits nor even an apparent regression toward the mean in its overall costs. This 
section transitions from historical empiricism to quantitative analyses that examine those state-level policies 
that contribute to Medicaid’s high cost and the high level of variation in the states’ Medicaid programs. 
Chapter 6 is a quantitative study that examines various causal factors contributing to the stubborn 
state-level variation in Medicaid policies that determine the states’ overall Medicaid expenditures. The 
chapter introduces an original dataset of three decades of state-level Medicaid data collected from data 
archives at the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. I use this data to construct proxies for 
Medicaid’s costs to taxpayers, the poor’s access to Medicaid services, and the quality of benefits provided to 
Medicaid recipients. These proxies are employed in several related multivariable time-series statistical 
models that examine how certain state-level factors related to economics, ideology, and interest groups 
influence the observed variation in Medicaid policymaking.  
Chapter 7 looks at the cost of Medicaid from a different perspective. Using fiscal year 2008 data, I 
offer nuanced estimates of the cost of Medicaid to taxpayers, in both their capacity as Americans and as 
residents in particular states. The chapter quantifies both the direct taxpayer burden and the states’ 
aggregate liability for the nation’s Medicaid expenditures. By transforming the data to reflect the 
progressivity of federal taxation, the impact of Medicaid’s funding formula, and the state’s revenue sources, 
the chapter presents what is arguably a better approximation of Medicaid’s true opportunity cost to 
taxpayers and states. While significant variation still exists in what each of the state governments demand of 
their residents in support of the state’s welfare medicine program, the variable funding sources mitigate the 
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direct cost of the state’s fiscal commitments, thereby increasing the perceived benefits of the program 
relative to its apparent costs.
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Chapter 6. 
Examining the Relationship of Benefits and Coverage on Medicaid’s Costs 
 
The iron triangle of health care financing is an apt metaphor used to illustrate the trade-offs 
inherent to health care financing. The iron triangle refers to the relationship between access, quality, and 
costs and is used to describe how any reform to one of the major components of health care delivery will 
necessarily affect one or both of the other components. The American health care system cannot 
simultaneously make improvements along all three vectors. For example, despite the efforts to innovate and 
enhance the delivery of health care at a lower cost, the reality is that any expansion in access or 
improvement in the quality of care is likely to come at a higher cost. Conversely, the only way to guarantee 
substantial savings is by reducing access to insurance and/or lowering the scope of coverage. 
Constrained as it is by the iron triangle, Medicaid policymaking too reflects a zero-sum game. 
Further, with state balanced budget laws limiting the state governments’ abilities to redistribute, the states 
must weigh the trade-offs in emphasizing the quality or access vectors of the iron triangle in favor of 
controlling costs. Any increase in Medicaid spending will generally need to be offset by a corresponding 
(proportional to the state’s federal matching rate) increase in tax revenues or decrease in public spending 
for other services. Of course, states have alternative options for expansions: if a state does not want to 
impose such costs on the public but nevertheless desires to expand eligibility criteria for Medicaid, the state 
could decrease the number of optional Medicaid services provided or lower reimbursement rates paid to 
providers; conversely, a state could increase benefits or raise reimbursement rates but decrease eligibility. 
In each instance there are clear winners and losers among the providers, beneficiaries and taxpayers. 
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However, in the introductory chapter, I presented a simple game theoretic model to describe how 
the federal government uses the FMAP formula to incentivize states to pursue expansionary Medicaid 
policies by reducing the cost to the state taxpayer. By reducing a state’s own fiscal liability for its policies, 
the federal match in effect lessens the ability of the cost vector of the iron triangle to constrain the state’s 
policy decisions with respect to the other two vectors. Considerations of costs are not eliminated, however. 
With states still financing between 20 to 50 percent of Medicaid’s net cost and Medicaid programs 
consuming ever-greater proportions of state budgets, state policymakers must still weigh the costs and 
benefits of sacrificing one or more vectors of the iron triangle in favor of the other(s).  
This chapter presents three interrelated statistical models to help understand the different 
compromises, if any, that states policymakers select in setting their Medicaid eligibility and benefits criteria 
and the impact that such policy decisions have on a state’s overall Medicaid spending. Consider the 
following figures that are not atypical of the general variation that is prevalent even among relatively 
comparable states. In North Dakota primacy care physician typically gets paid 135 percent of what Medicare 
reimburses, compared to about half that amount, 69 percent, in neighboring South Dakota (2012 data, 
statehealthfacts.org); in New York a parent in a household earning 150% of poverty is eligible for Medicaid 
insurance, whereas in Texas the household income of a parent can be no more than 12% of poverty (2010 
data); in Pennsylvania, a 31.8% of the state’s budget is appropriated for Medicaid services, compared to 
16.2% in neighboring Delaware (fiscal 2011 data, National Association of State Budget Officers). Using two 
independent models I explore the relative influence of various social, political and economic factors on the 
two constitutive components of the states’ Medicaid and CHIP programs—the state’s eligibility criteria in 
relationship to the state’s poor population (i.e. access) and the average spending for each recipient (i.e. 
quality). I then consider how variation in access and quality affects state variation in Medicaid spending per 
capita (i.e. costs). 
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The chapter proceeds as follows: I will next introduce the primary dependent variable, costs, and its 
two primary explanatory variables—benefits and coverage—that also serve as dependent variables in two 
associated models. Given these primary variables, I offer a series of hypotheses related to specific economic, 
partisan/ideological, interest group factors and the controls to explain the significant and persistent level of 
variation in costs, benefits, and coverage.72 Before presenting the results of the three associated regressions I 
will define and defend the model. The final section considers the results and offers some possible extensions 
to the model for future investigation. 
 
Primary Variables: Costs, Benefits, and Coverage 
This chapter’s multidimensional approach to studying Medicaid follows Colleen Grogan’s (1994) 
examination of the determinants of a state’s discretionary choices over its Medicaid policy. As Grogan 
articulated, “the practice of using the same global state determinants in several diverse state policy studies, 
such as interparty competition or state median income, obscures the reality that the factors affecting policy 
decisions vary according to the specific policies confronted” (1994: 590). She further argued that even 
within a specific policy area, particularly one as complex as Medicaid, the impact of certain factors might be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72	  Throughout this chapter, I use “inequity” and “variation” as synonyms. Variation itself is too neutral a term 
and diminishes the multidimensional costs of redistributive policies. The states’ different Medicaid policies impose 
unequal costs and provide concentrated rewards on different subsets of the population. Although equity has strong 
normative and ethical connotations, “inequity” better captures the inherent trade-offs in sacrificing one or more 
vectors of the iron triangle in favor of the other(s). I do not impose a specific standard of fairness, but any variation in 
the eligibility criteria, reimbursement rates or taxpayer burdens among states programs can be construed as a 
potential form of inequity for some. For example, any increase in Medicaid spending will generally need to be offset 
by a corresponding (proportional to the state’s federal matching rate) increase in tax revenues or decrease in public 
spending for other services. Thus, we must not consider just the inequity of the poor in terms of their lack of access, 
but also the relative inequity of the taxpayers underwriting Medicaid and the doctors and hospitals performing its 
services. Of course, states have other options for expansions: if a state does not want to impose such costs on the 
public but nevertheless desires to expand eligibility criteria for Medicaid, the state could decrease the number of 
optional Medicaid services provided and/or decrease its reimbursement rates paid to providers; conversely, a state 
could increase benefits and/or reimbursement rates but decrease eligibility.	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variable depending on the dimension of the policy under consideration—for example, eligibility criteria 
versus spending on benefits per enrollee. Michael Bailey and Mark Rom (2004) have similarly demonstrated 
the importance of looking at different dimensions of a policy in their quantitative study on the variable 
impact of interstate competition across multiple measures of state redistributive programs, including 
Medicaid, AFDC and Supplemental Security Income-State (SSI-S) policy.  
Grogan (1998) and Bailey and Rom’s (2004) models rest on the assumption that certain political, 
economic, or social factors can contribute in different ways to different components of a state’s means-
tested policies. By ignoring the multidimensional aspect of welfare politics, the substantive significance of 
certain variables may be needlessly lost due to their statistical correlation with other variables in the model. 
For example, hospitals and other health care professionals have an economic incentive to seek an increase in 
reimbursement rates and they are likely to be unconcerned about the marginal increase in state spending 
that higher reimbursement rates may impose on the average state taxpayer. Conversely, some of those same 
providers may be indifferent, or even be actively opposed to enrollment expansions intended to improve 
access to Medicaid in their respective state if it meant that a doctor would be expected to accept more 
patients at relatively low Medicaid reimbursement rates. Yet either higher reimbursement rates or broader 
coverage will likely increase overall Medicaid spending, holding all else constant. Given the potential for 
desperate preferences among various stakeholders the relative influence of health care providers on 
Medicaid policy, for example, might be difficult to discern if the policy is not disaggregated into its 
constitutive components. Ignoring the different dynamics at work with respect to eligibility criteria and 
benefits may muddle the independent effect that certain variables, such as the strength of hospitals in the 
state, have on the distinctive policies associated with state Medicaid programs.  
The dependent variables for the three interrelated, but distinct, models (with the former two 
variables serving as explanatory variables for the latter) are as follows: 
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I. Costs: Total Expenditures per Capita  
II. Benefits: Medical Payments per Recipient 
III. Coverage: Number of Recipients as a Percent Poverty Population 
Pairwise correlations between the three proxies support the supposition that different dynamics 
influence the three components of the health care iron triangle.73 Although cost is positively correlated with 
access and quality, the proxies for access and quality exhibit no correlation with each other. The absence of a 
relationship between access and quality offers preliminary evidence that the Medicaid policymaking process 
varies across the state and across the specific dimension of Medicaid under consideration, with certain states 
favoring liberalizing eligibility criteria for basic services over delivering comprehensive services to only the 
poorest residents and vice versa in other states. As such, any empirical analysis exploring the causal impact 
of various independent variables on a state’s aggregate spending on Medicaid should therefore first 
differentiate between the direct and indirect effects such variables may have on the different components of 
Medicaid policy.  
 
Costs Dependent Variable  
The costs variable is this study’s primary dependent variable of interest and reflects annual state 
share of spending on Medicaid and CHIP per capita. I use the state’s share of Medicaid expenditures because 
I am interested in the direct cost of the program to residents. I could have used total spending inclusive of 
the share reimbursed by the federal government and then controlled for the state’s FMAP rate, but this 
alternative measure would understate the absolute variability in the state residents’ liability for Medicaid. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73	  See Table 6.2 below, following an introduction to each of the primary variables.	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The expenditure data is derived for fiscal years 1980-2009 from the Medicaid Financial 
Management Reports provided by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).74 These public 
forms provide annual aggregate state–level summaries of state and federal spending by broad benefit 
categories as reported in Form CMS-2082 (formerly Form HCFA-2092), Form CMS-64 and, since 1997, 
Form CMS-21 (summarizing expenditures related to the implementation of the Children’s Health Insurance 
Programs). A measure of total Medicaid/CHIP spending was calculated by summing the “Net Expenditures 
Reported” lines from the state share “Medical Assistance Payment” and “Administration” files. For the fiscal 
years after the 1997 implementation of State Children Health Insurance Program, I sum the “C-Total Net” 
and the SCHIP-related “Net Expenditures” line. I divide total Medicaid/CHIP spending by the state’s 
resident population, using the Census Bureau’s annual midyear population estimates. 
 Figure 6.1 charts the historical trend in the median spending on Medicaid per capita among the 
states between 1980 and 2009 (adjusted for inflation using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price 
Index (CPI-U All Items) to reflect comparable real value of the dollar (base=2008)), as well as the range 
reflecting the 10th and 90th percentiles. Even after adjusting for inflation, the median level of real spending 
per capita has increased over five-fold during the study’s period, from $230 in 1980 to $1,220 in 2009. The 
lighter solid line represents the state median for the unadjusted Costs data. 
In fiscal year 2009, total federal-state expenditures for the Medicaid program was $384.3 billion 
with expenditures under the CHIP program adding $10.7 billion. Comparatively, federal direct spending 
on Medicare (i.e. not including the premiums paid for Part B and Part D and state contributions for the dual 
eligible) was $429.3 billion in 2009. By 2015, total spending on Medicaid and CHIP, including the 
estimated impact of the Affordable Care Act that will expand coverage to approximately 16 million more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Expenditure data from annual Financial Management Reports, summarizing data from the CMS-2082 and 
CMS-64. Fiscal year 1997 through 2009 are available online from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services; reports 
from 1980 through 1996 were acquired by special request to CMS. 
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people, is projected eclipse the total direct spending on Medicare: with Medicaid expenditures reaching 
$649 billion compared to $635 billion for Medicare (Social Security Administration 2011; Federal Register 
78(33): 9233-49). Unlike Medicare that has approximately half of its expenditures financed by payroll taxes 
and interest earnings, Medicaid is financed almost entirely by state and federal general revenues. 
 
Figure 6.1. Total real Medicaid/CHIP spending per capita (in 2008 dollars), Median and 10th/90th Percentile, by 
State, FY 1980-2010 
 
Note: Medicaid/CHIP data adjusted by averaging CPI-U All Items for each Fiscal Year (e.g. 1980=average of 
October 1979 through September 1980), CPI multiplier uses base 2008 
Sources: expenditure data from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Annual FMR Data Reports); state population data from 
U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Contrary to the hypothesis that federalism tends to have a moderating affect on social policies, the 
amount of variation between the states has remained persistent (even after controlling for inflation). With 
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the real value of the states’ spending commitments increasing significantly across all states over the three 
decades there has been no indication of a “race to the bottom” among the states in their commitments to 
Medicaid. Every state has drastically increased their fiscal commitment to Medicaid/CHIP, with the 10th 
and 90th percentile of states’ per capita spending on Medicaid increasing from approximately $160 and $400 
in 1980 to $900 and $1,900 in 2009, respectively.  
Figure 6.2 shows adjusted (for 2008 dollars) Medicaid spending per capita in ten representative 
states. The shaded area represents the 10th and 90th percentile. All figures represent real dollars adjusted for 
the impact of general inflation (base=2008). The figure demonstrates how the rate of growth in spending 
varies significantly across the states. For example, for the ten year period between 1992 and 2001, real 
spending on Medicaid in Nevada remained flat, while real spending in New York increased by a third. 
 
Figure 6.2. Total real Medicaid/CHIP spending per capita (adjusted to 2008 dollars), 10 individual states and 10th-
90th percentile range, FY 1980-2010 
      
Note: Medicaid/CHIP data adjusted by averaging CPI-U All Items for each Fiscal Year (e.g. 1980=average of October 1979 
through September 1980), CPI-U All Items multiplier uses base 2008 
Sources: expenditure data from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Annual FMR Data Reports); state population data 
from U.S. Census Bureau 
	  
	   	  
 225 
It is further worth noting that the relative ranking of states with respect to per capita spending on 
Medicaid has changed over the years. While New York and D.C. have consistently had some of the costliest 
Medicaid programs in the nation and Nevada remained one of the cheapest, most states have seen their 
relative costs fluctuate. Of the 10 states falling outside the 10th and 90th percentiles in 1980, only four 
remained among the relative outliers in 2009; and among all states the median state has seen its ranking 
move 23 positions over the 30 years. Similar temporal and intra-temporal variations are noted for coverage 
and benefits.  
Figure 6.3 presents data on the annual inflation of Medicaid spending and the 10th and 90th 
percentile changes; the dotted line represents the mean rate of change in the states’ total general revenues. 
It is evident that the rate of growth in Medicaid expenditures fluctuates considerably both across time and 
between states. Between 1980 and 2008 the rate of inflation in Medicaid spending has averaged 9.7%, with 
an average standard deviation of 11.5% inflation over the past decade. By controlling for the previous year’s 
cost, the models emphasize the marginal changes. 
Figure 6.3 Annual Percent Change in the 50 states’ (excludes DC) (a) own-source general revenues per resident and 
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Before proceeding to the next variable of interest, a significant qualifier about the costs variable 
should be emphasized. The states have ways to inflate their Medicaid budget that are not directly associated 
with their Medicaid expenditures per se but are not reflected in this proxy. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 5, after distributing DSH or UPL payments to hospitals and collecting federal reimbursements 
according to its FMAP rate, a state can impose specific provider taxes on hospitals to recoup a portion of 
their own state-level expenditures as well as some of the federal disbursements. Although the DSH/UPL 
payments appear in the Medicaid budgets used in the constructing the costs variable, any potentially 
offsetting provider taxes do not appear in the Medicaid budget. For example, assume a state legislature 
wants to respond to voter pressure to reduce state deficits by cutting $5 millions from budget. The state 
could reduce reimbursements rates to hospitals. Or, the state could provide $20 million in DSH payments. 
Collect $10 million from the federal government and then institute $15 million in new taxes. It may be 
counterintuitive, but effectively the combination of DSH payments and provider taxes allowed both the 
hospitals and state to each net $5 million in new revenues, paid for by federal taxpayers. Such practices 
were common in the early 1990s and anecdotal evidence suggests that states still employ provider taxes to 
leverage federal revenues, thereby raising Medicaid expenditures without actually raising the actual state-
level taxpayer burden of Medicaid that the costs variable is intended to represent. All of the costs models 
understate this tendency. 
 
Coverage Variable:  
After a period of stagnation in the number of Americans enrolled in Medicaid in the 1970s followed 
by a period of actual retrenchment in the early 1980s the number of Medicaid recipients increased rapidly 
over the subsequent decades, nearly tripling from approximately 25 million in 1980 to nearly 70 million 
three decades later. Figure 6.4 presents the annual change in the absolute number of Medicaid recipients 
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(unduplicated count), by state. Even during much of the Eighties when Medicaid was experiencing below 
average rates of growth in its enrollment, many states still experienced increases in the number recipients 
that approached 10 percent. The significant bump in enrollments in 1998 corresponds with the 
implementation of S-CHIP. 
Figure 6.4. Median Annual Change in Number of Annual Unduplicated Recipients, by State, FY1981-2009 
 
Notes: In 1998, Medicaid beneficiaries were redefined to include enrollees on behalf of whom a capitation payment is paid; CHIP 
data not included for FY05, FY07 and FY08 (Unavailable as of 08. 29.2011) 
Sources: Unduplicated recipient account from MSIS: 1980-1990: data request from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 1991-
1998: Annual Statistical Supplement; 1999-2009: MSIS State Summary Datamart at msis.cms.hhs.gov 
 
Absolute enrollment numbers, however, do not control for either population growth or the 
population’s relative need for Medicaid over time. Therefore, for the proxy of the poor’s access to 
Medicaid insurance, I construct the variable coverage by taking the total number of Medicaid recipients in a 
state and dividing it by the number of residents who are living under the federal poverty line. With respect 
to the Medicaid populations, the state-level recipient counts for the years 1980-2009 were taken from the 
Social Security Bulletin – Annual Statistical Supplement (for 1980-1998) and the Medicaid Statistical Information 
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System (for 1999-2009). These statistics represent the total annual number of unduplicated recipients in 
Medicaid or CHIP. This includes anyone who has had Medicaid services provided at any point in the year 
(and includes those enrolled in Medicaid managed care plans who may or may not have received any actual 
health care services).75  
The number of poor, used in the denominator of the access variable, reflects the number of residents 
in a state living with household income less than 100 percent of the federal poverty line, as estimated by the 
US Census Bureau and found in their “Detailed Poverty Tables.” For example, if a state has 1 million 
residents living below the poverty line and 1.4 million Medicaid recipients, the coverage proxy for the state 
would be 140% of the poor. Scaling the number of recipients to the poverty rates allows the model to 
compare states of different sizes. It also implicitly emphasizes how over time Medicaid has become less 
exclusively a poor person’s program. Although it may be beneficial to adjust the measure of “poor” to 
reflect variation in the cost of living across the states, as Medicaid’s categorical eligibility criteria and FMAP 
formula are tied to federal poverty levels, the federal measure is sufficient. (I do control for income in the 
regression model, however.) 
Figure 6.5 charts the historical trend in the median and 10th/90th percentiles of the states’ coverage 
over thirty years. Nationally the number of poor who have gained access to Medicaid has increase from 60 
percent of those below the poverty line to about 140 percent of those in poverty. By 140 percent of the 
poverty (or 140 percent of the ‘poor’ in the state) I do not mean the eligibility criteria, but the absolute 
number of recipients. Throughout the Eighties (and for much of the decade before), national enrollment for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 It is worth nothing that there is significant turnover in Medicaid enrollees as household income and therefore 
eligibility for Medicaid fluctuates during the year. This will lead to some incongruence between the poverty figure 
that reflects net annual household income and the Medicaid enrollment figure. A more appropriate measure of 
Medicaid caseload would arguably be the states’ average monthly enrollments, also called full-year equivalents. Since 
1997 the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured have conducted bi-annual surveys that offers point-in-
time estimates (for June and December) of the number individuals enrolled in Medicaid. 
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Medicaid stubbornly held around 22 million annual recipients with median coverage falling below 50 percent 
of the states’ poor in 1983 (the last year of the OBRA ’81 cuts to federal Medicaid spending). But after 
declining in the first half of the decade, the share of the poor with access to Medicaid steadily increased 
between 1986 and 2000 with a temporary (and largely unintended) decline following national welfare 
reform of 1996 and improved economy. It is worth emphasizing that despite the series of mandates passed 
during the 1980s that significantly liberalized and federalized Medicaid’s eligibility criteria, there remained 
nearly as much variation among the fifty states in 2009 as there was in 1980, with several states providing 
Medicaid/CHIP to nearly 200 percent of the number of residents who were “poor”, while other states 
provide proportionally half that level of coverage. For example, non-working parents in Pennsylvania 
qualify for Medicaid through its CHIP program if the family’s income is below twice the federal poverty 
level ($44,100 for a family of four in 2008). In Louisiana, however, non-working parents qualify only if 
their incomes are below the state’s TANF eligibility criteria equivalent to 11 percent of the poverty level 
($2,426 for a family of four). 
Figure 6.5. Coverage variable – Medicaid/CHIP Recipients as percent of state residents in poverty, median and 
10th/90th percentiles, by state, FY 1980-2010 
 
Note: In 1998, Medicaid beneficiaries were redefined to include enrollees on behalf of whom a capitation payment is 
paid; CHIP data not included for FY05, FY07 and FY08 (Unavailable as of 08. 29.2011)  
Source: HCFA/CMS MSIS Unduplicated Recipient Count (Data Request: 1980-1998, msis.cms.hhs.gov: 1999-2009) 
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While using the number of Medicaid recipients has the advantage of measuring actual participation 
in the states health care systems, this number underestimates the ability of eligible state residents to receive 
Medicaid services because it does not include residents who are neither enrolled in a managed care plan nor 
who make no use of any health services in a year. Significantly, Medicaid coverage can be applied 
retroactively—up to three months of retroactive coverage can be provided to eligible recipients prior to 
application who required coverage and had alternative source of medical insurance. Not only does this 
create a severe adverse selection it effectively means that an individual or family has little incentive to apply 
for Medicaid without an a priori need for care.  From an insurance perspective this is counterintuitive.76 A 
preferable proxy for the poor’s access to Medicaid could arguably be an estimate of a state’s potential 
enrollment based on total eligible population. Significantly, a 2008 study by National Institute for Health Care 
Management Foundation estimated that approximately a quarter of the 47 million then uninsured in 2006 
were eligible for Medicaid, including an estimated 6.1 million children, nearly two of every three uninsured 
children (NIHCMF, 2008).77 However, this data is inconsistent and less reliable for this study’s extended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The benefits variable, introduced next, all suffers similar defects, with Medicaid’s adverse selection problem 
leading to the overestimation of the true cost of providing Medicaid insurance to Americans because it excludes 
nonusers who are an essential part of any insurance pool. 
77 The enrollment of these currently eligible Medicaid recipients is one of the concerns that many states share 
with respect to state-level fiscal burden associated with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (P.L. 
111-148) is over eligible-but-not-yet-enrolled individuals. The Act stipulates that newly eligible Medicaid recipients 
will be eligible for 100 percent federal cost sharing (drawing down to 90 percent by 2019), but those whom are 
eligible for Medicaid under state criteria prior to implementation of the Act (regardless of whether or not they are 
enrolled) will have their costs subsidized according to the standard FMAP cost sharing arrangement. The Act’s 
included mandate that individual’s hold insurance coverage will likely lead to a significant rise in coverage rates 
among these previously eligible recipients. 
	  
	   	  
 231 
time period. The coverage variable should be interpreted as a minimal estimate of the poor’s access to 
Medicaid.78 
 
Benefits Variable:  
The benefits variable is intended to be a proxy of the comprehensiveness of the Medicaid coverage 
provided by a state. Benefits is estimated by taking total federal and state expenditures on Medicaid (as 
described above in relationship to Costs) and subtracting the amounts spent on administration and then 
dividing the balance—reflecting all provider payments and/or capitated managed care payments—by the 
total number of unduplicated recipients. It is arguable whether or not disproportionate share hospital 
payments should be excluded from a measure intended to indicate the generosity of Medicaid benefits. 
Where they are not used by a state to leverage federal dollars as a supplement to the state’s general 
revenues such payments are intended to go, in part, to subsidizing the uncompensated care provided to 
hospitals treating non-Medicaid recipients; therefore, including DSH payment could inflate the level of 
spending that went specifically to actual Medicaid recipients. I do not make any adjustment, but given this 
feature of DSH payments and the potential fiscal abuses associated with DSH payments, particularly when 
they were are at their peak, I argue it is prudent to at least include them as a control in the models.79  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Future research could explore whether or not states that have Medicaid managed care programs that provide a 
third party administrator (“TPA”) a fixed amount per enrollee exhibit a higher level of penetration among their 
eligible populations, presumably because the TPA has an incentive to increase the number of recipients and reduce 
their per-recipient costs. 
79 Similar arguments can be made with respect to Upper Payment Limits, that I do include in the Benefits variable. 
Two reasons for this bias treatment are: (1) before 2009, the MFR data reports did not differentiate UPLs and so the 
data is simply unavailable; (2) whereas DSH payments subsidize the costs of uncompensated care provided to 
Medicaid and non-Medicaid recipients and so are not explicitly “Medicaid” benefits, UPL payments are intended only 
to increase the effective reimbursement provided for Medicaid recipients and so are more appropriately seen as 
Medicaid reimbursements (see Chapter 5 for discussion on DSH payments and UPLs) 
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Figure 6.6 charts the historical trend in the median spending on Medicaid vendor payments per 
recipient among the states between 1980 and 2009, adjusted for medical inflation using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI-U All Items) to reflect comparable real value of the dollar 
(base=2008), as well the range reflecting the 10th and 90th percentiles. Adjusted for medical inflation the 
spending has remained remarkably stable over the past thirty years. However, as in the cases of Costs and 
Coverage there has been no lessening of the variation among the states over time. (The lighter solid line in 
the figure represents the 50-state median for the unadjusted Benefits data.) 
Figure 6.6 Benefits variable – Median real Medicaid/CHIP spending (less administration/DSH) per recipient, 
adjusted for CPI-U Medical care, median and 10th/90th percentiles, by state, FY 1980-2010 
 
Note: In 1998, Medicaid beneficiaries were redefined to include enrollees on behalf of whom a capitation payment is paid. The 
large increase in 1997 is primarily the result of this change of definition. 
Sources: expenditure and recipient (annual unduplicated recipient count) data from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (Annual FMR 
Data Reports and MSIS reports, respectively); CPI-U Medical Care from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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With respect to the comprehensiveness of Medicaid coverage, all states must cover fourteen 
categories of basic services (as set forth in 42 U.S.C. 1396d(a)(1)-(5)80), but can apply to the CMS for 
waivers (Section 1115, Section 1915(b) or Section 1915(c) waivers) to avoid specific federal requirements 
related to the provision of certain services. States may also elect to include any among 34 optional services 
(as set forth in see. 42 U.S.C. 1396d(7)-(16)81). 
Federal mandates (those associated with both eligibility and benefit criteria) create a confounding 
variable, or third variable, problem to our models.  A confounding variable is an exogenous variable that a 
researcher fails to control for and yet is empirically related to both the other independent variables and the 
dependent variables in a model. The confounding variable problem associated with the federal mandates 
will make it difficult to disentangle the relationships and therefore the proper correlation of state factors 
that the states have control over and overall benefits (or coverage or costs). If a state’s Medicaid benefits are 
defined exogenous to state specific factors any correlation exhibited between the independent variables and 
benefits could be happenstance and causality could not be discerned. To correct for this potential problem, 
Thad Kousseer (2002) disaggregated Medicaid funding into optional and mandatory coverage costs for the 
period 1979 through 1993. In his quantitative study he looks at the political and economic effects on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Mandatory Medicaid services include: inpatient and outpatient hospital care; physician's service; nurse midwife 
service; pediatric and family nurse practitioner services; federally qualified health center ("FQHC"); laboratories and 
x-ray services; rural health clinic services; prenatal care; family planning services; nursing facility services for persons 
over age 21; home health care services for persons over 21 who are eligible for nursing facility services (includes 
medical supplies and equipment); early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment for persons under age 21 
("EPSDT"); vaccines for children; transportation. 
81 Optional Medicaid services include: podiatrists' services; optometrists' services and eyeglasses; chiropractic 
services; private duty nurses; clinic services; dental services; physical therapy; occupational therapy; speech, hearing 
and language therapy; prescribed drugs; dentures prosthetic devices; preventive, diagnostic and screening services; 
rehabilitative services; services for persons age 65 or older in mental institutions; intermediate care facility services, 
including for persons with MR/DD and related conditions; inpatient psychiatric services for persons under age 22; 
Christian Science schools; nursing facility services for persons under age 21; emergency hospital services; personal 
care services; hospice care; case management services; respiratory care services; home and community-based services 
for individuals with disabilities and chronic medical conditions; Program for All-Inclusive Care for the Elderly 
(“PACE”) 
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discretionary Medicaid expenditures and finds partisan effects where others have not. Unfortunately, he 
only looks at the period from 1980-1993 and the present study seeks to examine a longer time period. 
Kousser reasoned that policies and administrative rulings that have transpired since 1993 have made in more 
difficult to discern discretionary spending. Although the increasing level of discretion granted to the states 
during the Clinton and Bush administrations makes Kousser’s results around the determinants of state-level 
policymaking all the more consequential, they also may lessen the need to isolate the optional spending 
from the mandatory spending totals. A study by the Kaiser Family Foundation (2005) on Medicaid 
expenditures and enrollment data (not including CHIP data) found that 60 percent of all Medicaid 
expenditures went toward “optional” services in 2001,82 with 86% of all optional expenditures going 
toward paying for services provided to the elderly and disabled. Additionally, although certain services are 
mandated, the states still have considerable latitude in setting reimbursement rates and thus excluding 
spending on mandated services would remove this important source of variation from the study. From the 
perspective of a state-level analysis, the flexibility that states having for deciding upon the optional benefits 
provided and, more generally, the reimbursement paid mitigate the influence of potentially confounding 
nature of federal mandates on benefits. 
Finally, with respect to benefits, it is important to recognize that a state’s eligibility criteria and 
demographic mix will significantly affect the average cost of services provided to a Medicaid recipient in 
that state. In 2008 a child cost an average of $2,171 to be insured with Medicaid, compared to $2,646 for a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82	  Despite the number of Medicaid services that are technically optional, in most instances the purported 
flexibility is more superficial than real. For example, while prescription drug coverage is an optional benefit for all 
beneficiary groups other than children (for whom prescription drugs are required under EPSDT requirements), every 
state includes prescription drug coverage in their Medicaid package. This ‘optional’ benefit cost the states $24.2 
billion, or 7 percent of total Medicaid/CHIP expenditures, in 2009. Similarly, intermediate care facilities for people 
with mental retardations (“ICF-MR”; see Section 1905(d) of Social Security Act) are an optional benefit that every 
state now includes. In 2009, $19 billion, about 5 percent of total vendor payments, was spent on providing care for 
Medicaid recipients in either mental health facilities or ICF-MR. While the demand for such services varies vastly 
across the states and the states’ commitments to this subpopulation may vary, every state had at least one ICF-MR 
facility according to the CMS.	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nondisabled adult, and $12,950 and $14,865 for the elderly and disabled, respectively. In Florida, for 
example, the annual cost of providing nursing home care to a single Medicaid recipient was approximately 
$65,000 in 2008; comparatively, the same amount of funding could provide a full year of CHIP coverage to 
almost 40 Floridian children in 2008.83 Figure 6.7a and Figure 6.7b present a national summary of 
Medicaid’s enrollment mix and spending between 1980 and 2009: the aged and disabled have always 
commanded a large share of total costs relative to their population. With costs so skewed, a state with 
expansive coverage for children and non-disabled adults may be classified as being less generous benefits than 
a state with comparatively restrictive eligibility but a proportionally higher number of aged or disabled 
Medicaid recipients. 
Figure 6.7a. Share of total Medicaid payments by enrollment group, 
averaged across all states, FY1980-2008 
	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Throughout fiscal year 2008, Florida’s CHIP program insured approximately 230,000 children a month (for an 
annual count of 350,000) at a total cost of  $390 million (statehealthfacts.org). Comparatively, the average per diem 
Medicaid reimbursement rate for a day of nursing home care was $177.06 in 2008 (Florida Agency for Health Care 
Administration). And Florida was not particularly egregious in its high costs of nursing homes: a 2010 survey of state 
long term care ranked the affordability of private-pay long term care in Florida just above the median (Reinhard et al. 
2011). Some states, such as New York and Connecticut, have annual nursing home costs that exceed $100,000 per 
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Figure 6.7b. Share of Recipients by Enrollment Group, averaged across 
all state, FY1980-2008 
 
Source: recipient (annual unduplicated recipient count) data from Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (MSIS 
reports) 
Correlation between Cost, Coverage and Benefits 
Table 6.1 displays the simple pair-wise correlations between the above variables, averaged across 
the 30 years. As expected, both coverage and benefits are positively correlated with costs: the broader the 
coverage or more generous the reimbursement rates and/or services the more likely it is the state’s overall 
program will also cost more. In contrast, the correlation between benefits and coverage is low—often 
negative or near zero. Over the past three decades the precise relationships between costs, coverage, and 
benefits has fluctuated. 










Max	  (Year)	   Min	  (Year)	  
cost	  :	  coverage	   0.61	   0.33	   0.39	   0.44	   0.75	  (1981)	   0.17	  (1994)	  
cost	  :	  benefits	   0.50	   0.60	   0.53	   0.55	   0.71	  (1991)	   0.30	  (1980)	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Note:  cost: Total Medicaid/CHIP spending per Capita;  
benefits: Total Medicaid/CHIP Spending (less Administration) per Unduplicated Recipient;  
coverage: Unduplicated Recipient as % of Residents in Poverty 
I also considered the pairwise correlation of the 50-state ranking of the states with respect to the 
three dependent variables. The results were comparable, suggesting that the correlation results 
were not driven by certain states having extreme values for the variables. 
Source:  Author’s dataset 
In the early 1980s the correlation between costs and coverage was marginally greater than the 
correlation between costs and benefits: 0.61 compared to 0.50. Through the 1990s the correlation between 
costs and coverage decreased significantly relative to the previous decade, suggesting that a state’s eligibility 
criteria and therefore its total enrollments became less of a contributing factor to the states’ overall 
Medicaid expenditures. A potential cause for temporary spike in the benefits – costs correlation in the early 
Nineties was the abuse of DSH payments that inflated aggregate costs and Medicaid payments per recipient 
without any concurrent increase in state enrollments. This also would have lessened the positive 
relationship between coverage and costs typically demonstrated. The declining correlation between cost and 
coverage is also consistent with the fact that most of the new enrollees insured through the Medicaid 
mandates of the late 1980s and the CHIP expansion of late 1990s and 2000s were children who are 
significantly less expensive to provide health care to than the old or disabled. Given the lower cost of 
providing Medicaid insurance to the newly enrolled children, and in some states, their parents and other 
healthy adults, the precise demographics and health status of a state’s Medicaid population would become at 
least as important for determining a state’s total expenditures as the absolute size of the population. Thus, 
states that can offer coverage more efficiently may be more willing to liberally expand coverage to 
additional children. Additionally, the repeal of the Boren Amendment in 1997 afforded the states greater 
flexibility determining reimbursement rates and therefore offset the costs of new enrollees by reducing 
payments if a state saw that to be prudent. The result would be that per capita costs could remain relatively 
low despite a state raising its eligibility standards. 
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The comparatively low correlation between benefits and coverage offers preliminary evidence that at 
least most states in designing their Medicaid programs make trade-offs between establishing high eligibility 
criteria on the one hand and offering a generous beneficiary package (and/or including high reimbursement 
rates) on the other. A state may choose, like California or Tennessee, to spread available resources thin, 
with broad eligibility and low reimbursement rates, or it may, like Arizona before the implementation of 
Prop 204 expansions in early 2000s, provide comparatively generous reimbursement for the care of an 
extremely low-income population. Fewer can afford, either politically or financially, like New York or 
Connecticut for example, to offer both generous coverage and comprehensive and favorably reimbursed 
benefits. Figure 6.8 plots the coverage and benefits values of each state for fiscal year 2008 as the X- and Y-
coordinates, with the states’ general costs value indicated by the symbol identifying each states’ point of 
intersection.  The figure supports the correlations presented in Table 6.1. Overall, the absence of a 
positive correlation between the benefits and coverage variables suggest that different causal factors—as 
Grogan (1994) and Bailey and Rom (2004) similarly argued—are at work in determining each of the 
components of a state Medicaid program. Although rudimentary, this diagnostic provides a basis to assume 
that what primary factors contribute to variation in one of the above measures may not have the same effect 
for another. It is necessary to look at Medicaid policymaking from a multidimensional perspective. 
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Figure 6.8.  Trade-off between benefits (Medicaid Spending per Recipient) and coverage (Medicaid Recipients as 




This section introduces the primary explanatory variables and demographic and economic controls 
that influence the states’ variation in coverage, benefits, and costs.  The explanatory variables are grouped into 
three loose categories: macroeconomic conditions, partisan or ideological, and interest groups.  
I posit that coverage is determined largely by a state’s political ideology and macroeconomic 
condition, controlling for state demographics; benefits are greatly influenced by interest group strength, 
controlling for local cost of health care; and, aggregate costs in addition to being determined by the state’s 
benefits and coverage policies are directly affected by the macroeconomic conditions within the state and 













































































COVERAGE,	  	  Number	  of	  Medicaid	  Recipients	  as	  Percent	  of	  Poor	  (<	  100%FPL),	  %	  
COST,	  Total	  Medicaid	  Spending	  per	  Taxpayer	  
=	  $500	  -­‐	  $775	  (5	  states)	  
=	  $776	  -­‐	  $1,00	  (26	  states)	  
=	  $1,001	  -­‐	  $1,500	  (18	  states)	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ECONOMIC Explanatory Variables: 
Not all states have the same level of economic activity and, thus, comparable tax bases from which 
they can raise revenues to finance public programs. A poor state has an inherently smaller tax base than a 
rich state, and so the former would need to impose a higher tax rate on its residents if it sought to raise the 
same amount of money compared to the latter. The more likely outcome would be the poor state to 
provide fewer services than the rich state. To entice poorer states’ to increase their financial participation in 
Medicaid while at the same time maintaining relative parity in the states’ taxpayer burden across the nation, 
the federal government subsidizes the states’ Medicaid costs with variable matching funds defined by the 
Federal Medical Assistance Percentages (FMAP). A state’s FMAP rate is inversely related to the state’s per capita 
income relative to the national average. If the FMAP was successful at redistributing federal revenues across 
the states there would be no significant relationship between total Medicaid spending per capita and either a 
state’s per capita income or its associated FMAP rate. 
However, the FMAP is an imperfect funding mechanism. Regardless of the intent of the FMAP to 
stimulate spending by more generously subsidizing poor states relative to rich states, it has proven to be 
insufficient at raising all states to comparable levels of total spending. With respect to the costs model I 
include a state’s per capita income as an explanatory variable and expect a positive relationship between per 
capita income and costs. Alternatively, I could use a state’s FMAP rate, but the endogeneity of the former to 
the latter make it inappropriate to include both metrics in a model. While substituting a state’s FMAP rate 
for its per capita income does not substantively affect the coefficient of any of the other variables, I prefer 
per capita income to FMAP because the FMAP rates are limited to a statutory minimum of 50% and 
statutory maximum of 83%. However, I do include a dummy to indicate whether or not a state is affected 
by the 50% minimum.  
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I expect the state’s poverty rate to be negatively correlated with coverage. Given that Medicaid is a 
means-tested program this relationship may be counterintuitive; and, indeed, the relationship is, in part, a 
result of the construction of the dependent variable. If two states had the same eligibility standard tied to, 
for example, 100% of the FPL, the state with greater poverty would have more residents falling into the 
eligibility category. However, because the coverage variable controls for the state’s poverty rate (by using 
the number of residents living under the poverty line in the denominator) and reflects the share of a state’s 
poor with Medicaid and not the share of the state’s total population with Medicaid, the two states would 
have the same coverage metric. For example, a state with low level of poverty will be able to raise its 
eligibility thresholds and serve a Medicaid population that may still be similar in size (proportional to total 
number of residents) to that of a state with greater poverty rate but lower Medicaid thresholds. 
 
Summary of Economic Hypotheses: 
Economic H1.a: The states’ total (including both federal and state) costs will be positively related 
to the states’ per capita income. 
Economic H1.b: The states’ total costs will be inversely related to its FMAP. 
Economic H2: State total costs will be positively correlated with the state’s poverty rate. 
Economic H3: State coverage will be negatively correlated with the state’s poverty rate. 
Economic H4: State coverage will be positively correlated with per capita income. 
 
INTEREST GROUP Explanatory Variables:  
	  
	   	  
 242 
The public is likely to be most concerned with the total budgetary implications of the Medicaid. 
The public is likely to be less concerned with the specifics of who or what benefits Medicaid covers; the 
general American belief that it is inappropriate to get between a doctor and his patients helps shield the 
public financing of health care from scrutiny. In contrast to this laissez faire attitude, many health care 
providers have a strong financial incentive to lobby policymakers for their preferred Medicaid policies: their 
personal incomes and operating revenues are directly impacted by Medicaid reimbursements. For example, 
Medicaid is the primary source of payments for nursing care: half of all spending on nursing home care and 
43 percent of total national spending on long-term care came from Medicaid sources in 2002. The strength 
of the health care industry is reflected in the fact that five of the ten best funded interest groups in the 
United States are directly associated with the health care sector: including the American Hospital 
Association, American Medical Association, Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Pharmaceutical Researchers and 
Manufacturers of America, and AARP (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). These associations have a 
vested interest in expanding Medicaid spending on benefits and states with the largest health care sector are 
likely to experience the greatest amount of lobbying by its health providers. As a consequence those states 
are likely to have higher benefits. 
As proxies for the potential lobbying strength of the health care sector I collected data on the 
number of hospitals and intermediate care facilities as well as the number of doctors working in the state. 
The facility-related data is from an annual publication, Hospital Statistics, by the American Hospital 
Association (and includes the vast majority of non-profit, for-profit, and state and local government medical 
facilities whose services are available to the public). The number of doctors is from Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, and originally collected by the American Medical Association. I collected data on the number 
of hospitals, skilled nursing facilities and beds in both type of facility for each of the states for 11 years in the 
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dataset. With none of the variables being substantively significant, however, I use total health care spending in 
the state as a proxy for interest group strength of the health care sector in most of the models. 
In contrast to their impact on benefits, I anticipate the impact of interest groups on coverage to be 
insignificant. Compared to the provider community, potential Medicaid recipients are politically weak and 
susceptible to the collective action problem when attempting to organize (see Olsen, 1965). Grogan and 
Gusmano (2007) have considered the variable and unequal influence on the different dimensions of 
Medicaid policy. The authors have persuasively argued that the poor, especially children, lack consistently 
vocal policy advocates. Although the federal government has significantly raised the minimum eligibility 
criteria for Medicaid and every state has complied by expanding their enrollments (with many states 
exceeding the national minimum rates), the poor, they argue, have not been as well represented in the 
implementation of Medicaid policy as their increased Medicaid participation would seemingly warrant, 
particularly at the state-level. 84  
A potential exception to this lack of policy representation and influence among potential recipients, 
however, is Medicaid’s elderly and developmentally disabled populations. These recipients are often 
described as members of the “deserving poor” and are generally more politically active than the general 
population. They also have the AARP and other advocacy groups, such as the American Association of 
People with Disabilities, aggressively lobbying on their behalf for expanded Medicaid benefits that are 
exceedingly expensive. However, the aged and disabled residents of any state are already more-or-less fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Complicating the quantitative study is the reality that insuring and providing health care to children, the largest 
group of Medicaid recipients, is a relatively inexpensive proposition (compared to providing Medicaid to the aged and 
disabled). Thus, any public advocacy that successfully leads to expanded eligibility for children will likely reduce 
Medicaid’s per beneficiary spending (while only marginally increasing per capita costs of Medicaid). The effect is 
unlikely to show up in a macro analysis of spending per recipient that group all recipients and expenditures together, 
such as the following regressions model. The Center for Medicare and Medicaid makes publicly available spending per 
type of recipient and so future research would do well to look at affects of variables on the separate groups of 
children, adults, aged, disabled. 
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insured, either through Medicaid or Medicare, and so efforts by the AARP are more likely to seek enriching 
benefits rather than expanding coverage. To account for the potential influence of the state’s aged 
population on benefits I include the percentage of the state population aged 65 and older. I do not include it 
as an explanatory variable in the coverage model because the aged and disabled account for a small number of 
total recipients and there is little variability in their eligibility criteria. 
 
Summary of Interest Group Hypotheses: 
Interest Group H.1: The proportional number of doctors in a state will be positively correlated 
with a state’s spending on Medicaid benefits. 
Interest Group H.2: The proportional number of hospitals in a state will be positively correlated 
with a state’s spending on Medicaid benefits. 
Interest Group H.3: States with a higher level of health-related economic activity will have 
higher Medicaid benefits. 
Interest Group H.4: The percentage of state residents’ that are aged will be positively correlated 
with the states’ Medicaid benefits. 
 
PARTISAN (and IDEOLOGICAL) Explanatory Variables:   
Medicaid was included in the contentious Social Security Amendments of 1965 that was part of a 
liberal policy agenda orchestrated by a popular Democrat president and a strong Democrat majority in 
Congress. In the decades since Medicaid’s enactment, however, both parties have more-or-less embraced 
Medicaid’s guarantee of health care to the nation’s poorest citizens. It has become an essential social 
responsibility of federal- and state-governments. Medicaid expansions have historically appealed to 
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bipartisan coalitions. Each amendment to the Social Security Act that raised Medicaid eligibility criteria in 
the second half of the 1980s attracted large majorities; as did the original SCHIP legislation and its 
expansion in 2009 that achieved uncharacteristic bipartisan support. Nevertheless, political ideology and 
state partisanship are still likely to contribute to the inter- and intra-state variability of Medicaid. Holding all 
else constant, a liberal public or a Democrat-controlled state legislature will be more inclined to favor 
spending an additional dollar on Medicaid compared to a conservative public or a Republican-controlled 
state legislature. Of course, political ideology and partisanship are not equivalent. The median Republican 
from Massachusetts is likely to have different ideological beliefs than, say, the median voter in a Republican 
presidential primary. Nonetheless, although a Republican governor of Massachusetts is likely to be more 
liberal than his colleague in Texas, a local Republican in any particular state will generally be more 
conservative than his Democrat neighbor. The relative preference orderings between the two parties should 
be similar throughout the nation. In my models I take into consideration both inter-state ideological 
variability as well as variability in intra-state partisanship over time. 
As a measure of the relative political ideology of a state, I use the Berry et al. state citizen ideology 
score (see Berry et al. 1998, 2007) that is calculated by averaging the interest group rating of the state’s 
congressional representatives and an estimate of each challenger’s ideology (estimated as the average 
ideological rating of the candidates of the challenger’s party who were successfully elected elsewhere in the 
state), weighted by the election returns of the two candidates in the district. The score runs on a 0-1 scale 
where, 0 is perfectly conservative and 1 is perfectly liberal (I convert the measurement to base 100). The 
results of the regressions are consistent with using the state presidential vote or average NOMINATE score 
of the state’s two senators. I prefer the citizen ideology, however, score as it more dynamic and available on 
an annual basis. The state-level partisan explanatory variables are the % Democrat in Lower Chamber and 
Unified Democrat Dummy or Unified Republican Dummy. The former reflects the two-party share of seats 
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controlled by Democrats and the latter is a 1 if the governor and both the chambers of the state legislature 
are all controlled by the respective party (with the exception of Nebraska that is unicameral).85 I lag all 
ideological and partisan variables by one year to compensate for delay in implementation of any reforms. 
The impact of the voters and legislators’ different policy preferences for a certain level of public 
spending is most likely to show up through policy decisions affecting the dependent variables, coverage and 
costs. I expect a positive relationship between ideology and partisanship with coverage. This model posits that 
conservative publics and/or Republican legislators, who generally desire limiting the size of the public 
safety net and minimizing federal tax rates, are more likely than a liberals to favor eligibility cuts, lowering 
coverage, that will slow, if not reverse, the marginal growth rate of Medicaid so as to lower the relative costs 
of Medicaid. I do not suspect any significant relationship between either ideology or partisanship with benefits. 
Although liberal states may be more inclined to offer additional medical services to each recipient, thereby 
increasing spending per recipient, any eligibility expansion will likely reduce the cost of Medicaid/CHIP 
per recipient. 
Regardless of the temporal policy preferences of voters and state legislators, the ability of 
politicians to affect change being severely limited by the state’s previous policy commitments. The 
Democrats major health care reform initiative of 2010 exemplifies this tendency: instead of overhauling the 
health care sector by introducing a single-payer or public option Obamacare relies upon an expansion of 
Medicaid and existing private insurers to reduce the number of uninsured. Similarly, when Republicans 
(whether in Congress or the White House) have proposed the draconian reforms necessary to repeal 
Medicaid, their alternative programs for block granting Medicaid would have left intact the states’ and 
federal-government’s significant health-related commitments to the poor. Relatedly, any partisan or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Other variables substituted were: Democrat Governor Dummy (1 if Democrat Governor), % Democrat in 
Upper Chamber  
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ideological influence on Medicaid will only be effective at the margins. For this reason I include a lag of the 
dependent variables in each model. 
Significantly, I do not include any federal controls for partisanship. The historical trends with 
respect to political influence on Medicaid policy are too inconsistent for the following macro level time 
series analyses. For example, while Reagan successfully lowered spending in the first three years of his 
administration, any savings were quickly overshadowed by the expansions initiated by a bipartisan group of 
governors and Democrats in Congress and passed by large majorities of both parties. And it was bipartisan 
groups in Congress who passed SCHIP. Further, given that each of the dependent variables are measured at 
the state-level, any federal change will be constant across the states and captured by the year dummies. 
How a state responds to the federal policy change—allowance of DSH payments, raising the optional 
eligible thresholds—will be the result of state politics. The independent impact of federal reforms on 
individual states–such as variability in the Secretary of Health and Human Services’ approval of state 
waivers—will be relegated to the error term.  
 
Summary of Partisan/Ideological Hypotheses: 
Partisan H.1a: Traditionally liberal states, with a higher citizen ideology score will be correlated 
with greater Medicaid coverage.   
Partisan H.1b: A higher citizen ideology score will also be correlated with higher total costs. 
Partisan H.2: The percentage of Democrats in a state legislature will have a weakly positive 
relationship with Medicaid coverage. 
Partisan H.3: Unified Democratic control of state government will be positively correlated with 
coverage; whereas unified Republican control will have no significant relationship with coverage. 
	  





A state’s Medicaid population is determined by a combination of federal laws that set Medicaid’s 
minimum eligibility thresholds, the state’s eligibility standards for its optional Medicaid population, the 
state’s poverty rate and its general demographics. While there remains considerable variation in the 
eligibility criteria among the states, federal mandates enacted in the later part of the Eighties made certain 
individuals, particularly children and pregnant women, more likely to be eligible for Medicaid. By 1991, 
Congress had mandated that states provide Medicaid coverage to all children younger than 6 and pregnant 
women who had incomes less than 133% of the federal poverty line and for children aged 6 to 18, to 100% 
of FPL. Approximately 70 percent of Medicaid recipients are eligible due to federal mandates that are 
exogenous to state policymakers’ decisions—including four-fifth of all children and disabled adults, but just 
one-half of the aged (Kaiser Family Foundation 2005). 
I expect that variability in the state’s demographics will impact on the state’s Coverage. Because 
children are the largest Medicaid population I include controls for the percentage of the state’s general 
population that are children aged 18 and under and, as already described in the economic section above, I 
account for the state’s poverty rate. As described in interest group section above, I include a control for the 
percentage of adults aged 65 and older, although there is little variability in the measure across the states. 
With a small fraction of all Medicaid recipients accounting for a large majority of the program’s 
total expenditures the demographics of a state and the demographics of the state’s Medicaid population will 
have a significant impact on determining overall spending. Thus, with respect to Benefits, I include controls 
for the proportion of the state’s Medicaid population that are children aged 18 and under and are aged or 
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disabled. Children are comparatively inexpensive to insure with Medicaid and so states with a greater 
proportion of children are likely to have lower per recipient charges. For example, in 2008, the average 
cost of insuring a child was $2,050, ranging from $1,100 in Wisconsin to $3,450 in Massachusetts; im 
contrast, the average cost of delivering Medicaid to the aged and disabled was $15,910, ranging from 
$9,200 in Alabama to $29,600 in New York. States with a Medicaid population that consists of a greater 
than average proportion of children should have lower benefits per recipient; with respect to the proportion 
of aged or disabled, the relationship will be positive. However, precisely because of the high concentration of 
costs among the aged and disabled and their sensitivity to a multitude of other exogenous factors, the 
demographic coefficients are unlikely to reach significance in a multivariate empirical study. 
In the coverage model I also control for the percentage of general population that is black. 
 
Cost of Health Care 
I consider two different proxies for health care costs: average Medicare spending per Medicare 
beneficiary and total health expenditures per capita, both by state. The Medicare data is available only for 
1992 onward and was acquired from the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. The aggregate health expenditure 
data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and available for the entire time period. Both proxies exhibit 
significant variation across the states, thereby warranting the inclusion of a control for the local cost of care 
in the models.  
Both data sources suffer a degree of endogeneity with the dependent variables that is unavoidable. 
While Medicaid finances a share of Medicare charges, the issue is not significant with respect to average 
Medicare costs and so I ignore any possible complications.  However, Medicaid accounts for approximately 
15 percent of national health expenditures and so to lessen any potential problems with respect to the net 
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health care expenditures variable, I subtract the state’s net Medicaid expenditures from this total before 
calculating the amount of non-Medicaid healthcare-related spending per capita 
Researchers with the Dartmouth Atlas estimate that among groups of Medicare beneficiaries who are 
otherwise similar, individuals who live in high-spending areas receive approximately 60 percent more in 
services than do those who live in low-spending areas. The authors found that these differences were due 
not to differences in prices, average levels of illness, or socioeconomic status but rather to the overall 
quantity of medical services provided and to the relatively higher proportions of internists and medical 
subspecialists in high-cost regions. (Fisher et al. 2003) Similarly, a study of regional variation of aggregate 
Medicare reimbursements by MedPAC (2011) found service use in higher use areas was 30 percent greater 
than in lower use areas, with the analogous comparison for total Medicare spending being 55 percent 
greater in high use areas (see also Gawande 2009 and Franzini et al. 2010 on cost variation and physician).86 
Unless there is a substitution affect in which doctors who give more care to Medicare recipients 
systematically provide less care to Medicaid recipients, it can be expected that states with high Medicare 
usage and therefore higher costs will also have relatively high Medicaid Benefits. 
Significantly, Medicaid spending per recipient exhibits greater variability than Medicare spending 
per enrollee. Figure 6.9a and Figure 6.9b present the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of 
variation87 across the fifty states and the District of Columbia for each year between 1992 and 2009 for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Challenging the general consensus that Medicare spending is a good proxy for total health care spending, 
Andrew Rettenmaier, and former Medicare Trustee, Thomas Saving, have argued that the state-by-state rankings of 
per-patient Medicare spending is not strongly correlated with the state rank of total per-capita health care spending 
(with ρ = 0.210; Rettenmaier and Saving, 2010, Table 1; see also Franzi et al 2010 critique of Gawande 2009). 
87 Coefficient of Variation (CV) is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the absolute value of the mean 
of a population: 𝑐! =
!
!
. Unlike the standard deviation, the coefficient of variation is a dimensionless number. This 
is preferable for comparing data that may be subject to significant inflation across time or the comparison of two 
different us, for the across time comparison of data with an increasing means and comparison of two sets of data I use 
the coefficient of variation instead of the standard deviation. 
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Medicaid (on the right) and Medicare (on the left), respectively. Between 1992 and 1997, the standard 
deviation in spending per enrollee, by state, was an average of 230 percent greater with respect to Medicaid 
compared to Medicare; between 1998 and 2008, the difference in the standard deviations lessened, but the 
states’ Medicare cost per enrollee was still an average of 50 percent greater than the states’ Medicaid 
spending per recipient.  
Figure 6.9a. Medicaid spending per recipient, across 
the States & D.C., FY 1992-2009	  
Figure 6.9b. Medicare payments per enrollee, across the 
States & D.C., FY 1992-2009 
  
Sources: Medicare Spending: Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid Spending: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services  
 
A factor contributing to the greater variability in the cost of Medicaid compared to Medicare is the 
fact that latter’s reimbursement rates are set federally and are therefore more likely to reflect uniform rate 
setting standards. With respect to Medicaid, each of the individual states may have different political and 
economic calculi when determining their reimbursement rates. Additionally, because the federal 
government is responsible for the full cost and accrues the full savings associated with any marginal change 
to the rates they have an incentive to set the rates accurately and not bias any particular state.88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 The federal government may also lack incentives to sufficiently control costs. Whereas the states’ balanced 
budget rules and less progressive tax rates inhibit state expenditures and limit state revenues, federal deficits have 
rarely imposed any real obstacle to congressional policymaking, including Medicare rate setting. For example, a 1997 
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Table 6.2 looks at the correlation between a state’s Medicaid payments per recipients (i.e. Benefits) 
and its Medicare payments per enrollee: between 1992 and 2008, the coefficient of correlation averaged 
0.22, ranging from low of 0.08 in 1995 to 0.41 in 1999. Squaring the correlation coefficient (or R-squared) 
is equal to the percentage of variation in Medicare payments that is related to the variation in Medicaid 
payments across the states; less than 5 percent of the variation is statistically related. Thus, despite Medicare 
showing significant variation, it is correlated with only a fraction of the significantly greater degree of 
variation in Medicaid across the states. 
Table 6.2. Correlation between Medicaid Spending per Recipient and Medicare Spending per Enrollee, across the 
States & D.C., by Fiscal Year, FY1992-2008	  
Fiscal	  Year	   ‘92	   ‘93	   ‘94	   ‘95	   ‘96	   ‘97	   ‘98	   ‘99	   ‘00	   ‘01	   ‘02	   ‘03	   ‘04	   ‘05	   ‘06	   ‘07	   ‘08	  
Pearson	  
Correlation	  
.17	   .34	   .21	   .08	   .20	   .31	   .35	   .41	   .30	   .27	   .23	   .28	   .19	   .14	   .08	   .12	   .15	  
R2	   .03	   .12	   .04	   .01	   .04	   .10	   .12	   .17	   .09	   .08	   .05	   .08	   .04	   .02	   .01	   .01	   .02	  
Sources: Medicare Spending: Dartmouth Atlas; Medicaid Spending: Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
 
DSH Payments 
In the early 1990s, many states made use of the Disproportionate Share Hospital payments to raise 
its federal payments without any real increase in state spending. The practice has been reigned in, but still 
these payments still account for approximately 5 percent of federal Medicaid dollars and increase benefits. 
Beginning in the late 1990s, Upper Payment Limit (UPL) subsidies were similarly used as a means to collect 
additional federal revenues. DSH and UPL payments, when coupled with hospital licensing fees, provider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
federal law intended to reduce the rate of growth in Medicare was quickly proven to be unworkable (whether for 
economic reasons or because it was simply politically inexpedient): every year since 2003 the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid should have decreased the Medicare physician payment rates given the law’s “sustainable growth rate” 
formulary. However, 12 times in the 8 years between 2003 and 2010 (including five times in 2010) Congress has 
passed stopgap measures to delay the cuts. The last so-called “doc fix”, passing by overwhelming vote of 409-2 in the 
House after a unanimous consent in the Senate, staved off a 25 percent reduction in Medicare payments and will go 
through the end of 2012 (when payments, if another doc fix is not passed, will be scheduled to fall 29.5 percent). 
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taxes and/or intergovernmental transfers, effectively increase the federal share of Medicaid without any of 
the prerequisite spending by the states. Federal laws are intended to prevent or at least minimize the 
unmatched use of federal funds for Medicaid purposes, but loopholes persist and the CMS has no way of 
accurately accounting what proportion of these supplemental payments are or are not recycled back into the 
states’ general revenues. 
No good data exists on state level provider taxes or UPL payments (only from fiscal year 2009 and 
onward are the UPL payments available by fiscal year 2009, by state) and so I only include a control for the 
amount of DSH per recipient in the model.  
 
Summary of Control Hypotheses: 
Control H.1: The share of their children enrolled in Medicaid will be negatively correlated with 
benefits. 
Control H.2: The percentage of children in a state will be positively correlated with access. 
Control H.2: Medicare costs per enrollee or health care spending per capita will be positively 
correlated with benefits. 
Control H.3: DSH payments will be positively correlated with benefits. 
 
Model Specification 
With as many as 29 observations (T ≈ 29) for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia (N 
≈ 51), the data is structured as a panel. In panel studies we can break down the error term into two 
components, the genuine error term εit and unobservable characteristics of the state, ui (i.e. there 
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something about Texas that causes it to have lower Medicaid rates that elsewhere). The repeated 
observations allow us to draw out these unobserved characteristics. With just one year we can see that New 
York and Texas vary but we cannot say why. Over thirty years we can see that they consistently vary and 
with the introduction of explanatory variables we may begin to answer the why. 
Panel data analysis endows regression analysis with both a spatial and temporal dimension thereby 
allowing the researcher to conduct longitudinal analyses on the phenomena of interest—in this case the 
effect of various explanatory variables on state policies pertaining to Medicaid. The spatial dimension 
pertains to the set of cross-sectional units of observation, in this case states. The temporal dimension 
pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing these cross-sectional units over a 
particular time span, in this case years. Thus, a state-year constitutes the unit of analysis.  
Formally, an empirical model for panel data would examine the relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables using a two-way model, controlling for the year and state. The two-
way fixed effect model takes the form:  
Yit=α + βXit + ui + vt +εit 
Where α is a constant and Xit is (1 x k) vector of k explanatory variables with a three-part error 
structure.  
Fixed effects models are not without their drawbacks. In particular they consume a lot of degrees of 
freedom. Two-way effect models have two sets of dummy variables for group and time variables (e.g., state 
and year). With the lag of the dependent variable included, however, I elect to not include a full set of year 
dummies and conserve the degrees of freedom. Thus, the following models are one-way fixed effect.  
I compare my results to a one-way random effects model. The difference between the random 
effects and fixed effect models is the treatment of the cross-sectional error, ui, and its variance. In a fixed 
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effect model ui is assumed to represent a state-specific effect that is assigned to every state. Conversely, in a 
random effects model it is assumed there are no state-specific effects and so ui will be uncorrelated with any 
explanatory variables that are included in the model.89  
I conduct a pooled regression model with panel corrected standard errors that includes neither time 
nor spatial dummies. 
Table 6.3 presents an overview of the between-, within-, and overall-group variation among the 
three dependent variables.90 The between variation refers to the variation of the mean value for an 
individual state (ie. heterogeneity between states, due for example to per capita income of state). The 
within variation refers to the variation in the deviation for a state from their respective mean (i.e. 
heterogeneity within a state’s data across time, due for example to some state-specific policy shock or 
possibly a measurement error). Overall refers to the whole dataset.  
For each of the dependent variables, costs, coverage, and benefits, there was significantly more change 
over the three decades for a state than there was variation between the states. This is not surprising given all 
the evidence of the inability of federal legislation to reduce the variation across the states. It supports the 
decision to focus on the state effect, ui, and the relatively diminished import of the year effects.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Greene (2003) refers to the random effects model as a regression with a random constant term. However 
unintuitive this description may be, this ‘random constant term’—i.e. the series’ intercept—is a random outcome 
that is a function of a mean value (an unknown constant, ui) plus a random error. Similarly, Bartels (2008) uses 
‘random effects’ and ‘random intercept’ interchangeably. 
90 In Stata, the xtsum command provides some general descriptive statistics pertaining to the overall, between 
and within variation of the variables in the dataset. 
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Proportion	  of	  Variation	  
relative	  to	  overall	  
variation	   Minimum	   Maximum	   Observations	  




























































Note (1): The proportion of variation column was constructed by taking square of between or within variation and 
dividing it by square of overall variation.  
Note (2): The Minimum and Maximum columns refer to the extreme demeaned values of the dependent variables. The Within 
minimum and maximum are the extreme values calculated by taking the data point (i.e. New York Benefit in 1990 was X) 
subtracting the respective state mean (i.e. mean of New York Benefits over period was Y) and then adding the overall mean (mean 
of all Benefits was Z). The Between minimum and maximum is equivalent to a data point less the year mean plus the overall mean. 
 
The general specification for my Cost, Coverage and Benefits models are: 
(1) Costit = α + β1Costi-1t  + β2Coverageit + β3Benefitsit + β[Partisani,t-1 ] + β[Economic it] + β[Xit]  + ui  + εit 
(2) Coverageit = α + β1Coveragei-1t  + β[Partisani,t-1] + β[Xit] + ui  + εit 
(3) Benefitsit = α + β1Benefitsi-1t  + β[Interests1t] + β[Xit] + ui + εit 
Where costit, coverageit, and benefitit are the respective dependent variables for state i and year t. 
Economicit is the vector economic variables. Partisani,t-1 is the vector of lagged partisan and/or ideological 
variables; these variables are all lagged a year because of the delay in policy implementation (I tested various 
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other lags and improvement of fit was not apparent). Interests1t is the vector of Interest Group variables, and 
Xit are various controls, including specified year dummies.  
In each model specification, the two-part error structure includes a state fixed-effect, ui, that 
controls for permanent differences between states, and a random idiosyncratic error, εit.91 I also adjust the 
standard errors for clustering at the state level (Wooldridge 2001).  
I do not include year fixed-effects, vt, that account for impacts common to all groups but vary year 
by year; instead I tested specific year dummies. 
I have collected data for thirty years, back through 1980, but the lagged dependent variable 
included in each model reduces T by 1. Further, the data is not fully balanced and so T varies across the 
states for certain models, depending on explanatory variables included. For example, Arizona did not join 
until 1982. I also exclude data from its early years (through 1987), as it is inappropriate to compare 
Arizona’s new program with the mature programs of the other states. I have also dropped certain state-
years that are outlying data points.92 Due to missing values for certain states and years, the dataset is 
unbalanced. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 The  Stata command is:  xtreg  dependent_variable  independent_variables, fe i(index_var)  t(index_var), where 
the index_var is the variable indicating membership in the group (i for group- and t for time-fixed effects) 
92 The benefits and costs outliers that I exclude are: New Hampshire in 1992 through 1994, Hawaii in 1995, and 
Connecticut and New Jersey in 1997. I exclude these state-years because they are extreme outliers both with respect 
to the fiscal year and within their group. In the case of New Hampshire, between 1991 and 1992, total Medicaid 
expenditures in New Hampshire jumped from $390 million to $1.1 billion. In 1993, however, expenditures dropped 
to $410 million (according to CMS data). Total expenditures then returned to $950 million in 1994, including $360 
million in total DSH payments.  The CMS’ inconsistent accounting of DSH payments seems to be the issue of this odd 
series. In the early 1990s, New Hampshire legislators discovered the utility of DSH payments, but not until 1994 did 
the federal financial reports separate out DSH payments. And it would appear they were completely ignored in 1993 
in New Hampshire, despite the fact that DSH payments “accounted for more than 50% of all state Medicaid spending, 
making New Hampshire far and away the national leader in the percentage of Medicaid funds allocated for DSH 
payments” (Hackey 1998; 188). Indeed, elsewhere, the federal DSH payments for New Hampshire for 1991 through 
1994 were reported at $25 million, $196 million, $192 million, $190 million.  
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To minimize the temporal influence of medical and general inflation on Medicaid’s Costs and 
Benefits, I take the natural log of these dependent variables (as well as per capita income, Medicare spending per 
enrollee, and health spending per capita) because I suspect the relationship between them is multiplicative in 
nature (i.e. a increase from $500/capita to $600/capita over one year is comparable to increase of 
$2,500/capita to $3,000/capita a decade, or two, later—in each case the annual change is 20 percent).  
 
Time Effects 
Given the panel structure of the data there is often reason to suspect a dynamic, time-specific effect 
that is otherwise not accounted for in the marginal changes to the explanatory variable. A now standard 
modeling practice is to use a Fixed Effects model with panel-corrected standard errors and a lagged 
dependent variable to account for dynamics (Beck and Katz 1996; Beck 2001; Wilson and Butler 2007), 
though there is no consensus about this strategy among practitioners (see, e.g., Blaydes 2006; Goodrich 
2006). 
Having included a lag of the dependent variable I do not include dummies for each state and year; 
however, given the 30-year time span it is reasonable to include specific year-effects. For example, the 
repeal of the Boren Amendment in 1997 allowed reimbursements to decline with fewer restrictions than 
previously, the sequential eligibility reforms of the later part of the 1980s, like the CHIP legislation of 
1996, increased Medicaid enrollments, and the discovery of DSH payments in 1990 and 1991, like UPL 
payments a decade later, altered the relationship between the states and federal governments by affecting 
the fiscal incentives for states to control their overall costs. I test various year dummies, and include those 
that both improve the fit of the model and make theoretical sense.  
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Fixed versus Random versus Pooled 
The data generation process underlying the model specification assumes linearity, independence of 
observations, the strict exogeneity of the error term, and homoscedastic error variance with no serial 
correlation. However, a Lagrange Multiplier Test for each of the models that compares the residuals of the 
model with and without the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable rejects the null hypothesis of 
independent errors, thereby justifying the inclusion of the lag.93 This upsets the assumption of strict 
exogeneity and precipitates the substitution of the more natural assumption of sequential exoegeneity 
condition on ui, causing the estimators to become inconsistent. 
Given the two-part error structure, the idiosyncratic error term, εit, is uncorrelated with 
explanatory variables; but each state may have a state-specific error term, ui. This means, every state-year 
observation is subject to a random error unaccounted for by the explanatory variables; but, New York, for 
example, has Costs and Benefits that are consistently higher than the 50-state group mean over the entire 
thirty year period. This not associated with some random error, but something unique to the state of New 
York that is not sufficiently accounted for among the independent explanatory and control variables (it 
could be the relative strength of the nursing union or the cost of real estate that are not fully incorporated 
into the interest group variables or cost of health care variables). The failure to account for this error 
specifically associated with New York leads to incorrect standard errors and inefficient estimation. The 
treatment of the state-specific error and its assumed relationship to the explanatory variables determines 
whether a fixed effects model or random effects model is appropriate. 
 
Pooled OLS 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 To test for potential autocorrelation, that is the correlation between a variable and its previous value(s), in the 
model, I use the Stata command corrgram. For each of the primary dependent variables the first lag dominates. 
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The original recommendation for dealing with time series cross-sectional data offered by Beck and 
Katz (1995) was to completely pool the data, thereby ignoring any unobserved heterogeneity and use panel 
corrected standard errors. The Beck-Katz’ PCSEs do not make corrections to the standard errors, but the 
OLS estimates. However, any serial correlation of the errors must be eliminated before PCSEs are 
calculated. Serial correlation may be modeled by including a lagged dependent variable among the set of 
independent variables. Although this approach is simple and widely implemented, the ignored 
hetereogeneity within cross-sectional units can induce omitted variable bias. 
With pooled data, the errors tend to have heteroschesdastic variances. For example, a state that 
sees a lot of political turmoil may have more volatile public policy, or a state that is near the minimum 
requirements or maximum requirements may see less volatility since they can only move in one direction 
and that direction would be counter to the states’ natural tendencies. By taking the log of certain variables, 
as I do with the dependent variables for Cost and Benefits, the impact of any potential temporal 
heteroschesdaticity is lessened (see Hicks 1994 for summary of complications arising from pooled OLS 
error estimation). 
As a baseline comparison, the pooled OLS model ignores the panel structure of the data and 
assumes there is no correlation across states, nor across the years for any state. It thus ignores the effect of 
unobserved features of a state, u, which generates correlation between the values of different years (i.e. the 
correlation between ui + εi1 and ui + εit) for each individual state, i. 
Pooled OLS assumes constant intercept and slope; although year or state dummies can effectively 
change the intercept for certain states. Unlike the fixed or random effect models with a lot of cross sectional 
units it will preserve many degrees of freedom that may be needlessly used up if the variables do not vary 
within the cross-sectional units. Indeed, Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with a full set of n-1 
dummies, would, in fact, be a fixed effect model.  
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Pooling is appropriate when there is no theoretical reason to suspect significant state or temporal 
effects. Although it is unlikely in a 50-state study that there would not be legitimate state effects (few would 
mistake the Medicaid policy in Texas with that in Massachusetts), it could be that beyond the variation in 
explanatory variables the state effects may be insignificant. Or fewer dummies could capture the spatial 
variation. Instead of 50 state dummies that treat, for example, Connecticut and Massachusetts and Rhode 
Island as distinctive entities, a compromising approach that preserves some degrees of freedom could be to 
replace the state dummies in a pooled OLS with more parsimonious regional dummies based on the Census’ 
regions (four) or divisions (nine) that group the preceding states as either part of the Northeastern or New 
England states. Similarly, year dummies can account for major federal legislative or regulatory changes 
affecting the dependent variables across the 50 states. 
While pooled analysis is a useful instrument for greatly increasing the number of observations, 
permitting inquiry into variables that are largely time-invariant, and, as a result, the development of 
comparative theory, its substantive popularity has been challenged on methodological grounds. Stimson 
1985, Hicks 1994, Beck and Katz 1995, 1996 point out that pooled time series analysis violates the standard 
OLS assumptions about the error process—that all errors have the same variance and are independently of 
each other. In fact, the OLS regression estimates, used by social scientists commonly to link potential causes 
and effects, are likely to be biased, inefficient and/or inconsistent when they are applied to pooled data. 
 
Fixed Effect Model 
The Medicaid dataset includes the full set of states and as such a fixed effect model is appropriate 
for the panel because the cross-sectional units are “fixed.” Like a regular OLS model, a fixed effect model 
will have constant slopes for each of the explanatory variables across the cross-sectional units, in this case, 
the state. The intercepts, however, can differ for each of the states. Because i – 1 dummy variables are 
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included to designate each of the states, this model is also referred to as the Least Squares Dummy Variable 
model 
With panel data it is important to be cautious of potential auto-correlation owing to time-lagged 
temporal effects. As I have argued elsewhere, the path dependency nature of public policy makes it 
reasonable to suspect that any error in period t for state i will be present for period t + 1 for the same state 
i. Two ways of dealing with this is through an auto-regressive parameter (AR1) or with the inclusion of a 
lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation. Given that nearly every series are 
unidirectional with Costs, Benefits and Coverage, a moving average model (constructed by ‘demeaning’ the 
data) would be inappropriate because the mean will overestimate the first half of every series and 
underestimate the second half of the series. Further, Beck and Katz (2004) argue there is little reason to 
prefer the auto-regressive parameter to a lag. 
 
Random Effect Model 
In a random effects model, the intercept is a random outcome variable that is function of a mean 
value and a random error. The state-specific error terms are not estimated directly; rather the random 
effects estimate the mean and variance of a distribution of ui. Thus, while 𝑢! + 𝜀!"  represent the random 
part of the estimation, the actual parameters being estimated are 𝜎!! and 𝜎!!, not 𝑢! + 𝜀!". This allows us to 
interpret variances not individual state effects: 𝜎!! is the unexplained variation at Level-2, i.e. between 
states, after controlling for all explanatory variables, and 𝜎!! is the unexplained Level-1 variation, i.e. 
within states, after controlling for explanatory variables. 
For random effects to be modeled the (unobserved) cross-sectional error term, ui, must be 
uncorrelated with the individual error terms, εit. In this case, the cross-sectional error term would have to 
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be constant across the 30 years of data and heterogeneous to a state (Yaffee, 2003). Very reasonably, this 
assumption that the random effects term, ui, is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables (i.e. Cov(Xit, ui) 
= 0) is unrealistic, making the Fixed Effects model theoretically superior.  
Further, the random effects model reflects a loss of information to the model, but as I am primarily 
interested in the effects of the specific explanatory variables and not the state-specific effects, a random 
effects model may be appropriate. For example, in the case of the effect of state ideology on Coverage, the 
dependent variable is Coverage, the explanatory variable of interest is state ideology and the state is treated as 
a control variable and random effect. (see Littell et al. 2002; Hanneman, n.d.).  
A random effects model has the “distinct advantage of allowing for time-invariant variables to be 
included among the regressors”(Ibid.). Any heterogeneity that is function of time-invariant variables will be 
absorbed by the cross-sectional intercepts and so the influence of time-invariant variables cannot be 
separated. Though not perfectly invariant, the slow changing variables for ideology, certain health care-
related variables (such as hospitals and doctors), and demographic characteristics justify the consideration of 
a random effects model. Such time invariant variables impact the assumption that the cross-sectional error 
terms, ui, are orthogonal to, or uncorrelated with, the individual error terms, εit. Because several of my 




For each dependent variable (costs, benefits and coverage), I compare the several models. The first 
model in each case is a completely pooled model (OLS) approach with a lagged dependent variable and 
panel corrected standard errors. I run the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test to compare the results 
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from the pooled OLS models to those from the Random Effects models (Breusch and Pagan 1980). For each 
of the dependent variables the tests reject the assumption that the cross sectional variance components, ui, 
are zero; therefore, suggesting that the random effects model is preferable.  
To compare the Fixed Effects model to the Random Effects model I perform the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978). It tests the null hypothesis that the individual errors are 
uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model. A large and significant Hausman statistic means a large 
and significant difference between the two models, and so one can reject the null hypothesis that the two 
methods produce similar coefficients in favor of the alternative hypothesis that the Fixed Effect model is 
preferred to the Random Effects model, with the latter producing biased estimators (therefore violating 
Gauss-Markov assumptions).94 The results of the tests suggest that the fixed effects models are more 
appropriate. 
 Table 6.4 through Table 6.6 present the results for the benefits, coverage, and costs models, 
respectively. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 The Stata commands for the Hausman Test are as follows (where y is the dependent variable, and x1, x2, etc. 
are the model’s explanatory variables including lags and dummies):  
xtreg y x1 x2, fe   
estimates store fixed  
xtreg y x1 x2, re 
estimates store random  
hausman fixed random 
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Table 6.4. Benefits Model 
Dependent	  Variable:	  Total	  Medicaid	  Spending	  per	  Medicaid	  Recipient	  (Unduplicated	  Count)	  
	   Pooled	  OLS	   Random	  Effects	   Fixed	  Effects	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  










Ln(Health	  Income	  per	  Capita)	   .1217***	  
(.0272)	  
.1906***	  
(0.0188)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.252***	  
(0.0225)	  
Ln(Medicare	  per	  Enrollee)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   .3184***	  (.0388)	   -­‐	  
Hospitals	  per	  100,000	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐.0551***	  (.0216)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Nursing	  Homes	  per	  100,000	   -­‐	   -­‐	   .0139***	  (.0040)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  




















AFDC	  Enrollees	  per	  100	  	   .0036	  







Interaction:	  1990	  Dummy	  ×	  




(.0064)	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
0.0229***	  
(0.0067)	  





Citizen	  Ideology	  Scoret-­‐1	   .0003	  







Institutional	  Ideology	  Scoret-­‐1	   -­‐.0004**	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Table 6.5 Coverage Models 
Dependent	  Variable:	  Number	  of	  Medicaid	  Recipients	  (Unduplicated	  Annual	  Count)	  as	  a	  Share	  of	  the	  
Number	  of	  Residents	  Living	  in	  Poverty	  (base	  100)	  


























































































Variance:      𝜎!	  
𝜎! 	  
𝜌	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Table 6.6. Costs Model 
Dependent	  Variable:	  Natural	  log	  of	  State-­‐Share	  of	  Medicaid	  Costs	  per	  Capita	  
	   OLS	  with	  PCSE	   Random	  Effects	   Fixed	  Effects	  
	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	   (4)	   (5)	   (6)	  
























Ln(Per	  Capita	  Income)	   	   5.6740***	  
(.5337)	  
	   4.9941***	  
(.4051)	  
	   5.0424***	  
(.4144)	  
FMAP	  Dummy	  	  
(1	  if	  FMAP	  =	  50)	  
	   .0195	  
(.0148)	  
	   .0443**	  
(.0181)	  
	   .04382***	  
(.0187)	  
Recession	  Dummy	   	   .0002	  
(.0006)	  
	   .0099	  
(.0100)	  




	   .0058***	  
(.0006)	  
	   .0028***	  
(.0006)	  
	   .0022***	  
(.0007)	  










Variance:      𝜎!	  
𝜎! 	  
𝜌	  












R2:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  within	  
between	  
overall	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Discussion and Conclusion 
Admittedly, the multi-variable regression analysis appears of limited utility. Nevertheless, the 
results from each of the multivariable models accord, for the most part, to the hypotheses introduced 
earlier—though the substantive effects are not always intuitive given that some of the dependent and 
explanatory variables have been transformed with the natural log function. I will interpret some of the 
results to help demonstrate the observed relationships. 
The predictive power of the models is diminished by the importance of the lag dependent variable 
and the fact that this variable in absorbing much of the explanatory force of the models. In each of the 
benefits and coverage models the lag dependent variable, as expected, has the highest predictive power. An 
alternative approach to accounting for time-dependent nature of the data is to transform the data to reflect 
year-to-year changes, so that the dependent variable reflects only the change—either in absolute terms or as 
a percentage. This, however, would have a similar affect of reducing the potential impact of any 
explanatory variable since only a small portion of total spending or benefits or enrollments would be 
explained. Given the nature of the panel data and the assumptions of the models that must be met, this is 
unavoidable. That many of the variables remain significant, however, is noteworthy. 
A lag of the cost dependent variable is not included in the costs model. Such a lagged variable is 
redundant because the cost models already include the coverage and benefits variables and demonstrated in 
their respective models, these two dimensions of Medicaid policymaking are largely determined by the 
states’ past policy decisions. Therefore, I assume by including coverage and benefits in the costs model, the 
policy effect of time on overall spending is already accounted, if indirectly so, in the model’s construction. 
With respect to the overall costs models, the states’ policies establishing their benefits and coverage 
are positively correlated with higher expenditures. Based on the estimated substantive impact of the two 
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variables it would appear that higher expenditures per recipient (i.e. benefits) has a greater impact on raising 
Medicaid expenditures than does the expansiveness of access to Medicaid services (i.e. coverage). It could be 
that states with higher proportion of their poor (and near-poor) enrolled in Medicaid have learned to 
deliver a more efficient Medicaid/CHIP program, either by reducing reimbursements to providers and 
hospitals or offering less expansive benefits. 
It is worth noting that the Affordable Care Act will significantly expand coverage across most 
states, but so long as implementation of the Medicaid expansion is uneven there could be a period of 
increased variability. Based upon what states have announced that they will participate in the Medicaid 
expansion, it is likely that states’ ideological score and institutional score will become more significant, at 
least temporarily. This hypothesized pattern would contrast, at least superficially, with the states’ 
willingness to implement CHIP in 1997. In their study of the determinants of changes in the average income 
eligibility levels (as a percent of the federal poverty level) for states between 1997 (pre-CHIP) and 2000 
(post-CHIP), Ullman and Hill (2001) find that changes in the federal matching rate and party control of 
governorship and legislature are not significant. Consistent with some of the findings from the coverage 
model, Ullman and Hill find the only significant effects in their model to be the initial eligibility level, per 
capita income and fraction of children uninsured in 1997. 
As the states implement the Medicaid expansion (assuming they ultimately do so), variability in 
coverage should diminish, thereby lessening the impact of eligibility criteria on a state’s overall costs.  Though 
some states will continue to be outliers with respect to the access that their residents have to Medicaid, the 
federalizing of eligibility criteria (to 133% of poverty across the nation) will mean that Medicaid benefits 
and reimbursement rates, as well as the specific demographics of their Medicaid population, will be the 
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primary determinants of variation in spending.95 States that are able to deliver Medicaid most efficiently 
should be able to more effectively control their spending per capita. However, the impetus for states to 
reduce there own share of costs will likely be mitigated by the fact that the federal government will fully 
finance 100 percent of the cost of newly eligible Medicaid recipients up to 133 percent of poverty (with the 
federal share declining to 90 percent by 2019). 
As expected, a state’s per capita income had a significant and substantively positive impact on costs: 
this is intuitive because states with higher incomes have a lower FMAP rate and therefore must pay for a 
larger proportion of their total Medicaid costs controlling for total spending. This is the intent of Medicaid’s 
funding formula, to raise the level of spending in lower income states than it would (or could) be 
otherwise. That the FMAP dummy (the variable is set to 1 if the state had the minimum FMAP rate of 50 
percent) was also positive and significant suggests that the federal minimum matching rate inflated states 
spending more than would have been the case if the state-share of Medicaid spending was defined strictly by 
the state’s level per capita income alone. 
As an alternative construction for the dependent variable, costs, I substitute total Medicaid spending 
in lieu of just the state-share of Medicaid spending—the high level of endogeneity between this alternative 
costs and benefits make this model inappropriate for a general analysis. With the alternative costs variable, 
state-level income per capita remained significant and positively correlated, but its substantive impact 
lessened greatly. This diminution in the observed relationship between net spending per capita and income 
per capita suggests that the federal cost sharing formula reduces the potential inequities in the states’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The Affordable Care Act mandated that every state participating in Medicaid would need to expand eligibility 
up to 133% of poverty based on modified adjusted gross income of the household. As part of its ruling for the case 
known as National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. ___ (2012), the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of two provisions of the Affordable Care Act: the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion. The 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the former, but ruled the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that most, if not all, states will eventually acquiesce and expand coverage given 
the very favorable federal match of 100% initially, dropping to 90% in 2020 and prospectively). 
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commitments to Medicaid that could otherwise be expected given the variation in the states’ relative fiscal 
resources. Nonetheless, the persistence of a still significant level of variability in net costs (see Figures 7.1 
and 7.2 above) that can be attributed to state-level per capita incomes suggests that Medicaid’s cost sharing 
formula does not sufficiently reflect the states’ different abilities to pay for Medicaid. 
The data tends to support the argument that Medicaid manages to escape the ideological and 
partisan wrangling that typically surround the politics of welfare policy in the United States, with the 
relationships between each of the dependent variables and the political and ideological variables being 
muted. For the most part, the quantitative analysis would appear to support the observation that Medicaid 
exemplifies path dependency and its observation that policy development is more-or-less exogenous to the 
political process, with policy being determined largely by past policy choices. For voters concerned about 
the fiscal commitment of Medicaid this lack of relationship to citizen ideology and the changing ideological 
representation of state legislatures could be troubling. 
In each fixed effects model the citizen ideology score is in the positive direction as predicted, with a 
higher ideology score according to greater costs, more generous benefits, and broader coverage. However, in 
the benefits (fixed effects) model the effect is overwhelmed by other factors and is not always significant nor 
in the positive direction. In the costs model, the citizen ideology score variable is significant, but exhibits no 
substantive impact. Only in the coverage model does citizen ideology appear to be significant and have a 
substantive impact—according with the hypothesis that voters are most cognizant of eligibility criteria, with 
liberal states expressing a preference for more expansive coverage (compared to benefit levels or marginal 
costs).  
Similarly, the institutional scoret-1 is not substantive in most of the models in which it is present. 
Despite the study’s descriptive data and much anecdotal evidence demonstrating that states annually make 
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adjustments to their Medicaid policies over time, three decades of quantitative data suggests that such 
changes exhibit no consistent relationship to partisanship. While unified Democratic control of the state 
legislatures may lead to a liberalizing of enrollment, as indicated by the positive coefficients on both the 
unified democrat dummy variable and the positive direction of the institutional score in the coverage model, the 
coefficients on neither variable are significant. In general, therefore, it would appear that state-level 
ideology or partisanship does not determine policies that establish Medicaid coverage and benefits criteria. 
Such a statement may appear somewhat counterintuitive—particularly given the generosity of Medicaid 
programs in such avowedly liberal “Blue” states as New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts. However, what 
may be more appropriately characterized as a regional pattern could be caused by the similar combination of 
relatively high per capita income and high medical costs in these states as opposed to partisanship. While 
local ideology is not incidental, the data suggests it is not sufficiently causal. 
In general, the statistical analyses demonstrate the difficulty of abstracting the complexities of a 
public policy to fit a few variables. The apparent singularity of the state-level Medicaid policies that the 
quantitative study suggests calls forth Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold’s notion of state capacity as 
potential theoretical approach to studying Medicaid policy. Introduced in a 1982 essay that looked at the 
divergent histories of two contemporaneous New Deal programs—the National Industrial Recovery Act 
and the Agricultural Adjustment Act—Skocpol and Finegold’s theory of state capacity discounts the 
explanatory value of traditional socio-economic variables for understanding the relative success or failure of 
different public programs. Instead, Skocpol and Finegold attribute variation in the implementation of policy 
to the abilities and hard work of skillful bureaucrats and presence of experienced political institutions. 
Drawing upon Hugh Heclo’s idea of policy learning, Skocpol and Finegold recognize that the successful 
implementation of a public policy is dependent upon the state’s “capacity to draw upon administrative 
resources of information, analysis and expertise for new policy lessons and appropriate conclusions on 
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increasingly complex issues” (1982: 277-78; quoting Heclo 1974: 305-06). They argue for the need to “go 
beyond the social-determinist proclivities of conventional pluralism and conventional Marxism alike” (1982: 
260). Such a broad perspective may be needed to understand a policy as complex as Medicaid. 
Unfortunately, a meaningful measure of state capacity is difficult to capture quantitatively and would 
require thick descriptions of multiple case studies—such an endeavor lies outside the scope of the central 
theme of this dissertation.  
Michael Sparer’s (1996) excellent comparative case study of New York and California’s Medicaid programs 
support the Skocpol and Finegold thesis in relationship to Medicaid policymaking. Although New York and 
California are similarly wealthy and have comparable partisan leanings, the two states have historically 
committed significantly different levels of resources to their Medicaid programs, particularly with respect 
to the level of spending per recipient—with California generally spending half the amount per capita as 
New York. Sparer attributes the divergent paths of these two states to the level bureaucratic autonomy of 
state Medicaid offices. Future research, mine included, might want to similarly pursue qualitatively rich 
case studies that comparatively examine divergent policymaking patterns between states so as to explore 




Linear Random Intercept Model 
Given the indecision over whether or not to accept the Random Effects model or Fixed Effect 
model, future modeling efforts could consider Bartels’ “unified” approach to modeling times series cross-
sectional data (see Bartels 2008). He refers to his so-called unified approach as a random intercept model, 
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estimated by feasible generalized least squares (FGLS). Bartels argues that the model corrects for cluster 
confounding, thereby allowing for time-invariant variables (e.g. certain state-level data such as a state’s 
ideological score) and unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. provider taxes that may be correlated with 
DSH/UPL payments and total spending) while still satisfying the assumption that explanatory variables be 
uncorrelated with the random effects term. Bartels explains, “Cluster confounding occurs when a level-1 
variable (e.g., a time-varying covariate in panel and TSCS data) exhibits distinct within-cluster and 
between-cluster effects, yet one only includes the original level-1 variable in the model without 
distinguishing these two types of variation in that variable” (Ibid.). 
In my Medicaid dataset, a cluster is defined by the state. Thus, Benefits, for example, can vary within 
any individual state over the 30 years; Benefits, however, can also vary at any point in time between the states. 
Benefits, or any explanatory variable, could potentially exhibit very distinct within- and between-cluster 
effects. For example, the number of hospitals per 100,000 may have a null within-state effect on Benefits 
(i.e. as the number of hospitals in a state falls, as has been the trend across almost all the states, there has 
been no causal effect on the state’s reimbursement rates), but a positive between-state effect on Benefits (i.e. 
states with more hospitals typically have higher reimbursement rates). The fixed effect model would only 
capture the null within-state effect, while the complete pooling and random effects model would assume 
the within- and between- effects are equal. This is an example of cluster cofounding—when the different 
within- and between- effects of the explanatory variable on the dependent variable cannot be distinguished. 
If the two effects are equal it is not a problem, but if they are not equal ignoring the issue will lead to 
incorrect interpretation of the model’s coefficients (Bartels 2008, 9; Zorn 2001). 
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Chapter 7. 
Medicaid’s Fiscal Burden, a Taxpayer and State Perspective 
 
The public cost of Medicaid and CHIP is often presented in the aggregate: in 2008, spending 
totaled approximately $362 billion, or $1,150 per capita, with the federal government spending about $208 
billion to match the states’ spending of $153 billion. In the previous chapter, the dependent variable of the 
costs model was a per capita measure of state-level spending, ranging from $507 in Utah to $2,443 in New 
York for fiscal year 2008. 
However, what the nation or state spends on Medicaid/CHIP on a per capita basis is vastly 
different than what individual Americans pay for Medicaid/CHIP in the form of their direct tax liabilities 
for the program. As a redistributive program financed by general revenues, a more appropriate proxy of 
Medicaid’s cost might therefore be the proportion of total costs that a typical taxpayer is implicitly 
responsible for financing. Taking this perspective, and defining a taxpayer as an American aged 18 through 
64 with earnings twice the poverty line, the average American taxpayers’ burden for the nation’s 
Medicaid/CHIP commitment was actually closer to $2,270 in 2008. Or, if we were to approach Medicaid 
from a state perspective, total spending on Medicaid/CHIP ranged from $253 in Nevada to $1816 in New 
York, on a per taxpayer basis, in 2008. 
Yet, these estimates still obfuscate the discrete cost of Medicaid to the American taxpayers by 
ignoring the distribution of those costs, both at the individual level by and across the states. Using 2007 and 
2008 data from the IRS, the non-partisan Tax Foundation, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid, this 
chapter presents more precise estimates of (a) what state-residents cum federal taxpayers contribute toward 
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Medicaid/CHIP, and (b) what Medicaid/CHIP costs the states as a discrete political entities by taking into 
consideration the interstate transfer of federal tax dollars associated with Medicaid cost sharing. 
 
Medicaid’s Taxpayer Burden 
To calculate the direct cost of Medicaid from the perspective of the taxpayer it is prudent to 
disaggregate total spending into its two components—the federal- and state-shares—to reflect the different 
revenue generation models of these distinct levels of government. With respect to the first component, I 
estimate the federal-taxpayer burden of the federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP by taking into consideration 
the progressivity of the federal tax code. With a small portion of Americans paying the vast majority of all 
federal personal income taxes, any meaningful individual-level estimate of the cost of the federal-share of 
Medicaid expenditures must consider the the distribution of tax liabilities. This variable proxy adjusts 
aggregate federal Medicaid/CHIP spending to reflect the proportion of general expenditures actually 
financed by current individual income tax receipts by controlling for deficit financing, corporate income 
taxes, and the progressivity of the United States tax code.  
For the second component of the calculation, I shift my attention to the state-taxpayer burden 
associated with the state-share of Medicaid/CHIP. In contrast to federal income tax liabilities, the relative 
regressivity of the states’ revenue generating mechanisms makes calculating a variable proxy for each state 
less essential. As such, the mean estimate of the state-share of costs on a per state-taxpayer basis remains a 
more-or-less legitimate proxy for establishing the taxpayer burden in a state. I will further adjust the state 
share of Medicaid spending by reducing it by the proportion of state revenues levied on tourists and 
interstate commerce so that the state-share reflects only the direct cost to state residents.  
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The Federal-Taxpayer Burden of Medicaid/CHIP 
Medicaid/CHIP spending totaled $362 billion in fiscal year 2008, of which the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid reimbursed $208.4 billion to the states (and territories). To put this spending into the context 
of the federal budget, Medicaid/CHIP was the third largest domestic expenditure commitment of the 
federal government, excluding military spending.  
By commanding about 7.0 percent of the near-$3 trillion in federal spending during 2008, 
Medicaid was behind just Social Security and Medicare in terms of aggregate costs. Yet, Social Security with 
$625.2 billion in total disbursements, and Medicare with $468.1 billion in payments, had nearly all, as in 
the case of Social Security and Medicare Part A (hospital insurance), or at least a significant portion, as in 
case of Medicare Part B (supplemental health insurance) and Part D (prescription drug coverage), of their 
total expenditures balanced with dedicated revenue sources that are funded, either directly or indirectly, by 
their beneficiaries.96 
The Social Security Administration make explicit the individual tax burden of the costs associated 
with these two social insurance programs. Each year, working Americans receive a personalized Your Social 
Security Statement from the federal government that summarizes how much they and their employers 
contributed toward Medicare and Social Security: a household earning the median income of $52,029 in 
2008 paid approximately $3,225 in Social Security taxes and $750 in Medicare taxes (both matched by their 
employer). Medicare beneficiaries over 65 (and those under 65 who are disabled and eligible for Medicare) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 In fact, after summing all the receipts from the employment tax contributions, the income derived from taxing 
Social Security benefits and the interest earned on the accumulating balances of the OASI and DI Trust Funds, the 
federal government netted $179.3 billion for the Social Security Trust Fund, bringing their combined reserves to 
$2.4 trillion at the end of 2008. And although the dedicated funding sources for Medicare, which included $198.7 
billion in payroll taxes and $58.2 billion in premiums paid by current beneficiaries, are not as comprehensive as those 
for Social Security, the impact of Medicare on the general tax revenues of the federal government was just $184.4 
billion, or about 40 percent of the total Medicare bill (not factoring in the net $12.7 billion gain that was added to the 
Medicare Trust Funds). 
	  
	   	  
 278 
paid monthly premiums of $96.40 for their Part B insurance and an average of $32 for their Part D 
coverage that added an additional $1,519 in dedicated federal revenues per senior per annum.  
Unlike these two entitlement programs that have their own dedicated revenues sources, the federal 
revenues required to finance the poor’s entitlement to comprehensive health care services come entirely 
from general revenues. Significantly, Medicaid/CHIP consumes nearly 20 percent, one in every five 
dollars, of all non-military related general spending not financed with dedicated revenues. As serious as the 
threats of the potential insolvency of the Medicare may appear—the latest report from Social Security and 
Medicare Boards of Trustees [2010] estimated the “solvency” of Medicare Trust Fund through 2029—
Medicaid’s costs pose as great a, if not greater, fiscal challenge for the federal budget each year. 
Without the equivalent of a Your Medicaid Statement quantifying the public’s fiscal commitment to 
Medicaid, there is little public understanding of what Medicaid costs the nation, and more specifically, costs 
individual American taxpayers. However, if every American was provided with a federal receipt that 
totaled the net federal taxes they paid, if any, and itemized the proportional share of the programs their 
taxes financed, there would be vast disparities among what Americans contributed. After accounting for all 
tax deductions, credits, and refunds, many taxpayers would have had a tax liability that was negative or near 
zero tax in 2008 and consequently paid nothing or very little for most government services, including 
Medicaid/CHIP. In calculating Medicaid’s federal-taxpayer burden then, it should be recognized that not all 
Americans pay federal taxes. 
Further, while individual income taxes are a significant share of the federal government’s income, 
they are not the only source of public revenues. The above mentioned payroll taxes account for about a 
third of all revenues, and another fifth come from corporate profits, excise charges such as a gasoline fuel 
tax, estate taxes, and other taxes or fees. To get a more accurate estimate of the individual taxpayer burden 
imposed by a redistributive program like Medicaid it is necessary to have a better accounting of not only 
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who pays—that is, the number of Americans who have a positive tax liability and thereby finance a 
proportion of the federal government’s current operations—but how much this subset of taxpaying 
Americans pay—in this case, the proportion of the net federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP financed by 
individual tax receipts and the distribution of the net tax liability across income levels. 
 
Calculating the Federal-Taxpayers’ Adjusted Share of Medicaid/CHIP Spending 
In estimating the proportion of Medicaid/CHIP expenditures directly financed by the public, I 
assume the share of spending financed from general revenues is equivalent across all government programs. 
I calculate this amount by disaggregating the federal government’s total general spending into the share that 
can be reasonably assumed to having been financed by the individual income tax receipts collected by the 
IRS. 
Total public spending reported by the federal government, including the two supplemental 
appropriation requests for military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan (totaling $189 billion) totaled $2.983 
trillion in FY 2008. That calendar year, the Internal Revenue Service reported total revenue collections of 
$2.742 trillion (I ignore any complications caused by the fact that the U.S. Treasury’s fiscal year leads the 
IRS’ calendar year by three months—the Congressional Budget Office (2009) reported the federal 
government collected $2.524 trillion in revenues in fiscal 2008). Individual income taxes accounted for 
$2.307 trillion. However, embedded in the individual income tax data are all employment-related FICA 
taxes designated for Social Security and Medicare. In 2008, these totaled $883.1 billion. As these revenues 
are earmarked for specific entitlement programs, excluding them as a potential source of Medicaid funding 
is prudent. Doing so leaves the federal government with $1.424 trillion of uncommitted general revenues. 
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In ignoring all FICA taxes, it is important to also reduce net federal expenditures by the $971 
billion of Social Security and Medicare spending financed by these payroll taxes and other dedicated 
revenues (such as beneficiary premiums and interest earnings). Excluding this entitlement spending reduces 
federal general expenditures to $2.012 trillion. 
Thus, the $1.424 trillion of uncommitted individual income taxes collected in 2008 funded 70.8 
percent of the federal governments’ $2.102 trillion in general expenditures.97 Other federal taxes 
(corporate income taxes totaled $352.9 billion and estate, gift and excise taxes added $81.4 billion), federal 
charges and user fees, and debt, financed the remaining 29.2 percent of the government’s current general 
operations. Accepting that all forms of general revenues are used to finance equal proportions of the 
government’s various public commitments then individual federal income tax receipts directly offset 70.8 
percent, or $145.8 billion, of the $206.1 billion federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP spending. 
Table 7.1 summarizes the calculations made to arrive at the percentage of general spending 
financed by individual federal income taxes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 This is a rough proxy of individual tax burden for the federal government’s general spending. On the one hand, 
I could treat federal revenues similar to how the CBO does and assume a unitary budget that does not give any special 
consideration to the intragovernmental transfers of expenditures (in which case total individual income tax 
collections, net of all FICA contributions, accounted for 77.3 percent of cumulative federal spending). On the other 
hand, there are other expenditures with dedicated funding sources that are not accounted for in the personal income 
tax figure but are remain in the expenditures figure: for example, I could decrease general federal spending by the 
$48.4 billion collected primarily through an 18.4 cent per gallon fuel tax and earmarked for the Highway Trust Fund 
distributed to the states. 
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Table 7.1 Calculating Taxpayer Burden as a Percent of Total Federal Spending 
REVENUES	   	  
Total	  Federal	  Tax	  Collections	  
Individual	  Income	  Taxes	  
Less	  Payroll	  Taxes	  
Old	  Age	  and	  Survivors	  Insurance	  
Disability	  Insurance	  
Hospital	  Insurance	  
Railroad	  Retirement	  Taxes	  









Individual	  Income	  Taxes	  available	  for	  General	  Expenditures	   1,423.5	  
EXPENDITURES	   	  
Total	  Federal	  Spending	  
Less	  Spending	  by	  Trusts	  with	  Dedicated	  Revenues	  
Old	  Age	  and	  Survivors	  Insurance	  
Disability	  Insurance	  
Hospital	  Insurance	  
Supplemental	  Medical	  Insurance	  
Railroad	  Retirement	  Board	  









Net	  Federal	  General	  Spending	   2,011.7	  
Individual	  income	  taxes	  less	  dedicated	  payroll	  taxes	  as	  
percent	  of	  total	  general	  spending	  
70.761%	  
	  
Note: *HI/SMI spending paid from general revenue sources are retained in calculation 
of federal government’s aggregate “General Spending” 
  
The Mean, Median and Modal Distribution of Federal-Taxpayer Burdens 
For the purposes of the immediate calculation I define a federal-taxpayer as a non-poor adult over 
the age of 18 and earning at least twice the federal poverty line ($21,200 for a family of four).98 The Census 
Bureau estimated that 161 million individual Americans fit this profile. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 In a quantitative study of Medicaid costs presented in the previous chapter I use the states’ adult population 
with incomes of at least 100% of the federal poverty as a proxy for the number of taxpayers. This lowering of the 
threshold was necessary of practical limitations imposed by the available time series data, but seems theoretically 
appropriate over the larger time frame of the study, given the fact that a much greater proportion of Americans owed 
a net tax liability to Washington in the Eighties and Nineties compared to present. For example, in 1993 (the earliest 
date such estimates are available), the threshold at which a family of four was estimated to owe net federal taxes was 
$15,600 and the federal poverty guideline was $14,350. Twenty-four percent of all federal tax filers had no liability 
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This proxy seems plausible and sufficiently robust, if still somewhat of an overestimation of the 
actual number of federal taxpayers. For the 2008 tax year, Scott Hodge (2010) of the non-partisan tax 
research group, The Tax Foundation, estimated that after factoring in the affect of the major elements of the 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-185), the income threshold at which point a married couple with 
two children had a positive tax liability was $56,700. In the absence of the stimulus rebates, the threshold 
would have been roughly $44,500—which is still slightly higher than twice the Federal Poverty Guidelines 
for 2008 (i.e. $21,200 = 100% of FPL for a family of 4). 
Using this subpopulation as the denominator for calculating the average public cost of all 
Medicaid/CHIP spending by the federal government the result is $1,280 per taxpaying adult with a 
household income greater than twice poverty in 2008. It might be arguable that this reflects the true 
opportunity cost of Medicaid/CHIP—that is the total savings that could be used for other public services if 
the federal payments for program were fully eliminated. 
But if the objective, as it happens to be, is to calculate a better measure of the direct costs to 
taxpaying Americans for the nation’s redistributive spending on Medicaid, it is necessary to recognize that 
that the individual income taxes paid by this subpopulation financed only 70.8 percent of the federal 
government’s total spending commitments, including Medicaid/CHIP. With this adjustment, the mean 
federal-taxpayer burden of financing the nation’s federal commitment to Medicaid/CHIP was $876 in 
2008. 
This estimation of a taxpayer’s burden, however, is significantly higher than what the median 
taxpayer contributes. Given the progressivity of federal income taxes any estimate of the mean taxpayers’ 
burden for the federal government’s public spending will vastly overstate the direct liability paid by a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in 1993, compared to 36 percent of filers in 2008. Throughout the 1980s the percentage of returns with no net tax 
liability averaged less than 20 percent, suggesting that the income threshold was even closer to the federal poverty 
line in the 1980s than in the 1990s (Hodge 2010). 
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majority of the taxpaying population while simultaneously understating the very high cost borne by a few 
Americans. The unequal distribution of income and the progressivity of federal taxes in the United States 
compound to shift a significant portion of the federal tax burden on to a minority of the public (the flat-rate 
FICA payroll taxes are excluded from the current discussion). For example, according to data from the IRS’ 
Statistics of Income (SOI) Division the wealthiest 0.1 percent of all Americans paid 20.2 percent of the total 
income taxes collected by the IRS for 2007. Comparatively, the bottom 50 percent of tax filers, about 70 
million households, paid 2.9 percent of aggregate federal tax collections (IRS 2009). The ratio between the 
average tax liabilities of filers in these two groups is nearly 350 to 1. By extension, the marginal tax burden 
imposed by Medicaid/CHIP and paid by the majority of taxpaying Americans is significantly less than the 
numbers presented thus far would indicate. 
Based on this data and the Medicaid/CHIP’s adjusted federal share of $148.5 billion, the poorest 
half of federal tax filing households paid an average of just $61 each toward the federal government’s 
commitment to Medicaid/CHIP ($148.5 billion × 0.029 ÷ 70.5 million99). Aggregated together these 
households contributed just 2.1 percent of Medicaid’s total federal share. Americans who were among these 
bottom 50% of earners contributed $61 toward the federal government’s Medicaid/CHIP commitment, 
the equivalent of 0.4 percent of their gross income. 
The average rate for the next quartile (the top 50% through 25% of income earners) had a 
Medicaid burden equivalent to 0.9 percent of their income. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 According to 2007 income tax data, the most recent data available (as of October 2010), the SOI Division 
estimated there to be 141 million tax filers who had a positive tax liability, net of all exemptions and deductions but 
inclusive of FICA payroll tax contributions (Ibid). (As the IRS’ estimate of tax filers counts a married couple filing 
jointly as a single tax filer and includes payroll taxes, their count is not too far off from the proxy of 161 million 
American taxpayers I computed based on twice the poverty line.)  While I could leverage the IRS’ data, computing 
on the basis of taxpaying household would prevent any comparative analyses at the state level where only poverty data 
is available. 
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The median taxpayer, with an income of $32,879, would fall precisely between this group and the 
next percentile group. Therefore, if I assume the median federal-taxpayer (with an income of $32,879) paid 
somewhere between 0.40 and 0.90 percent of their income, the median federal-taxpayer contributed 
somewhere between approximately $130 and $300 toward the federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP in 2008. At 
the other end of the income distribution, the top 0.1 percent of earners (i.e. households with adjusted gross 
income of at least $2 million) who paid 20 percent of the nation’s total federal income taxes and were liable 
for nearly 15 percent of the total federal spending on Medicaid/CHIP financed an average of $212,550 per 
tax filer of federal Medicaid expenditures.  
Figure 7.1 displays the average federal-taxpayer burden imposed by Medicaid’s federal share for 
various percentiles of the nation’s income distribution (the relative widths of the columns indicate the 
aggregate proportion of the federal taxes paid by the earners in the group). Table 7.2 details the average 
taxpayer liability and the portion of Medicaid’s federal-share paid by of each percentile as well as data 
related to the adjusted income and federal taxes. For example, a household earning about $250,000 in gross 
income would have approximately $5,000 of their net federal income taxes redistributed to Medicaid. 
Table 7.2. Distribution of Personal Incomes, Federal Incomes Taxes and Federal Medicaid Liability per Tax Return 









Top	  10%	  -­‐	  
	  5%	  
Top	  5%	  -­‐	  
	  %1	  
Top	  1%	  -­‐	  
0.9%	   Top	  0.1%	  
#	  of	  Returns	  with	  
Positive	  AGI	  
70,535,4
85	   35,267,743	   21,160,646	   7,053,548	   5,642,839	   1,269,639	   141,071	  








2,155,364	   >$2,155,364	  
Average	  AGI	   15,287	   47,490	   85,891	   132,316	   227,950	   755,255	   7,438,510	  
Share	  of	  Total	  AGI	  (%)	   12.26	   19.04	   20.66	   10.61	   14.62	   10.90	   11.93	  
Average	  Income	  Tax	  
Rate	  (%)	   2.99	   14.03	   15.98	   18.79	   20.53	   22.45	   21.46	  
Share	  of	  Income	  Taxes	  
(%)	   2.90	   10.52	   15.38	   10.59	   20.20	   20.23	   20.19	  
Total	  Medicaid	  Liability	  
(millions)	   4,295	   15,624	   22,823	   15,727	   30,002	   30,044	   29,985	  
Share	  of	  Total	  Medicaid	  
Liability	  	   2.06	   7.50	   10.95	   7.55	   14.40	   14.42	   14.39	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Avg.	  Federal	  Medicaid	  
Liability	   61	   443	   1,079	   2,230	   5,317	   23,664	   212,550	  
Sources: Medicaid Data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2010); Tax data for CY 2007 from I.R.S Tax Services 
 
Figure 7.1 Distribution of Federal Share of Medicaid Liability per Tax Return by Adjusted Gross Income (“AGI”), 
2008 
 
Sources: Medicaid/CHIP data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2010); tax data from IRS Tax Services (2009) 
Note: The width of the columns reflect the proportion of federal share paid by the income percentile 
 
The State-Taxpayer Burden of Medicaid/CHIP 
If a state were to eliminate entirely its Medicaid and CHIP programs the potential taxpayer savings 
would be limited to the nominal value of the state-share. State residents would see no direct relief in their 
personal federal tax liabilities as a result of the marginal drop in net federal Medicaid expenditures 
attributed to the elimination of the state Medicaid program.  
As the program is jointly funded and jointly administered by the federal and state governments, it is 
a valid concern as to whether or not the FMAP formula and federal-state cost sharing properly distributes 
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Medicaid’s public costs in a manner that reflects the policy preferences of Americans. While state residents 
can more-or-less control the fiscal burden of the state-share of Medicaid/CHIP spending (by enticing their 
elected officials to adjust eligibility and benefits), the residents have a limited capacity, if any, to adjust their 
liability for the aggregate federal-share. 
Given the broad discretion granted the states and the open entitlement nature of the programs that 
guarantee federal funding and prevent the CMS from arbitrarily limiting reimbursements to any state, 
without a fundamental reform to Title XIX (Medicaid) or Title XXI (CHIP) there is no way for a state 
delegation to limit its constituents’ federal tax burden for the nation’s Medicaid/CHIP commitments. 
Thus, from the perspective of taxpayer equity, the emphasis on the variation and redistribution of net 
federal-taxpayer burden is justified because it is largely exogenous to any individual state’s policy calculus. 
Comparatively, the state-level taxpayer burden of financing the state-share of Medicaid/CHIP 
spending commitments can be assumed to be a reflection of the median policy preference of the state’s 
voters. As a result, a certain degree of variation in the state-shares is expected and desirable from the 
perspective of state-taxpayer preferences for different levels of redistributive spending.100  
As a case in point compare Massachusetts and Missouri. It is reasonable to assume the median voter 
in Massachusetts, a state having passed health reform in 2006 that mandated that individuals be insured and 
that most businesses offer insurance to their workers or face penalties, would prefer greater 
Medicaid/CHIP spending than the median voter in Missouri, a state that voted 71.1 percent (in August 
2010) in favor of the ballot measure intended to block the federal government from requiring Missourians 
to buy health insurance or punishing the uninsured. Indeed, differences in the Medicaid programs of the 
two states may appropriately reflect these two states' median voters’ contrasting policy preferences for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 I acknowledge any claims of equity may be less meaningful from the perspective of potential recipients and/or 
providers who would qualify for public care or be paid more generously in one state compared to another. 
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government involvement in health care: in 2008 Medicaid’s state-share spending averaged $1,118 per 
resident in Massachusetts and about half that amount, at $604 per resident, in Missouri. 
Yet, absent a normative argument about an appropriate provision of health care, there is little 
justification to either rein in Massachusetts’ altruism or compel Missouri to commit more to Medicaid. On 
the one hand, Massachusetts—which spent an average of $8,798 per Medicaid recipient and had 18.9 
percent of its residents insured by Medicaid at some time in 2008—remained a net contributor of federal 
revenues relative to its own federal-share of Medicaid reimbursements and so its generosity imposed no 
great externalities on conservative taxpayers elsewhere in the nation, including Missouri. On the other 
hand, Missouri’s Medicaid program—that insured 17.9 percent of its residents at an average cost of $6,726 
per recipient—was about average for the nation and so it is difficult to argue that the state’s policies were 
inequitable to either providers or the poor. As a result of Missouri’s higher FMAP rate (63.71 percent 
compared to Massachusetts’ 50 percent), the two states did not differ in terms of their substantive policies 
as much as might be expected given their respective state-shares. 
 
Calculating the State-Taxpayer Burden of Medicaid 
Accepting that a certain level of variability in state policies is legitimate, it remains to calculate what 
state-taxpayers pay for their state-share of their respective Medicaid/CHIP program. Similar to the 
calculation of the federal-taxpayer burden of the federal-share, a state-taxpayer’s burden is determined not 
just be the state’s overall funding commitment and the state’s FMAP rate, but also by the states’ specific 
revenue generating mechanisms and the consequent distribution of public liability among residents. 
The states (and their local subgovernments) differ with the US Treasury in how they raise public 
revenues in at least three significant ways.  
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First, a larger proportion of a state’s residents contribute to their state’s share of Medicaid spending 
than they do to the federal-share of Medicaid spending. Unlike the federal government that generally funds 
about three-quarters of its total public spending with a highly progressive income tax, only seven states 
collect more than half of their revenues from individual income taxes (seven states actually have no 
individual income tax at all, while another two states limit income taxes to just dividend earnings and 
interest income). 
 Fearing an exodus of capital and high income earners, the states instead rely upon a variety of 
revenue sources—including general sales taxes, cigarette and alcohol taxes, property taxes, and select user 
fees—that tend to be much less progressive (if not categorically regressive). Indeed, after factoring in state 
and local taxes, the Center for Tax Justice noted, “The U.S. tax system is not as progressive as you think” 
(McIntyre 2009). Similarly, researchers at the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy concluded, 
“[N]early every state and local tax system takes a much greater share of income from middle- and low-
income families than from the wealthy” (Davis et al. 2009: 1). Thus, whereas it was appropriate to calculate 
the federal-taxpayer burden based on the IRS’ distribution of tax receipts by income-level, I calculate the 
state-taxpayer cost of Medicaid per adult resident. Nationally, state spending on the state-share of Medicaid 
averaged $597 per adult in fiscal year 2008, ranging from $242 (in Alabama) to $1,603 (in New York). 
Second, states must pay, or at least budget, for their current operating expenditures and so it is 
reasonable to ignore any incidental deficit financing that would justify reducing the state share to reflect the 
proportion of Medicaid expenditures funded by current revenues. Whereas former Vice President Dick 
Cheney could famously chide, “Deficits don’t matter,” every state, except for Vermont, has a constitutional 
or statutory requirement for maintaining a balanced budget. (Admittedly, in 2009 and 2010 this rationale 
for ignoring state deficits was weakened by the near-universal deficit financing that reached over half of total 
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state spending in some states. Still, the opportunity cost of any public spending at the state-level still 
generally remains more visceral than at the federal level where deficit spending is the norm.) 
Third, unlike the federal government that has, for the most part, given up on import duties as a 
means to raise any significant amount of revenues from non-Americans, the states successfully export their 
tax burden. As early as the 1960s, researchers found that states were extracting between 15 and 35 percent 
of their operating revenues from non-residents (McLure, 1967). Recent research by the Tax Foundation 
(2010) similarly evidenced that the beggar-thy-neighbor effort continues.  
In its study, the Tax Foundation estimated the total state and local taxes that the average state 
resident paid both to its own state and to the other states. Using this data as well as data from the U.S. 
Census’ on state populations and state and local governments’ own-source general revenues, I estimate a 
proxy for the percentage of total state revenues financed by a state’s own residents.101 This percentage is 
used to estimate the state-share of Medicaid/CHIP spending paid directly by a state’s own residents.  
In 2008, the average state successfully “exported” over half of its revenues and collected only 41.5 
percent of total state and local revenues directly from its own residents. In-state collection rates ranged 
from a low of 6.1 percent of revenues in resource-rich Alaska to a high of 60.8 percent in Maryland.102 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 The Tax Foundation data does not include an estimate of the total taxes collected by the state and local 
governments and so to calculate the percentage of revenues paid instate by a state’s residents I multiply (a) the per 
capita estimate of the state and local taxes paid by a state’s own residents and, (b) that state’s total population and then 
divide the product by, (c) the US Census’ estimate of the total own-source revenues collected by the state and its local 
governmental units. 
102 Examples of the Tax Foundation’s accounting of state revenues paid by in-state residents 
Alaska 
-­‐ has no sales tax nor does it levy an income tax (some cities have sales tax) 
-­‐ public revenues almost entirely derived from petroleum industry 
-­‐ Tax Foundation: 6 percent of revenues paid by in-state residents 
New York 
-­‐ income tax rates range from 4 percent to 6.85 percent over five income brackets 
-­‐ 4% state sales tax, with net sales tax exceeding 8% in some areas 
-­‐ lots of corporate profits and tourists paying in-state tax (e.g. 5.875% hotel tax) 
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Table 7.3 (available at the end of chapter) includes the data used to compute the share of revenues paid for 
directly by a state’s residents. 
Similar to the exclusion of corporate taxes and deficit financing from the estimation of the 
proportion of Medicaid’s federal-share paid for by individual Americans, these in-state revenue percentages 
are employed as proxies of the proportion of the states’ state-share of Medicaid/CHIP spending financed 
directly by their own residents.  
Of course, from a budgetary perspective, the full state-share of Medicaid/CHIP remains the state’s 
real cost for the program. Given the zero-sum nature of state budgets and minimal deficit financing, more 
so than is the case with the federal budget, a state’s Medicaid commitments impose a credible opportunity 
cost, regardless of the proportion of Medicaid’s revenues that come directly from the state’s own residents’ 
wallets. In financing Medicaid, the state implicitly prioritizes the poor’s access to health care over 
competing public demands; that is, any funding allotted for Medicaid’s state-share could have alternatively 
financed new public infrastructure projects, greater police protection, smaller class sizes and higher teacher 
pay, or, in Alaska’s case, larger rebate checks for all residents.  
Between 1980 and 2008, the average share of state’s own-source revenues (i.e. excluding all 
intergovernmental revenue transfers such as TANF or No Child Left Behind payment or federally-financed 
infrastructure projects) going to pay for the Medicaid has increased from 6.6 percent to 15.3 percent. The 
share of state budgets going to everything from education, corrections, infrastructure and general 
administration have fallen correspondingly. 
Situations in which states have cut other public programs while expanding Medicaid can be found 
across the nation. For example, were it not for the marginal cost of the additional Medicaid commitment 
made by Arizona to its poorest residents just since 2001, the state would not have had to cut its higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
-­‐ Tax Foundation: 50 percent of revenues paid by in-state resident 
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education budget and force its public universities to raise the tuition rates by upwards of 20 percent and to 
impose a mandatory furlough on university employees in fiscal year 2009. During the congressional debates 
over Education Jobs and Medicaid Assistance Act of 2010, Senator Lamar Alexander (R, Tenn.) decried the 
pattern in which, “Governors and legislatures that have less State revenues continue to increase their 
spending on Medicaid, not on other programs such as public colleges and universities” (Congressional 
Record—Senate, August 4, 2010, p. S6565).103 
Figure 7.2 overlays the proportion of the state-share of Medicaid/CHIP financed directly by the 
state’s residents over the total spending on the state-share, on per adult resident basis. In relationship to 
Medicaid the availability of alternative sources of states’ revenues has a significant impact on state-
taxpayer’s direct burden. Alaska, for example, had the ninth most expensive state-share of Medicaid 
spending in the nation at $640 per capita. Yet, with neither a state sales taxes nor an individual income 
tax—instead Alaska raised 94 percent of its revenues from the oil and gas industry and not directly from 
Alaskans—it is misleading to suggest that a typical Alaskan contributed much toward the total $480 million 
in state revenues committed to Medicaid/CHIP. Rather, after adjusting for just the proportion of Alaska’s 
revenues paid in-state by residents, the state-share of Medicaid that was paid directly by Alaskans was 
reduced to just $29 million. And at $39 per adult, the direct cost of Alaska’s state-level commitment 
became the least burdensome in the nation. 
If the average per adult cost estimated above is assumed to reflect the state-level tax burden of an 
American earning the nation’s median income, then the net taxpayer burden of Medicaid across the 50 
states can be roughly approximated by summing the variable state-taxpayer burden presented in Figure 7.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Senator Alexander went on to question the public’s tacit support for this high spending on Medicaid. “I am 
sure the students protesting at the University of California over the 32 percent tuition hikes have no idea the reason 
they are having the hikes is because Washington keeps imposing new costs on State Medicaid Programs,” 
hypothesized Senator Lamar. “Causing Governor Schwarzenegger and the California Legislature to take money that 
otherwise most likely would have gone to the University of California and spend it instead on Medicaid” (ibid). 
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with the $130 to $300 federal-taxpayer burden estimated in the previous section. For example, an Ohioan 
earning about $33,000 could estimate his contribution to Medicaid/CHIP to between $425 and $595 (i.e. 
the $294 adjusted state-share plus $130-300 adjusted federal share). 
Figure 7.2. State-Share and Adjusted (for proportion of state tax revenues paid by in-state residents) State-Share of 
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Note: States are ordered left-to-right with respect to highest to lowest FMAP rate 
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  &	  Local	  
Revenues,	  excl.	  
Federal	  Transfers	  	  
($million)	  
State	  &	  Local	  
Taxes	  Paid	  by	  In-­‐
State	  Residents	  
($	  per	  capita)	  









Paid	  by	  State's	  
Residents	  	  
($million)	  






Alabama	   4,716	   3,598	   2,474	   36,372	   24,396	   1,977	   38.22	   21,938	   0.96	  
Alaska	   672	   492	   389	   44,872	   15,908	   1,433	   6.05	   4,360	   0.19	  
Arizona	   6,529	   4,796	   3,224	   38,174	   33,207	   2,170	   42.67	   32,009	   1.40	  
Arkansas	   2,822	   2,116	   1,340	   33,395	   13,639	   2,315	   47.90	   20,985	   0.92	  
California	   36,637	   27,231	   18,844	   47,706	   270,097	   3,683	   49.96	   268,462	   11.74	  
Colorado	   4,908	   3,701	   2,841	   48,300	   31,589	   2,684	   41.70	   41,964	   1.84	  
Connecticut	   3,433	   2,615	   2,080	   63,160	   27,705	   4,498	   55.74	   46,710	   2.04	  
Delaware	   861	   653	   485	   44,889	   6,551	   2,364	   31.07	   12,761	   0.56	  
Florida	   18,022	   14,002	   9,636	   46,293	   112,800	   2,384	   38.09	   125,090	   5.47	  
Georgia	   9,541	   7,015	   4,755	   37,850	   49,853	   2,579	   49.36	   57,924	   2.53	  
Hawaii	   1,255	   970	   753	   46,512	   9,372	   3,699	   49.53	   7,501	   0.33	  
Idaho	   1,515	   1,099	   763	   36,492	   7,870	   2,374	   45.70	   8,084	   0.35	  
Illinois	   12,687	   9,507	   7,049	   46,693	   78,144	   2,948	   47.86	   110,521	   4.83	  
Indiana	   6,288	   4,701	   3,341	   37,279	   35,680	   2,348	   41.38	   38,213	   1.67	  
Iowa	   2,986	   2,275	   1,703	   38,636	   18,333	   2,263	   36.86	   17,167	   0.75	  
Kansas	   2,716	   2,017	   1,449	   40,784	   17,644	   2,460	   37.87	   18,629	   0.81	  
Kentucky	   4,246	   3,236	   2,086	   34,339	   21,217	   2,201	   44.05	   22,840	   1.00	  
Louisiana	   4,326	   3,208	   1,997	   39,116	   27,215	   2,093	   33.27	   32,375	   1.42	  
Maine	   1,317	   1,044	   749	   38,309	   8,074	   2,701	   44.06	   6,041	   0.26	  
Maryland	   5,528	   4,195	   3,282	   52,709	   36,943	   4,062	   60.78	   48,907	   2.14	  
Massachusetts	   6,420	   4,966	   3,830	   56,661	   47,700	   3,609	   48.57	   72,230	   3.16	  
Michigan	   9,806	   7,434	   5,388	   39,273	   58,241	   2,536	   42.70	   60,809	   2.66	  
Minnesota	   5,120	   3,889	   3,046	   46,106	   35,546	   3,328	   47.94	   63,161	   2.76	  
Mississippi	   2,900	   2,121	   1,300	   31,836	   14,896	   1,773	   34.52	   10,767	   0.47	  
Missouri	   5,861	   4,457	   3,136	   38,084	   29,916	   2,261	   44.30	   41,039	   1.80	  
Montana	   973	   757	   518	   36,793	   5,393	   1,960	   35.36	   4,404	   0.19	  
Nebraska	   1,774	   1,322	   988	   40,499	   11,334	   2,611	   40.87	   13,777	   0.60	  
Nevada	   2,581	   1,910	   1,448	   49,371	   15,755	   1,952	   31.98	   15,848	   0.69	  
New	  Hampshire	   1,300	   1,004	   822	   48,033	   7,185	   1,824	   33.00	   10,304	   0.45	  
New	  Jersey	   8,515	   6,480	   5,000	   56,116	   69,828	   4,376	   53.36	   101,061	   4.42	  
New	  Mexico	   1,977	   1,470	   895	   36,031	   12,705	   2,051	   31.92	   8,898	   0.39	  
New	  York	   19,309	   14,965	   10,655	   55,032	   184,106	   4,845	   50.81	   192,567	   8.42	  
North	  Carolina	   9,234	   6,936	   4,642	   37,508	   49,377	   2,597	   48.57	   60,045	   2.63	  
North	  Dakota	   625	   480	   350	   39,612	   4,816	   2,167	   28.12	   3,684	   0.16	  
Ohio	   11,386	   8,644	   6,159	   38,925	   68,534	   2,937	   48.79	   95,002	   4.16	  
Oklahoma	   3,550	   2,650	   1,890	   38,415	   18,991	   2,280	   42.62	   19,755	   0.86	  
Oregon	   3,806	   2,936	   2,076	   39,444	   21,326	   2,538	   45.29	   23,778	   1.04	  
Pennsylvania	   12,178	   9,420	   7,074	   43,796	   76,931	   3,054	   48.34	   100,088	   4.38	  
Rhode	  Island	   1,042	   808	   604	   44,463	   6,901	   2,900	   43.78	   8,475	   0.37	  
South	  Carolina	   4,462	   3,398	   2,249	   35,419	   24,265	   2,048	   37.66	   18,850	   0.82	  
South	  Dakota	   794	   599	   439	   39,103	   3,959	   1,645	   32.99	   4,613	   0.20	  
Tennessee	   6,163	   4,710	   3,037	   38,090	   30,354	   1,779	   36.12	   43,752	   1.91	  
Texas	   24,174	   17,411	   11,464	   42,796	   131,113	   2,082	   38.39	   178,762	   7.82	  
Utah	   2,754	   1,892	   1,485	   35,971	   15,122	   2,305	   41.98	   14,200	   0.62	  
Vermont	   610	   483	   355	   42,626	   4,087	   3,072	   45.86	   3,456	   0.15	  
Virginia	   7,735	   5,873	   4,477	   47,666	   48,595	   3,281	   52.22	   54,324	   2.38	  
Washington	   6,526	   4,979	   3,741	   48,574	   43,369	   2,957	   44.50	   53,831	   2.35	  
West	  Virginia	   1,796	   1,412	   942	   32,145	   10,137	   1,982	   35.12	   6,183	   0.27	  
Wisconsin	   5,548	   4,222	   3,130	   40,953	   34,623	   3,047	   48.82	   38,456	   1.68	  
Wyoming	   529	   397	   295	   53,163	   6,040	   1,925	   16.86	   3,940	   0.17	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  by	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Taxpayers	  	  
(%)	  
Alabama	   608	   572	   287	   110	   4,219,107	   1,872,046	   44.37	  
Alaska	   717	   724	   640	   39	   911,781	   295,356	   32.39	  
Arizona	   779	   641	   394	   168	   7,662,692	   3,075,510	   40.14	  
Arkansas	   890	   1,011	   325	   155	   3,426,808	   1,734,971	   50.63	  
California	   563	   920	   548	   274	   40,714,415	   26,615,459	   65.37	  
Colorado	   340	   954	   332	   138	   3,296,251	   3,271,576	   99.25	  
Connecticut	   669	   1,450	   664	   370	   4,576,547	   4,155,293	   90.80	  
Delaware	   651	   1,699	   646	   201	   1,117,067	   961,156	   86.04	  
Florida	   478	   838	   358	   137	   15,080,929	   10,187,521	   67.55	  
Georgia	   509	   786	   292	   144	   7,640,757	   4,952,990	   64.82	  
Hawaii	   557	   643	   424	   210	   1,232,026	   727,169	   59.02	  
Idaho	   580	   684	   246	   113	   1,252,111	   669,884	   53.50	  
Illinois	   480	   1,012	   470	   225	   12,053,523	   9,679,442	   80.30	  
Indiana	   630	   738	   371	   153	   6,289,986	   3,325,190	   52.86	  
Iowa	   606	   651	   371	   137	   2,919,670	   1,469,070	   50.32	  
Kansas	   515	   830	   347	   131	   2,341,137	   1,507,355	   64.39	  
Kentucky	   812	   707	   348	   153	   4,923,098	   2,061,626	   41.88	  
Louisiana	   1,053	   1,047	   395	   131	   6,264,884	   2,568,252	   40.99	  
Maine	   1,108	   521	   636	   280	   2,298,116	   742,445	   32.31	  
Maryland	   544	   962	   531	   323	   5,941,000	   4,804,696	   80.87	  
Massachusetts	   883	   1,218	   865	   420	   11,222,400	   7,158,764	   63.79	  
Michigan	   601	   729	   428	   183	   10,091,808	   5,548,678	   54.98	  
Minnesota	   695	   1,339	   689	   330	   7,087,486	   5,592,423	   78.91	  
Mississippi	   1,052	   535	   321	   111	   3,983,144	   986,845	   24.78	  
Missouri	   769	   845	   459	   204	   7,198,248	   3,727,918	   51.79	  
Montana	   572	   549	   258	   91	   808,174	   360,894	   44.66	  
Nebraska	   540	   900	   384	   157	   1,638,634	   1,129,586	   68.93	  
Nevada	   280	   707	   247	   79	   1,360,086	   1,182,969	   86.98	  
New	  Hampshire	   492	   809	   485	   160	   1,269,965	   844,536	   66.50	  
New	  Jersey	   591	   1,305	   574	   306	   9,922,137	   8,850,257	   89.20	  
New	  Mexico	   1,157	   642	   460	   147	   3,197,846	   840,105	   26.27	  
New	  York	   1,250	   1,167	   1,242	   631	   48,121,371	   24,083,146	   50.05	  
North	  Carolina	   731	   835	   405	   197	   10,489,842	   5,527,058	   52.69	  
North	  Dakota	   567	   680	   317	   89	   552,460	   283,345	   51.29	  
Ohio	   717	   996	   457	   223	   13,367,829	   8,408,035	   62.90	  
Oklahoma	   697	   675	   336	   143	   3,667,992	   1,729,229	   47.14	  
Oregon	   532	   739	   338	   153	   3,311,820	   2,051,108	   61.93	  
Pennsylvania	   741	   913	   623	   301	   16,601,275	   9,847,962	   59.32	  
Rhode	  Island	   981	   906	   864	   378	   1,922,781	   917,826	   47.73	  
South	  Carolina	   707	   541	   304	   114	   4,509,874	   1,674,993	   37.14	  
South	  Dakota	   515	   678	   338	   111	   677,193	   373,371	   55.14	  
Tennessee	   754	   930	   427	   154	   7,280,157	   3,652,833	   50.18	  
Texas	   566	   1,007	   361	   139	   22,425,487	   14,396,324	   64.20	  
Utah	   407	   617	   166	   70	   1,579,602	   1,069,383	   67.70	  
Vermont	   1,035	   629	   665	   305	   1,036,885	   399,541	   38.53	  
Virginia	   365	   783	   357	   187	   5,585,643	   4,798,434	   85.91	  
Washington	   503	   929	   467	   208	   6,335,976	   4,682,649	   73.91	  
West	  Virginia	   962	   424	   331	   116	   2,322,552	   590,761	   25.44	  
Wisconsin	   532	   793	   387	   189	   5,096,251	   3,423,375	   67.17	  
Wyoming	   482	   862	   475	   80	   506,148	   285,690	   56.44	  
Sources:	  State	  Tax	  Data	  from	  Tax	  Foundation	  (2010),	  Federal	  Revenue	  and	  Tax	  Data	  from	  IRS	  Tax	  Services	  (2010),	  Medicaid	  Data	  from	  Kaiser	  
(2010)	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The Interstate Redistribution of Federal Taxes and Medicaid/CHIP 
The previous sections estimated individual proxies for Medicaid’s federal- and state-taxpayer 
burden. Whereas the taxpayers’ state-share is determined by the Medicaid/CHIP spending of the state in 
which they live and its revenue generating mechanisms, the uniformity of federal income tax brackets across 
the United States means that two individuals of comparable wealth will pay the same federal taxes and 
contribute comparably toward the federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP. 
Due to the progressivity of the federal tax code, however, a poor state inhabited by a 
disproportionately large number of poor individuals will pay far fewer federal taxes in the aggregate and on 
average per taxpayer than a rich state that has a greater share of wealthy residents. With state per capita 
incomes ranging from $31,836 in Mississippi to $63,160 in Connecticut in 2008, the distribution of federal 
taxes paid per capita varies widely across the fifty states. Indeed, with respect to the states’ federal 
individual income tax collections, Mississippi paid an average of $5,076 per capita compared to $17,862 per 
capita in Connecticut. Based on the respective poverty levels and distribution of incomes of these two states 
it is reasonable to extrapolate that their median federal tax liabilities would exhibit even greater variation. 
Federal redistributive programs, such as Medicaid/CHIP, are generally intended to take revenues 
collected from rich states and subsidize the delivery of public services to residents living in poorer states. 
The income-adjusted FMAP formula compounds the progressive transfer of federal tax dollars from rich 
states to poor states by lowering the marginal cost of a dollar of expenditures in a poor state relative to a 
rich state. This interstate redistribution of federal revenues is intended to lower the potential horizontal 
inequity in state-level tax rates and/or benefits that would otherwise result from the states different abilities 
to finance their Medicaid commitments. 
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Thomas Grannemann and Mark Pauly (2010), however, argue that deficiencies in 
Medicaid/CHIP’s cost sharing formula and Medicaid’s limitless entitlement financing oblige the taxpayers 
in comparatively poor (and, generally, conservative) states to subsidize the state-level policy decisions of 
their wealthy (and, typically, liberal) neighbors. The authors argue this limits the effectiveness of the 
program to redistribute revenues to poor states. As evidence for the taxpayer inequities imposed by 
Medicaid, they computed the net interstate transfer of federal revenues used to finance the federal-share of 
Medicaid. They “calculate [a state’s] contribution to the federal funding [of Medicaid] by assuming its share 
is proportional to its share of aggregate federal personal income taxes” and then “subtract the imputed 
contribution toward Medicaid paid in federal taxes from the federal Medicaid payments provided to the 
states” (2010: 140). The authors then designated any state that received from Washington at least a billion 
dollars more in Medicaid transfer than the state contributed in taxes toward the total federal-share of 
Medicaid spending as a ‘receiver’; a state that contributed at least a billion dollars more in federal taxes than 
it received in Medicaid funding was a ‘donor’ state; and states netting either a marginal gain or loss of 
plus/minus billion dollars was ‘about-even’. 
To demonstrate Grannemann and Pauly’s metric and exemplify the potential for real taxpayer 
inequities as identified by them, compare New York and Georgia. In addition to differing in terms of state 
and per capita income and, therefore, the general federal taxpayer burden of their residents, New York and 
Georgia also represent the opposite extremes for the potential generosity and frugality of Medicaid/CHIP. 
From most perspectives New York has one of the most generous programs in the nation, both in terms of 
its eligibility criteria and the benefits it delivered: at a total cost of $48.1 billion, or $2,492 per resident, the 
state insured 4.9 million residents with Medicaid (about 1.7 times the number of residents in poverty) at an 
average cost of $9,780 per Medicaid enrollee in 2008. In contrast, Georgia spent a total of $7.3 billion on 
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Medicaid/CHIP, or just $801 per resident, to insure 1.7 million (a population equivalent in size to 1.1 
times the number of poor) at an average cost of $4,286 per recipient. 
Based on New York’s residents’ proportional share of all federal income tax revenues paid in 2008, 
Grannemann and Pauly’s metric would have attributed 8.4 percent, or $16.8 billion, of the $207 billion 
total federal share of Medicaid/CHIP reimbursements to the federal taxes paid by New Yorkers. The 
federal government, however, reimbursed New York $24.1 billion. Even with the minimal FMAP rate of 
0.50, New York netted $7.3 billion in Medicaid/CHIP funding above what its residents paid in taxes 
underwriting the federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP. Comparatively, Georgians paid 2.5 percent of all federal 
individual income taxes collected and therefore financed $5.2 billion of the federal government’s spending 
on Medicaid/CHIP, but received just $4.9 billion in Medicaid/CHIP transfers. Despite a federal matching 
rate of 63.10 percent for Medicaid (and 74.17 percent for CHIP) that augmented every dollar that came 
from the state’s own resources with nearly three federal dollars the state’s taxpayers actually suffered a net 
loss of $300 million in federal Medicaid/CHIP-related funds.104 
Admittedly, both New York and Georgia are exceptional in their Medicaid programs. But, are 
Grannemann and Pauly justified to conclude that Medicaid’s federal-state cost sharing not only subsidized 
the largesse of certain rich states, such as New York (the fourth wealthiest state on the basis of per capita 
income), but actually redistributed wealth out of some of the nation’s poorest states? From this perspective, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Had Georgia provided Medicaid coverage and benefits comparable to New York, Georgia’s total Medicaid 
spending would have increased to $25.8 billion, with the federal government subsidizing the state $16.3 billion, for a 
net gain of $11.0 billion in federal Medicaid/CHIP related funds (although the conditional state-share that would 
have had to been financed by state residents would also increase—to $9.5 billion). And if every state similarly 
resembled New York then the nation’s total spending on health care for the poor would approach a staggering $700 
billion, with the FMAP-adjusted federal-share reimbursed by the national treasury topping $400 billion, double the 
current federal Medicaid expenditure for 2008. Conversely, if all states, including New York, provided Medicaid 
coverage and average benefits equivalent to Georgia’s comparatively frugal levels, total Medicaid-related spending in 
the United States would fall by about forty percentage points to $200 billion, with the federal-share costing national 
taxpayers approximately $115 billion. 
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it appears that Georgia, despite recouping three our of every five dollars it spent on Medicaid, could have 
actually been better off it it had borne the entire liability of its Medicaid program itself and its residents 
were allowed to recoup the full share of federal tax dollars contributed to nation’s spending on Medicaid. 
Figure 7.3 replicates the state-by-state analysis of Grannemann and Pauly (2010), using FY 2008 
data from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid. The results are consistent with the authors’ findings; 
although the magnitudes of the transfers are slightly attenuated in 2008 compared to 2006. Overall, the 
map and numbers shows that the redistributive effect of all the shuffling of federal funds is quite minimal 
with the majority of states coming out ‘about-even.’ New York is a relative anomaly with most of the 
comparatively wealthy states being classified as either “about-even” or “donors.” 105 Aside from New York, 
the nation’s fifteen wealthiest states remained net contributors to Medicaid/CHIP’s federal-share. And, as 
the authors acknowledge, “part of [the redistribution into New York] can be viewed as a transfer within the 
New York-New Jersey-Connecticut tri-state area” (p. 143) with both New Jersey and Connecticut classified 
as generous ‘donor’ states. 
Indeed, as evidenced by the dark columns in Figure 7.4 that aggregate the state-level transfers over 
the four main census regions, the Northeast region, which includes New York and its wealthy neighbors, 
saw a net interregional transfer of $2.7 billion—less than 1.5 percent of total federal spending on 
Medicaid/CHIP. Despite the authors’ criticism of the purported taxpayer inequity caused by 
Medicaid/CHIP’s cost sharing, the nation’s poorest states in the South saw the greatest aggregate gain from 
Medicaid with a net federal transfer of $4.1 billion into the region. This later redistribution being the result 
of the region’s higher than average FMAP rates that augmented the progressivity of the federal income tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 However, to put the interstate transfer of revenues into New York in perspective, I believe it is worth noting 
that although New York may have benefited in this instance from Medicaid’s federal-state cost sharing, the state 
remains a net contributor of federal taxes, generally losing out on 21 cents in federal transfers for every dollar its 
residents contributed in federal taxes (based on 2005 data; Tax Foundation 2007). 
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and returned to the poorest southern states as much as four or five dollars of federal aid for every dollar in 
state revenues they spent on their Medicaid/CHIP programs. 
Figure 7.3. Donor, Receiver, and ‘About-Even’ States Based on Aggregate Dollar Amounts of Federal Medicaid 
Payments to State Net of Proportional Share of Total Federal Medicaid Payments based on Income Taxes, FY 2008 
 
Sources: based on Grannemann and Pauly 2010: 141 (Figure 6-2); data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2010) and US Internal 
Revenue Service (2010) 
Note: Example of Pauly and Granneman’s calculation of the net transfer of federal revenues attributable to federal income taxes 
paid by state residents and total federal spending on Medicaid/CHIP 
Michigan 
• Total Medicaid/CHIP Expenditures in MI = $10.5 billion 
• State-Share = $4.2 billion 
• Federal-Share = $6.3 billion 
Calculation of MI’s Proportional Share of Total Federal Spending on Medicaid/CHIP 
o Michigan’s Share of Total Federal Personal Income Taxes Collected = 2.9% 
o Total Federal Spending on Medicaid/CHIP = $199 billion 
o Therefore, MI’s Contribution to Total Federal Spending on Medicaid/CHIP  
= 0.029 ×$199 billion = $5.8 billion 
Note: If MI were to cease participation in Medicaid/CHIP altogether its residents 
would still contribute $5.6 billion toward the federal-share of Medicaid/CHIP 
expenditures through their federal income taxes, i.e. 0.029 × ($199 billion – $6.3 
billion) 
• MI’s net transfer of federal revenues associated with Medicaid/CHIP  
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Figure 7.4. Interregional Transfers of Federal Individual Income Taxes Due to Medicaid/CHIP, by Census 
Region, FY 2008 
 
Sources: based on Grannemann and Pauly 2010: 141 (Figure 6-2); data from Kaiser Family Foundation 
(2010) and US Internal Revenue Service (2010) 
 
Critique of Grannemann and Pauly 
Grannemann and Pauly’s observations that “Medicaid’s redistributive effect toward the lower-
income states is a modest one” and that its federal cost sharing “does not consistently benefit all lower-
income states” (p. 144) holds for the 2008 data. However, there are two problems with their methodology 
for calculating interstate transfer of federal revenues associated with Medicaid’s taxpayer burden that 
superficially influence their findings and the implications thereof. 
First, given the considerable differences in state populations it is more appropriate to present the 
states’ federal share of Medicaid costs on a per capita or per taxpayer basis instead of on an absolute basis. 
The implications of not controlling for a state’s population size can be significant. For example, 
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for the states’ populations, Delaware appears as the nation’s most generous interstate “donor” with a net 
contribution of $642 per capita.106 Meanwhile, Maine becomes the second highest “receiver” of 
Medicaid/CHIP federal funding with a net gain of $708 each. 
Second, Grannemann and Pauly’s calculations assume that federal individual income taxes are the 
only source of funding available for Medicaid redistribution, despite being only a proportion of total federal 
revenues collected. Grannemann and Pauly explain that their metric is based exclusively on a state’s share 
of the total personal income taxes paid to the IRS because “other federal taxes (such as corporate income 
taxes) are less clearly attributable as a contribution of the state’s residents” (2010: 140). Corporations, for 
example, generally file in a single state despite often having business operations span across the nation. 
However, by not adjusting from their calculations for those taxes that they consciously exclude, 
Grannemann and Pauly overstate the degree to which Medicaid/CHIP are financed by individual income 
taxes. This leads to them both overestimating the amount paid directly by the residents in each state and 
underestimating the return that the states receive from the federal government for their Medicaid/CHIP 
programs.107 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Similarly, the $500 million transfer out of Delaware is much more significant than a $2.8 billion transfer out 
of California. California is the most generous “Donor” state according to Grannemann and Pauly’s aggregate metric, 
but after controlling for population the state is seen to distribute only $76 per resident, less than the average “about-
even” state. 
107 Grannemann and Pauly’s metric also includes all dedicated FICA payroll taxes. These dedicated taxes are 
more regressive in nature than regular income taxes and so they account for a greater proportion of the federal 
revenues collected from lower income states compared to wealthier states. Excluding these payroll taxes will lead to 
lower income states appearing to be recipients of a marginally greater federal Medicaid transfer, relative to their 
uncommitted general revenue contribution. Unfortunately, the IRS’ accounting of state-level individual income tax 
receipts is net of all FICA taxes and thus the same data limitations that would not have allowed Grannemann and 
Pauly to differentiate the amount of FICA taxes paid in each state also prevent me from fully corroborating the 
hypothesis that excluding payroll taxes would show a marginal redistribution of federal revenues from rich to poor 
states. 
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To address these two concerns, I replicate Grannemann and Pauly’s metric using the percentage of 
general spending financed directly by the uncommitted tax receipts of Americans (i.e. 70.8 percent, as 
calculated above to exclude dedicated payroll taxes), thereby matching the $145.8 billion in taxpayer-
financed Medicaid contributions with the full $206.1 billion in federal Medicaid reimbursements. Given 
what effectively is a 30 percent subsidy across the nation, it is unsurprising that every census region was the 
recipient of significantly more in Medicaid funding than it directly funded. Only ten states and the District 
of Columbia continued to contribute more in personal income taxes than they received in federal Medicaid 
reimbursements.  
Making these two adjustments to Grannemann and Pauly’s methodology provides modest evidence 
that federal matching formula positively improved horizontal taxpayer equity and redistributed the fiscal 
burden of Medicaid of the poorer states to wealthier ones—albeit not necessarily to the extent intended. 
The 10 states that continued to have net redistribution included the nation’s three wealthiest states—
Maryland, New Jersey and Connecticut.  And all ten of these states had low FMAP rates, with only Nevada, 
with a FMAP rate of 52.64 percent, having a rate higher the statutory minimum. Figure 7.5 re-presents 
the state-level redistribution of federal revenues associated with Medicaid/CHIP expenditures, but adjusts 
the state-level contributions to the federal-share to reflect the proportion of federal revenues paid for with 
personal federal income taxes from the state’s residents. Figure 7.6 aggregates the per capita and total 
Medicaid-related redistribution by census region, comparing it to the unadjusted amounts. 
Despite finding some of Grannemann and Pauly’s evidentiary support to be attenuated with a few 
simple and reasonable corrections to their metric, the authors’ broader critique of Medicaid’s federal-state 
cost sharing and the ineffectiveness of the FMAP rates remain compelling. Certainly, the cost sharing aspect 
of Medicaid’s funding mechanisms hides its true public cost and has the potential to contribute to Medicaid-
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related inefficiencies (if not inequities). Reforming the FMAP formula to reflect more than a state’s per 
capita income could reduce these problems. This is left for a later discussion, however. 
Figure 7.5. Per Capita Distribution of Federal Medicaid Payments Received Net of Contribution toward Federal-
Share of Medicaid (relative to Individual Income Taxes Paid), by State, FY2008 
 
Sources: data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2010) and US Internal Revenue Service (2010) 
 
Figure 7.6.  Net/Per Capita Distribution of Federal Revenues for Medicaid/CHIP, by Census Region, FY2008 
 
Sources: “Unadjusted Net Federal Gain/Loss” from Figure 4 above, chart based on Grannemann and Pauly 2010: 143 
(Figure 6-3); data from Kaiser Family Foundation (2010) and US Internal Revenue Service (2010) 
Notes:   “Unadjusted” Gain/Loss replicates Grannemann and Pauly (2010) methodology (see Figure 7.3 above). 
“Adjusted Gain” considers only the transfer of federal revenues attributable to federal income taxes 
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The States’ Net Return on their Medicaid/CHIP Expenditures 
This final section considers the states’ net return on their direct investments in Medicaid/CHIP. To 
do so, I sum the state-share paid in-state by residents (i.e. employing the Tax Foundation data introduced 
above that excludes those taxes ‘exported’ to nonresidents) and the state’s net contributions to the federal-
share of Medicaid. This sum is then used to derive an estimate of the proportion of a state’s total Medicaid 
spending paid directly by the state’s residents. On average, state residents directly finance what would be 
equivalent to approximately 60 percent of the total spending on Medicaid/CHIP in their state. 
Americans, however, can only impact their own state’s commitment to the program. So it is 
significant that the direct cost of the state-share of Medicaid/CHIP is less still, at just 5 to 25 percent of the 
total state spending on Medicaid/CHIP in the state. This is the only portion of the aggregate tax burden 
associated with Medicaid/CHIP that residents and their state legislators have any amount of real control 
over. While Medicaid is one of the costliest domestic programs in a state’s budget, states have little 
incentive to decrease their spending on Medicaid because any direct savings would be minimal relative to 
the sizeable reduction in benefits required of the cuts. 
Alaska with its low state-level taxes is an extreme case, but if Alaska eliminated their program in an 
act of conservative activism, Alaskans would see their direct tax liability drop by just $39 per adult. The 
state would still be on the hook for contributing nearly $350 million (about $869 per federal-taxpaying 
Alaskan) toward the nation’s federal spending on Medicaid/CHIP. Further, the state would lose $430 
million in transfer payments—money that would have gone directly into the pockets of doctors and 
hospitals.  
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Figure 7.7 presents the proportion of each state’s Medicaid/CHIP commitment financed with 
state- and federal-taxes paid by a state’s residents (see also the last column of Table 7.3). The states are 
listed from top to bottom, from lowest to highest per capita income, with the bottom 13 states all having an 
FMAP rate of 0.50 percent. Over half of the states pay less than 60 percent of the aggregate cost of their 
state’s Medicaid/CHIP program. Ten states directly finance more than 70 percent of their own spending—
and every one of those states has per capita incomes above the national average. Only Colorado approached 
100 percent of cost, but is both an outlier and relatively wealthy, with an FMAP rate of 50 percent. Table 
7.4 synthesizes the information presented in the figure and offers the average and minimum and maximum 
of the various measures of Medicaid costs. 
In examining the funding sources of Medicaid/CHIP what emerges is a picture that median-
income-earning Americans across the fifty states get a pretty decent return on their tax dollars with respect 
to Medicaid/CHIP. While it may seem counterintuitive given the extreme cost of the Medicaid/CHIP 
programs, the taxpayer burden of the program, at least for the median taxpayer, is comparatively low 
relative to the benefits the states’ derive. While the diffusion of costs is not sufficient explanation for 
Medicaid/CHIP—AFDC with its comparable funding structure and similar diffusion of costs incited public 
outrage and has seen no growth in funding commitments over the past decades—it does offer a partial 
explanation for the resiliency of Medicaid/CHIP spending. 
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Figure 7.7 Comparing Medicaid/CHIP's per Capita Costs and Spending, by State, FY 2008
 
Note: Cost of Medicaid/CHIPi = state-­‐sharei+state  share  of  federal  income  taxesi× federal-­‐sharei!!!"
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Table 7.4. Various Metrics Estimating the Federal- and State-Share of Medicaid/CHIP Spending, by State, FY 2008  
Federal-­‐Share	  
Federal	  Spending	  per	  Capita	  
Cost	  of	  Federal-­‐Share	  per	  TaxpayerX	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Notes: X: Taxpayer is defined as an individual at least 18 and with household income of 
twice the FPL  
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programs with dedicated revenue sources), based Tax Foundation’s estimate of in-
state tax revenues (i.e. 70.8 percent for FY 2008)	  
 
	  











The preceding chapters have explored in considerable detail the political development of 
Medicaid’s cost sharing formula and the affects of the Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentages (FMAP) on 
the states’ Medicaid budgets. Both qualitatively and quantitatively the dissertation has provided evidence 
identifying this funding mechanism as one of the critical factors contributing to the nation’s high level of 
welfare spending on health care. With the federal match reducing the fiscal burden of a state’s Medicaid 
program, state policymakers are incentivized to repeatedly expand eligibility and enrich benefits for 
Medicaid. With the inflationary affect of such policy reforms Compounded over decades the result has been 
a level of public spending on the health care needs of the poor that contradicts the common assumption that 
Americans generally prefer a modest welfare state.  
I have argued that Medicaid’s cost sharing formula is designed to obfuscate the program’s total costs 
and compel states to participate more generously in the program than they would otherwise. Similar to how 
subprime mortgages wrecked havoc on household savings and the housing sector by enticing families to 
spend more on a home than they would otherwise, the states’ FMAP rates have led the states to spend 
significantly more on Medicaid than is optimal given the states’ limited finances. Indeed, rising Medicaid 
costs have affected the states’ spending priorities and have necessitated that the states reduce their spending 
on other public commitments and/or impose higher tax collections. The average proportion of the states’ 
general operating funds needed to finance the state share of Medicaid has increased from less than 2% in 
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1966 to 5% in 1980 and then to 13% in 2008108 (see Figure 3.5 and Figure 4.2). Similarly, total Medicaid 
spending as a share of the states’ total budget has increased from 9% in 1980 to 24% in 2008. As a result of 
the growth in Medicaid, by the early nineties, the states were spending more on Medicaid than on higher 
education; and, now, many states spend more on Medicaid than they do on K-12 education.109 It is not 
surprising that Governor Evan Bayh of Idaho (D), quoted in Chapter 5, lamented, “Health care is destroying 
state government.” (Shribman 1993) 
The game theoretic model known as the prisoner’s dilemma, introduced in the final section of 
Chapter 1, provides a prescient theory for the inflationary tendency of Medicaid and recognition of the 
opportunity cost of both the state and federal shares. In the absence of cooperation between the states to set 
limits to their own budgets, the model explains how and why federal cost sharing compels states to increase 
spending on Medicaid beyond what is preferred by Americans. In game theoretic terms, the states’ 
Medicaid budgets reflect a Pareto inefficient Nash equilibrium, meaning that although no state would 
rationally pursue an alternative strategy of a more limited Medicaid program given their residents 
preferences, most Americans would strictly prefer it every state, including there own, had more limited 
Medicaid budgets than what is currently reflected by the status quo. This is the paradox created by the 
status quo funding mechanism for Medicaid that redistributes fiscal liabilities.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 The state share declined in 2009 to 12.5% of the state’s own-source revenues, despite an increase in overall 
Medicaid spending, due to the a increase in the temporary increase in the states’ FMAP rates passed by Congress in 
response to the national recession.) 
109 Personally, as an academic, I am particularly sensitive to the contrast in how the states’ prioritized the 
maintenance of their Medicaid budgets over their higher education commitments in the five years following the Great 
Recession of 2008-09. For example, whereas the states’ spent an average of 28 percent less on higher education in 
2013 than in 2008—with many public universities having been forced to dramatically raise their tuition rates or cut 
staff and faculty (Oliff et al 2013)—the states spent at least 40 percent more on Medicaid/CHIP over that same period 
(using projections for fiscal year 2013 from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services). Of course, Medicaid is a 
countercyclical program and so there is the expectation that the program will experience higher costs during a weak 
economy. 
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Irrespective of the federal share, as long as the marginal benefit derived from the Medicaid spending 
in a state exceeds the direct marginal cost associated with the state share, the budget is rational. For 
example, the state of Michigan had a FMAP rate of 58.1 percent for FY 2008—meaning dollar the fiscal 
burden of a$1 million investment in Medicaid is “just” $420,000 in state revenues. So long as Michigan 
residents preferred an additional million dollars in Medicaid expenditures to a $420,000 increase in taxes or 
a $420,000 reduction in spending elsewhere in the budget, the prioritization of additional Medicaid 
spending would be rational. Overall, the Michigan residents are better off having this larger Medicaid 
budget than either maintaining the status quo or pursuing some alternative expenditure. For the most part, 
Michigan residents should be unconcerned with the indirect costs associated with the financing of either its 
own federal share or the nation’s cumulative federal share because Michigan’s own policy will have no 
meaningful affect on total federal spending. 
Yet, federal spending is financed with income taxes paid by state residents. As such, the federal 
shares are not strictly exogenous to either a state’s residents or the state’s budget. As federal taxpayers the 
Michigan residents should be concerned about not only their own state’s federal share but, more 
importantly, every states’ federal share. Admittedly, emphasizing the financial implications of federal 
spending on a state’s budget and its residents’ income taxes is contrarian. For example, a fact sheet 
prepared for the Center for Children and Families at Georgetown University refutes the endogeneity of 
Medicaid financing to the state’s federal share with its authors arguing, “[W]hen considering how Medicaid 
spending impacts state budgets and other priorities for state dollars, it is more accurate to examine state 
spending, rather than total (state and federal) spending” (Heberlein and Alker: 2011, pp. 1-2). Although I 
distinguish between the fiscal burden of the state share and the total cost of a state’s Medicaid program 
throughout this dissertation I think ignoring the cost of Medicaid’s federal share effectively underestimates 
the opportunity cost of the program. Given that most state residents also pay federal taxes the size of the 
	  
	   	  
 312 
states’ cumulative federal share, nearly $200 billion in 2008, is relevant from the perspective of a state’s 
residents. 
In Chapter 7 I quantified the full opportunity cost of the states’ federal shares by examining how 
cost sharing affected the net transfers of federal revenues between the states in relationship to their 
Medicaid programs. Overall, I found that the transfer of funds between the states was remarkably flat, 
meaning that for most states the opportunity cost of a state’s Medicaid program was more or less equivalent 
to the total cost of that state’s own Medicaid program. Again using the example of Michigan, the state’s 
$10.5 billion Medicaid/CHIP program imposed a state fiscal burden of $4.2 billion on Michigan resident in 
2008. However, the residents paid federal taxes equivalent to $5.8 billion toward the federal government’s 
spending of $199 billion on Medicaid/CHIP.110 The total opportunity cost of the nation’s Medicaid/CHIP 
program for Michigan residents was therefore $10 billion, more than double Michigan’s state share. When 
Michigan residents are considering their support for their state’s Medicaid programs should they define 
their preferences in relationship to the $4.2 billion state share financed from the state’s general operating 
fund, or in relationship to the $10 billion opportunity cost of the Medicaid program? Under the status quo 
funding arrangement, it may be rational for residents and their state representatives to consider only the 
$4.2 billion state-level investment because the state can do nothing to appreciably affect total federal costs 
and even if Michigan had no Medicaid program the federal tax liability of Michigan residents would remain 
unchanged. 
The only way to limit total Medicaid’s cost and therefore the state residents’ net liabilities is for 
Congress to impose institutional constraints that limit the states’ policy choices. Without any federal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110	  I assume all Americans financed the nation’s federal spending on Medicaid in relationship to their contribution 
to the nation’s total income tax collections—in total, Michigan residents paid 2.9 percent of federal income taxes 
collected in 2008 and so I assume they financed a 2.9% share of the nation’s total federal spending on 
Medicaid/CHIP. 
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intervention, the states will continue to increase spending on Medicaid until the marginal cost of the 
increase in the state share exceeds the marginal benefit derived from the additional spending. In the past, 
both Congress and the executive branch have proposed potential solutions. For example, replacing the 
existing financing mechanism that allows states to draw down unlimited federal funds with a program of 
federal block grants of capitated state allocations would limit the states’ ability to leverage federal dollars 
and mitigate, but not eliminate the incentives created by the funding formula to commit state resources to 
Medicaid (see Chapter 4 for block grant proposals presented by President Reagan in 1981 and the 
Republican-led House in 1995). Alternatively, fully federalizing the program would make Congress 
accountable to all American taxpayers for the net amount of Medicaid appropriations and eliminate the 
ability of the states to redistribute costs, thereby leading to a budget that would more likely reflect the 
preference of the median American (see Chapters 3 and 4 for report of President’s Nixon’s McNerney Task 
Force of 1969 and proposal of President Reagan in 1982).  
Contrary to such efforts to rebalance the shared responsibility between the states and federal 
governments for underwriting Medicaid, the federal government has passed reforms, both temporary and 
permanent, that have seen the absolute and proportional shares of Medicaid expenditures steadily increase. 
Without any reforms to Medicaid’s cost sharing formula to restrain the states’ spending, Medicaid/CHIP 
costs are projected to further increase, exceeding the general rate of inflation ever year and approaching 
$900 million in expenditures by fiscal year 2020 (Center for Medicare and Medicaid 2013). As a result this 
means-tested program will continue to supplant the funding available for other state priorities. I hope that 
in highlighting the FMAP funding formula readers will scrutinize the total opportunity costs associated with 
the nation’s Medicaid spending before its costs become unsustainable. 
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EPILOGUE: 
The Affordable Care Act: Reshaping Medicaid and the Welfare State 
 
After a contentious political debate, President Obama signed comprehensive health reform, the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), into law on March 23, 2010. The law creates public health insurance 
exchanges in every state and provides substantial federal subsidies to individuals assist with the cost of 
purchasing coverage through the exchanges, introduces a requirement that individual maintain health 
coverage (i.e. the individual mandate) and imposes penalties on some employers who do not offer 
insurance, modestly reforms Medicare (in particular, Medicare Part D, the prescription drug benefit), and 
includes a myriad of new regulations on the health insurance industry. With respect to Medicaid, the law 
extends eligibility to all Americans with incomes less than 133% of the federal poverty line, effectively 
138% of FPL after a 5% allowance is factored—for a family of four this is equivalent to an annual income of 
$32,499. With many states not providing coverage to any nondisabled adults, except pregnant women, 
unless they are extremely poor, this reform accounts for nearly half of those who are anticipated to gain 
insurance coverage beginning in 2014 as a direct result of the reforms. According to budget estimates by the 
CBO, the Medicaid reforms are anticipated to cost a trillion dollars between 2014 and 2022, with the 
federal government financing 93 percent of the costs over that period (CBO 2012).  
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court rendered its final decision that upheld the new health care 
law, with one significant caveat. While a majority of the Court ruled that the individual mandate requiring 
Americans to be insured to be constitutional, albeit under the federal government’s taxing authority not any 
broader general welfare authority, the Court determined that the ACA’s mandatory Medicaid expansion 
(42 USC § 1396a-c) was unconstitutionally coercive of states and violated basic principles of federalism and 
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limitations on Congress’ spending power (as recognized by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203 (1987)). The Court explained that Congress could not use its spending power as a means to coerce 
states into accepting conditions that it could not impose directly by threatening to withhold all federal 
funding under Medicaid, the nation’s single largest grant-in-aid program. 
The Chief Justice described “the threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget” for 
not participating in the Medicaid expansion as “economic dragooning that leaves the States with no real 
option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion” (National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 
U.S. ___ (2012): 52; the case was heard together with Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services). 
Such coercion, Chief Justice Roberts noted, “runs counter to this Nation’s system of federalism.” 
Irrespective of the generous “financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen,” the withholding of all federal 
Medicaid funding for noncompliance with the ACA expansion was akin to holding  “a gun to the head” of 
state legislators. (Ibid. 51) The Court reasoned that Washington could use the carrot (i.e. dangling new 
money) but not the stick (i.e. withdrawing old money) to entice state participation in the new program. 
Given the present magnitude of Medicaid, the Court dismissed the 1965 introduction of Medicaid’s broader 
participatory requirements and concurrent repeal of the then existing system of medical vendor payments as 
establishing precedent for Congress’ inducement for mandatory participation in the Medicaid expansion.111 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 The reader may recall from Chapter 3 how the Social Security Act of 1965 encouraged states to participate in 
the optional Medicaid program by making it the only avenue for federal assistance for vendor payments. Upon a 
state’s adoption of the Medicaid, but no later than end of 1969, the federal government would no longer fund vendor 
payments under the various public assistance titles of the Social Security Act (other than Title 19). This is different 
than the conditionality of the ACA’s Medicaid funding for two reasons. First, is the relative scale of the potential 
impact of the two provisions: federal reimbursements of vendor payments prior to 1965 were insignificant compared 
to the value of the federal-share of Medicaid payments today (less than 1 percent compared to over 10 percent). 
Second, the elimination of non-Title 19 vendor payments was not contingent on participating in Medicaid; every state 
would lose non-Medicaid payments, irrespective of their participation in Medicaid. Medicaid would become the only 
program and not be a separate program like Chief Justice Roberts understands the ACA Medicaid expansion to be. 
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The Court remedied the unconstitutionality of the Medicaid expansion and upheld the broader law 
by limiting the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary’s enforcement authority to withhold federal 
funds to states that do not elect to expand their Medicaid. This effectively made the Medicaid expansion 
optional. A seven-Justice majority of the Court agreed with this assessment and proposed remedy. 
Although the majority opinion accepted that Congress can generally impose conditions on the 
receipt of federal aid and make adjustments to such conditions—even acknowledging that the original 
Medicaid statute explicitly gives Congress the “right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of the law. 
(Ibid 53, citing 42 U. S. C. §1304)—Chief Justice Roberts argued that this allowance does not apply to the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion because it is “a new grant program, not an addition to the Medicaid program 
existing before the ACA’s enactment” (Ibid. 39). By “threaten[ing] States with the loss of funds from an old 
program in an effort to get them to adopt a new one” (Ibid) Congress was employing financial dependency 
as a “means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes” (Ibid. 50). The Chief Justice opined that by 
“forc[ing] the States to implement a federal program would threaten the political accountability key to our 
federal system” (Ibid. 48).  
To differentiate unconstitutionality of the ACA expansion from the constitutionality of other 
federal mandates impacting the states’ Medicaid programs, Roberts emphasized two features of the ACA 
expansion that show the reform to be a “a shift in kind, not merely degree” (Ibid. 53) and a “transformation” 
of Medicaid (Ibid. 55). First, his majority opinion recognizes that by extending Medicaid coverage to all 
non-elderly Americans under 133 percent of poverty, the ACA fundamentally changes the demographics of 
Medicaid. “[Medicaid] is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage,” observes the Chief Justice 
(Ibid. 53-54). In comparison to the ACA’s more general Medicaid expansion, previous changes to the 
program’s eligibility criteria have been restricted to extending Medicaid coverage to a larger number of 
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pregnant women and children. As the Chief Justice reflected, “[Previous eligibility reforms] can hardly be 
described as a major change in a program that—from its inception—provided health care for ‘families with 
dependent children’” (Ibid. 55). 
Second, and most relevant to the preceding chapters, the majority opinion argues that Congress has 
created an entirely new social program because it supplants the variable FMAP funding formula with a new 
funding arrangement. The Court’s perspective that the Medicaid expansion reflects a “a shift in kind” is 
predicated on the argument that the FMAP funding formula is fundamental to not only Medicaid’s 
financing, but also its general administration. “The manner in which the expansion is structured indicates 
that while Congress may have styled the expansion a mere alteration of existing Medicaid, it recognized it 
was enlisting the States in a new health care program,” observed Chief Justice Roberts (Ibid. 54). Even more 
so than with the introduction in 1996 of the enhanced FMAP rates for SCHIP—itself is an optional welfare 
program, separate, if still related, to Medicaid—the funding mechanism employed for the Medicaid 
expansion is an implicit acknowledgement by Congress that no state had the fiscal capacity to implement 
and finance the nation’s health reform agenda under its existing Medicaid program. Whereas the traditional 
FMAP formula reflects a shared fiscal responsibility loosely related to the states’ relative wealth (as 
measured by the state’s per capita income), the constant and more generous federal match proposed to 
finance the state’s Medicaid expansion population is an entirely different funding mechanism that is an 
implicit acknowledgement by Congress that no state has the fiscal capacity to finance the nation’s health 
reform agenda as part of its existing Medicaid program.  
 
Will the States Participate in Medicaid Expansion? 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision, states have the option of whether or not to go forward 
with the Medicaid expansion. This could temporarily increase variability in the state’s Medicaid 
	  
	   	  
 318 
programs.112 As of October 2013, only 25 states had announced their intentions to expand Medicaid to all 
nonelderly residents with incomes up to 133 percent of poverty. Twenty states have announced that they 
will not expand their Medicaid programs and 5 states are still debating the alternatives. Interestingly, the 
policy of whether or not a state elects to expand its Medicaid program appears to be significantly motivated 
by partisan politics: of the 26 states moving forward with the Medicaid expansion, only 6 have Republican 
governors (Arizona, Iowa, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey, and Ohio); conversely, of the 26 states 
either not moving forward with the Medicaid expansion or still debating whether or to expand forward, 
only 3 have Democrat governors, with political opposition coming exclusively from the Republican-
controlled houses of the legislature in those cases (Missouri, Montana, and New Hampshire). The 
unambiguous correlation between partisanship and a state’s decision to extend Medicaid eligibility contrasts 
remarkably with the results from the quantitative study in Chapter 6 that found little to no substantive 
impact of political ideology on Medicaid policymaking. 
Despite the initial hesitancy of many conservative states to implement the Medicaid expansion, I 
anticipate that nearly all states will eventually participate in the ACA Medicaid expansion—if not 
necessarily at a full 133 percent of poverty.113 Even discounting the social benefits that come from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 In the long term, however, the ACA should motivate a regression to the mean among the states’ Medicaid 
eligibility criteria. On the one hand, the ACA Medicaid expansion encourages all states to raise access to 133-138% of 
poverty. On the other hand, the introduction of the exchanges and federal tax credits to purchase lower the cost of 
purchasing private insurance, may encourage some states to lower their Medicaid eligibility criteria for certain 
individuals above 133-138 percent of poverty in order to lower the state’s fiscal burden for Medicaid (ACA 
Maintenance-of-Effort requirements prevents states from lowering coverage for children and pregnant women).  
113 If allowed by the federal government, some states may elect to set Medicaid eligibility for nonelderly adults at 
(say) 100 percent of poverty and rely upon the ACA’s health benefit exchanges to deliver private insurance to 
Americans above 100 percent. Beginning in 2014 Americans with incomes between 100 and 400 percent of poverty 
and purchasing coverage through one of the exchanges will be eligible for federal subsidies to help lower the cost of 
purchasing private health insurance. While the exchanges were intended to be complement the Medicaid expansion, 
the Supreme Court’s decision making Medicaid expansion options could allow the states to use the exchanges as a 
substitute for Medicaid coverage, at least for those between 100 and 133 percent of poverty. The monthly cost of 
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extending insurance coverage to tens if not hundreds of thousands of previously uninsured residents, with 
the federal government financing a substantial portion of the cost of the expansion, at least through 2020, 
the fiscal incentives for participation are just too great for states to ignore. Specifically, the states will not 
pay any cost (aside from 50 percent of associated administrative costs) for the expansion until 2017, at 
which point the federal government will gradually transition to covering a fixed 90 percent of the cost, 
irrespective of the state’s FMAP rate, through at least 2021. In total, the Congressional Budget Office 
estimates that the federal commitment to Medicaid will increase by approximately 40 percent, adding 
approximately $100 billion in additional federal spending by 2020 (assuming participation of all states). 
Comparatively, the state-share attributed to the ACA expansion population will increase the state’s fiscal 
burden by an average of just 0.8 percent (Ibid. 46, 48). It is likely that the states will be able to finance these 
marginal costs from new revenues that they would accrue from economic activity directly tied to the new 
federal dollars flowing into the states on behalf of the Medicaid expansion population.  
Budget estimates from the states support the view that health reform imposes minimal fiscal burden 
on the states. Indeed, some states’ analyses suggest that by just maintaining the status quo and not 
expanding Medicaid to include the ACA-eligible population, a state could find itself in a situation in which it 
faces an increased fiscal burden (for significantly fewer public services) than it would have had the state 
participated in the expansion.114 For example, in Kentucky, the state’s Cabinet for Health and Family 
Service estimates that even after assuming 10 percent of the cost of the newly eligible Medicaid recipients 
“it would cost the state more not to expand [Medicaid] than to expand.” According to the Cabinet’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
obtaining coverage for this subpopulation would be equivalent to 2 percent of household income: approximately $25 
per month for an individual earning $16,000 a year. 
114 Part of the increased costs could be for state paying for otherwise uncompensated care, previously funded 
with disproportionate share hospital payments that the ACA limits. The logic behind the restriction in DSH payments 
being that with a greater number of people insured through Medicaid and/or obtaining private insurance there would 
be less uncompensated care. Of course, if a state did not expand Medicaid there would likely be a greater amount of 
uncompensated care than there would be otherwise that the states may be pressured to subsidize (without any federal 
match). 
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accounting, upon full implementation of the ACA reforms, Kentucky would see a negative $38.9 million 
impact to the state’s budget in fiscal year 2021 if it did not expand. Comparatively, “expansion would 
create a $802.4 million positive budget impact from FY14 to FY2” and directly contribute to $15.6 billion 
in new economic activity in the state, creating nearly 17,000 additional jobs throughout the state (Kentucky 
Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 2013). In May 2013, Democrat Governor Steve Beshar committed 
his state to the Medicaid expansion.  
Similarly, a report funded by a consortium of nonprofits and Ohio University concluded 
Kentucky’s northern neighbor, Ohio, would see a net gain of $1.8 billion through fiscal year 2021 due to 
the ACA’s Medicaid-related provision. “Medicaid expansion not only pays for itself—it creates a positive 
state budget impact and creates local fiscal and economic benefits,” concluded the report. “State savings due 
to the Medicaid expansion would exceed the net state costs resulting from the ACA’s other provisions.” 
(The Health Foundation of Greater Cincinnati et al., 2013) Despite the Ohio legislature failing three times 
to pass a bill implementing expansion, the report provides an economic rationale to explain why Republican 
Governor John Kasich ignored the wishes of the state legislature as well a state budget that forbade 
expansion and instead used a relatively obscure 7-person committee, the Controlling Board that includes 6 
state legislators appointed by both parties and the state’s budget director, to obtain authority necessary to 
implement Medicaid expansion. It would seem that ideological preferences of certain state policymakers for 
a limited federal government aside, the Medicaid expansion involves too much federal money for the states 
to leave on the table. 
 
Post-ACA Medicaid 
In her partial dissent to the majority’s argument that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally 
coercive, Justice Ruth Ginsburg describes Medicaid as a  “federally funded, state-administered program” 
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(National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. ___ (2012): f.n. 17 at 45). Her opinion 
curiously failed to acknowledge that both state and federal governments have traditionally funded Medicaid. 
Yet, this shared fiscal responsibility has always been fundamental to Medicaid operations. As the nation’s 
largest example of cooperative federalism the mutual responsibility for the cost of implementation has 
helped maintain, as Chief Justice Roberts observed in the majority opinion, “political accountability” for 
both partners. This feature is necessary for protecting federal taxpayers and encouraging states to be 
efficient in how they operate their Medicaid program. Under the traditional FMAP formula the states retain 
some proverbial skin in the game. The absence of any meaningful cost sharing diminishes the fiscal 
imperative for states to control their costs. Similar to how some states inappropriately leveraged DSH and 
UPL payments to reduce the effective fiscal burden of their Medicaid policymaking decisions or to how 
some states took advantage of CHIP waivers to extend the enhanced FMAP match for coverage beyond the 
intended population (see GAO 2004), the enhanced funding provided under the Affordable Care Act may 
motivate states to undertake creative accounting schemes that maximize their federal dollars. Not unlike the 
quid pro quo of states providing UPL payments to hospitals while simultaneously collecting a provider tax, 
the opportunity to access to the ACA’s match may be too tempting for state policymakers to resist. 
Part of the appeal of Medicaid’s original cost sharing arrangement is that it minimizes, or at least 
reduces, the moral hazard of a state being profligate with federal dollars. Although the federal-state cost 
sharing incentivizes a state to spend more than it would otherwise, a state must still adhere to balance 
budget laws that bound public officials to a degree of fiscal discipline. Every year or two when these elected 
officials set their state’s budget they must justify to their voters the Medicaid expenditures. For example, if 
a state desires to raise reimbursement rates or enact an eligibility expansion that increases Medicaid 
spending by $100 million, the state would need to find between $20 to $50 million in state revenues to 
finance its share of the expansion. Even if federal cost sharing obfuscates the total cost of Medicaid, voters 
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are given the opportunity to express their preferences for a more-or-less robust Medicaid program in 
relationship to their state’s other public needs or tax policies. 
In contrast, with a state’s fiscal burden for the ACA’s Medicaid expansion approaching zero (at least 
in the initial years), proponents of expansion can discount its high national cost and instead strictly 
emphasize its positive benefits for the states. Similar to the examples set by Kentucky and Ohio, Governor 
Janice Brewer of Arizona, a fierce opponent of the ACA more generally, successfully lobbied her state 
legislature to implement the ACA expansion by articulating what a fiscal boon it was for the state. She, like 
Governor Kasich did in Ohio, emphasized how the state stood to gain nearly $2 billion in Medicaid 
assistance to cover an additional 300,000 Arizonians and “boost our economy by creating more than 20,000 
jobs at a time when Arizona needs them most.” It was an opportunity for the state to recapture “the very tax 
dollars our citizens already pay to the federal government” (Brewer 2013). Such economic arguments rest 
on the implicit assumption that a state’s decision to expand Medicaid will not lead to its residents 
experiencing any increase in either their taxes or diminution of other public services. With full federal 
funding this argument is valid across all the states and should entice most rational states to participate in the 
Medicaid expansion. 
Irrespective of a state’s decision to expand Medicaid, its expenditures will continue to increase and 
likely at a pace greater than either general inflation or the growth in state general revenues (as has been the 
trend of the past half century. Assuming full implementation of the ACA-related reforms the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) projects that Medicaid expenditures will increase by more than 150 
percent over the next decade: by 2021 total Medicaid spending is expected to reach almost a $1 trillion and 
account for at least 20 percent of national health expenditures, up from 15.5 percent in 2010, with the 
states’ share expected to reach $385 billion (CMS 2012). Medicaid is unsustainable in its current form; as 
the bipartisan State Budget Crisis Task Force succinctly explained in July 2012, “Medicaid spending growth 
	  
	   	  
 323 
is crowding out other needs.” Yet, if the notion of universal coverage that is embodied in the ACA remains 
a national goal, our governments—both federal and state—and the people they represent must come to 
terms with the necessary scale of public spending.115 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Fortunately, despite its high cost and high fiscal burden, Medicaid, remains the most efficient component of 
the US health sector and therefore offers an appropriate avenue for expanding coverage. Compared to either 
Medicare or private health insurance Medicaid is significantly less expansive on a per recipient basis after controlling 
for the health status of the recipient. The differentials are due primarily to lower reimbursement rates for doctors and 
hospitals and, when compared to private insurance, lower administrative costs. For example, across all primary and 
specialty care Medicaid reimbursement rates are an average of one-third less than comparable Medicaid rates 
(Zuckerman and Goin 2012).  
Unfortunately, the deluge of federal funding with little-to-no requirement for the states to share in the cost of 
their policymaking decisions may reduce the relative cost effectiveness of Medicaid by lessening the fiscal imperative 
for states to restrain costs. Indeed, the ACA provides 100 percent funding—separate from the 90-100 percent 
funding for the Medicaid expansion population—for states to temporarily increase their reimbursement rates for 
primary care physicians paid on behalf of all Medicaid recipients up to the Medicare’s allowable rate. An analysis by 
the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the average rate increase for primary care physician will rise 73 percent in 
2013 (Zuckerman and Goin 2012). 
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